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*Performing Citizenship
in Plato's Laws*

LUCIA PRAUSCELLO

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PERFORMING CITIZENSHIP IN PLATO'S *LAWS*

In the *Laws*, Plato theorizes citizenship as simultaneously a political, ethical and aesthetic practice. His reflection on citizenship finds its roots in a descriptive psychology of human experience, with sentience and, above all, volition seen as the primary targets of a lifelong training in the values of citizenship. In the city of Magnesia described in the *Laws*, *erōs* for civic virtue is presented as a motivational resource not only within the reach of the 'ordinary' citizen but also factored in by default in its educational system. Supporting a vision of 'perfect citizenship' based on an internalized obedience to the laws and persuading the entire polity to consent willingly to it requires an ideology that must be rhetorically all-inclusive. In this city, 'ordinary' citizenship itself will be troped as a performative action: Magnesia's choral performances become a fundamental channel for shaping, feeling and communicating a strong sense of civic identity and unity.

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CONTENTS

<i>Preface and acknowledgements</i>	<i>page</i> vii
<i>Note to the reader</i>	ix
 Introduction	 I
Preliminaries	8
P.1 Terminology: the language of desire and Plato's moral psychology	13
Part I Performing ordinary virtue in Plato's utopias: citizenship, desire and intention	
I Citizenship in Callipolis	21
1.1 Utopian citizenships: <i>Republic</i> and <i>Laws</i>	21
1.2 Degrees of virtue in the <i>Republic</i>	24
1.3 <i>Sōphrosynē</i> as civic <i>philia</i> in Callipolis	27
1.4 Musical education and the erotics of beauty: from <i>philia</i> to <i>erōs</i> ?	35
1.5 <i>Philia</i> and the language of care: Callipolis and models of citizenship	46
1.6 Degrees of 'friendship' in Callipolis	52
2 Citizenship in Magnesia	57
2.1 Degrees of virtue in Magnesia	57
2.2 <i>Anagkaiotatē sōphrosynē</i> in Magnesia: slaves and metics	59
2.3 'Ordinary virtue' and 'perfect citizenship' in Magnesia	68
2.4 'Perfect citizenship' and the language of erotic desire in the <i>Laws</i>	73
Part II Citizenship and performance in the <i>Laws</i>	
3 Choral performances, persuasion and pleasure	105
3.1 The erotics of citizenship and its context: between symposium and chorus	109
3.2 Dramatic and non-dramatic mimesis in Magnesia	118

CONTENTS

3.3	The origin of <i>choreia</i> : <i>charā</i> , <i>charis</i> and <i>peithō</i>	128
3.4	Divine and human <i>choreia</i>	135
3.5	Rhythm, order, pleasure and belief	137
4	Patterns of chorality in Magnesia	152
4.1	The three choruses of Magnesia	152
4.2	Dionysiac music: the third chorus	160
4.3	Magnesia's <i>emmeleia(i)</i>	173
4.4	<i>Euphēmia</i> versus <i>thrēnos</i>	182
5	Comedy and comic discourse in Magnesia	192
5.1	Comedy and the law in Magnesia	193
5.2	The psychology of comic laughter in the <i>Republic</i> and the <i>Philebus</i>	197
5.3	Comedy at Magnesia: the spectacle of otherness	201
5.4	Comedy at Magnesia: comic <i>mania</i> and bad speech	211
6	Epilogue: On law, agency and motivation	223
6.1	Law and human nature	225
6.2	Rewriting citizenship in Plato's <i>Laws</i>	230
	<i>Bibliography</i>	236
	<i>Index</i>	261
	<i>Index of subjects</i>	270

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

By education neither an ancient philosopher nor a cultural historian, I have come to Plato's *Laws* from the perspective of someone interested in literary criticism and its history. I soon became fascinated by the inexhaustible richness and complexity of a text that requires a constant process of unpacking and unravelling from its reader. Above all, I was struck by the way in which the *Laws* pervasively engages with the discursive practices of the contemporary *polis* and in particular with *polis* religion. The result is an attempt at narrowing the gap between philosophy and literature in our appreciation of Plato's *Laws*. I am conscious that such a hybrid approach will probably disappoint both the analytical expectations of the philosopher proper and the sophistication of the literary critic. Yet if the book as it is offers some new insights on the strategies of persuasion woven by Plato in the *Laws* and on the resonances that these strategies may have evoked in a contemporary audience, then, with Plato, I can say that καλὸς ὁ κίνδυνος.

The debt of gratitude that I have contracted over the years with colleagues and friends who have patiently read and commented, at some stage or other, on versions of individual chapters or of the whole work is a very large one: I would like in particular to thank Albio Cesare Cassio, Franco Ferrari, Richard Hunter, Leslie Kurke, Salvatore Lavecchia, Geoffrey Lloyd, Donald Mastronarde, Robin Osborne, Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi, Richard Rawles, Ian Rutherford, Frisbee Sheffield, David Sedley, Mario Telò, Olga Tribulato and James Warren. A major debt of gratitude is owed to two persons without whose constant support and guidance this book could not have been written and, in all likelihood, not even conceived: Giovan Battista D'Alessio and Malcom Schofield. They both believed, in different ways, that I had, after all, something to say about

Plato's *Laws*. How much I owe to their unbounded intellectual and human generosity cannot be adequately put into words. It goes without saying that I alone am responsible for any infelicity, misunderstanding or mistake present in the book.

The bulk of this book was written between 2009 and the early months of 2013. The important volume by A.-E. Peponi (ed.), *Performance and Culture in Plato's Laws*, Cambridge and New York 2013 came out too late (June 2013) for me to engage with it with the thoroughness and detail that it deserves. I have nevertheless tried to incorporate it in my discussion, highlighting both convergences and divergences. I am particularly grateful to B. Kowalzig, L. Kurke, K. Morgan and A.-E. Peponi for allowing me to read the proofs of their contributions ahead of publication. [Chapters 3](#) and [4](#) include (but are not limited to) a substantially revised and expanded form of some of the material previously published as 'Patterns of chorality in Plato's *Laws*' in D. Yatromanolakis (ed.) *Music and Cultural Politics in Greek and Chinese Societies, vol. I: Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA 2011 [but 2012]: 168–93) and as 'Choral persuasions in Plato's *Laws*' in R. Gagné and M. Govers Hopman (eds.), *Choral Mediations in Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge 2013: 257–77). [Chapter 5](#) is a slightly revised and amplified version of 'Comedy and comic discourse in Plato's *Laws*' in E. Bakola, L. Prauscello and M. Telò (eds.), *Greek Comedy and the Discourse of Genres* (Cambridge 2013: 317–42).

This book is dedicated to my father, in his last illness.

NOTE TO THE READER

The text of the *Laws* is that of J. Burnet, *OCT* vol. V; the *Republic* is quoted after S.R. Slings' 2003 *OCT*. Translations, unless otherwise stated, are my own. The abbreviations of the names of ancient authors and their works follow those in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th edition) when available, otherwise those of Liddell, Scott and Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (9th edition). Abbreviations of journals are cited after *L'Année philologique*.

INTRODUCTION

Ancient Greeks repeatedly claimed that what makes a *polis* is not territory or buildings, and not even its institutions, but its inhabitants: that is, its human material. What defines a *polis* is its citizens: it is the disposition of the rulers and ruled towards each other and towards the city as a whole that decides the quality of governance. In this sense Greek political thought gives particular emphasis to the moral character of the citizenry as something that pre-exists and determines political ideology, decision-making and even institutional make-up. This is most true of Plato, for whom, as is often noted, statecraft coincides with soulcraft.

Citizenship studies in Classics is a thriving field,¹ yet scholars have usually concentrated on the Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian normative view of citizenship. Plato's (utopian) contributions to this subject have been often neglected, and what work has been done in this direction in the past decade or two has been for the most part limited to Plato's *Republic*.² With a few important exceptions³ recent studies on the political and social structure of the second-best city promoted in the *Laws* have focused on either strictly institutional issues and its underlying historical background (the extent to which Plato's utopia is indebted to Athenian social and legal practices) or on the requisites of statesmanship (the duties of the divinely inspired lawgiver and the higher echelons of Magnesia's

¹ Cf., to quote only a few, Keyt and Miller 2007, Liddel 2007, Christ 2006, Farenga 2006, Boegehold and Scafuro 1994, Loraux 1993 and the still seminal work by Manville 1990 (esp. ch. 1).

² See e.g. Kamtekar 1998 and 2004, Brown 2004, Vasiliou 2008: chs. 7 and 8, and 2012, Wilberding 2009.

³ See, above all, Bertrand 1999, Bobonich 2002 and Kraut 2010.

society).⁴ This is not without good reason: from the very beginning of the *Laws*, the political *technē* is identified with the skill of recognizing the different natures and dispositions of the souls of the prospective citizens and the capacity of ‘taking care’ of them. This is clearly stated at *Laws* 1.650b6–9, where the Athenian Stranger says that ‘this, that is, to know the natures and dispositions of the souls (τὸ γινῶναι τὰς φύσεις τε καὶ ἕξεις τῶν ψυχῶν), would rank as one of the most useful aids for that art which is concerned to take care of these (θεραπεύειν): and we say, I take it, that this is the art of statesmanship’ (ἔστιν δέ που, φαμέν, ὡς οἶμαι, πολιτικῆς). From the start of the *Laws*, Cleinias and Megillos, the interlocutors of the Athenian Stranger, and with them also the ‘external’ audience are left with no doubt that legislative activity and political art have a precise addressee: the souls of the polity.⁵ Yet scholarly emphasis on statesmanship in the *Laws*, although fully justified by the purpose of the text itself, has at times obfuscated an equally interesting and complementary aspect of Plato’s political vision, the ‘craft’ of citizenship. In Magnesia, in fact, the only *technē* worth practising by a good citizen is ‘the cultivation of virtue’ (8.847a5–6 ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια).

The present book aims to redress this imbalance by shifting the focus away from the craft of statesmanship towards that of citizenship, and in particular ‘ordinary’ citizenship (that is, not the higher echelons of the second-best city), in Plato’s last major reflection on society and its moral premises. The personal limits and interests of the author mean that the coverage of this huge topic is far from exhaustive, not least because some aspects of Magnesian citizenship (the economy of blame and praise, the written and oral aspect of the voice of the law and the sacralization of the ‘public voice’) have already received excellent treatments from various quarters.⁶ I have instead focused on two lines of inquiry for which I thought I

⁴ Institutional issues: Pierart 1974, Sanders 1991; historical background: Morrow 1960, Brunt 1993; statesmanship: see, among others and from very different perspectives, Schofield 1999a, Brisson 2009 and 2012, and Rowe 2010.

⁵ Cf. Brisson 2012; Larivée 2003b.

⁶ See, above all, the several contributions by Bertrand and Laks.

could still contribute something new from a cultural historical perspective: the ethical and psychological underpinning of a distinct *rhetoric* of citizenship promoted within the communicational utopia of the second-best city (Part I); and the ways in which this rhetoric is implemented, on a practical level, through specific, ritualized forms of public discourse, namely Magnesia's collective choral *performances* (Part II). My aim is to show that the rhetoric and performance of civic ideology promoted in Magnesia open channels of communication along which 'real' interpersonal relationships can flow. Both parts of the book are unified by a common concern: to investigate in some detail how the *forms* of political and social discourse in the second-best city (choral performances included) hinge on the premise that the ways in which the citizens speak and are spoken to about their mutual relationships with each other and with the city are not only a consequence of but in a sense also contribute to *shaping* those very same relationships.

Part I ('Performing ordinary virtue in Plato's utopias: citizenship, desire and intention'; Chapters 1 and 2) focuses on Magnesia's political self-definition: the promotion of a *vision* of 'perfect citizenship' (to become an ἄκρος πολίτης) made normatively available to the 'ordinary' citizen, via a significantly 'more open' re-deployment (if compared with the *Republic*) of the language of desire in general and erotic desire in particular (Chapter 2). Chapter 1 represents the necessary first step towards a sustained comparison of the concept of 'ordinary' civic virtue in Plato's two utopias, Callipolis (*Republic*) and Magnesia (*Laws*). Its goal is to sketch the range of the various emotional and cognitive motivations to which the citizens of Callipolis can resort as members of a political and social community in which virtue is the paramount criterion for any sense of civic identity. From the perspective here adopted, a particularly salient issue is to test the extent to which the 'erotics of beauty' of Book 3 of the *Republic* can really be said to apply, in its supra-personal form, to the psychological profile of Callipolis' second class (the auxiliaries). Likewise, to put Callipolis' communitarian ideology of citizenship in a closer dialogue with the diverse notions of citizenship

developed in contemporary Athens helps us gauge the degree to which Plato's own vision of ideal citizenship is part and parcel of a broader political reflection on his own time. **Chapter 1** thus provides the background picture on the basis of which to evaluate the differences and analogies in Plato's articulation of the concept of 'ordinary' citizenship in the *Laws*.

Chapter 2 is devoted to the *ordinary* virtue of the Magnesian citizen, with specific attention to what I call the 'erotics of citizenship' promoted in the *Laws*. A semantic analysis of the language of erotic desire in the *Laws* shows that a paradigm of 'erotic' citizenship (to be eagerly in love with the *idea* of becoming a *perfect* citizen) resurfaces at key points in the work. This paradigm, while representing a logical extension of the 'erotics of beauty' of Book 3 of the *Republic*, is also a specific product of the education of sensibility nurtured by Magnesia's 'correct education'. In Magnesia not only 'correct opinion' (*doxa*) but also 'desire' (*epithymia*) and 'erotic passion' (*erōs*) are, with due qualifications, acceptable emotional and cognitive dispositions accessible to the 'common' citizen to foster civic excellence. At the same time I argue that Plato's idiosyncratic use, in the *Laws*, of the language of desire and *erōs* with reference to *civic* virtue must be read against the broader late-fifth- to mid-fourth-century BC debate on issues of citizenship, desire and intention. This particular deployment of the language of *erōs* allows Plato to emphasize, in the *Laws*, the notion (and feeling) of citizenship as 'a mode of belonging by choice': 'volitional belonging' and its self-propelling motivational agency form an important complement to the rhetoric of persuasion enacted in the second-best city. Passionate desire (*erōs*) must be enrolled into the landscape of Magnesia's civic virtues. By underlining the volitional aspect of citizenship I hope to show that Plato is again exploiting, on his own terms, what had become one of the most pressing questions of the Athenian political discourse in the first half of the fourth century BC: what does it take to be a truly good citizen? Are formal, external criteria enough? Plato's answer, in the *Laws*, is that to enroll fully as a citizen, one must

be motivated by an inner *desire* to be so; it is the degree of civic desire that is the only adequate criterion to award or withdraw citizenship.

Part II of the book ('Citizenship and performance in the *Laws*'; Chapters 3 to 5) analyses in detail, by means of case studies, how this erotics of citizenship is implemented in the second-best city, at the level of both the moral psychology of the embodied person (the physiology of pain and pleasure; see Chapter 3) and communal social practices (Chapter 4). In these two chapters, the focus turns to some specific forms of ritualized public discourse: Magnesia's choral performances and the ways in which they all become a fundamental channel for shaping, feeling and communicating a strong sense of civic identity and unity. In particular, it is argued that Magnesia's choruses contribute to the second-best city's behavioural policy by means of their own *performativity*: in the new Cretan colony, 'ordinary' citizenship itself will be troped as a performative action. It is thus within this framework that we must read also the much discussed claim by the Athenian Stranger that the whole *politeia* of Magnesia enacts 'the best', 'most beautiful' and 'truest tragedy' because it 'reproduces the most beautiful and virtuous life' (7.817b3–5). This claim is made possible only by Plato's careful negotiation of the mimetic status of Magnesia's choruses. The 'choral' project of the *Laws* entails a constant process of mediation between strictly dramatic (tragic mimesis) and non-dramatic (lyric mimesis) modes of performance. In Magnesia, the choreut-citizens are both speakers and recipients of the views that they promulgate, and it is this identity between performer and audience that guarantees that the collective ideology disseminated through choral performances reaches the entire political body. In their choral performances they can just be 'themselves': a group representative of the *polis* performing how to be, above all, 'well-ordered citizens' (*eunomoi politai*). The adoption of a lyric modality of experiential mimesis allows them to re-enact endlessly their own self-likeness. According to Plato, orderly vocal and kinetic activities are powerful means to connect the rational and irrational parts

of the soul, thus helping humans experience the divine oneness and harmony between perceptions, emotions and reason. Choral performances thus represent, via the collective, social nature of rhythm, the most genuine form of ‘embodied morality’ (Chapter 3).

Chapter 5 turns to the negative foil of Plato’s utopian citizenship, the discursive practices that must *not* be enacted by the virtuous citizen: comedy, abusive language and the rhetoric of invective and verbal aggression. In particular, comedy in the *Laws* is presented as the social space in which Magnesia’s citizens can and must become vicariously acquainted, at a rational level, with a form of moral and aesthetic ‘otherness’ with respect to its collective identity. Magnesians must attend comic performances in order to acquire a (merely) rational apprehension of morally bad models of behaviour. This brings us close to another remarkable feature of Magnesia’s policy towards its own citizens: the necessity to exert control, quite literally, over the citizens’ *modes* of speech. Comedy will provide a negative model of what has to be avoided not only in terms of experiential and representational mimesis but also in terms of specific speech-acts.

Finally, in the Epilogue, I briefly situate Plato’s last reflection on citizenship against the fourth-century BC varied discourse on the authority of the law and its relation to human nature. By comparing Plato’s theorizing on citizenship with the Athenian contemporary political practice, I argue that the overt promotion, in the *Laws*, of a model of *citizenship-as-practice* represents a powerful counter-hegemonic critique of the Athenian normative model of *citizenship-as-achievement*. Education in citizenship values is seen by Plato as a lifelong training whose ‘prime mover’ resides in the psychic and affective dimension of the individual.

Before releasing the reader, two further qualifications are in order. In the past two decades or so, Plato’s *Laws* has been repeatedly taken as the litmus test for either a ‘developmental’ or a ‘unitarian’ reading of Plato’s ‘mature’ thought. From the content of the book as a whole, it is evident that I broadly align myself with those who favour a ‘unitarian’ interpretation of the

Laws as part of a broader Platonic continuum.⁷ Throughout the book I have thus adopted Gill's approach in considering the voice of the Athenian Stranger 'not so much as Plato's voice as the voice of [the *Laws*] distinctive project'; that is, the Athenian Stranger's voice in the *Laws* represents 'the main vehicle of this complex, but wholly explicit, act of negotiation between philosophical and conventional discourse'.⁸ Although this approach may not be shared by every reader, it is my hope that (s)he may find that the present inquiry still addresses issues relevant to the interpretation of the *Laws* from a synchronic perspective. Secondly, and no doubt because of my personal education as a scholar, I have consciously embraced a reading of the *Laws* that sees the philosophical and religious discourse as complementary rather than antagonistic.⁹ Again, what seems to me to justify this approach is the interpretative pay-off that can be gained by unravelling how Magnesia's communicative strategies are deeply indebted to the social and religious fabric of the Greek classical *polis*.

⁷ For this approach and its methodological justifications, see Rowe 2003, 2010 (cf. also Gill 2003). It goes without saying that a unitarian reading does not imply that Plato never modified or revised his thought but that he envisaged these revisions and modifications as fundamentally coherent with his life-long philosophical concerns.

⁸ Gill 2003: 44 with n. 6. For the intended double readership of the *Laws* that is, the 'common' layman and the 'practised' Platonic reader, see Rowe 2010.

⁹ The same point of view has been adopted recently also by Peponi's 2013 collected volume: see in particular Kowalzig 2013: 175–6.

PRELIMINARIES

In both the *Republic* and the *Laws*, the implementation of a well-ordered society is predicated on the maximization of the happiness and well-being (*eudaimonia*) of the whole civic body. In the first-best (Callipolis) and second-best (Magnesia) cities, the main aim of true statesmanship, be it embodied by philosopher-rulers or divinely inspired legislators, is to promote first and foremost the common good – that is, the happiness of *all* the individual members of the *polis*, not only one section of it.¹ In both cities, the primary component of civic happiness is virtue (*aretē*):² to promote the happiness of the *polis* as a whole coincides with promoting virtue in all its citizens, notwithstanding subjectively and objectively differential parameters.³

The first part of the book explores some of the ways in which a particular kind of virtue – that is, what has come to be called in contemporary scholarship the ‘lesser’ virtue of the ‘ordinary’ citizen (respectively the second and third class of Callipolis and those who do not partake, in Magnesia, of the ‘higher education’ reserved to the guardians of the law) – is troped and fostered within the political and social discourse of the first and

¹ Cf. e.g. *Resp.* 4.420b3–c4, 4.421b5–c5, 7.519e1–520a4; *Laws* 4.715b3–4. For a (non-exhaustive but useful) collection of related passages in the *Laws*, see Bobonich 2002: 577 n. 104. Cf. also Irwin 2010: 99–100.

² Citizens made happy by practising virtue in the *Laws*: cf. e.g. 4.718a3–b5, 8.829a1–3. Promoting virtue in *all* the citizens of Magnesia: cf. e.g. *Laws* 1.630b8–e4, 3.688a1–b4, 4.705e1–706a4, 6.770c7–e4, 9.853b4–8, 12.963a1–4.

³ See Morrison 2001 on the complex and not entirely symmetrical relationship between the happiness of the city and the happiness of its citizens in Callipolis; his conclusion (the well-being of the city and the sum of the well-being of the citizens are not absolutely identical: the priority of the common good means that under some circumstances individual well-being must be checked) holds true also for Magnesia (cf. also Schofield 2006: 219–20 and Irwin 2010: 94–5).

second-best cities.⁴ The differential ‘degrees’ of virtue and happiness accessible to the citizens of Plato’s utopias (both in the *Republic* and the *Laws*) have recently received increasing scholarly attention.⁵ Yet there has been no sustained comparison of the ‘lesser’ virtue of the ‘ordinary’ citizen in the two Platonic works. A comparative analysis of the rhetorical strategies by means of which a distinct ‘rhetoric of citizenship’ is developed and implemented within the ideal societies of Callipolis and Magnesia will provide a useful background against which to gauge some significant re-deployments and ‘extensions’ of this rhetoric in the *Laws*.

To study in some detail the concrete ways in which this more ‘open’ rhetoric of citizenship is enacted in the second-best city will be the task of the second part of the volume. In [Part II](#), the focus is on the spectrum of the diverse affective and cognitive motivations available to the citizens of the ideal Callipolis and Magnesia to qualify as members of a virtuous community. The overarching question addressed is the following: what motivates the lower echelons of the ‘ideal cities’ to act virtuously? What degree of intensity and compulsion is required by the grid of affective and non-affective commitments that Plato envisages will bind the citizens together in his two communities? And, above all, what kind of *desire*, in particular, must be activated in the souls of the citizens to reach this end?

⁴ A balanced survey of the often radically different approaches adopted by modern scholarship towards the concept of ‘possibility’ and ‘feasibility’ of Plato’s utopian project(s) can be found in Vegetti 2000. For the *Republic*, my own position is broadly in agreement with that of Burnyeat 1992 as refined by Morrison 2007: the paradigmatic nature of Callipolis does not undercut the value of its possible *human* approximations. On the *Laws* as at the same time a ‘utopian’ and ‘possible’ project, see Schofield 2010b, Laks 1991 and 2012: 29–37, Jouët-Pastré 2012.

⁵ Samaras’ objection (2002: 38–9) that the concept of ‘degrees of happiness’ jeopardizes the unity of virtue is ill-founded, cf. Kamtekar 2004. ‘Ordinary’ virtue in the *Republic*: Klosko 1982, Kamtekar 1998 (restricted to the ‘imperfect’ virtue of the auxiliaries) and 2004 (producers’ class included), Brown 2004, Schofield 2006: 270–5 (on the economic class), Wilberding 2009 (on the ‘second-best’ morality of the auxiliaries), Vasiliou 2008, ch. 7 and 8 (moral/cognitive capacities of the non-philosophers), and 2012 (an attempt to bridge the gap between the ‘ordinary and political’, virtue in *Phd.* 82a11–b1 and the *dēmotikē aretē* of the *Republic*). For the *Laws*, see Saunders 1962a: 47–9, and above all Bobonich 2002: ch. 5 (esp. 411–75), Kraut 2010 and Brisson 2012.

Because [Chapters 1](#) and [2](#) are strictly interconnected and develop a common thread of ideas, it makes sense to outline here the main stages of the argumentation. In [Chapter 1](#), after a general sketch of the similarities and differences in the constitutional and political make-up of the ideal and second-best city, close attention is given to (1) the ways in which the paradigm of civic *philia* is ideologically supported in the *Republic*, and (2) the emotional and epistemic resources available to the different classes of citizens to reach this goal. Emphasis is put on the *forms* of desire made experientially available to the citizens of Callipolis: the education of the young guardians culminating in the ‘erotics of beauty’ (3.403c6 τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἑρωτικά) of Book 3 of the *Republic* is put under scrutiny to test the extent to which the Socratic ‘move’ from abstract *philia* (‘love’) to extra-personal *erōs* (‘passionate desire’) is warranted for the second class of the ideal city. Furthermore, attention is paid to the psychological framework within which the second (auxiliaries) and third (producers) classes are encouraged to conceive of each other vis-à-vis the rulers and the city as a whole. This second aspect allows us to see how the rhetoric of citizenship promoted by Callipolis is premised on the assumption that the ways in which citizens express themselves about their reciprocal mode of social interaction can positively contribute to creating and cementing those very same relationships.

It is against this background that [Chapter 2](#) switches to the ordinary virtue of the Magnesian citizen with specific attention to what I call the ‘erotics of citizenship’ promoted in the *Laws*. In this chapter, the focus is primarily on what I think is, in some (relatively few but significant) passages of the *Laws*, an unnoticed expansion and deployment of the language of desire in general, and erotic desire in particular, with specific reference to the civic virtue of the ‘ordinary’ citizen.⁶

⁶ Cf. *Laws* 1.643c8–d3 and e4–6; 3.688b2–4; 6.770c7–d6; 8.837d4–6; on the ‘higher’, divine ladder (ἑρως θεϊός) of the erotics of statesmanship at 4.711d6–7, see §2.3. To the best of my knowledge, this specific aspect of the *Laws* (use of erotic terminology to foster civic virtue) has passed unnoticed among scholars. Moore 2005 and 2007 focus more narrowly on sexual legislation; the same applies to Boehringer 2007. Ludwig 2002, 2007 and 2009, although adopting a broader framework, is also silent on the issue.

Differently from the *Republic*, in the *Laws*, Plato seems to be more willing to harness erotic desire (*erōs*) as an acceptable (under due qualifications) emotional and cognitive disposition available to *every* citizen to promote civic virtue. This erotic deployment of civic virtue in Magnesia is, I contend, a philosophically coherent and logical extension of the ‘erotics of beauty’ fostered by the musical education of the guardians in Book 3 of the *Republic*, and as such has its own distinct function within the educational programme and moral psychology of the *Laws*.⁷ According to Plato every human being is above all a desiring agent, yet in the ideal Callipolis, with the exception of 3.402d1–403c6, the language (and rhetoric) of *erōs* is significantly limited only to the highest degree of virtue – that is, philosophical virtue (and its polar opposite: the psychological make-up of the tyrant in Book 9).⁸ In the *Laws*, the notable extension of the language of *erōs* to potentially every Magnesian citizen must be seen as part of Plato’s wider strategy to co-opt for his own agenda the emotional component promoted by every cognitive state, be it knowledge, correct/true opinion, opinion in general or even desire (§2.3). At the same time, the erotic paradigm of civic virtue activated in the *Laws* is shown to enable Plato to connect to and exploit for his own philosophical aims an important strand of the late-fifth-/early-to mid-fourth-century BC Athenian political reflection on the nature of democratic citizenship and its premises, namely the degree of civic desire (referred to as *epithymia* and/or *erōs*) as the most trustworthy and reliable criterion to award, or withdraw, citizenship. While mapping out the moral and emotional prerequisites to qualify as a member of a ‘community of the virtuous’,⁹ Plato is not only engaging (very much on his own terms) with one of the most pressing political questions of his

⁷ For a ‘unitarian’ reading of the philosophical project of the *Laws* and its interaction with Plato’s other dialogues, see above all Rowe 2003, 2010 and 2012 and Gill 2003.

⁸ For a recent attempt to reconcile the use of erotic language to define, within the *Republic*, the psychological profile of the philosopher and the tyrant only, see Scott 2007. For Plato’s significant switch from *philo*-compounds to *erōs*-compounds in describing the moral and cognitive profile of the future philosopher-kings in the *Republic*, see Schofield 2006: 159–60.

⁹ Bobonich’s definition (2002: 417).

own time, the measure of civic spiritedness proper to a true citizen – a question urgently pressed on the newly restored democracy after the oligarchic *coups* of 411/10 and 404/3 BC. He is also reconnecting this dialogue back to one of its fountain-heads: Pericles' *Funeral Oration* (Thuc. 2.35–46) and the attempt to harness erotic compulsion (2.43.1: Athenians will gaze at the power of the city and become her 'lovers', i.e. *erastai*) to foster 'good', exemplary citizenship. In particular, in two well-known, programmatic passages of Book 1 of the *Laws* (1.643c8–d3 and 643e4–6), the correct form of educational behaviour to be imprinted in the souls of the prospective citizens appeals significantly to the compulsive drive of *erōs*. At 1.643d1–2, the soul of the child will be led, while engaged in play, to desire passionately what he has to become when grown up (τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου ὃ δεήσει γινόμενον ἄνδρ' αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς). At 1.643e4–5, we are told that an education aiming at virtue from infancy will cause the addressee of such an educational programme to be eagerly in love with the *idea* of becoming a perfect citizen (ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλειον). I argue that in both passages the Athenian Stranger is re-appropriating a distinctly 'Periclean', democratic rhetoric of civic *erōs* while at the same time radically revising and rewriting its underlying moral psychology (§2.4).¹⁰ This forgotten piece of 'civic conversation' between Thucydides' Pericles and Plato¹¹ will help to shed some additional light on the vision of 'volitional' citizenship embraced by Plato in the *Laws*.

¹⁰ To the best of my knowledge, although the erotic paradigm of citizenship offered by the Periclean *Funeral Oration* has been repeatedly compared to and contrasted with Plato's 'political' vision of *erōs* in the *Republic* (see e.g. Ludwig 2002: 141–2, 332–3, 2007 and 2009, esp. 294–8) or with Aspasia's funeral oration in the *Menexenus* (e.g. Monoson 2000, chapters 2 and 7, respectively), the passage of the *Laws* previously quoted (1.643e4–6) has almost completely escaped modern scholarship on the issue. The only exception I could find is a bare 'cf.' in Christ 2006: 29. The recent study by Gordon 2012 does not address the issues raised here. Bobonich 2002: 419 quotes Thuc. 2.40.2–3 (another passage from Pericles' *Funeral Oration*) as a point of comparison with the model of political participation envisaged in Magnesia, but is silent on the startling similarity of language between Thuc. 2.43.1 and *Laws* 1.643d–e.

¹¹ I am alluding to the title of Mara's stimulating book (Mara 2008).

P.1 Terminology: the language of desire and Plato's moral psychology

Some methodological *caveats* and premises are in order when using terms like 'language of desire' and 'erotic desire' with reference to Plato, and Plato's *Laws* in particular. On the minimalist view (adopted here), there are at least two distinct but interconnected issues that must be addressed head on to avoid possible misapprehensions: (1) the presence or absence of a unified conceptual framework of the psychology of the embodied person across Plato's middle (*Republic*) and late (*Laws*) dialogues; and (2) Plato's well-known exploitation throughout his corpus of the various interpretative possibilities opened up by the extensive semantic overlap between the language of 'desire' in general (*epithymialepithymein*), 'erotic desire' (*erōs/erān*) in particular, and that of what for lack of a better word shall be called, conventionally, 'love' (*philia/philein*).¹²

As to the former issue, the reading offered here is premised on the presence, in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, of a significant continuity in the way in which the moral psychology of the individual is conceived.¹³ The main locus of contention among contemporary scholarship hinges on whether in the *Laws* we have a bipartition or tripartition of the soul (as in the *Republic*),¹⁴ and whether the possibility of moral *akrasia* ('weakness of will') is still dependent on such partitioning of the soul. Whereas for the latter issue some scholarly consensus seems to have

¹² Platonic scholarship on the subject is vast: for a recent assessment of Plato's conception of *philia* and *erōs* as different but not mutually exclusive forms of human relationship, see Kraut 2008, Sheffield 2006: ch. 5 (esp. 154–63), Carone 2006: 210–2, Ferrari 1992 (qualifying Halperin 1985), Gill 1990 and White 1990. On the interplay of *philia* and *erōs* in the *Republic*'s political agenda, see Ludwig 2007: 208–17 and 2009: 301–3; cf. also Price 1989: 179–92 on Plato's extended use of familial and civic bonds of *philia* in the *Republic*. On *erōs* and *philia* in the *Laws*, see Moore 2005: 184–7 and 2007.

¹³ See Kahn 2004: 356–62, Sassi 2008: 128–33 and more recently Sauvé Meyer 2012; cf. also Tarrant 2004.

¹⁴ On the partitioning of the soul in the *Republic*, see Lorenz 2006, chapters 1–3. For a defence of the unity of the soul as a composite object, see Lorenz 2006: 26 n. 18 and Brown 2012, who introduces what seems to me a most useful distinction between what he calls the 'earned' unity of the virtuous soul (the happy few) and the 'unearned' unity of every soul as such.

gathered momentum,¹⁵ the former is still hotly debated.¹⁶ The view taken here is that in both the *Republic* and the *Laws* the embodied human soul is conceived as a complex whole consisting of parts that are the subjects of different forms of desires and motivating impulses. In the *Laws*, a clear tripartition of the soul, despite some hints in the text, is not securely attested.¹⁷ It is undeniable that in his latest work Plato is much more explicitly interested in the distinction between a rational part of the soul and the rest of the soul taken as a whole (cf. the puppet analogy at *Laws* I.644d7–645b7). Yet this overtly predominant interest in distinguishing between a rational and non-rational component within the human psyche need not be read as a sign of Plato's radical change of thought about the structure of the embodied soul. First, as already observed, bipartition does *not* exclude tripartition:¹⁸ a bipartition of the soul into a rational and non-rational part is used by Plato also in the *Republic* when necessary to further his arguments, without this jeopardizing his explanation of the three-part structure of the soul.¹⁹

¹⁵ For a positive, balanced answer to the question, see Gerson 2003a: 265–75 and 2003b; cf. also Dorion 2007: 135–6 with n. 55 and Brisson 2012 (more radical). For a thought-provoking but ultimately (to my mind) unpersuasive rejection of akratic conflict in the *Laws*, see Wilburn 2012. I side with Tarrant 2004: 157 in taking the 'helpers' needed by the golden cord as a suggestion that 'reason may operate on us both from the outside and from within: from god or *polis*, or from the individual herself'.

¹⁶ Cf. Frede 2010: 116–20, Sassi 2008 (no commitment to tripartition: downgrading of the *thymoeides* in the *Laws*). See Sauvé Meyer 2012 against Sassi's too negative downplaying of a 'spirited' part of the soul in the *Laws*. A 'stronger' version of Saunders' 1962 thesis (tripartition of the soul and the corresponding presence of three classes of citizenship in the *Laws*) has recently been revived and defended by Brisson 2012. Although I agree with Brisson on the continuity in terms of moral psychology of the embodied person between the *Republic* and the *Laws* (i.e. even if in the *Laws* Plato is not explicitly concerned with parts of the soul, as in the *Republic*, their function is still broadly operative), the second part of Brisson's argument (a narrower correspondence between parts of the souls and social classes in Magnesia) raises unanswered objections: see Sassi 2008 (not quoted by Brisson).

¹⁷ The passages usually invoked are 3.689a5–b7, 9.863b1–4, 9.870c3, 11.934a, 11.935c: with the exception of 3.689a5–b7, all these passages come, significantly, from the 'penal' section of Magnesia's law code in which crimes – that is, psychic vices (in themselves the result of psychic injustice, *adikia*) – are classified according to the *psychological* profile of the offender.

¹⁸ Sassi 2008: 125–6; Gerson 2003a: 267 n. 54; Saunders 1962a: 37–8.

¹⁹ See the list of passages quoted by Saunders 1962a: 37 n. 2 and Sassi 2008: 125. Moss 2008 has very good points on Plato's strategy of blurring the two lower parts of the soul in the *Republic* when so required by his argumentation.

Furthermore, the nature of the political programme advertised in the *Laws* (the second-best city is conceived not for gods or children of gods but for humans) and its assumed notional audience (the ‘practised’ philosophical reader *and* the common layman)²⁰ may go a good way towards explaining some lack of technicality or detail in mapping out the make-up of the soul. For present purposes, I thus assume that, in principle, the moral psychology of the embodied person embraced by Plato in the *Laws* does not differ radically from that of the *Republic*.

It is against this moral and psychological framework that I suggest we evaluate the second issue: Plato’s usage of the language of desire and *erōs* in the *Laws*. Admittedly, the task still remains riddled with methodological difficulties. For a start, semantic overlap between *philo-* and *erōs-* compounds is a common feature of the Greek language even outside philosophical texts,²¹ and Plato is more than willing to exploit these grey areas when his argument and understanding of human nature require it.²² *Philia* and *erōs* are constantly represented by Plato as complementary forms of interpersonal relationship throughout his major works.²³ On the other hand, given Plato’s conception of the soul as a composite whole, the occurrence of terms like *epithymialepithymein* in his dialogues does not justify a default equation of *epithymia*-related words with ‘appetitive’ desires but must instead invite caution.²⁴ In Book 9 of the *Republic*, we are told that each part of the soul (the appetitive, the honour-loving and the rational) has its own particular forms of desires (*epithymiai*) and rules (*archai*) (9.580d6–7).²⁵ For a desire to be an ‘appetitive’ desire (that is, belonging to the lowest part

²⁰ I follow here Rowe 2010 and Gill 2003.

²¹ Cf. e.g. Dover 1978: 43, 49 and Davidson 2007: 32–4 (with 522 n. 88).

²² For the collapse of differences between *erōs*, *philia* and *epithymia*, cf. e.g. *Lysis* 221b7–8; in the same direction cf. also *Resp.* 5.474c9–11 where φιλεῖν (c9) is broadly synonymic to στέργειν (c11), ἀσπάζεσθαι (d4), ἀγαπᾶν (475b1) and *erōs* (474d3; within an analogy to pederasty). At *Symp.* 210c1 the language of ‘care’ (*kēdesthai*) and *erōs* converge in the ‘true’ love that is love for knowledge. Examples could be multiplied.

²³ See Sheffield 2012, Kraut 2008 and Kahn 1996: 271–81 for a unitary reading of the phenomenology of *erōs* in *Phaedrus*, *Symposium* and *Republic*.

²⁴ Cf. Lorenz 2004: 42, 45–6, Kraut 2008: 289.

²⁵ See Russell 2005: 124–5 and Gerson 2003a: 118–20 on the passage.

of the soul), it must be focused on pleasure (*hēdonē*): that is, pleasure must be the motivation characteristic of that desire.²⁶ The *epithymia* of the rational part is a desire for a particular kind of activity, the love of wisdom: notably, we shall see that it is only this modality of intense desire that is promoted in the *Republic* to the category of *erōs* (§1.2). The desire of the rational part of the soul is nevertheless called *epithymia* not because it contrasts with the appetitive desires (which it does) but because it is a primitive urge of that specific part of the soul and *not* the result of what we may think of as an internal deliberative process. Otherwise said, as Halliwell puts it, ‘though pursued through the exercise of reason and intellect, nevertheless [rational desire] involves an element that P[laton] wishes us to think of as a strong *passion* or appetite’.²⁷ Hence, even in the *Republic*, *epithymia* can be used of rational desires for the good, just as in *Symp.* 205d2 we are told that for a desire (*epithymia*) to qualify as *erōs* the necessary requisite is that it must be a desire ‘for good things and well-being’.²⁸ Furthermore, the language of volition (*thelein*, *boulesthai*) may at times be used by Plato as synonymous with the language of desire in general (*epithymein*).²⁹

Notwithstanding all these semantic ambushes, some more general, non-controversial points can nevertheless still be used as a frame of reference for the present investigation: (1) the higher emotional intensity of *erōs*-derived feelings over *philia*-inspired emotional attachments;³⁰ (2) the higher degree of obsessive compulsion of an erotic passion (*erōs*) compared to desire in general (*epithymia*). To qualify as *erōs*, a desire must

²⁶ Cf. Lorenz 2004: 69.

²⁷ Halliwell 1993: 201 on *Resp.* 5.474b3–476d7 (author’s italics).

²⁸ On the *erōs* terminology in the *Symposium*, see above all Kahn 1987. Cf. also Sheffield 2012: 214–5 on Plato’s use of the term *erōs* in the *Symp.* exclusively for good-dependent desires.

²⁹ *Boulesthai* and *epithymein* are often used interchangeably by Plato: cf. Weiss 2007: 96–100. However, cf. *Charm.* 167e14–5 where the objects of *epithymia* are pleasures (*hēdonai*), whereas those of *boulēsis* is what is good (*agathon*): for such a distinction between *boulesthai* (rational desire aiming at the good) and *epithymein* (sensual desire aiming at pleasure) in the *Gorgias*, see Kahn 1987: 91–2; cf. also *Meno* 77e–78b (*boulēsis* can only be for what is good).

³⁰ This is spelled out in the *Laws* at 8.837a8–9 *ἐταν δὲ... γίγνηται σφοδρόν, ἔρωτα ἐπινομάζομεν*. For the specific context of this passage see §2.4.

not only be insatiable but compulsively so in its nature: a non-derivative, irreducible, resistance-overriding craving.³¹ Bearing all these difficulties in mind, a key factor in analysing the language of desire in the *Laws* will thus necessarily be a reading highly sensitive to the particular context of the passages examined, with particular attention to the part(s) of the soul that are called on as agents of that desire. The ultimate proof must be in the interpretative payback offered by such an analysis.

In order to be able to gauge the extent to which the psychological and cognitive reservoir of *erōs* is potentially made normatively available to all the citizens of Magnesia, it is first necessary to look at the different make-ups of the citizen bodies of the two Platonic utopias (§1.1). The focus is first (§1.2) on the spectrum of diverse psychological and epistemic motivations granted to the citizens of Callipolis, the implied ‘model’ of Magnesia (cf. *Laws* 5.739e1 παράδειγμα πολιτείας).³² Within this framework, particular attention is given to the ‘ordinary virtue’ (δημοτική ἀρετή) of Callipolis’ two lower classes, producers and auxiliaries (§§1.3–6). It is against this background that we then turn to a closer inspection of the ‘lesser virtue’ of the ordinary Magnesian citizen (§2.1).

³¹ The main divide between *erōs* and *epithymia* does not rest on their insatiability (*aplēstia*) as such: cf. Scott 2007: 137 n. 2 ‘having a desire that never reaches satisfaction is not the same as having an erotic obsession’. What sets them apart is *erōs*’ complete ‘single-mindedness’.

³² I side here with Schofield 2010: 15–16 vs Levin 2010: 7–10. For the way in which the Magnesian project in *Laws* may be read as a ‘projection’ of the ideal political model described in the *Republic* and the resulting tension between the two, see Laks 1990 and 2000.

PART I

PERFORMING ORDINARY VIRTUE IN
PLATO'S UTOPIAS

Citizenship, desire and intention

CITIZENSHIP IN CALLIPOLIS

1.1 Utopian citizenships: *Republic* and *Laws*

As is often noticed, the most significant constitutional difference between Callipolis and Magnesia regards the respective composition of their citizen body. Whereas the utopia of Callipolis extends citizenship to the ‘producer’ class (*Resp.* 2.371a11–e10: farmers, craftsman, traders and waged-labourers), in Magnesia the only *technē* worth cultivating by a ‘citizen’ (πολίτης ἀνὴρ) who aims at safeguarding the common order of the city (*Laws* 8.846d5–6 τὸν κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως κόσμον σῶζων καὶ κτῶμενος) is the practice and cultivation of virtue (8.847a5–6 ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια). Within the social discourse of the *Laws*, learning to practise virtue is envisaged, at least at the level of ideological self-presentation to the community at large, as a full-time job for a citizen of the second-best city (*Laws* 8.846d4–7, 847a4–6).¹ In Magnesia, ‘trade and crafts’ (δημιουργικαὶ τέχναι) will be the concern of strangers (metics) and their slaves (*Laws* 11.919d2–6).² From a constitutional point of view, Plato’s Magnesia is indeed remarkably more conservative than his Callipolis.³ Magnesian citizens will then practise only one *technē*: the *technē* of virtue that quite

¹ For a detailed analysis of these passages, see Bobonich 2002: 409–17. Notice, however, the insightful observation by Morrow 1960: 152 about the inner tension, if not divide, between practice and ideology for the ‘agrarian citizenship’ of Magnesia: only a tiny minority of the members belonging to the 5,040 landed households of the second-best city will be ‘fully leisured’ citizens, because the poorer classes are exonerated from some civic services on the grounds that they have less leisure to devote to public affairs (6.763d–764a). Morrow’s position is now restated by Samaras 2012.

² This division of labours between citizens and resident non-citizens was common in many classical Greek cities (e.g. Sparta, Thebes), but was distinctly un-Athenian: see the succinct historical survey by Schöpsdau 2011: 240.

³ Cf. Kahn 2004: 344–5.

literally coincides with the ‘craft of citizenship’ (Morrow 1960: 322).

To modern sensitivities there is an obvious elephant in the room in this utopian model of citizenship: slaves. For present purposes, few words will be said on it. Slavery is a pervasive presence within Magnesian society and represents a considerable portion of the total population.⁴ Because slaves are obviously not a class of citizens (even if part of the resident population at large), they are not taken into detailed consideration here in mapping out the landscape of civic interpersonal relationships in the second-best city. However, the attitudes of citizens proper towards slaves (and metics) are taken into account while sketching the minimal moral requirements (‘instinctual’ moderation) to be met by any long-term resident of Magnesia: this will help us understand what is Plato’s bottom-line view on ‘untaught’ moderation (*sōphrosynē*) in his second-best utopia. As for the (disputed) presence of slavery in the *Republic*, as already observed by Vlastos, I do not see any substantial difference between Callipolis and Magnesia in this respect: the fact that Plato expands much more in detail on slaves and their relationship with citizens in Magnesia is simply a by-product of the more prescriptive, practice-oriented project of the *Laws*.⁵

⁴ The most comprehensive treatment of slavery in the *Laws* is still that of Morrow 1939 (cf. also Morrow 1960: 148–52). More recent (though partial) treatments include Saunders 1962a: 49–54, Panno 2009: 183–6, 196–201, Bertrand 1999: 340–5 and 2001.

⁵ For the presence of slavery in Callipolis, see Vlastos 1968; contra Calvert 1987 (followed more recently also by Hammond 2008: 247–50). Pace Calvert, the arguments of Vlastos about *Resp.* 4.433d1–4 are still unassailable (notice that Vlastos 1968: 294 n. 17 speaks of slaves as ‘part of the population’, not part of the *polis*). More complex is, in my view, the problem of whose property (κτῆματα) the slaves are or may be. Vlastos 1968: 292 n. 6 suggests that they belong to the third class. Calvert 1987: 369–70 objects that to envisage the slaves as property of the producers is contradictory because ‘only the philosophers are entitled to exercise absolute authority over other human beings, and the third class who lacks *Logos* are disqualified’. I am not wholly persuaded by Vlastos’ solution, yet certainly Calvert’s objection misses the point: crude as it may seem, slaves are such *by nature* for Plato (cf. the ἀναγκασία διόρισις in *Laws* 6.777a–b). Hence also Calvert’s argument about the isomorphism between soul and city is undermined.

Notwithstanding this remarkable difference in terms of extension/reduction of citizenship rights,⁶ in both the *Republic* and the *Laws* a significant part of the rhetoric of citizenship to be internalized and performed in Plato's utopias hinges on a sustained ideological promotion of mutual 'concord' (*homonoia*) and 'love/friendship' (*philia*) between *all* its members.⁷ At *Resp.* 1.351d4–5, concord and friendship are cited as the greatest benefits conferred by justice in a city (as opposed to *stasis*, hatred and strife brought on by injustice). Likewise in the *Laws*, the 'friendship', both of the city with itself (3.693b2–5)⁸ and of the citizens among themselves (5.743c5–6),⁹ is the true linch-pin of Magnesia's *politeia*.¹⁰ To understand how this 'collective' friendship is implemented in the *Republic*, it is necessary to look briefly at how the concept of 'moderation' (*sōphrosynē*) as 'agreement' among the three parts of the soul that the rational part should rule is framed in terms of *philia* among the three classes of Callipolis. Doing so allows us to identify the emotional and cognitive resources made available to the citizen body at large of Callipolis. Secondly, I pay closer attention to the distinctive psychological framework within which the second (auxiliaries) and third (producers)

⁶ Samaras 2012: I n. 3 downplays its import arguing that the citizenship of the producers in Callipolis is merely 'nominal' and 'does not involve even the slightest shred of political self-determination'. This claim calls for two observations. First, to speak of 'political self-determination', be it in Callipolis (with the partial exception of the philosopher-rulers) or Magnesia, is misleading: on the anachronism of such an approach, see Brisson 2005: 106–116 and 2012: 283–5. Second, the normative value, in classical Greece, of the language of 'citizenship' in defining individual identity and grounding social cohesion is difficult to over-estimate; and this is independent from the *actual* share in the constitution that citizenship entailed.

⁷ Cf. also *Plt.* 311b9–c1, on which see Bobonich 2002: 412–16.

⁸ A city must be 'free, wise and friendly to itself' (ὅτι πόλιν ἐλευθέραν τε εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἔμφρονα καὶ ἐαυτῇ φίλην) and the lawgiver should legislate aiming at this: cf. also *Laws* 3.701d7–9.

⁹ The underlying 'premise' (ὑπόθεσις) of Magnesian legislation is to maximize the happiness and friendship of its citizens (ὅπως ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατοι ἔσονται καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις φίλοι). Cf. also 1.627e3–628a3 (notably within a discussion about what is *naturally* [φύσει] correct or wrong as law per se); 1.628c10–11 (civic *philophrosynē*: cf. also 5.738d6–e1 and 740e4); 3.693c2–3 (the lawgiver must aim at *philia* among citizens and its multiple analogues); 6.757a1–758a2 and 759b4–7 (concerning the allotments of some magistracies).

¹⁰ On civic friendship in Magnesia, see Schofield 2010b: 21–2; Irwin 2010: 107; Bobonich 2002: 427–32, Price 1989: 192–3.

classes are invited to envisage each other vis-à-vis the rulers and the city as a whole. This second step is particularly important when attempting to pin down the self-propelling motivational agency of the ‘popular virtue’ (*Resp.* 6.500d9 δημοτική ἀρετή) of the non-philosophers in Callipolis. As we shall see (§1.6), part of the make-believe of the communitarian ideology of the ideal city relies on the premise that the ways in which the citizens of Callipolis (producers, auxiliaries and philosopher-kings) speak about their mutual relationships with the city as a whole and each other are not only a consequence of, but in a sense also contribute to, *shaping* those very same relationships.¹¹

1.2 Degrees of virtue in the *Republic*

In Book 4 of the *Republic*, the principle of non-opposition leads the way to the tripartition of the soul. Just as the ideal city has three different classes (philosopher-kings, auxiliaries and producers), so there are three corresponding parts of the soul (4.435d9–441a3).¹² Each part of the soul has its own forms of desires and rules (9.580d6–7). The appetitive part (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) ‘intensely’ (διὰ σφοδρότητα) desires the pleasures of food, drink, sex and the like (9.580e2–581a1): its ‘characteristic’¹³ object of desire is love of money (τὸ φιλοχρημάτων). The spirited part (τὸ θυμοειδές) is by nature allied with

¹¹ In Magnesia even the ‘*parole servile*’ will be exploited by the law with a view to ideological propaganda: see Bertrand 1999: 340–5.

¹² My understanding of the working of the city/soul analogy is much indebted to Ferrari 2003. For the tripartition of the soul in the *Republic*, see Burnyeat 2006.

¹³ I borrow here Kamtekar’s (2008a) distinction between the ‘characteristic object of a part’ (that is, the object pursued by an individual normatively ruled by that part) and ‘the natural object of a power’, which implies a privileged but not exclusive relationship between a power and its natural object. Otherwise said, ‘the three parts [of the soul], reason, spirit and appetite, can desire and pursue objects other than their respective characteristic object of desire and pursuits, viz. truth, honour and the pleasures of nutrition and reproduction. What objects they actually desire and pursue depends on their powers (their degree of virtue or vice) . . . An object is called the “characteristic” object of a part because it is the object pursued by an individual ruled by that part, and so it is the object most obviously associated with that part. However, it does not follow that this part would pursue that object if it were not ruling’ (Kamtekar 2008a: 132–3).

reason and its ‘characteristic’ object of desire is love of honour (φιλόνικον . . . καὶ φιλότιμον 9.581b3), whereas the rational part (τὸ λογιστικόν) is entirely oriented towards the apprehension of the pure truth (φιλομαθὲς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον 9.581b10). Every individual has all these different tendencies within his/her soul, and there are three types of persons depending on which part of the soul rules normatively:¹⁴ appetite (money making) in the producer class, love of honour in the class of the auxiliaries and love of wisdom for the philosopher-kings.

In both passages quoted previously from Books 4 and 9, the language of *erōs* does not surface, at least at a denotative level. The striving of each part of the soul after its natural object of desire *and* the predominant desire of the resulting individual, be it that of the producer, auxiliary or philosopher-to-be, is couched in these passages in the language of *philia* (*philo*-compounds) and ‘generic’ desire (*epithymia*).¹⁵ Even while describing the psychological make-up of the future philosopher-king in Book 9, Plato’s Socrates is not adopting the language of erotic passion but only the ‘weaker’ definition of the ruler of the ideal city as ‘lover of wisdom and learning’ (φιλόσοφος καὶ φιλομαθής).¹⁶ This is even more remarkable if one considers that between Book 4 and 9 the love of wisdom of the philosopher has already been promoted to the status of a distinctly *erotic* passion. At 6.485a10–b2 we are told that philosophical natures ‘always passionately desire’ (ἀεὶ ἐρῶσι) any learning that shows them the eternal, immutable substance of things. A little later at 6.485c6–8 the language of *erōs* is used for the ‘erotic man’ (ἐρωτικός) introduced as a parallel/foil to the philosopher.¹⁷ At 6.490b2 the philosopher keeps going on in

¹⁴ I adopt Kraus’ distinction between normative and predominant rule (Kraus 1973: 208–12).

¹⁵ Cooper 2008: 22–3 is thus mistaken in ascribing *erōs* to all the parts of the soul: at 9.581a–c we have only *philo*-compounds. For the theoretical bias underlying Cooper’s Straussian reading of *erōs* in the *Republic* (esp. at 67–94), see Konstan 2010. For a detailed criticism of Strauss’ (and post-Straussian: e.g. Roochnik 2003, Rosen 2005) approach to *erōs* in the *Republic* as causing the collapse of Callipolis, see Ferrari 2005.

¹⁶ For the distinctively ‘Platonic’ nuance of the adjective φιλομαθής, unattested before Plato, see Halliwell 1993: 206 ad *Resp.* 5.475c2.

¹⁷ See Barney 2008: 358 n. 3 on the import of this *comparandum*.

his search after truth without ever dulling his erotic passion or desisting from it (οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος), so much so that at 6.501d2 true philosophers are defined as 'lovers of truth' (ἀληθείας ἔραστοι).¹⁸ Plato's reluctance to use the language of *erōs* while outlining the three forms of desires of the three parts of the soul at 9.580d6–583a11 is certainly not casual. To persuade Glaukon of what he is explaining (how each part of the soul has its proper desires), Socrates is obliged to emphasize analogies among the different parts of the soul in the modality of experiencing desire (hence the use of *philo*-compounds) as much as differences in the object of such a desire (money for the appetitive part; honour for the spirited part; wisdom for the rational part). It is partly because of this overriding goal that the language of *erōs* does not appear in Socrates' outline of the phenomenology of desire proper of the rational part of the soul in Book 9. Non-interpersonal *erōs*¹⁹ (and not simply *philia*) is a distinctive form of experiencing desire, a form that in Callipolis is the unique privilege of the philosopher.²⁰ The obsessive compulsion of *erōs* and its inexhaustible drive is applied in the *Republic* only to the philosopher and its negative double, the tyrant – the moral psychology of the timocratic, oligarchic and democratic man in Book 8 is never characterized in terms of *erōs*. This brings us to another concomitant reason for Socrates' avoidance of the language of erotic passion at 9.580d6–583a11: the internal structure of Book 9. At 9.572e–575a Glaukon has just been told about an example of *erōs* gone terribly wrong: the kind of *erōs* (9.572e5 ἔρωτά τινα) which is

¹⁸ At 5.475b8 the 'true philosopher' (ἀληθινὸς φιλόσοφος) 'desires wisdom' (σοφίας ἐπιθυμητής); Barney 2008: 371 n. 30 interestingly observes that, although in this passage the term for desire is the generic *epithymēin* and the unifying element among the erotic man, the wine-lover and the philosopher is that each is *philo*-something, it 'is certainly suggestive that the discussion opens with a vivid and detailed description of the erotic man, as the paradigm case of the kind of intense, insatiable desire that the philosopher shares'.

¹⁹ On the interpersonal 'correct *erōs*' (ὀρθὸς ἔρως) available to both training auxiliaries and future philosopher-kings at *Resp.* 3.402d1–403c6, see §1.4.

²⁰ Several other passages in the Platonic corpus where a specifically erotic nuance is attached to the desire of knowledge are collected by Halliwell 1993: 202 and Halperin 1985 (*passim*).

implanted in the soul of the young tyrant as the superintendent of his idle and dissipated desires.²¹

To take stock of what has been outlined so far: within the discursive utopia of the ‘city of words’, non-personal *erōs* as a motivational resource to draw on is granted only to the ‘best citizens’, the future philosopher-kings.²² What is the emotional and cognitive reservoir that is left available to the two lower classes, the producers and the auxiliaries, as citizens of Callipolis? This is investigated in the next section.

1.3 *Sōphrosynē* as civic *philia* in Callipolis

As already observed (*Resp.* 7.519e1–520a4), the law in Callipolis does not exist for the exclusive benefit of one class within the city. Its aim is instead to ensure the well-being of the city ‘as a whole’ (ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει), bringing the citizens into harmony (συναρμόττων) by using both persuasion and compulsion, and making each class ‘share’ with the other classes (μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις) the positive contribution it is able to bring to the community (τῆς ωφελίας ἣν ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν δυνατοὶ ὧσιν ὠφελεῖν). The necessity of sharing as the origin of organized human communities (and first of all of sharing *material* goods – that is, what the third class will produce in Callipolis) is firmly present in Socrates’ mind when he delineates the emergence of a political community (*Resp.* 2.369b5–c10).²³ An organized political community (πόλις), we are told, ‘comes into being’ (2.369b7 γίγνεται) because men realize that they are not self-sufficient in every respect and they need

²¹ On *erōs* and tyranny in the *Republic*, see Parry 2007 (esp. 394–7), Ludwig 2007: 222–30, Newell 2000: 168–9, 174–8 and more recently Scott 2007 (the philosopher and the tyrant share the potentially asocial nature of erotic obsession: this view is shared by Larivée 2005: 171 and 175).

²² Recently Barney has made a case for the philosophers’ epistemic ascent to the cave (7.515c4–516a2) as caused by a ‘compulsion’ (ἀνάγκη) and ‘force’ (βία) that resembles the erotic responsiveness to Beauty (Barney 2008). On the psychological form of necessitation involved (‘nomic necessitation’) in this process, see Shields 2007; cf. also Sedley 2007 and Caluori 2011.

²³ See Ober 2009: 78–9 on this passage; cf. also Schofield 1999b: 72–5 on Plato’s emphasis on the ‘specialisation of skills’. For the relation of these requirements in the ‘city of pigs’ and Callipolis, see Morrison 2007: 249–53.

‘partners and helpers’ (2.369c3 κοινωνούς τε καὶ βοηθούς). They then give to (μεταδίδωσι) or receive from (μεταλαμβάνει) each other (ἄλλος ἄλλῳ) a share because they believe (οἰόμενος) that this is better for themselves (2.369c6–7). Sharing then is based on the belief that to do so will be better for oneself (αὐτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι). But what is the nature of this belief in the ideal city of Callipolis? Could it be grounded in what are, by the standards of Platonic doctrine, ‘false’ beliefs, for instance the beliefs that external goods, wealth and honour among them, are an end in themselves? Do the producers in Callipolis pursue wealth because they believe that wealth is the ultimate good? Or do the auxiliaries pursue honour as an intrinsic good? Should we assume that a person, whose normative ruling-part of the soul (i.e. the ‘characteristic’ object of Kamtekar, or the ‘normative’ rule of Kraut) is appetite, cannot take a different ‘turn’ under the supervision of the ‘predominant rule’ or ‘power’ (*dynamis*) of a different part? Recent scholarship has shown that the picture is much more complex than this.²⁴

There is no doubt that all the citizens of Callipolis (producers included) are not only maximally happy but also ‘aware’ of their own maximal happiness (cf. 6.500d11 ἐὰν δὴ αἰσθωνται οἱ πολλοί and e4 ἐάνπερ αἰσθωνται). Yet the way in which, for instance, some scholars limit the content of the ‘happiness’ of the first two classes to the satisfaction of their pleasures ‘on their own terms’ (that is, wealth for the producer class and honour for the auxiliaries) is objectionable on several grounds.²⁵ If the producer class considers wealth and its accumulation a good in itself, and the auxiliaries consider honour likewise, it is not clear in which way the rule of the philosophers would have contributed to the moral improvement, and hence ‘happiness’,

²⁴ See Vasiliou 2008: 232–46, 259–67, Brown 2004, Kamtekar 1998 and 2004 (mainly on the ‘auxiliaries’ as possessors of a form of ‘imperfect virtue’); on the ‘second-best morality’ of the auxiliary, see also Wilberding 2009 (who, although defending the intrinsic moral worth of the *thymoeides*, rejects the ‘internalization’ thesis offered by Kamtekar 1998). On the economic class, see Schofield 2006: 270–5.

²⁵ See e.g. Reeve 1988: 204–8 (esp. 208); most pessimistic about the cognitive and moral gap between the philosophers and non-philosophers in the *Republic* is also Bonichon 2002: 72–80 (following Reeve).

of *all* the members of the city.²⁶ The focus of more recent studies has been mainly on the ‘second-best morality’ of the auxiliaries, grounded essentially in educated correct opinion.²⁷ I deal with the ‘erotics’ of beauty fostered in the fledging guardians by musical education (*Resp.* 3.403c) in §1.4. Here I would like instead to look more in detail at how the happiness of the producing class, the lowest grade of the *dēmotikē aretē*, is produced and sustained in Callipolis. This will give us a firmer ground on which to try to understand how producers and auxiliaries envisage their personal relationship with each other and with the higher class of the philosopher-king. In particular, I would like to show how their understanding of the ethically significant true belief that they must be ruled by those whose better part of the soul reigns supreme fits within the grid of affective commitments (*philia*) required by Callipolis’ communitarian ideology (§1.5).

At 6.500d5–9 we are told that within the ideal society of Callipolis the philosopher who has contemplated the divine Forms will be led by some compulsion (ἀνάγκη) to apply (τιθέ-ναι) his superior knowledge to human behaviour (εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἥθη), both at the individual and collective levels (καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ).²⁸ It is in this capacity that he will be a craftsman (δημιουργόν) of ‘self-restraint’, ‘justice’ and ‘every other demotic virtue’ (σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς). He will ‘mould’ (πλάττειν) not only himself but the whole of the political community. The essence of this ‘demotic virtue’, in its minimalist manifestation, has been identified, rightly I believe, in a lesser (but still beneficial) ‘correct opinion’ (*orthē doxa*) deriving from indirect habituation or instinct. It is this instinctive self-moderation (*sōphrosynē*)

²⁶ See Kamtekar 2004: 145–8, Vasiliou 2008: 261 with n. 32.

²⁷ Cf. n. 5. Kamtekar 2004 deals more specifically with the producer class only at 158–61.

²⁸ 6.500d5 ἂν οὖν τις . . . αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται: the conditional phrasing (ἂν . . . γένηται) indicates that some compulsion to rule will indeed be exerted on the philosophers in Callipolis, but philosophers in non-ideal cities will probably be exempt from that pressure (7.520a–b). The key importance of the conditional statement of 6.500d5 (‘if some necessity arises’) is defended by Caluori 2011: 13 and 16–19. On the nature of the ‘compulsion’ exercised on the philosopher-kings in Callipolis, see n. 22 in this chapter.

that is the ‘lesser virtue’ of the lowest class.²⁹ In Callipolis, the educational project through music and gymnastics is reserved, strictly speaking, only to the ‘guardians of the city’ (including both the philosopher-kings and the auxiliaries). We get to know very little about the education of the third class, except that they will be educated in their own *technai* (5.456d8–10).³⁰ Does this mean that no form whatsoever of moral education will be made available to them? Most probably not.³¹ The positive effects of the education of the guardians will be experienced also by the producer class if only *vicariously* inasmuch as the producers will be exposed throughout their lives to the well-ordered and moderate behaviour of the ruling class.³² One of the most explicit passages on the paideutic effectiveness of environmental influences on character moulding is the botanic imagery of 3.401b1–d3. Guardians, we are told, should not be brought up (3.401b8 τρεφόμενοι) among images of what is bad (3.401b8 ἐν κακίας εἰκόσι), like a herd let to graze on a bad pasture (3.401d9 ὥσπερ ἐν κακῇ βοτάνῃ), lest a great evil should penetrate into

²⁹ See e.g. Saunders 1962a: 47–8 and Klosko 1982 (although the latter exaggerated the degree of educational training received by the producer class: cf. instead the balanced assessment by Kamtekar 2004: 159 n. 49 and Brown 2004: 298 n. 44 on Hourani’s pessimistic view). Cf. now Vasiliou 2008: 264–6 and 2012, Kraut 2010: 58. For the relationship between the ‘ordinary and political’ virtue (τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν) in *Phd.* 82a11–b3 and the δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ of *Resp.* 4.429c–430c, and 10.619c, see Vasiliou’s 2012 reading emphasizing continuity. In particular Vasiliou 2012: 16–26 argues that the former is substantially different from the ‘slavish’ (ἀνδραπώδης) virtue aiming at pleasure of 68d–69c in terms of both cognitive import and ethical value. It is worth reminding us that in *Resp.* 4.430c the adjective πολιτικὴ must refer to ‘civic’ virtue, that is the virtue of the city, ‘since the virtues of the individual are not yet under discussion’ (Sedley 2000: 804 n. 20).

³⁰ See Wilberding 2009: 356 n. 22. For Kraut’s too charitable reading of the ‘technical’ education of the third class (Kraut 1973: 219–22 argues that in the *Republic* the love of one’s craft is the equivalent for the producers of the love of wisdom for the philosopher), see Klosko 1982: 377–9.

³¹ Differently Samaras 2002: 39–41, who at 47 n. 48 adduces *Resp.* 6.496a5 τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδείσεως as proof that the third class is, in Plato’s view, ‘unworthy’ of any education. Yet the reference is not to the craftsmen/economic class of Callipolis, but more generally to those who, in contemporary Athenian society, faultily structured as it is, pretend to cultivate philosophy and pretend to elevate themselves without merit (cf. 6.495c3 ἀνάξιοι) from the condition of smith to that of philosopher. The difference in the referent seems to me relevant.

³² Cf. Vasiliou 2008: 236–7; Silverman 2007: 46 with n. 13; Schofield 2006: 272–3; Kamtekar 2004: 161.

their soul day by day without their knowing it (3.401c2 λανθάνωσιν). On the contrary, one should seek ‘the craftsmen gifted by nature to track down the nature of what is fine and graceful’ (3.401c4–5), so that the guardians can live in a healthy environment (3.401c5 ἐν ὑγιεινῷ τόπῳ οἰκοῦντες), drawing benefit from everything (beautiful) which surrounds them (3.401c5–6 ἀπὸ παντὸς ὠφελῶνται), as if a breeze from healthy places led them imperceptibly, from childhood, ‘to affinity, friendship/love and harmony with the beauty of reason’ (3.401c9–d1 εὐθύς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνη εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα). In this passage, the primary concern is most obviously the education of the guardians: *they* will benefit from a (materially and morally) healthy environment. Yet the very use of imagery drawn from nature and biology emphasizes the immediate, spontaneous and almost universal responsiveness of human beings to the quality of their surroundings.³³ If this is true of the guardians, it will necessarily apply, even if at one-step removal, also to the *crafters* of such healthy surroundings. Potentially interesting in this respect is also the way in which these craftsmen are introduced at 3.401c3–5: τοὺς δημιουργοὺς τοὺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους ἰχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν. Their ability to produce beautiful objects is attributed to their ‘natural predisposition’ (εὐφυῶς): in fact, in the same passage we are also told that whichever craftsman is *not able* to do this cannot reside in Callipolis (3.401b7–8 ὁ μὴ οἶός τε ὦν οὐκ ἑατέος παρ’ ἡμῖν δημιουργεῖν). If, as suggested here, it is nature that gives them such ability, then there must be in (at least some of) the *dēmiourgoi* also a kind of untaught good natural propensity which can be used as a stepping-stone towards self-moderation.³⁴

³³ This passage is discussed by Petraki 2011: 89 who, however, limits this ‘automatic’ response only to poetic representations (*eikones*).

³⁴ This good, natural propensity is obviously short of fully fledged virtue yet the context seems to me to suggest also some form of moral import, however diluted. Cf. also Janaway 1995: 104 observing à propos of this passage as Plato reserves for some *dēmiourgoi* ‘a positive and deep role’; differently Burnyeat 1999: 283 n. 49, according to whom, because they work at the orders of the rulers, ‘there is no need to suppose that the craftsmen who make the various artefacts are themselves persons of sobriety’.

On a political level, the way in which this self-moderation will be brought about is best explained by the concept of *sōphrosynē* as an agreement between the three parts of the soul that the rational part should rule (4.430e6–431e2; cf. also 4.443d4–e2 and 9.590c7–d6³⁵). This agreement is repeatedly referred to as a form of *philia* not only among the three parts of the soul of each individual but also across the three classes of Callipolis. This is most explicitly spelled out at 4.431d9–e2: a city is moderate (σώφρων) when there is a shared opinion (ἡ αὐτὴ δόξα ἔνεστι) between rulers and ruled (τοῖς τε ἄρχουσι καὶ ἀρχομένοις) as to who should rule (περὶ τοῦ οὐστινας δεῖ ἄρχειν). When this is the case, moderation (τὸ σωφρονεῖν) is present (ἐνεῖναι), of course in different degrees and approximations, both in the rulers and in the ruled (4.431e4–6 ἐν ἀμφοτέροις – even if only in some of them). This happens because moderation is like a sort of harmony (4.431e8 ἁρμονία τινὶ ἢ σωφροσύνη ὡμοίωται) that ‘extends naturally throughout the whole city’ (4.432a2–3 δι’ ὅλης ἀτεχνῶς τέταται) spreading by osmosis, making the weakest, the strongest and those in the middle sing the same song in unison (διὰ πασῶν παρεχόμενη συνάδοντας τοὺς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταῦτόν καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους). The moderation of the city (i.e. the desires of the morally and cognitively inferior majority are held in check and redirected by the desire of wisdom of the ruling class and the agreement, on the part of the ruled, about the just and beneficial nature of such an arrangement) is a consequence of the justice of the city: each class ‘does its own’; that is, the philosopher-kings rule, the auxiliaries help and support them, the producer class assents to obey.³⁶ The producers assent to obey because reason (τὸ λογιστικόν) is ‘wise’ (σοφός) and has forethought (προμήθεια) on behalf of the *whole* of the soul (ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς) (4.441e2–3). At 9.586d4–e2 we are told that when passion and desire follow the leadership of reason (d5–6: φιλοκερδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόνηκον ὅσαι ἐπιθυμῖαι εἰσὶν, αἱ μὲν ἂν τῇ

³⁵ On this last passage, see the following discussion.

³⁶ Kamtekar 2004: 149–50.

ἐπιστήμη καὶ λόγῳ ἐπόμεναι), the appetitive and spirited part find their fulfilment in seeking those pleasures to which intelligence directs them (d6–7 καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσαι, ἃς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγῇται).³⁷ Likewise at 9.590c7–d6 we are told that the producers (and possibly also the auxiliaries)³⁸ are externally and vicariously led by the reasons of the philosopher-kings:

οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἷον περὶ ὁ βέλτιστος, δοῦλον αὐτόν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ᾤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους (cf. I. 343b–c), ἀλλ' ὥς ἀμεινον ὄν παντὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκείον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες ὅμοιοι ὦμεν καὶ φίλοι, τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι;

So is it not in order that also such a person (i.e. whoever practises βαναυσία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία) may be ruled by the same principle as the best person, that we say he must be the slave of that best person, since the latter has the divine ruler within him? And when we say that he needs to be ruled, we do not mean any harm to the slave, as Thrasymachus believed that the ruled would be. But it is better for *everyone* to be ruled by what is divine and wise, ideally with the divine and wise element in himself, but if not so it will be imposed on him from outside, so that as far as possible we may all be equal, and all friends, since we are all under the guidance of the same commander.

Justice and hence happiness, in an embodied soul, are possible when there is harmony among the different parts of the soul so that each part does its job under the leadership of reason; and the same is true at the macro-level of the city. Absolute, perfect agreement is required only for the most virtuous activities (philosophy), whereas an inferior degree of agreement

³⁷ On this passage, see Russell 2005: 135: the health of the soul consists in 'each part of the soul finding completion and fulfillment in the things appropriate to it, and in the whole soul endorsing and engaging in the sort of life that really is best for it. When reason leads the way, every part of the soul becomes fulfilled in its nature.... In fact each part of the soul finds its own proper and beneficial pleasures under the leadership of reason'.

³⁸ At 9.590c1–5 the specific reference is to the psychological type of the third class (9.590c1 βαναυσία δὲ καὶ χειροτονία). Yet at 9.590d3 the mention of 'everyone' (παντί) seems to justify the extension of a vicarious form of rational hegemony also to the auxiliaries (differently Wilberding 2009: 355–7 who limits this hetero-direction to the producer class only).

and order between parts is necessary to perform lesser activities (cf. 5.472c–d). A less perfect soul has a ‘lesser portion of happiness according to how closely its order approximates the just soul’s’ (Brown 2012: 68).³⁹ The happiness of the producing class does not consist in the maximization of material wealth but in their understanding (defective as it may be from an epistemic point of view)⁴⁰ the ethically significant true belief that they must be ruled by those better than themselves. As observed by Schofield, the self-restraint of the producers

is exhibited...by obedience to the rulers, ...and by the control they themselves exercise over their physical pleasures. ... What Plato must be supposing is that this outcome will be achieved in Callipolis by *cultural means*: by a combination above all of ideology and law – which can be assumed to be reflected in the kind of upbringing and moral education children of farmers and craftsmen and business people will receive’. (Schofield 2006: 272–3; italics mine)

The producer class, because of its limited cognitive capacity, has no direct access either to the musical education of the auxiliaries or, *a fortiori*, to the unquenchable urge for the good (*erōs*) which motivates the philosopher-kings. Yet its ‘portion of happiness’, if only relative, is adequate to its cognitive and psychological make-up and finds its root in an instinctive and/or habituated self-moderation. In §1.5–6 we take a closer look at how the communitarian ideology of Callipolis is meant to foster a mutual relationship of ‘care’ (*kēdesthai*), mutual dependence and familial affection (*philia*) among the three classes of the ideal city, notwithstanding the objectively different psychological profile of its members. But let us first turn to the emotional and cognitive resources made available to the auxiliaries.

³⁹ See also 67–71 on the correlation between psychological order and psychological ‘functioning’.

⁴⁰ A cognitive gap between waged producers admitted to citizenship even if, strictly speaking, endowed with adequate cognitive faculties, and the rest of the citizen body is recognized also at *Resp.* 2.371d9–e4.

1.4 Musical education and the erotics of beauty: from *philia* to *erōs*?

After having outlined the belief/notional content of the musical-cum-poetical education of the guardians (3.398b6–7 τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους), Socrates tells Glaukon that what has still to be dealt with is the issue of ‘modes of song and music’ (3.398c1–2 τὸ περὶ ᾠδῆς τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν) – that is, ‘music in *sensu stretto*’, to borrow Schofield’s expression.⁴¹ At 3.398c–403c there follows a detailed analysis of the non-verbal component of music (meter, rhythm, melodies) and of its overwhelming influence in moulding the aesthetic, ethical and cognitive habituation of the young guardians (both auxiliaries and future philosopher-kings).⁴² It is through this musical education of their sensibilities⁴³ that the fledging guardians will be habituated to take pleasure in beautiful things. This education of their perceptions prepares the soul for the development of a rational evaluation and appreciation (λόγος) of these very same things. At the end of the passage, Socrates sums up the goal of the musical education by stating that its proper *telos* is ‘the erotics of the beautiful’ (3.403c5–6: δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔρωτικά). What psychological phenomenon goes here by the name of

⁴¹ See Schofield 2010a: 231.

⁴² On the inner structure of 3.398b–403c, see the account by Brancacci 2005: 92–102; cf. also Pelosi 2010: 20–2. The otherwise excellent analysis of this section by Richardson Lear 2006 is marred by the fact that she is too willing to limit the sense of *mousikē* to that of ‘education in beautiful poetry’ (poems, etc.), effacing the performative aspect of music *qua* music in its strict sense. This shortcoming is redressed by Schofield 2010a.

⁴³ The view here taken is that the primary addressee of the musical educational programme outlined by Socrates is the *philomathes* and spirited part of the soul (cf. Schofield 2010a: 233–4, Pelosi 2010: 35, Gill 1996: 270–2. Richardson Lear 2006: 116–21, although mainly in agreement with Schofield, seems to privilege the spirited part, by limiting the *philosophon* of 3.411e5–6 to ‘a sort of proto-reason that is stretched and develop into reason proper by fine words’). Because of the hydraulic analogy, appetite also will be affected by such an education, but only indirectly: see Moss 2008: 43–4 and Wilberding 2012. The identification of the part of the soul that perceives the beautiful and the ugly with the appetitive part (Irwin 1995: 217–8) is to be discarded: cf. the detailed criticism by Gill 1996: 271–2 n. 105 and Schofield 2010a: 247 n. 7.

erōs? Which part of the soul is responsible for what seems to be a human innate responsiveness to beauty? Is this *erōs* of the young guardians the same *erōs* as that of the philosopher-kings who have contemplated the Forms? Or a lesser, qualified version of it? What emotional and cognitive drive is here made available to the guardians? To answer these questions we must first examine the logical progression of Socrates' argument at 3.400c12–403c6.

Socrates' first step (3.400c12–400e4) is to reassert (prescriptively rather than descriptively), the supremacy of the verbal component over the charming power of verse, rhythm and musical modes (cf. 3.398d8–9).⁴⁴ What is rhythmical (τὸ εὐρυθμον) must follow and imitate beautiful language by assimilating to it (3.400c12–d1 τὸ μὲν τῇ καλῇ λέξει ἔπεται ὁμοιούμενον). Now, both the manner of speaking and its content (ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως . . . καὶ ὁ λόγος) derive from the nature of the speaker's soul (3.400d5–7 τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθει ἔπεται). Hence we must infer that 'beautiful language, good attunement, gracefulness and beautiful rhythm' (3.400d10–e1 εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία) derive from 'a good natural disposition' (3.400e1 εὐθεία ἀκολουθεῖ), explained as a cognitive capacity 'truly well and finely constituted in relation to its character' (3.400e2–3 τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν).⁴⁵ The use of the term διάνοια seems to imply that some 'minimum of rationality is required' at this stage, but reason, in its highest form, 'is not directly involved' (Pelosi 2010: 21 n. 18).

The next step is to extend the perception of gracefulness and good attunement to other sensible dimensions *outside* the

⁴⁴ The prescriptive character of the injunction betrays Plato's deep awareness of the opposite experience in real life: cf. also *Resp.* 10.601a–b: the belief content must come first, because the charm of verse, rhythm and musical modes (10.601a8 ἐάντε . . . τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ) is otherwise so powerful *by nature* (10.601b1 οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν) as to beguile and persuade above and over the verbal content. Cf. also *Laws* 2.669e1–4.

⁴⁵ Cf. Schofield 2010a: 238 'this is imitation of speech not in a parrot mode, but *as expressing thought or character*' (author's italics); see also Brancacci's insightful observation on how διάνοια is shaped by the audible structure of music (2005: 99–100).

exclusive dominion of music. The young guardians of Callipolis, if they are to perform their proper task, ‘must aim at these qualities everywhere’ (3.400e5 πανταχοῦ ταῦτα διωκτέα). Hence, in the ideal city, one should compel (ἐπιστατέον) not only the poets to create in their poems the image/likeness of good character (3.401b2 τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἥθους) and abstain from the opposite, but also all the other craftsmen (3.401b3–4 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς). It is at this point that the natural imagery of healthy pasture-land and breezes (cf. §1.3) is deployed to convey the imperceptible process that will lead the guardians, from childhood onwards, ‘to affinity, friendship/love and harmony with the beauty of reason’ (3.401c8–d2 εὐθυς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνη εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα). So far the language of *erōs* has not surfaced: what the young soul of the guardians will experience through habituation is to assimilate oneself, be friend of/love (*philia*) and harmonize with the beauty of reason.

At 3.401d4–402a6 we have a significant change of direction: from the ‘everywhere’ (3.400e5 πανταχοῦ) that is going to shape the guardians’ character Socrates moves back to one specific field, music – that is, music in its strict sense:

ἄρ’ οὖν, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἔνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία, καὶ ἔρρωμενέστατα ἄπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφεῖ, εἰ δὲ μή, τούναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὐτῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ’ ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὲ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ’ ἂν ἅπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός, τὰ δ’ αἰσχροὰ ψέγοι τ’ ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὢν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάξοιτ’ ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι’ οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφεὶς;

Is it not the case, Glaukon, I said, that a musical education is most powerful for these reasons, because it is rhythm and melody which above all insinuate themselves in the inner soul and take hold of her with the utmost force, bringing gracefulness with them and making one graceful, if he is correctly educated, or otherwise producing the opposite effect? And because the person who has been educated in this field as he ought to will perceive most

acutely what is short of this standard in faulty artefacts or natural products and being rightly disgusted at them he will praise what is beautiful and rejoicing at it and welcoming it in his soul he will feed on it and become beautiful and good? And will he not correctly blame what is ugly and start hating it since he is still young, before he is able to take in reason, and when reason comes who has been raised in this way will embrace it above all and recognise it because of its familiarity?

The educational power of music is most effective (κυριωτάτη) for two reasons. First, rhythm and harmony – that is, the *non-notional* element of music⁴⁶ – reach a person's inner recesses of the soul more than anything else (μάλιστα) and cleave to it 'most powerfully' (ἐρρωμενέστατα).⁴⁷ Second, music sharpens, in a pre-rational but not anti-rational way, our *sensory* awareness and responsiveness to the beautiful (ὀξύτατ' ἄν αἰσθάνοιτο) by making us perceive everything that falls short of it. It is through perceptive stimuli that the rational part of the soul, still passive in a young human being, recognizes what is akin to itself.⁴⁸ Musical education is thus presented as a pathway to the development of the basic level of human rationality that comes with age.⁴⁹ At a merely descriptive level, it is worth observing that also in this section of Socrates' argumentation

⁴⁶ Cf. Schofield 2010a: 232 'The words – the right kind of words – come first. It is striking, however, that it's not the consciously understood words (*logoi*) that are cited as the influence which will do most to shape the soul, ... but the music in *senso stretto* that is designed to match them'.

⁴⁷ ἄπτεται seems to indicate a direct, almost physical contact of the music over the frame of soul: see Brancacci 2005: 100 n. 3.

⁴⁸ See Wilberding 2012: 142 'it is best to understand the rational part of the soul as the philosophical part of the soul in adults who have become rational (not all do, 441a–b), whereas the philosophical part of the soul of the children (and some adults) is pre-rational'. In the same direction cf. also Pelosi 2010: 35.

⁴⁹ I disagree with Vasiliou 2008: 226, who identifies the *logos* of 3.402a2 with the knowledge of the Forms. In its higher form, *logos* does entail dialectic reasoning, but the context of our passage strongly suggests that what Socrates is speaking of is the physiological advent and development of the reasoning faculty in a human being: cf. also the parallel from *Laws* 2.653b3–4 (μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον) discussed at §2.4. The context makes clear that the musical-cum-poetic education refers to the *early* (if not earliest) stages of the educational curriculum of the guardians, which starts already in infancy and childhood, when the soul is most malleable (2.377b). Within this evolutionary frame, the advent of the *logos* makes sense only if more generally understood as the active adult capacity for reasoning or argument which *naturally* supervenes in an unimpeded process of maturation and growth (see in this direction Schofield 2010a: 234).

(3.401d4–402a6) the language of erotic passion has not yet been directly mobilized to convey the guardians’ emotional and cognitive response to beauty.⁵⁰ What we have so far are expressions of praise (3.401e4 ἐπαινοῖ), rejoicing (3.401e5 χαίροι) and welcoming (3.401e5 καταδεχόμενος, 3.402a3 ἀσπάζοιτ’): emotional dispositions that can be subsumed under the lower-key emotional intensity of *philia*-inspired feelings (cf. 3.401d1).

After zooming in on music in its strict sense, at 3.402a7–b8, Socrates draws an analogy between music’s *modus operandi* on the human soul and the process of learning to read letters (γράμματα): you cannot do it until you can ‘recognise’ (3.402b2 διαγιγνώσκειν) their ‘images’ (εἰκόνες) wherever they may come up. Thus you cannot recognize the images of the letters, when reflected in water or in a mirror, until you recognize the letters themselves.⁵¹ Likewise, at 3.402b8–c9 Socrates tells Glaukon that one will never be properly educated in music (3.402b9–c1 οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα) until one will be able to recognize (3.402c5 γνωρίζωμεν) the different ‘forms’ (3.402c2 τὰ...εἶδη) of moderation (τῆς σωφροσύνης), courage (καὶ ἀνδρείας), liberality (καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος), generosity of spirit (καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας) and their kindred (together with their opposites) wherever they may occur (3.402c4–5 πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα) and until one is capable of perceiving them and their likenesses in the things in which they are present (3.402c5–6 καὶ ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστι αἰσθανώμεθα, καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν).

What is the cognitive level presupposed here for the truly well-educated man in music (μουσικός)? What are the multiple, sensible and moving ‘forms’ (εἶδη) mentioned in this passage?

⁵⁰ The fact that the working of the music on the soul is described in vividly physical terms (cf. 3.401d5 καταδύομαι, 3.401d6 ἄπτομαι) is a different matter. Of course physical language may be eroticised in given contexts but the default assumption of its identity with the language of *erōs* is misleading. What is emphasized here is the almost physical grasp that music has on the human soul.

⁵¹ Cf. Schofield 2010a: 234 on how in this passage the response of the soul to music is consistently characterized by Plato ‘in cognitive terms’; cf. also Burnyeat 1999: 283 n. 51. For the approximation of this analogy to the musical education, see Rosen 2005: 112–13.

Some scholars have argued for a more or less straightforward identification of the ‘forms’ of 3.402c2 with the transcendent Forms.⁵² This assumption is mistaken:⁵³ a person so educated will be able to *recognize*, we are told, *and perceive* the concrete manifestations of the various virtues (temperance, courage and so on) as they present themselves to us in *this* embodied life. But this does not mean that that person is able to ‘understand’ the dialectically based knowledge of the Forms, although of course knowledge of the Forms also presupposes, but is not limited to, the ‘inferior’ cognitive perception here described.⁵⁴

It is at this juncture (3.402d1–9) that a significant shift of focus takes place. Socrates’ argument switches from perceptible moral qualities and their ‘images’ (those of moderation, courage, liberality and magnanimity in whatever type of life they may present themselves) to one specific instantiation of the beautiful: namely, *embodied human beauty*. The passage is worth quoting in full (3.402d1–9):

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὗτο ἄν συμπίπτῃ ἐν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἦθη ἐνόντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου, τοῦτ’ ἄν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι;

πολύ γε.

⁵² See e.g. Zeller 1922: 560. Vasiliou 2008: 227–31 has recently attempted to revive a weaker version of Zeller’s thesis: according to Vasiliou, these εἶδη may or not be the Forms, but the cognitive level to which they refer is the knowledge of dialectics. Because Vasiliou’s is the most recent treatment of which I am aware, it may be useful to point out what seem to me its two major weaknesses: (1) the identification of the *logos* of 3.402a2 with the knowledge of the Forms (see n. 49 in this chapter); and (2) the supposed parallel of *Resp.* 5.476a5–8 is only apparent: *logos* there means ‘account’. That the transcendent Forms in this later passage are said to associate with bodies, actions and the like and manifest themselves in a plurality of appearances even if each is by itself one (πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον) only confirms that the sensible εἶδη of 3.402c are necessarily linked to their transcendent *Urbild*, but the similarity stops here.

⁵³ See, among others, the criticism of Barker 2005: 46–49, Nehamas 1999: 260, Reeve 1988: 52–3, Janaway 1995: 103 n. 62, Gill 1996: 271. More recently, see also Herrmann 2007: 207–12.

⁵⁴ Cf. Ferrari 1989: 120–1 on the strict correlation of these sensible forms to the transcendent Forms (see also Morrison 1977: 216–7 in this direction); ‘one can recognize the “forms” of virtue entirely from within one’s own sense of virtuous life, just by living it; or one can attempt not only to live that life but to grasp its conditions, not only to “recognize” but to “understand”, to study the system of virtue’.

καὶ μὴν τό γε κάλλιστον ἐρασμιώτατον;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

τῶν δὴ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ὃ γε μουσικός ἐρώη ἄν· εἰ δὲ ἀσύμφωνος εἶη, οὐκ ἂν ἐρώη.

(Socrates): Surely, [I said], when someone chances to have in his soul a beautiful character and a corresponding and harmonious beautiful disposition in his physical form, since physical beauty participates of the same model, would this not be the most beautiful sight for who is able to see?

(Glaukon): Yes, very.

(Socrates): And what is indeed the most beautiful is not also the most desired/lovable?

(Glaukon): How could it not be so?

(Socrates): Then the person truly educated in music would be passionately in love with men as much like these as possible; he would not passionately love someone who is lacking in that harmony.

Socrates tells Glaukon that a soul possessing a beautiful disposition (καλὰ ἦθη) and *embodied* in a beautiful physical form (ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις) is the most beautiful sight for anyone to see (κάλλιστον θέαμα). What is most beautiful (that is, in this case, embodied human beauty) is also the object of our utmost desire (ἐρασμιώτατον): hence the truly musically educated man will passionately desire (ἐρώη ἄν) *persons* who will approach this standard as much as possible (τῶν δὴ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων). This is the first time in section 3.402d1–403c3 that the semantic field of *erōs* is deployed.⁵⁵ The use of the adjective ἐράσιμος ('desirable/lovable') in this context is quite interesting. Before Plato, it is attested only three times (Semon. 7.52 W², Anacr. *PMG* 375 and Aesch. *Ag.* 605) and always with an overtly erotic meaning.⁵⁶ Within Plato's *corpus*, the adjective occurs (only in the superlative form) three times:

⁵⁵ Cf. Peponi 2012: 148 who also observes how at 3.402d there is a 'switch from a remarkably low-toned diction, referring to the *euschemosune* of forms, to a diction that tends to elevate the emotional intensity of language'. Peponi, however, is not interested in differentiating, cognitively and in terms of emotional response, between *erōs* for embodied human beauty and non-personal *erōs* for abstract concepts.

⁵⁶ For ἐράσιμος being originally 'at home' particularly in the 'sphere of erotic', see Fraenkel 1950, II: 300 on *Ag.* 605.

apart from this passage of the *Republic*, it also appears in *Phaedrus* 250e1 and *Timaeus* 87d7–8. In all three instances, ἐρασμιώτατος is used with reference to the erotic desire provoked by *human embodied* beauty. The verbal and thematic echoes between the passage of the *Republic* quoted previously and the passages of the *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus* are remarkable.⁵⁷ Although it is the *Timaeus* that comes closest to the *Republic* in terms of intertextual resonances, the overall context of *Phaedrus* 250b1–e1 seems to provide the underlying explanation (only hinted in at *Resp.* 3.402d1–9) of why embodied beauty, in this earthly world, is the most vividly perceived form and hence the one that triggers in us the greatest degree of desire (*Phdr.* 250d7–e1 νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον).⁵⁸ The use of ἐρασμιώτατος at 3.402d6 thus provides an important hint to Plato's practised reader: we are in the field of erotic desires and its compulsions.

What is also worth observing about 3.402d1–403c3 is that it is only when Socrates' discourse switches from the perceptual recognition of some universal qualities to the perception of the embodied beauty of human beings that the language of *erōs* kicks in (3.402d6 ἐρασμιώτατον, 3.402d9 ἐρώη twice).⁵⁹ That is, the love for the beautiful (so far described only in terms of generic *philia*) is, strictly speaking, promoted to the

⁵⁷ In *Tim.* 87d7–8 the human being whose soul and body are both beautiful and well-proportioned is 'the most beautiful and desirable spectacle of all for who has eyes to see it' (τὸ . . . πάντων θεαμάτων τῷ δυναμένῳ καθορᾶν κάλλιστον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον).

⁵⁸ Cf. also 250c8–d3 περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, μετ' ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ὄν, δευρὸ τ' ἐλθόντες κατελήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον ἐναργέστατα. The unsurpassed radiance of Beauty, both in its earthly likenesses (δευρὸ τ' ἐλθόντες) and in its hyperouranian form, most attracts human desire; immediately after this follows the account of how the sight of a beautiful young man – embodied – arouses desire in the soul (250e1–252c3). It is the radiance and vividness with which a Form is perceived by our weak organs that causes the intensity of our desire for it (see Yunis 2011: 149–51 on the entire passage).

⁵⁹ Cf. Kraut 2008: 308 'receptivity to the sexual allure of the human body is one of the modes by which we take pleasure in the beauty of the physical world'. For the perception of and innate responsiveness to human beauty as *the* fundamental experience of what is beautiful available to embodied souls, see Richardson Lear 2006: 115–6 (on the *Republic*, *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*). For the close relation of the Form of beauty with the Good, cf. *Symp.* 204d–e; for the link between the Good and beauty in the Sun passage, cf. *Resp.* 6.508e–509a.

level of passionate desire (*erōs*) among the fledgling guardians only when applied to the sphere of interpersonal relationships, and, more to the point, to same-sex relationships (3.402d8 τῶν δὴ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων). In fact, what follows at 3.402d10–e2 is Socrates' playful reference to Glaukon's well-known homoerotic entanglements (3.402e1 παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα).⁶⁰ This becomes explicit at 3.403b1–c6, when Socrates defines the form of 'correct *erōs*' (ὀρθὸς ἔρως 3.403a7, α11; cf. also ὀρθῶς ἐρῶσι at 3.403b2) among *erastēs* and *erōmenos* to be promoted in Callipolis. Because there cannot be any 'communion' (3.402e3 κοινωνία) between 'moderation' (σωφροσύνη) and 'excessive pleasure' (ἡδονῇ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ), and because sexual pleasure (3.403a4–5 ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια) is by its nature the 'keenest' (3.403a4 ὀξυτέραν), greatest and 'most insane' pleasure (3.403a6 μανικωτέραν) experienced by man, then the relevant law (νόμος) will be established in Callipolis (3.403a10–c2):

οὐδὲν ἄρα προσοιστέον μανικὸν οὐδὲ συγγενὲς ἀκολασίας τῷ ὀρθῷ ἔρωτι;

οὐ προσοιστέον.

οὐ προσοιστέον ἄρα αὕτη ἡ ἡδονή, οὐδὲ κοινωνητέον αὐτῆς ἐραστῇ τε καὶ παιδικoῖς ὀρθῶς ἐρῶσι τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις;

οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσοιστέον.

οὕτω δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, νομοθετήσεις ἐν τῇ οἰκισμένῃ πόλει φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ἀπτεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑέος παιδικῶν ἐραστήν, τῶν καλῶν χάριν, ἐὰν πείθῃ, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὕτως ὁμιλεῖν πρὸς ὃν τις σπουδάζοι, ὅπως μηδέποτε δόξει μακρότερα τούτων συγγίγνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, φόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέξοντα.

(Socrates): Then nothing insane or akin to intemperance must be brought near to the correct *erōs*?

(Glaukon): No, it must not.

(Socrates): Is it not the case that this kind of pleasure must not be brought near and those who correctly love and are loved must not have anything to do with it?

(Glaukon): Indeed no by Zeus, Socrates.

(Socrates): Thus, as it seems, in the city we are founding you will legislate that a lover may kiss his beloved, spend time with him and touch

⁶⁰ Glaukon as erotic man: *Resp.* 2.368a, 5.458d, 5.468b, 5.474c–475a.

him as a father would a son, for the sake of beauty, if he persuades him. As for the rest, he must consort with the beloved he cares for so that there will not be any suspicion of anything further than that. Otherwise he will be liable to the charge of being truly uneducated and lacking in taste.

By law in Callipolis, only the ‘correct form’ of interpersonal *erōs* between same-sex persons will be admitted: an *erōs* short of sexual intercourse that is recruited for beauty’s sake (3.403b6 τῶν καλῶν χάριν) in the interest of the *polis*.⁶¹ The ‘correct *erōs*’ among the guardians of Callipolis will find its equivalent in the interpersonal form of ‘virtuous *erōs*’ (ἐρωὺς ἀρετῆς) fostered among Magnesian citizens at *Laws* 8.837d4–6 (and possibly extended to both sexes in the second-best city).⁶²

It is at this point that Socrates ends his discourse on *mousikē* with the famous claim that the musical education ‘ends where it ought to end; for the musical education ends, I believe, in the erotics of beauty’ (3.403c5–6 οἱ γοῦν δεῖ τελευτᾶν, τετελετύτηκεν· δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά). What is remarkable in this closure is Plato’s overt generalising move. Erotic desire, we have seen, has been summoned so far only when the focus has narrowed down on one particular form of perceptual recognition of what is beautiful, the perception of embodied human beauty – that is, interpersonal *erōs*. All the other forms of sensory recognition of what is beautiful fostered by the musical education have been instead couched in the language of generic *philia*. In fact, once the language of *erōs* has made its appearance, from 3.402d1 to 3.403c3 the dominant, if not unique, object of investigation between Socrates and Glaukon is how to define the proper boundaries of homosexual erotic desire within the ideal city. Yet, when it comes

⁶¹ Cf. also 5.468b3–c8: in Callipolis, those among the guardians who excel on the battlefield will have the right by law to kiss and be kissed by whomever they are in love with, man or woman (c1–4 μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι ἀπαρνηθῆναι ὃν ἂν βούληται φιλεῖν, ἵνα καί, ἔάν τις του τύχη ἐρώων ἢ ἀρρενος ἢ θηλείας), so that they may be keener to triumph (προθυμότερος ἢ πρὸς τὸ τὰριστέα φέρειν). In the ideal city, both heterosexual and homosexual desire is harnessed to the interests of the city, cf. Burnyeat 1999: 285 on the passage.

⁶² See Bobonich 2002: 428. On *Laws* 8.837d4–6 see §2.4.

to summing up the result of the whole conversation, Plato's Socrates is most willing to extend, as if *en passant*, what has been so far an erotics of embodied human beauty *only*, to a universal, unqualified erotics of 'what is beautiful'. The same attempt at an all-inclusive erotics of the beautiful per se can be detected also at 3.403a7–8. Socrates has just had Glaukon recognize that no pleasure is more intense and insane than sexual pleasure (3.403a4–6). There is no mistaking here the area of reference: sex. Yet immediately after this, we are confronted with the (generalising, again) statement that 'the correct *erōs* instead intensely desires by nature what is well-ordered and beautiful in a moderate and harmonious way' (3.403a7–8 ὁ δὲ ὀρθὸς ἔρως πέφυκε κοσμίῳ τε καὶ καλοῦ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μουσικῶς ἑρᾶν). This rhetoric of inclusion, or, if you prefer, this oscillation between the language of (interpersonal) *erōs* and (non-personal) *philia* for what is beautiful at 3.400c12–403c6 has, to the best of my knowledge, mostly passed unnoticed.⁶³ Bearing in mind all the methodological *caveats* raised at §P.1, the switching from the language of *philia* to that of *erōs* within section 3.400c12–403c6 seems not casual but carefully worked out. The very fact that Plato can be 'caught out' in his generalising rhetoric at 3.403c5–6 indicates a real tension in his manipulation of the language of erotic desire with reference to the young guardians to be. The impression is that Plato is striving here to extend the unquenchable drive of *erōs* as motivational source to *both* auxiliaries and future philosopher-kings, but this projection is undermined by his deeper awareness, which from time to time resurfaces in the text, that the auxiliaries will not be able to have access to it except at the lower level of interpersonal relationships. Otherwise, their souls will only step on the lower ladders of love, that of *philia*-inspired feelings.

⁶³ Cf. e.g. Richardson Lear 2006, who, although she recognizes that 'erotic love' refers 'in the first instance' to the homosexual passions of the guardians (104), is then willing to erase the difference. Differently Burnyeat 1999: 283: 'his education will ensure that the younger male comrade he favours has beauty of character to match the beauty of his physical appearance. Love (ἔρως) of such a *person* is the goal and consummation of musical education' (my italics).

1.5 *Philia* and the language of care: Callipolis and models of citizenship

We have seen that in Callipolis both the producers and the auxiliaries agree on the ethically significant true belief that they must be ruled by their betters. The wage earners will do so because of their instinctual and/or habituated ‘moderation’. The guardians will also have the full benefit of the musical and gymnastic education that will nurture in them their inborn emotional responsiveness (framed as *philia*) to what is beautiful. Only in the case of interpersonal relationships will this responsiveness to beauty reach, for the class of the auxiliaries, the intensity of an erotic passion: this will be disciplined and tamed into the normatively ‘correct *erōs*’ (ὀρθὸς ἔρως) of *Resp.* 3.403a7–8. The philosopher-kings are the only ones who will experience the higher, non-personal form of *erōs* for what is true and good. But what about the emotional and affective ties between the three classes which are required by Callipolis’ collectivist psychology? Which form of emotional commitment is exacted in the ideal state by the communitarian ‘friendship’ (*philia*) among producers, auxiliaries and philosopher-kings? Scholars have rightly identified the key feature of this ‘friendship’ in the promotion, in the *Republic*, of an undiluted ideology to which the whole citizenship will be exposed.⁶⁴

Central in this ideological propaganda is the dissemination and manipulation of the ‘public voice’ (φήμη/φήμαι) in inculcating the belief of a ‘virtuous’ friendship⁶⁵ among the three classes: above all, the Noble Lie (3.414b–415d) on the physiological brotherhood of *all* the citizens because of their common autochthonous origin,⁶⁶ and the abolition of any

⁶⁴ See e.g. Schofield 2006: 222–4; Laks 2005: 55–7; Bertrand 1999: 397–400 and 2000: 40–1.

⁶⁵ The qualifier is important: because happiness and virtue come in degrees, ‘some’ degree of virtue is also required from (and exercised by) the producer class. In this sense in Callipolis too, and not only in Magnesia (differently Bobonich 2002: 579 n. 121), civic friendship will be ‘friendship among virtuous people, not a generalised benevolence for all regardless of virtue’.

⁶⁶ For the Noble Lie being addressed to *all* the citizens, producers included, see Wilberding 2012: 130–1, Vasiliou 2008: 235, Kamtekar 2004: 161, Brown 2004: 298 n. 44.

distinction between the use of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ at least among the guardians, because they share women, children and property (5.462b–463e).⁶⁷ Both passages have been extensively studied – for present purposes it will suffice to emphasize that the psychological framework within which the second (auxiliaries) and third (producers) classes are invited to envisage each other vis-à-vis the rulers and the city as a whole is grounded on a skilful declination of the language of care (*kēdesthai*) and familial affection (*philein*).⁶⁸ The earth is their mother (3.414e1 ἡ γῆ...μήτηρ οὔσα), and the citizens of Callipolis will be resolute to defend it as sons defend their mother and nurse (3.414e2 ὡς περὶ μητρὸς καὶ τροφού). Each citizen of the ideal city will look at the other citizens as ‘brothers’ (3.414e4–5 δεῖ... ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν ὄντων καὶ γηγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι).⁶⁹ As observed by Schofield (2006: 286):

‘Loving the city and living out the conviction that promoting what one takes to be its best interests... is something Plato evidently took to require not reason or argument, but the production of a generally accepted ideology’.

It is the emotional commitment that represents the *sine qua non* condition of any communitarian ‘make-believe’. The rhetoric of ‘maternity’ and ‘care’, common currency in

⁶⁷ The citizens of Callipolis will not only address each other using family terms (father, mother, sister, brother and so on) but also will behave themselves as one family. At 5.462b5 Socrates speaks of the *koinōnia* of all citizens (πάντες οἱ πολῖται), but at 5.463c–e he switches to the guardians alone (5.463c1–2 φύλακες, συμφύλακες), apparently identifying the unity of a city with the unity of a class within the city. Yet at 5.463d6 the discourse turns again to ‘all the citizens’ (ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν πολιτῶν) and eventually at 5.464a4 we are left with the unqualified mention of πολῖται *tout court*. For this strategy of ‘linguistic mystification’, see Halliwell 1993: 171 and 175 ad loc., Bertrand 2000: 41 n. 31 and Laks 2005: 57–8.

⁶⁸ Cf. e.g. 3.412d4 ἂν μάλιστα τούτου ὁ τυγχάνοι φιλῶν, 3.415d2–3 πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦς τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ ἀλλήλων κήδεσθαι. On the semantic spectrum covered by κήδομαι already in Homer (solicitude/affliction, care for someone, usually in the slightly pejorative sense of ‘anxiety’), see Mawet 1977, esp. 364–8. For the rhetoric of civic ‘care’ in Plato, cf. e.g. also *Gorgias* 503a3 κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν, *Crito* 53b6 ὅσοι περ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, [*Ep.*] 357c4 ὅσοι περ τῆς πόλεως κήδονται.

⁶⁹ For the paradox, already criticized in antiquity by Aristotle (*Politics* 2.1262b1–2 and 15–16), by which such a form of ‘extended’ *philia* to the whole citizen body will be no *philia* at all, see Ludwig 2007: 214–15.

the patriotic discourse of fifth- and fourth-century BC Attic oratory,⁷⁰ is here de-metaphorized and redefined by Plato to secure social cohesion and solidarity among the inhabitants of Callipolis.⁷¹

However, what is more interesting is that, conventional as this image of the *polis* as ‘nurturing parent’ and object of filial devotion may be, it was only *one* of the multiple, overlapping frameworks made available by contemporary Athenian democratic ideology for envisaging the relationship of the citizens with their city (and hence also intra-citizens’ relationships). This model emphasizes the unequal, asymmetrical relationship between parent and child and hence the authority of the city over the citizens: that is, it rules out *a priori* any ‘negative’ reciprocity between citizens and city (cf., for example, *Crito* 50e7–8 οὐκ ἐξ ἑσού).⁷² But there was at least one other competing model available to Plato’s contemporaries for categorizing the relationship between the city and its citizens that equally hinged on the *emotional* commitment required from the citizen. Democratic ideology in Athens did recognize and welcome, up to a point, the inevitability of self-interest and tried to channel it into the interest for the common welfare. It did so by persuading the individual that the relationship between citizen and *polis* was a mutually rewarding and supporting one.⁷³ One of the rival templates for this kind of ‘positive’ reciprocity or ‘enlightened’ mutual self-interest between citizen and city is that offered by the distinctively *erotic* declination of

⁷⁰ See Liddel 2007: 139–40, Ludwig 2009: 296–7, Dover 1978: 218–19. On κηδομαι in oratory and historiography said of the active concern of the ‘good citizen’ (πολίτης ἀγαθός) for his own country, *polis* or fellow-citizens, cf. e.g. Thuc. 6.14 εἴπερ ἡγείσῃ σοι προσήκειν κηδεσθαί τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθός, Din. 1.31 φιλόπολις ἀνὴρ καὶ κηδεμών, 1.92 εἰ δέ τι κηδόμεθα τῆς πατρίδος, Isocr. 8.39 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κηδομένων τῆς πόλεως, Dem. 24.193 where πολιτεύεσθαι is presented as synonymous to κηδεσθαι τῆς πόλεως. For the ideological (mostly aristocratic) premise underlying the language of brotherhood and care in the Athenian public discourse of the fourth century BC, see Christ 2012: ch. 2.

⁷¹ Cf. Ludwig 2007: 212–17.

⁷² Cf. Strauss 1993: 44–5 and 57–60.

⁷³ See Christ 2006: 15–44 on the integration of the legitimacy of self-interest into the Athenian ideology of citizenship; cf. also Balot 2001: 136–233 and Farenga 2006: 424–39 on the urgency of the discourse of self-interest in late-fifth-century BC Athens.

the civic *philia* motif: the model citizen as *lover* (ἐραστής) of the city.⁷⁴

The *locus classicus* for such a conceptualization of the good citizen as an erotically desiring agent is Pericles' *Funeral Oration* in Thuc. 2.43.1.⁷⁵ Be it or not Thucydidean fiction, Pericles' speech 'is no mere idiolect but rather a fluent example of Athenian civic language', and especially so in its deployment of the discourse of the erotics of citizenship (Wohl 2002: 32). Thuc. 2.43.1–2 represents a critical juncture within the architecture of Pericles' funeral oration. It is the first time in the *epitaphios* that Pericles explicitly distinguishes between dead and living (cf. 2.43.1.2 τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς) and re-establishes contact with the real addressees, the Athenians who have survived. Athens, and contemporary Athens especially, with its material and intellectual achievements,⁷⁶ is presented as the centre around which revolve the individual lives of its citizens. They are asked to pray to have a safer resolve against the enemy but one that is no less brave than that shown by the dead soldiers. To do so they must shift from a logic of individualistic advantage expressed 'by words only' (2.43.1.4 σκοποῦντας μὴ λόγῳ μόνῳ τὴν ὠφελίαν) to one of devotion to the city and its power in which private gains and concerns are absorbed (but not effaced) within a broader vision of the public good:⁷⁷

⁷⁴ For the erotic twist of the civic *philia* motif in late-fifth-century BC Athens, see the pioneering study by Connor 1971 (esp. 99–108). More recent treatments include Ludwig 2002 (esp. 141–4) and 2009: 296–7, Monoson 2000, ch. 3, Wohl 2002, ch. 1, Yates 2005, Farenga 2006: 435–8, Scholtz 2004 and 2007, ch. 2 and 3 (with focus on its Aristophanic deployment). In general, for a survey of occurrences (up to the fourth century BC) of *erōs* and related terms with specific reference to the political dimension, see Ludwig 2002: ch. 3.

⁷⁵ On the 'authenticity' of Pericles' speech recreated by Thucydides and the dangers inherent in any attempt at recovering anything beyond Thucydides' version of it, see above all Yunis 1996: 64–5. For the political role of *erōs* in Thucydides' historical narrative, see the still useful survey by Cornford 1907: 201–20; more recently see also Ludwig 2002: 153–69, Allison 1997: 183–6 and Forde 1986.

⁷⁶ For the (untraditional) role granted by Pericles to the 'glorification of contemporary Athens itself' in the funeral oration, see Rusten 1989: 136 and Taylor 2010: 64–5; for Pericles' possible historical motivations in doing so, see Bosworth 2000.

⁷⁷ Cf. also 2.43.2 κοινῇ γὰρ τὰ σώματα διδόντες ἰδίᾳ τὸν ἀγέρων ἔπαινον ἐλάβανον καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐπισημότατον.

ἀλλὰ (sc. χρῆ) μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους⁷⁸ καὶ ἔραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς⁷⁹ κτλ. (Thuc. 2.43.1)

but you should do so rather by gazing day by day at the actual power of the city and becoming her lovers etc.

Earlier on (2.41.1), Pericles maintained that only in Athens the same person can be ‘self-sufficient’ (τὸ σῶμα αὐταρκες παρέχεσθαι) ‘in all the different kinds of conduct’ (ἐπὶ πλεῖστ’ ... εἶδη)⁸⁰ and that (2.41.2–3) the ‘power’ of the city (δύναμις) is the product and ‘visible sign’ (σημαίνει) of the individual citizen’s ‘ways of life’ (τρόποι).⁸¹ Athens, Pericles claims, is distinctively and uniquely good at realizing a flourishing life for human agents, because its citizens foster the *polis* and its power by becoming her lovers. It is by transposing *erōs* from the most intensely private sphere of human life to a public, civic dimension that Athenian citizens achieve what they have achieved. In this way the citizens receive happiness and freedom to pursue the activities they deem worthy (2.40.1–2), be they intellectual cultivation (φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε ... καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν), economic gain (πλουτῶ τε ἔργου μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγου κόμπῳ χρώμεθα) or politics (οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια). The civically sanctioned activities embraced by the Athenians *as* Athenian citizens are presented as alternative lifestyles *compatible* under the Athenian democracy.⁸²

This compatibility is made possible by the citizens’ *erōs* for their city: the pool of the distinctively personal, ‘free’ (that is, without external coercion), and at the same time compulsive

⁷⁸ For the erotic nuance of θεάομαι in this context, see Taylor 2010: 72–3.

⁷⁹ For αὐτῆς referring, from a grammatical point of view, primarily to πόλις (and not to δύναμις), see Hornblower 1991: 311 ad loc.

⁸⁰ The syntax of 2.41.1 is debated: I follow here Rusten’s interpretation (1989: 158 ad loc.)

⁸¹ 2.41.2–3 αὐτὴ ἡ δύναμις τῆς πόλεως, ἣν ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν τρόπων ἐκτρεφόμεθα, σημαίνει: cf. Long 2003: 56 on it. See also 2.36.4 on how ‘customary practices’ (ἐπιτηδεύσεις) and ‘individual ways of life’ (τρόποι) have made the greatness of Athens’ public life: see Rusten 1985: 17.

⁸² Cf. Rusten 1985: 18: ‘Although Pericles makes use of the same scheme of lives as the philosophers, his purpose is different: none of the three lives is rejected in favour of another, and each is so qualified as to imply that it is of value only as far as it harmonises with Athenian society as a whole’. On Athenian society as one of “thin coherence” rather than thick identification’, cf. also Balot 2009: 289 (following Ober 2005: 89–90). See also Christ 2012.

emotional energy of *erōs* is harnessed as a political tool to reconcile the freedom of individuals and their disinterested commitment to the collective well-being of the *polis*. As observed by Ludwig, ‘eros makes people willingly enter bonds that would otherwise look like slavery. In seeking to motivate free, democratic citizens toward civic sacrifice and duty, Pericles here discovers a passion that is at once *perfectly free and perfectly committed*’ (Ludwig 2009: 297; italics mine).

Yet the competitive ethos of the *erastēs* metaphor, evoking the image of intense rivalry among aristocratic *erastai* over the *erōmenos*, is not without its dangers. Pericles’ democratization of aristocratic values may indulge the *dēmos*’ fancy of conceiving itself as an erotic and political elite, but when erotic competition slides into the political dimension the tyrannical threat is never very far away.⁸³ It is because of its potential for strife that Plato rejects this model of citizenship (the citizen as *erastēs* and the city as *erōmenos*) in his ideal Callipolis. At *Resp.* 7.521b4–5 Socrates explicitly states that only those who are *not* entangled in an erotic longing for public power must have access to it (ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε μὴ ἐραστὰς τοῦ ἀρχεῖν ἵέναι ἐπ’ αὐτό), otherwise the only possible outcome will be a fight among ‘rival competitors in desire’ (εἰ δὲ μὴ, οἳ γε ἀντερασταὶ μαχοῦνται). Plato adopts here the language of erotic desire only to undermine it: political desire and political contestation are two aspects of the same coin and must be eradicated from Callipolis. It is indeed difficult not to see this passage (7.521b4–5) as an example of Plato’s engagement with and refutation of the Periclean rhetoric of erotic citizenship. Access to political power (ἀρχεῖν) is not exactly the same thing as ‘being a citizen’, yet the ‘participatory’ nature of Athenian citizenship itself, based as it was on the concept of ‘sharing’ (μέθεξις) duties and privileges, and the reference, in Thuc. 2.43.1, to the ‘power’ (δύναμις) of the city

⁸³ Shanske 2007: 45–6; Scholtz 2004; Wohl 2002: 36–7; Crane 1998: 312–25 (Farenga 2006: 436 significantly down-plays this aspect of Thucydides’ Pericles’ erotic image). Ancient Greeks perceived a very close relationship between *erōs* and tyranny: Ludwig 2002: 129 and 141, 149, 153. For the political currency of the discourse on tyranny in late-fifth/early-fourth-century BC Athens, see Raaflaub 2003 and Forsdyke 2009. For Athens as *the* tyrant city (cf. Thuc. 2.63.1–2) and Pericles’ tyrannical attitude, see also Kallet 2003.

clearly betray the assumption of a citizen actively interested in the public management of the *polis*.⁸⁴

In Greek political discourse and practice, these two models of citizenship (filial care and erotic desire) offered different but complementary visions of citizenship and its duties: Pericles himself skillfully exploited them both in his funeral oration.⁸⁵ In other words, to the eyes of his contemporary, Plato did not *have* to choose between two radically incompatible models. Yet Plato's psychology of the embodied person and his collective psychology of Callipolis make him opt for the civic model of *philia*-inspired feelings. The degree of the emotional participation from individuals requested by the collectivist ideology of the best city will not be the late-fifth-century BC model of the *erastēs* of the city (with its stasiotic potential) but that of care and filial devotion only. This is also an additional sign that Plato is clearly more preoccupied with division within the class of guardians (the possible *erastai* in the political arena) than with a possible disconnection between auxiliaries and producers.⁸⁶ The language of *erōs* in its civic and public dimension is carefully excised from the public *phēmē* of the ideal city.

1.6 Degrees of 'friendship' in Callipolis

Callipolis' friendship with itself and its own members heavily relies on the assumption that the ways in which citizens talk

⁸⁴ On 'sharing in the constitution' as a building block of the notion of Athenian citizenship in fourth-century BC oratory and political discourse, see Liddel 2007: 136–9 and Hansen 1991: 64–5; for Aristotle's definition of Athenian citizens as equal 'share-holders' in the city (*Politics* 3.1276b1–2 and 4.1291b36), see Schofield 1996.

⁸⁵ The *polis* as nurturing mother: Thuc. 2.46.1: τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς παῖδας τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε δημοσίᾳ ἢ πόλιν μέχρι ἥβης θρέψει. On the complementary nature of the two models of citizenships (filial obligation and enlightened mutual self-interest), see Christ 2006: 26–8 and Liddel 2007: 139–43. On the complementarity of popular sovereignty and rule of the law, see Ober 1989: 144 and now Wohl 2010: ch. 1.

⁸⁶ Cf. Laks 2005: 56–7. Class consciousness in the *Republic* is not envisaged as potentially divisive and disruptive of the social cohesion and fabric because all the citizens of Callipolis are able, even if at different cognitive levels, to understand and appreciate the justice, goodness and beneficial nature of τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν (cf. 443b1–2) because of the close interconnectedness of their functions within the community they live in.

about their relationship within the city not only reflect but in a sense also contribute to *creating* those very same relationships. This is especially true of the role of the ‘public voice’ (φήμαι ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν πολιτῶν) at *Resp.* 5.463d6–7:⁸⁷ it is this collective voice of the citizens that will approvingly sing (ὑμνήσουσιν) of the universal bond of care into the ears of young and elder (εὐθύς περὶ τὰ τῶν παίδων ὧτα καὶ περὶ πατέρων). The verbal basis of this ‘egalitarian fiction’ is clearly exposed at 5.464a4–5: οὐκοῦν μάλιστα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ πολῖται, ὃ δὴ ἐμὸν ὀνομάσουσιν; (‘will our citizens not share above all in the same thing which they call “mine”?’).⁸⁸ From a sceptical stance, one could claim that it is literally only the act of ‘speaking out’ (ὀνομάσουσιν) this communitarian ideology that is left to the third class. The producers can only articulate verbally the egalitarian ideology they promote, but not live it out.⁸⁹ Yet, on a more charitable reading, one could equally contend that, within the ideal city of Callipolis, rhetoric, be it only the rhetoric of ideology, opens up channels of communications along which different *degrees* of personal relationships can take place.⁹⁰ This seems to be the case at *Resp.* 5.463a10–b8. Plato is deeply aware that what really defines a constitution is not only the type of authority exercised by the rulers but also the emotional dispositions of rulers and subjects towards each other and towards the city as a whole, independently from the constitutional and institutional superstructure.⁹¹ According to Plato, contemporary democratic Athens, although claiming to promote justice and the well-being of the Athenians, is defective in moulding what really matters: the *moral* education of its citizens. And it is the moral and emotional disposition of

⁸⁷ On Plato’s oscillation in his conceptualization of ‘citizen’ in this passage (auxiliaries only and/or producers?) see n. 67 in this chapter.

⁸⁸ Cf. also 5.464a1 μετὰ τούτου τοῦ δόγματός τε καὶ ῥήματος.

⁸⁹ See Bertrand 2000: 41.

⁹⁰ Cf. Schofield 2006: 247 n. 91 ‘the solution might consist in recognizing the *grades* or *modes* of brotherhood to which Plato might be thought to be logically committed. One could say that guards (gold or silver in nature) have one grade or mode of brotherhood with other guards, another with farmers, artisans and people involved in commerce (iron or bronze)’ (my emphasis).

⁹¹ See e.g. the excursus on mixed constitutions in Book 3 of the *Laws* with Hahm’s comment on it (2009: 183).

the citizenry that is ‘prior to and determining of every political ideology’ (Balot 2007: 41). It is within this framework that we should read 5.463a10–b8.

Socrates has just reminded Glaukon that the ‘rulers’ (ἄρχοντες) in most cities are called by the ‘people’ (δῆμος) their ‘masters’ (δεσπότης), but in democracies the very same term means ‘magistrates’ (ἄρχοντας). In the ideal city the situation will be different:

τί δ' ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δῆμος; πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί τοὺς ἄρχοντάς φησιν εἶναι;

σωτῆράς τε καὶ ἐπικούρους, ἔφη.

τί δ' οὗτοι τὸν δῆμον;

μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφείας.

οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἄρχοντες τοὺς δῆμους;

δούλους, ἔφη.

τί δ' οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀλλήλους;

συνάρχοντας, ἔφη.

τί δ' οἱ ἡμέτεροι;

συμφύλακας.

(Socrates): And what about the people in our city? In addition to ‘citizen’, what do they say the rulers are?

(Glaukon): ‘Saviours’ and ‘allies’.

(Socrates): And what do these call the people?

(Glaukon): ‘Wage-givers’ and ‘*tropheis*’.

(Socrates): And what do the rulers in other cities call their peoples?

(Glaukon): ‘Slaves’.

(Socrates): And what do the rulers call one another?

(Glaukon): ‘Fellow-rulers’.

(Socrates): And what ours?

(Glaukon): ‘Fellow-guardians’.

In the ideal city, the producers (or anyway the majority of the population, producers included: 5.463a10 ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δῆμος) call the rulers neither ‘rulers’ (ἄρχοντες) nor ‘masters’ (δεσπότης) but ‘saviours and allies’ (σωτῆράς τε καὶ ἐπικούρους), hence implying a recognition of and moral assent, on the part of

the third class, to the justice of the rule of the philosopher-kings. The co-rulers (auxiliaries and philosopher-kings) are ‘co-guardians’ (5.463b8 συμφύλακες)⁹² and they refer to the members of the producer class not as ‘subjects’ or ‘slaves’ but as their ‘wage-payers’ (μισθοδότης)⁹³ and τροφίας. What really defines the different class of citizens in their reciprocal relationship with each other is not as much their objective function (policing and army for the auxiliaries; magistracies for the philosopher-kings, production of the necessities of life for the producers) but their perceived role in the emotional imagination of the citizenry. This seems to me the case also for the third class. At 5.463b2 the producers are called by Glaukon μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφίας. The latter term is quite interesting. Translators usually rend it, no doubt correctly, with either ‘providers of food’ or ‘sustainers’.⁹⁴ And this is what is literally meant: because the guardians will not dedicate themselves to any craft (farming, trading and so on), it will be the producers that will provide them with the necessities of life. Yet τροφεύς (if not μισθοδότης) has also a deeper emotional resonance, especially in Plato: it is he who practises the art of nurturing and educating, both materially and metaphorically.⁹⁵

⁹² On the analogies between philosophers and auxiliaries, see Wilberding 2009: 358–9. At 3.414b5–6 the auxiliaries are called ‘allies and helpers of the rulers’ beliefs’ (ἐπικούρους τε καὶ βοηθοὺς τοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων δόγμασιν).

⁹³ Halliwell 1993: 174 ad loc. sees an ‘ironic edge’ in Plato’s use of the word μισθοδοται: at 4.419a10–420a1 Adeimantus had called the guardians ‘waged allies’, i.e. mercenaries (ἐπικούροι μισθωτοί), while Socrates had replied that the μισθός of the guardians does not entail money but only subsistence. According to Halliwell, the ironic point is that ‘the Guardians, for all the pre-eminence of their natures, will be the political servants of the city’ – my interpretation sees instead in the reappropriation of the (democratic) notion of μισθός a sign of Plato’s willingness to emphasize instead the mutual interdependence between producer class and rulers.

⁹⁴ Cf. e.g. Griffith’s ‘providers’, Grube’s ‘providers of food’, ‘Waterfield’s ‘quartermasters’, Shorey’s ‘supporters’.

⁹⁵ The term occurs nine times in Plato: twice in the *Crito* (51e6 and 54b2), always said of the laws as educators and nurturers of Socrates; once in the *Plt.* (308e5), with reference to the role of ‘the teachers and educators’ (τοῖς κατὰ νόμον παιδευταῖς καὶ τροφεῦσιν), which must be directed by the true art of kingship (for the semantics of τρέφω in the *Statesman*, cf. Lane 1998: 2–4 and 53–4); thrice in the *Republic* (5.463b2, 8.548c1–4, 9.580a5 [in the last passage the tyrant is τροφεύς κακίας]); and thrice in the *Laws*: at 7.809b1–3 the law must educate (παιδεύειν) the παιδείας ἐπιμελητής with the utmost accuracy without omitting, as far as it is possible, anything but ‘fully interpret every argument so that he in his turn may become both

Apart from 9.580a5 (see [note 95](#) in this chapter), in the *Republic* the term τροφεύς occurs at 8.547c1–4: when the ideal city degenerates into a timarchy, then the ruling class privatizes land and possessions, and enslaves as *perioikoi* and servants (δουλωσάμενοι... περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας) those whom they previously protected as freemen, friends *and* τροφέας (8.547c1–3 τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας). The tricolon ἐλευθέρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας is no doubt meant to emphasize the emotionally valuable role of being a τροφεύς, be it also from a material point of view. In a work so obsessively concerned with the transformative power of nurturing and education as the *Republic*, it is difficult not to see in the qualification of τροφεύς a deeper emotive nuance. In a way commensurate to their degree of virtue, the producers in Callipolis also take part in the web of care and reciprocal *philia* binding the whole citizenry.

It is against this background that we now turn to the vision of ordinary citizenship promoted in the *Laws*.

interpreter and educator to the others’ (πάντα δὲ λόγον ἀφερμηνεύειν, ἵνα οὗτος τοῖς ἄλλοις μνηστής τε ἅμα καὶ τροφεύς γίγνηται); in a more mundane sense, see 5.735b1 (τροφεύς τε ἱππῶν) and 8.834b5 (ἄρματος... τροφεύς).

CITIZENSHIP IN MAGNESIA

2.1 Degrees of virtue in Magnesia

We have seen in the previous chapter that in Callipolis the motivational force prompting the citizens' attitude towards each other and the city as a whole finds its strongest basis in a reciprocal bond of care and *philia*; only the philosopher-kings will have access to a higher form of non-personal *erōs* as a self-propelling drive towards virtue. Virtue and friendship, in the ideal city, come in degrees.¹ Is it the same also in the second-best city? Do the degrees of virtue available to the citizens of Magnesia map perfectly into those of the citizens of the *Republic*? Who is the 'ordinary' Magnesian citizen and what forms of both emotional and cognitive resources can he/she draw on in performing 'the citizenship of virtue' in the second-best city? Does desire, and especially erotic desire (*erōs*), ever come into play in the landscape of Magnesian civic virtues? And if it does, how does it relate to the moral psychology of the embodied person in the *Laws*?

In the following sections, I try to answer these questions by outlining first the minimum moral requirement exacted from the fringes of Magnesia's citizenry: slaves and long-term stranger residents (*metics*) (§2.2). Although these groups do not qualify, strictly speaking, as citizens, this preliminary analysis helps us to understand the nature of the instinctual, untaught *sōphrosynē* spoken of at *Laws* 3.696d4–e6 and 4.710a5 and its relationship with the 'demotic virtue' of *Resp.* 6.500d9 (δημοτική ἀρετή). In its lowest instantiation (instinctual

¹ For Callipolis I follow Kamtekar 2004, Vasiliou 2008 and Kraut 2010.

self-moderation without the direct benefit of the ‘correct education’), this lesser virtue, differently from the *Republic* (cf. §1.3 on the producer class), turns out to be a necessary but *not* sufficient requirement for qualifying as a citizen of Magnesia. In this respect, not only socially and politically, but also *morally*, the notion of citizenship promoted in the *Laws* is far more conservative and restrictive than that embraced in the *Republic*.² In the next section (§2.3), the focus then shifts to the moral and emotional commitment required from the ‘ordinary’ Magnesian citizen proper. We see that in the ‘communicational utopia’ of Magnesia, among the several strategies mobilized by Plato to bridge the gap between the governing elite and the rest of the citizen body, an important role is played by the extension of the language and rhetoric of desire, and erotic desire (*erōs*) in particular, potentially to the whole citizenry (§2.3).³ This paradigm of ‘erotic’ citizenship that resurfaces at key points in the *Laws*, while representing a logical extension of the ‘erotics of beauty’ of Book 3 of the *Republic*, is also a specific product of the education of sensibility fostered by Magnesia’s ‘correct education’. It is in the *Laws* that we find at its most explicit Plato’s willingness to harness the feelings prompted by every cognitive state to promote civic virtue. In Magnesia, not only ‘correct opinion’ but also *epithymia* and *erōs* are, under due qualifications, acceptable emotional and cognitive dispositions accessible to the ‘common’ citizen to foster civic excellence. At the same time, I show how Plato’s idiosyncratic use, in the *Laws*, of the language of desire and *erōs* with reference to civic virtue must be read against the broader late-fifth- and mid-fourth-century BC discourse on issues of citizenship, desire and intention (§2.4).

² Cf. Brisson 2005 on the ‘higher’ degree of social and political elitism of Magnesia; for the moral implications, see above all Kahn 2004: 344–5.

³ That the divide between rulers and ordinary citizens is somehow flattened in the *Laws*, is widely recognized, see e.g. Schofield 2003: 13 and more in detail 1999a; cf. also Kahn 2004: 345. What so far, to the best of my knowledge, has passed unobserved is that Plato’s ‘civic’ deployment, in the *Laws*, of the language of *erōs* and *epithymia* is part of this broader strategy.

2.2 *Anagkaiotatē sōphrosynē* in Magnesia: slaves and metics

We have already seen that the composition of the two utopian citizenships varies considerably between the *Republic* and the *Laws* (§1.1): in Magnesia trade and crafts will be practised only by metics and their slaves (*Laws* 11.919d2–6), with some form of agricultural labour allowed to the ‘landed citizens’ (γεωμόροι).⁴ As observed by Bobonich, in the second-best city, ‘the boundaries of the political community are constituted by the capacity for and dedication to virtue’ (2002: 417). What about those members of the population (slaves and metics) that, even if strictly speaking excluded from the *political* community, still form a significant part, on an everyday basis, of the private and collective life of the city? Should one infer that, as a corollary of the ‘virtuous friendship’⁵ practised by Magnesian citizens, *any* form or degree of virtue is precluded from the non-citizens? Even if the text of the *Laws* is much more explicit about metics than slaves in this respect, Saunders’ neologism ‘ἀναγκαιοτάτη σωφροσύνη’ (‘untaught’, ‘instinctive’ self-restraint) seems to be the most plausible answer for both categories (Saunders 1962: 53). Saunders’ qualification ἀναγκαιοτάτη (‘most necessary’) is important: the moderation of the non-citizens, in Magnesia, is envisaged as an emotional disposition that, although still the first ‘necessary’ step in the ladder of virtue, is also ‘necessary’ inasmuch as it is the unreflective product of nature and thus subject to its determinism. In the *Laws*, the term *sōphrosynē*, in keeping with Plato’s use of it in previous dialogues, has a wide variety of meanings, ranging from the mere instinctive ‘self-control’ mentioned earlier to the more articulate ‘moderation’ brought about by self-knowledge under the leadership of reason over passions.⁶ It is in this second, broader sense that *sōphrosynē* plays a pivotal, unifying role in outlining the map of civic virtues distinctive of the

⁴ See recently Samaras 2012 on the agrarian elite of Magnesia.

⁵ On civic *philia* in Magnesia, see above all Bobonich 2002: 427–34, 454–9.

⁶ See Saunders 1962a: 51–4 for a collection of passages; cf. also Stalley 1983: 54–6 and more recently Creller 2010. For a semantic study of *sōphrosynē* in Plato’s early up to middle dialogues, see Rademaker 2005, ch. 9 and 10.

Magnesian citizen *as* citizen.⁷ Slave and metics have access to the former type only, although in the case of the metics it encompasses, unsurprisingly, a higher degree of co-participation and, in a sense, responsiveness to the collective life of the *polis*.

Slavery in the *Laws* has been extensively studied, especially with regard to Magnesia's penal code and its bearing on contemporary Athenian legislation.⁸ Here I would like instead to focus on what is the *prescribed* moral make-up of slaves in Magnesia. The main passage in this respect is *Laws* 6.776c6–778a11. *Sōphrosynē* is not specifically mentioned in this section but the emphasis on the slaves' potential good and pliable nature (6.776d6 εὐμενεστάτους, 6.777b7 εὐχρηστον; cf. also 6.778a8–10) seems to suggest that some kind of *natural* disposition is implied as a default premise. How is the slaves' instinctive self-moderation brought about in Magnesia? Is it a necessary requirement for the slaves' own benefit only, or also for the benefit of the community of citizens at large?

The distinction between slaves and masters is recognized as 'necessary' at 6.777b5 (πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν διόρισιν), yet Plato is too much aware of the interconnected nature of human and social life not to allow space also for *some kind* of indirect moral education of slaves, at both a formal and more informal level.⁹ The passages that hint in this direction are indeed few, but still significant.¹⁰ At 8.838d6–8 we are told that by

⁷ For *sōphrosynē* in its extended sense as the 'the mainspring of the *Laws*', see Stalley 1983: 54–6. For the mutually interdependent relationship between *sōphrosynē* and the rule of law in the *Laws*, see Stalley at 84–6.

⁸ See above all Morrow 1939 and 1960: 148–52, Saunders 1991, *passim* (see index s.v. 'slaves' at 413) and Bertrand 2001.

⁹ Cf. Morrow 1939: 43–4.

¹⁰ Morrow's list, although still useful, is over-optimistic. I cannot find any direct or indirect reference to slaves either at 2.664b or 665a (quoted by Morrow 1939: 44 as evidence that the slaves will be taught in Magnesia that the just life is the happiest). 2.665c (omitted by Morrow) may, on the other hand, do (see following discussion). Morrow's interpretation of 7.794b5–7 as witnessing to the fact that in Magnesia also slaves' children will be educated together with the freemen's offspring up to the age of six is ill-founded; cf. Vlastos 1941: 95 and Saunders 1972: 54–5 (followed by Schöpsdau 2003: 520–1). The passage does not imply anything more than that the woman selected to be in charge of the surveillance of the Kindergarten education will punish *any* adult male or female, be it slave, stranger or citizen, who will

‘making sacred the public opinion’ (καθιερώσας ταύτην τὴν φήμην) ‘slaves as well as freemen, women and children and the whole city’ (παρὰ πᾶσι, δούλοις τε καὶ ἐλευθéroις καὶ παισὶ καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει) will be exposed ‘without any differentiation’ (κατὰ τὰ αὐτά) by the legislator to the fundamental ethical truth that incest is unholy. It is nevertheless within the *oikos* and in their personal relationship with their masters that the slaves’ education towards virtue will be mostly accomplished, and to the benefit of the masters too. At 6.777d2–e2 masters’ just behaviour towards slaves is the litmus test for uncovering the true or artificial nature of a citizen’s moral standards (6.777d5–6 διὰ δηλὸς γὰρ ὁ φύσει καὶ μὴ πλαστῶς σέβων τὴν δίκην): in so doing, the master will benefit not only his slaves but, over and above that, himself (6.777d2–3 μὴ μόνον ἐκείνων ἔνεκα, πλέον δὲ αὐτῶν προσιμῶντας). At the same time, this behaviour on the part of the master ‘is most efficient to sow the seeds of virtue’ in the slaves (6.777e1–2 σπείρειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἔκφυσιν ἱκανώτατος ἂν εἴη).

But is there also a more public, collective dimension within which slaves will be, by osmosis, exposed to and infused by the ‘civic’ correct education bestowed to Magnesia’s citizens proper? One (often neglected) passage that seems to go in this direction is 2.665c2–4.¹¹ Here the Athenian Stranger says that the whole city, without any distinction of gender, age and legal status, must never cease to enchant itself with its spells (τὸ δεῖν πάντ’ ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα, ἐλεύθερον καὶ δοῦλον, θῆλυν τε καὶ ἄρρενα, καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει ὅλην τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν αὐτῇ ἐπάδουσιν μὴ παύεσθαι), with apparent reference to the civic choral education *en masse* just outlined at 2.664b–665b. In this passage, at least *prima facie*, slaves feature as recognized members of the religious life of Magnesia: to a contemporary Athenian reader this openness cannot but have evoked the overall-inclusiveness of the Eleusinian Mysteries.¹² This ties in nicely with the

accompany the children to the sacred spaces, if they cause disturbance or do not maintain order.

¹¹ Neither Morrow 1939 nor Vlastos 1941 refers to the passage in question.

¹² For the ideological exclusion of slaves, at Athens, from the publicly financed rites of the city, the only civic ritual to which they were allowed to participate being the

recognition of slaves as members of the religious community that seems to be presupposed also by some of Magnesia's religious laws.¹³ Yet 7.817e1–3 complicates the matter further.

From 7.814e to 7.817d the Athenian Stranger has outlined the various types of choral dance in which Magnesia's citizens will be trained, with a final capping on tragedy. It is at this point that the Athenian Stranger refers to a separate arrangement, established by law, about the education in choral matters between masters and slaves (7.817e1–3 ταῦτ' οὖν ἔστω περὶ πᾶσαν χορείαν καὶ μάθησιν τούτων περὶ συντεταγμένα νόμοις ἔθῃ, χωρὶς μὲν τὰ τῶν δούλων, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν, εἰ συνδοκεῖ). Commentators have long since remarked on the surprising nature of this distinction, which seems to presuppose that the necessity of differentiating between diverse regulations in dance for masters and slaves has *already* been treated at some length (although it has not). To solve the riddle, some scholars have pointed to the unfinished state of revision of the *Laws*, observing that if Plato had in mind a differentiated education between citizens and slaves as far as dance was concerned, this is nowhere clearly developed and spelled out in the text as we have it.¹⁴ Others have argued that the only relatively recent passage to which this startling distinction can refer is 7.816e, where comedy acting and dancing is assigned to 'slaves and hired strangers' (δούλοις . . . καὶ ξένοις ἐμμίθοις).¹⁵ Plato would be here adopting, as far as dance is concerned, the double moral standard of masters and helots characteristic of Spartan society: slaves will be asked to perform degrading, undignified dances

Eleusinian Mysteries, see Parker 2005: 169 and Hedrick 2007: 291–2 for the socio-historical background.

¹³ Cf. Morrow 1939: 121 'nevertheless where the laws of the state stop short, religious law with its sanctions takes the slave under its protection, at the same time imposing on the slave, as on any "freeman", the obligations of "holiness". The recognition of the slave as a member of the religious community we found to be the most striking'. Cf. also Panno 2007: 185. More sceptical Bertrand 2000: 128 with n. 128 on the 'fictional' aspect of slaves' taking part in the religious life of the community.

¹⁴ Cf. Schöpsdau 2003: 599.

¹⁵ Cf. e.g. England 1921, II: 308 and Vlastos 1941: 95. For a detailed treatment of the role of 'comedy' and 'comedic' speech-acts and behaviours in Magnesia, see §5.4.

to show the young what kind of behaviour must be avoided by freemen.¹⁶

Even if we consider Plato's laconizing tendencies, this last hypothesis seems to me unlikely on several grounds. For a start, at 2.665c the choral civic dances promoted in Magnesia do not contemplate any substantial difference in ethos across the population of the city at large (citizens and slaves), but if anything quite the opposite.¹⁷ Second, we have already seen that the intrinsic interconnected nature of human social life is such that in Magnesia the divinely inspired legislator will devote careful thought on how to avoid the pollution of the moral character of citizens' slaves *for the citizens' sake* first of all (6.777d–e, quoted earlier). Likewise, when confining craftsmanship to metics, the law explicitly states that not only no citizen proper must devote himself to the δημιουργικά τέχναι, but also no citizen's slave (8.846d2–3 πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιχώριος μηδεὶς ἔστω τῶν περὶ τὰ δημιουργικὰ τεχνήματα διαπονούντων, μηδὲ οἰκέτης ἀνδρὸς ἐπιχωρίου).¹⁸ The same applies to trade as well: the rationale given is that in Magnesia tradesmen (that is, metics) can be only those whose corruption would not be 'a great harm for the city' (11.919c5–6 μεγάλη λύπη τῇ πόλει). The underlying principle in both cases (trade and craftsmanship) seems to be the implicit recognition that citizens' slaves' collusion with such activities will endanger, if only at a second remove, the moral character of Magnesia's citizens. Given Plato's deep awareness of the *transformative* power of mimesis and its grasp on the psychology of the individual, it seems to me *a fortiori* quite difficult to imagine that Plato would allow citizens' slaves to perform undignified dances in Magnesia but not

¹⁶ See Plut. *Lyc.* 28.9 καὶ ὥδ' ἀς ἐκέλευον ᾄδειν καὶ χορείας χορεύειν ἀγενεῖς καὶ καταγελάστους, ἀπέχεσθαι δὲ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. For this (standard) view see e.g. P. Murray 2013: 297–8. Cf. furthermore the Athenian Stranger's remark on the unsatisfactory form of human inter-relationship represented by the institution of helots at 6.776c–d.

¹⁷ Uniformity in ethos does not imply identity in the specific types of dance practised; we know, for instance, that women will have songs and dances different from the men's songs and dances. Yet one thing is to allow for different modalities of dance within a prescribed moral ethos and another to set such a double standard as posited by some scholars.

¹⁸ On Plato's use, in the *Laws*, of 'native' (ἐπιχώριος) as synonym of 'citizen' (πολίτης), see Morrow 1960: 112 n. 51.

to practise equally corrupting activities as trade and crafts. A way out of this difficulty at 7.816e5–6 (comic dance and speech-acts to be performed only by δούλοις . . . καὶ ξένοις ἐμμίσθοις) may be, in my view, to take the adjective ἐμμίσθοις as referring to *both* slaves and strangers – that is, only hired strangers and *their* slaves will be allowed to take part in such performances.¹⁹ In this way, choral ‘civic purity’ would be preserved uncompromisingly within the second-best city.²⁰ Be it as it may, the one positive inference that *can* be drawn from the text of 7.817e1–3 as it presently stands, is that, whether there is or not a reference to 7.815e, slaves in Magnesia seem to be the recipients of some forms of ‘apprehension’ (μάθησις) about choral matters. That this apprehension be a ‘negative’ one (apprehension of behaviours to be avoided) seems to me unlikely for the reasons stated previously.

What about the moral profile of the metic population of Magnesia? The distinction between metic and citizen, in Magnesia, is sharper than in contemporary Athenian practice.²¹ Already in the *Republic* Socrates acknowledges that one of the greatest evils in a democracy is that the metic is on a level with the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the foreigner likewise (*Resp.* 8.563a1–2 μέτοικον δὲ ἀστὴρ καὶ ἀστὸν μετοίκῳ ἐξισοῦσθαι, καὶ ξένον ὡσαύτως). In the second-best city, metics will be tradesman and craftsman, and as such limited to the third property class (the penultimate: 11.915b–c);²² at the same time, metics in Magnesia are also recruited as ‘state-hired’ teachers, thus contributing to the overall important

¹⁹ Neither England nor Schöpsdau entertains the possibility of this interpretation. For a comparable case of in terms of word order, see e.g. *Laws* 9.866e4 προπηλακισθέντες λόγοις ἢ καὶ ἀτίμοις ἔργοις, where the adjective ἀτίμοις must refer to both λόγοις and ἔργοις, cf. Berry 1922: 53.

²⁰ Athenians normally excluded foreigners from their civic choruses: cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 30.3 μὴ χορεύειν ξένον, Dem. 21.56 μὴδὲν ἀγωνίζεσθαι ξένον; see Wilson 2000: 80–1 and 340 n. 132 (differently actors – that is, *not* members of the chorus – could be strangers).

²¹ For a comparative analysis of Plato’s *metoikia* and Athenian contemporary practice, see Whitehead 1977: 129–32, Schöpsdau 2011: 251–3. On metics in the *Laws*: cf. Morrow 1960: 144–8; Whitehead 1977: 129–36; Saunders 1982: 46–7; Vidal Naquet 1986: 224–45, Bertrand 1999: 141–9, Levin 2010: 19–20 with n. 68.

²² On trade and commerce in Magnesia, encouraging and fostering ‘private’ pleasures only, see Skultety 2006.

‘correct education’ of the Magnesians youth (cf. 7.804c–d, especially d1 – where the Athenian Stranger says that the strangers will be ‘persuaded by a salary’ [πειπεισμένους μισθοῖς] – and 7.813e).²³ Several studies have identified an unresolved underlying tension in Magnesia between the respect owed to the metics as strangers and guests (under the tutelage of Zeus *xenios*) and the social and moral stigma attached to them as *banausoi* (with the partial exception for the true *dēmiourgoi* at 11.920d7–921a1).²⁴ What interests us here is not so much the technical and legal requisites demanded to be temporary residents in Magnesia, but the level of moral proficiency expected from strangers to join in the life of the city. The most interesting passage in this respect is 8.850a6–b4:

ἵεναί δὲ τὸν βουλόμενον εἰς τὴν μετοίκησιν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ὡς οἰκήσεως οὕσης τῶν ξένων τῷ βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ κατοικεῖν, τέχνην κεκτημένῳ καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντι μὴ πλεόν ἑτῶν εἴκοσιν ἄφ’ ἧς ἂν γράφηται, μετοίκιον μὴδὲ σμικρὸν τελοῦντι πλὴν τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, μὴδὲ ἄλλο αὐτὸ τέλος ἕνεκά τινος ὧν ἡς ἢ καὶ πράσεως.

Whoever wishes let him come as a resident alien on given terms, since there are settlements²⁵ for the foreigner who wishes it and is able to settle, provided that he has a craft and resides in the city not more than twenty years since the day he has been registered,²⁶ without paying even a small aliens’ tax except that of behaving with moderation, nor any other tax for any buying or selling.

²³ On these passages and their relation to contemporary Athenian pedagogical practices, see Morrow 1960: 192 and 326–7 with nn. 102 and 104.

²⁴ See above all Whitehead 1977: 134–5, Vidal Naquet 1986 and Saunders 1982 and 1991: 275–6 with n. 45 on the ‘ambiguous status of the foreigner’ in Magnesia as reflected on the penal code on assault by foreigners (9.879d5–e6). At 11.920d7–921a1 craftsmen are said to be sacred to Hephaistos and Athena, inasmuch as they spend their lives ‘taking care of the land and its people’ (χωρὰν καὶ δῆμον θεραπεύοντες): the law will honour and praise the good craftsmen (11.921e2–3 ὁ νόμος αὐτὸν ἐπαίνων οὐποτε καμείτῃ). In this passage craftsmen are compared with the soldiers of the city (nb: citizen-soldiers). Vidal Naquet sees in it a representation of artisans as soldiers, whereas Saunders 1982: 46–7 is more sceptical (cf. esp. 47 ‘the comparison is not to the advantage of the artisans, but to the disadvantage of the military’). This may be, but it remains remarkable that the terms of comparison for artisans and metics is here that of citizen-soldiers.

²⁵ For οἰκήσεως at 850a6 not as abstract ‘right of residence’ but as referring to concrete alien settlements where the foreigners will be directed, see Saunders 1962b and Whitehead 1977: 131.

²⁶ The reference is likely to be to the property register, not the *deme*’s register: cf. Whitehead 1977: 130.

What is required for qualifying as an alien resident is, from a legal point of view, the possession of a *technē* and not to dwell in Magnesia more than twenty years (in this sense a metic, even when integrated into Magnesian society, is mostly a ‘visitor’: cf. 8.850b1 ἐπιδημοῦντι).²⁷ It is at this juncture that a reference, still wrapped in the juridical jargon, is made to the minimum moral requirement asked from resident strangers: metics do not have to pay even a small aliens’ tax (μετοίκιον μηδὲ σμικρὸν τελοῦντι) except that of *sōphrosynē* (8.850b2 πλὴν τοῦ σωφρονεῖν).²⁸

What kind of *sōphrosynē* does this mean? Even if metics will probably be exposed themselves – even if only vicariously and indirectly – to the beneficial effects of the ‘correct education’, the ὀρθή παιδεία of Magnesia is explicitly said to be conceived for the ‘sons of free men’ (ἐλεύθεροι).²⁹ As observed by commentators,³⁰ the *sōphrosynē* asked from the metic population must primarily be the ‘untaught’, instinctive self-control towards pleasure that, as we are told at 4.710a5–b3, manifests itself spontaneously (4.710a8 σύμφυτον ἐπανθεῖ) in some children and animals (παισὶν καὶ θηρίοις) from the very beginning (εὐθύς). It is a kind of ‘ordinary’ self-restraint (4.710a5 τὴν δημῳδῇ) that does not deserve the name of ‘wisdom’ (φρόνησις) and that if unaccompanied by the other so-called virtues (4.710b2 μονούμενον ἔφαμεν τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν λεγομένων) is not much worth speaking of (οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι λόγου). This kind of ‘natural’ self-restraint is discussed also at 3.696d4–e6, within an excursus on how to apportion correctly honours in a state: *sōphrosynē* by itself, that is, if not accompanied by any other virtue, is not something very valuable

²⁷ Later at 8.850b6–c3 there is the specification that if during these twenty years the metic happens to have been a worthy benefactor towards the city and he is able to persuade the council and assembly, he can stay for all his life.

²⁸ Cf. England 1921, II: 376 on πλὴν τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ‘this metaphor reminds us of the way in which at 846d4 and 847a5 he [i.e. the Athenian Stranger] called τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν a τέχνην; so here ‘good behaviour’ is a τέλος’. More sceptical is Whitehead 1977: 131, who interprets the absence of a metic tax and metic *eisphora* as a further sign of Plato’s willingness to minimize the integration of the metics in the second-best city.

²⁹ On the frequency with which ἐλεύθερος is used in the *Laws* as synonym for citizen, see Morrow 1960: 323 n. 88.

³⁰ Cf. e.g. Saunders 1962a: 52.

(τίμιος) – yet at the same time it is a *necessary* adjunct (3.696d1 πρόσθημα, 3.696e4 προσθήκη) to every virtue: no virtue can be fully operative without it.³¹ In its lowest form (instinctive self-restraint without the benefit of the ‘correct education’), this inferior virtue, even if still virtue, is not enough in Magnesia to qualify as citizen proper: 3.696d4–e6 makes clear that this kind of untaught *sōphrosynē* is indeed a necessary precondition for the flourishing of virtue, but *not* a sufficient one. In this respect, the ‘moderation of the ordinary kind’ (δημῶδης σωφροσύνη) of *Laws* 4.710a5 is only *relatively* comparable to the ‘common virtue’ (δημοτική ἀρετή) of *Resp.* 6.500d9. Callipolis’ δημοτική ἀρετή includes both a higher (proper to the auxiliaries) and lower (proper to the producers) form, and the latter only maps into the cognitive and moral requirements of what in the *Laws* is qualified as δημῶδης σωφροσύνη.³² Thus δημῶδης σωφροσύνη, in the *Laws*, does not feature in the landscape of the civic virtues per se: it is logically presupposed as a basis of the δημοσίοι ἀρεταί of 12.968a1–2 but does not coincide with them.³³

In Magnesia, the minimum moral threshold required to be a member of the community of the virtuous is higher than in Callipolis. How this affects the relationship between the

³¹ Cf. Saunders 1962a: 52 (instinctive *sōphrosynē* ‘is a sine qua non of the successful development of any other virtue’); cf. also Görgemanns 1960: 130–1.

³² Brisson 2012: 301 is thus wrong when he speaks of Magnesian ‘ordinary citizens’ as ‘equivalent to the producers in the *Republic*’ on the basis of *Laws* 3.689a–b. We are told in this passage that pleasure and pain are ‘the crowd of the soul’ (τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ψυχῆς) and as such they occupy a position analogous to that of the majority of population within a city (δῆμος τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεως). This does *not* imply that the ‘ordinary citizen’ of Magnesia will enjoy a cognitive and moral position equivalent to that granted to the producer class in the *Republic*. The analogy of the soul/city, obviously reminiscent as it is of the *Republic*, simply suggests the presence, in the *Laws*, of an intra-psychoic conflict that, if anything, emphasizes a deep continuity, between Plato’s two works, of the psychology of the embodied person. The citizens of the second-best city (a landed leisure class supported by slaves’ and non-citizens’ manual labour) will be the recipients of an education that will elevate them above the level of the ‘instinctual’ *sōphrosynē* of the producer class or of the metic population of Magnesia.

³³ In this direction, see Bobonich 2002: 563–5 n. 93 and Schöpsdau 2011: 601. Habituated moderation through education is different from mere instinctive moderation but does require it nevertheless. Differently, see England 1921, II: 635 who assimilates the δημῶδης σωφροσύνη of 4.710a5 to the ‘common virtues’ (δημοσίοι ἀρεταί) of 12.968a1–2 (the same also Müller 1968: 29 n. 1); see n. 48 in this chapter.

‘ordinary’ citizens and the higher echelons of Magnesian society is considered in the next section.

2.3 ‘Ordinary virtue’ and ‘perfect citizenship’ in Magnesia

Although the gap between ruling elite and common citizens is somehow decreased in Magnesia, the second-best city remains a deeply hierarchical society. As Kraut puts it, Plato’s commitment to the ‘recognition of the importance of unequal relationship among human beings’ remains unchallenged in the *Laws*.³⁴ Virtue and education to virtue, in Magnesia as in Callipolis, come in degrees.³⁵ The educational curriculum of Magnesia’s ‘ordinary’ citizen will stop short of the ‘more advanced education’ (ἀκριβεστέρα παιδεία) reserved for the ‘guardians of the law’ (νομοφύλακες) who will be in charge of public offices.³⁶ The degree to which the ‘more advanced’ education bestowed on the members of the Nocturnal Council may (or indeed should) be compared to the dialectic training of the philosopher-kings of the *Republic* is a highly contested issue.³⁷ For present purposes, let it suffice to observe that Plato is keen to emphasize the existence of different degrees

³⁴ Kraut 2010: 52.

³⁵ For a comparative synopsis of the educational curriculum in Callipolis and Magnesia, see Kamtekar 2008b: 347 and 356.

³⁶ For the ‘more advanced education’ of the *nomophylakes*, cf. 2.670e2–3 παιδευθέντες ἀκριβεστέραν . . . παιδείαν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος φερούσης; 5.735a2–4 on the necessity of separating in some reasonable way those who are going to hold offices in the city from those ‘who have been gone through the test of a small education only’ (τοὺς σμικρὰ παιδεία βασανισθέντας); 12.965b–968c: the members of the Nocturnal Council will have a grasp of the unity of virtue and of the one over many, of the priority of the soul and the power of reason, and they will be able to give a rational account of it; 7.817e–818a: a detailed knowledge of mathematics, geometry and astronomy is reserved only for the happy few (τινας ὀλίγους).

³⁷ For the ‘disappearance of philosopher-kings’ in the *Laws*, see above all Schofield 1999a and Levin 2010. Contra see Kamtekar 1999, Rowe 2003: 96–7 and 2010: 46–7 with n. 59, with whom I am inclined to agree. The Athenian Stranger’s reluctance to go into any detail about the curriculum of the Nocturnal Council at 12.968d2–e5 seems to suggest not that proper dialectical studies will not take place in Magnesia, but that Plato’s present project is not meant to target primarily this concern, already extensively addressed in the *Republic*: cf. Brisson-Pradeau 2006, II: 376 n. 182.

of moral and cognitive capacities within the civic body of Magnesia. And so much so that also among the beneficiaries of the ‘more advanced’ education we find a differentiation of cognitive capacities: some guardians of the laws will have access to ‘wisdom’ (φρόνησις),³⁸ others only to ‘true opinion’ (1.632c5–6 τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι’ ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας).³⁹ Independently from whether or not (some) members of the Nocturnal Council will be the recipients of a (quasi)philosophical education, some citizens will be higher up on the cognitive and moral ladder than others, and these will be those ‘in charge’, from both an epistemic and moral point of view.⁴⁰ Only those who excel both morally and cognitively will form the ‘ruling elite’: this is never put in doubt. And yet – and here the distance from the *Republic* becomes notable – at least in terms of rhetorical strategy and ideological self-promotion, the possibility of being/becoming a ‘perfect citizen’ (ἄκρος πολίτης) is repeatedly framed, in the *Laws*, as an achievement potentially accessible to *all* the citizens of Magnesia, irrespectively of their individual cognitive abilities.⁴¹

A particularly interesting passage in this respect is 7.822e4–823a6:

γεγραμμένων δὴ ταύτη τῶν νόμων τε καὶ ὅλης τῆς πολιτείας, οὐ τέλος ὁ τοῦ διαφέροντος πολίτου πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίγνεται ἔπαινος, ὅταν αὐτόν τις φῇ τὸν ὑπηρετήσαντα τοῖς νόμοις ἄριστα καὶ πειθόμενον μάλιστα, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν

³⁸ See Bobonich 2002: 197–201 and esp. 520–1 n. 124 for the interchangeable use of φρόνησις and σοφία in the *Laws*.

³⁹ I follow here Schöpsdau’s interpretation of the passage: cf. id. 1994: 188–9.

⁴⁰ Epistemic superiority of the members of the Nocturnal Council: cf. 12.965c9–d3 (redefinition of the four major cardinal virtues (such for the ordinary citizens, but in reality a single virtue for the happy few) according to the new insight that the one is superior to the many) and 12.966c4–6 (they can give a rationale of the law whereas the majority, pardonably, follows only the letter of the laws [καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείστοις τῶν κατὰ πόλιν συγγιγνώσκειν τῇ φήμῃ μόνον τῶν νόμων συνακολουθοῦσιν]). Moral superiority: cf. 12.968d2–3 (among the principles for choosing the members of the Nocturnal Council, not only age and cognitive capacities are taken into account but also excellence in character and habits [ἡλικίας τε καὶ μαθημάτων δυνάμεσιν καὶ τρόπων ἡθεσιν καὶ ἔθεσιν]).

⁴¹ Cf. e.g. also 1.643d3 τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς and 1.643e6 πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλειον, 5.730d6–7 ὁ μέγας ἀνὴρ ἐν πόλει καὶ τέλειος.

ἀγαθόν· τελεώτερον δὲ ὥδε εἰρημένον, ὡς ἄρα ὅς ἂν τοῖς τοῦ νομοθέτου νομοθετοῦντός τε καὶ ἐπαινοῦντος καὶ ψέγοντος πειθόμενος γράμμασιν διεξέλθῃ τὸν βίον ἄκρατον. οὗτος ὁ τε λόγος ὀρθότατος εἰς ἔπαινον πολίτου, τὸν τε νομοθέτην ὄντως⁴² δεῖ μὴ μόνον γράφειν τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς δὲ τοῖς νόμοις, ὅσα καλὰ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ καὶ μὴ καλὰ εἶναι, νόμοις ἐμπεπλεγμένα γράφειν, τὸν δὲ ἄκρον πολίτην μηδὲν ἥττον ταῦτα ἐμπεδοῦν ἢ τὰ ταῖς ζημίαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατελιγμένα.

When the laws and the whole constitution have thus been written down, the praise of the citizen who distinguishes himself in virtue is not complete when one says that the good citizen is he who best serves the laws and is most obedient to them. A more complete statement will be phrased thus, that the good citizen is he who goes throughout his life obeying, without any intermission, the words of the lawgiver, whether written down as law, praise or blame. This is the most correct discourse of praise for a citizen, and a true lawgiver should not only write down the laws but also, interwoven with the laws, he must write down everything which he deems good and bad, and the perfect citizen must abide by these no less than by what has been enforced with penalties by the laws.

The context of this eulogy of the ‘perfect citizen’ is interesting on its own terms for its overtly self-conscious nature.⁴³ We are towards the very end of Book 7 and at a critical moment: the treatment of the norms regulating the subject of education (7.822d2–3 τὰ γε παιδείας μαθημάτων περί νόμιμα) has been exhausted and only hunting is still to be treated (by way of a proem). It is at this point that the Athenian Stranger introduces a methodological discussion on the duties of a ‘true’ legislator: he must not only set down the laws proper but also resort to ‘something else which by nature falls between advice and law’ (7.822d6–7 ἕτερον δὲ τι πρὸς τοῖς νόμοις εἶναι μεταξύ τι νοουθετήσεώς τε πεφυκὸς ἅμα καὶ νόμων), as has been observed several times during the discussion with Cleinias and Megillos (7.822e1 ὁ δὴ πολλάκις ἡμῶν ἐμπέπτωκεν τοῖς λόγοις).⁴⁴ The reference, overtly enough, is to the discursive strategy of blame and praise (7.822e9 ἐπαινοῦντος καὶ ψέγοντος) that notably takes on the leading role, as far as persuasion goes, in the ‘proems’

⁴² I retain, with England, the mss reading ὄντως versus Wilamowitz’s emendation οὕτως.

⁴³ Cf. Morgan 2013: 277–8 on how in this passage the lawgiver presents himself as the paradigmatic ‘poet of praise and blame’, re-deploying ‘epinician’ rhetorical strategies.

⁴⁴ Cf. 7.788a–c and 7.793b–d.

to the laws.⁴⁵ Section 7.822e4–823a6 represents thus a moment of enlightened self-consciousness within the written text of the law (and the *Laws*): while advertising the importance of praise and blame as *persuasive* forms of social discourse in the proems to the laws proper, the Athenian Stranger performs one proem of his own that coincides with a programmatic praise of the ‘perfect citizen’. The addressee of this meta-proem is the whole collective body of Magnesia: no reference is made to different degrees of education or different cognitive abilities of its members. The citizenry is addressed en masse: the only element singled out as necessary to achieve a level of distinction in civic virtue (7.822e5–6 ὁ τοῦ διαφέροντος πολίτου πρὸς ἀρετὴν; 7.823a5 τὸν δὲ ἄκρον πολίτην) is *obedience* to the directives of the lawgiver, be they written laws or (oral) discourses of praise or blame (7.822e7 πειθόμενον μάλιστα; 7.823a1 πειθόμενος; 7.823a5 ἐμπεδοῦν).⁴⁶

In particular, the emphasis on obedience to the *letter* of the law (7.823a1 γράμμασιν) calls to mind 12.966c4–6. In this later passage a distinction *is* drawn among the members of the Nocturnal Council – who will be able to understand the ‘true’ nature of the laws, give a rational explanation of them and act accordingly (12.966b6–7 εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν, καὶ λόγῳ τε ἱκανοὺς ἐρμηνεύειν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις συνακολουθεῖν) – and the majority of citizens (12.966c4–5 τοῖς μὲν πλείστοις τῶν κατὰ πόλιν) – who excusably limit themselves to follow the *phēmē* of the laws (12.966c5–6 συγγιγνώσκειν τῇ φήμῃ μόνον τῶν νόμων συνακολουθοῦσιν). Whereas in Book 12 the obedience to the ‘voice’ of the laws is presented as an inferior cognitive state that must be forgiven (12.966c5 συγγιγνώσκειν) in the population at large, at the end of Book 7 it is this very obedience that is promoted to the level of key civic virtue of the common

⁴⁵ Cf. Laks 2005: 135–8; on the relationship between proems to the laws and the distribution of collective praise and blame, see also Pradeau 2006 and Annas 2010: 87–8.

⁴⁶ This form of obedience is however a highly ‘internalized’ one, as shown by the fact that it is extended not only to normative laws but also to the educative function of praise and blame (cf. Morgan 2013: 278 on this ‘internalized’ mode of obedience).

Magnesian citizen.⁴⁷ There is of course no straightforward contradiction: differences of context and of internal addressee easily explain the shift of focus. At the same time, however, if blunt contradiction is avoided, what emerges in the *Laws* is an underlying tension between the necessity of persuading and motivating *en masse* every citizen and that of recognizing the importance of a moral and cognitive hierarchy in civic virtue. It is also obedience to the law as a form of wisdom (and *not* the ability to give an account of it) that must surely be understood under the much discussed meaning of πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς at 12.968a1–2.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Cf. also 7.801e6–10 (regulation about praise poetry on behalf of Magnesian citizens): *enkōmia* are reserved only as *post mortem* reward for those citizens (men and women) who have spent their whole life accomplishing with their soul or body fine and toilsome achievements and who have been obedient to the laws (ε8–9 κατὰ σώματα ἢ κατὰ ψυχὰς ἔργα ἐξειργασμένοι καλὰ καὶ ἐπίτρονα καὶ τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθεῖς γεγονότες). See Morgan 2013: 281 on the implied critique of the official Athenian ideology of the funeral oration.

⁴⁸ The context makes this clear enough: ὁ δὲ μὴ ταῦθ' οἷός τ' ὦν πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς κεκτῆσθαι refers to him who is able to give a rational account of everything that is rational (12.667e4–968a1 ὅσα τε λόγον ἔχει, τούτων δυνατὸς ἢ δοῦναι τὸν λόγον). The expression πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς is often misunderstood. England 1921, II: 635 seems to believe that the δημόσια ἀρεταί of Book 12 are the same as the δημόδης σωφροσύνη of 4.710a5. Schöpsdau 2011: 60 discards this hypothesis as 'die als angeborene naturhafte Tugend gewiss nicht zur Mitgliedshaft in der Nächtlichen Versammlung ausreicht'. Schöpsdau is right and wrong at the same time: the δημοσίαι ἀρεταί are the product of education based on correct opinion yet they also *include* (but are not limited to) 'angeborene naturhafte Tugend' as a necessary premise. This distinction between 12.968a1–2 πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς and 4.710a δημόδης is recognized by Bobonich 2002: 563–5 n. 93. Yet this acknowledgment does not necessitate, as Bobonich does, re-interpreting ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς as "public excellences", i. e. those good traits that allow one to function well in public or political life'. Why is this? Because Bobonich is at pains to deny that the 'quasi-philosophic members of the Nocturnal Council need to have the sort of advanced theoretical knowledge he has just sketched in *addition* (12.968a2–3) to such virtues', because this, according to his enlightened reading of the *Laws*, will imply that 'ordinary citizens have only a low-grade form of virtue'. But we have already seen that this is not the case. Bobonich, following Blank (unpublished), sees in the use of the plural in 12.968a1–2 an element in favor of understanding there *aretai* not as 'cardinal virtues', 'substantial virtues' – that is, moral virtues – but as 'fine deeds and qualities in general' – that is, 'the political excellences they need in order to rule well' – and connects them back to 11.961d5. However, the linguistic criterion is not decisive. For instance, at *Resp.* 7.518d9 (αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς), the cardinal virtues of Book 4 are indeed the implied referent: cf. Adams 1901, I: 99 ad loc. Equally, the specific context of *Laws* 12.968a suggests otherwise: at 12.965c9–d3 the four cardinal virtues have just been mentioned and the members of the Nocturnal Council are invited to redefine and reconceive them according to the new insight that the one is superior to the many. What

Our passage from Book 7 (822e4–823a6) is thus a moment of ideology explicitly meant to target the *whole* citizen body and to promote a *vision* of ‘perfect citizenship’ within the grasp of every citizen, whether one of the mass or the ‘happy few’ forming the ruling elite of the second-best city. Magnesia’s political and social life remains rigidly hierarchical; nevertheless, the necessity to persuade the *entire* citizen population to consent voluntarily to such a political programme requires the mobilization of an ideology promoting a paradigm of civic excellence that must be potentially all-inclusive. The following section investigates how this vision of a ‘perfect citizenship’ is made normatively accessible to every Magnesia citizen through a significantly ‘more open’ deployment in the *Laws* (if compared with the *Republic*) of the language of desire (erotic desire included).

2.4 ‘Perfect citizenship’ and the language of erotic desire in the *Laws*

Contemporary scholarship has repeatedly observed that to persuade en masse the body politic of Magnesia Plato is willing to exploit the whole cognitive spectrum (from *doxa* to *epistēmē*): the divine lawgiver of Magnesia ‘is interested in the feelings that promote and are promoted by each...cognitive state’ (Wellton 1996: 219).⁴⁹ This overture to cognitive attitudes other than those validated by *epistēmē* does not represent a breach with Plato’s epistemological attitude in the *Republic*: already in Callipolis ‘true’ opinion was granted a positive cognitive status (although only as an intermediary stage) promoting and predisposing the auxiliaries to virtue.⁵⁰ Yet what is peculiar to the *Laws* is the unprecedented extent to which such an

differentiates the members of the Nocturnal Council from the rest (12.966c4–6) is that they can give a rational account of it; at 12.968d2–3 among the principles for the choice of the members of the Nocturnal Council there is *also* character and habits (καὶ τρόπων ἡθῆσιν καὶ ἔθῃσιν).

⁴⁹ Opinion (δόξα): cf. e.g. 3.688b2–4, 3.689b2, 6.770d3, 9.864a1–8; ‘true’ or ‘correct’ opinion (ἀρθή/ἀληθὴς δόξα): cf. e.g. 1.632c4–7, 2. 653a7–8.

⁵⁰ Cf. e.g. Samaras 2002: 306–7.

epistemological overture is carried forth, no doubt because of the shift of focus, from the *Republic*, on how to deal practically ‘with ordinary human nature within the overall context of the [Laws]’ idealizing project’.⁵¹ In this section, I examine what seems to me an under-explored corner of the same territory: the role granted in the *Laws* to the emotional and cognitive resources of ‘desire’ in general (*epithymia*) and ‘erotic’ desire (*erōs*) in particular, when the ‘ordinary’ citizen is concerned.

As detailed in §P.1, absolute consistency from a terminological point of view is neither to be sought nor expected: in the *Laws*, as in Plato’s other dialogues, there are passages in which the language of *philia*, *erōs* and *epithymia* seems to collapse into a fluid, all-embracing spectrum of human relationships. This is true, for instance, at 8.836e5–838e1, where the Athenian Stranger, as a way of introducing the laws concerned with sex and procreation, defines *philia* and *erōs* as different but overlapping frames of interpersonal relationship. Throughout this whole section on sexual legislation, *philia*, *epithymia* and *erōs* are used almost interchangeably, each term encompassing emotional dispositions as diverse as parental affection, erotic passion, friendship and even attraction to inanimate beings.⁵² It is within this section, for instance, that at 8.837d4–6 we are offered the analogue to the ‘correct *erōs*’ (ὀρθὸς ἔρως) promoted in Callipolis by the musical education of the guardians at *Resp.* 3.403a7–8 (cf. §1.4):

δῆλον ὅτι τὸν (sc. ἔρωτα) μὲν ἀρετῆς ὄντα καὶ τὸν νέον ἐπιθυμοῦντα ὡς ἀριστον γίγνεσθαι βουλοίμεθ’ ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνεῖναι;

Is it not clear that we should wish that the sort of *erōs* which is *erōs* of virtue and desires the young to be as good as possible should exist within our city?

The form of affective attachment that is promoted as the civic model (ἐν τῇ πόλει) of interpersonal relationship in the *Laws* is

⁵¹ Quotation by Schofield 2010b: 23–4; for the remarkable extent to which *doxa* is promoted in the *Laws*, see Samaras 2002: 305–309.

⁵² Sexual legislation in Magnesia is discussed extensively by Moore 2005: 180–201 and 2007. Cf. also Renaut 2013: 107–10.

likeness in virtue (8.837a6–9):⁵³ a passionate desire for virtue (ἔρως ἀρετῆς) that sidesteps physical satisfaction.⁵⁴

Yet, outside the section of Book 8 devoted to sexual legislation, when it comes to more abstract forms of passionate desire (a desire not oriented towards embodied human beauty) there are also passages that suggest a significantly more pointed use of the language of desire and *erōs*.⁵⁵ The passages I focus on here are 1.643c8–d3, e4–6, 3.688b1–4, 4.711d6 and 6.770c7–d6. Some of these passages use the language of *erōs* alone, others that of *erōs* and *epithymia* combined, others still that of *epithymia* only. A context-specific reading of these passages will be essential to unravelling what I think is Plato's coherent strategy, in the *Laws*, to rehabilitate the *rhetoric* of the language of desire as the main springboard to civic excellence available to the 'ordinary' citizen of Magnesia. In a sense, then, this particular extension, in the *Laws*, in the use of the language of *erōs* and *epithymia* is part of the same strategy that underlies

⁵³ See Bobonich 2002: 428.

⁵⁴ Here as well as in the *Republic* the focus seems to be particularly on male homosexual relationships (cf. Schöpsdau 2011: 193–4 ad loc.: the definition of *philialerōs* comes immediately after a discussion of the negative aspects of male homosexuality at 8.836c1–e5), yet it is impossible to rule out *a priori* the applicability of the Athenian Stranger's threefold definition of *philia* also to heterosexual love (or for that matter to female homosexuality): see Moore 2007: 113–4.

⁵⁵ This is recognized, on a general level, by Moore 2007: 119. The term ἔρως occurs twenty-one times in the *Laws*: six times within the sexual legislation section at 8.835d–842a (836a7, b8, 837a1 and 9, 837b6 and d2; cf. also the use of ἐράω at 8.837c1, c3, c5 and d1 and of ἐρωτικός at 839a7, 841d1, 841d1); twice in the excursus on the laws relating to marriage and procreation at 6.782e10–783b1 (782e3 ἐμφυτον ἔρωτα: sex as one of the three fundamental, inborn desires of human nature, whose satisfaction is a necessary condition of an embodied existence, together with drink and food; 783a1 ἔρως δξύτατος: 'the most acute passion' to procreate); twice in the hunting section at 7.823b1–824a22 (823d8 and 823e6 [this last occurrence, αἰμύλος ἔρως, occurs also in Sophocles, cf. *TrGF* 816 Radt² = *Synag.* 363, 1 Bekker ≈ Phot. Berol. 54.3 s.v. αἰμύλος: ... Πλάτων 'αἰμύλος ἔρως' φησί, καὶ Σοφοκλῆς; it is not impossible to posit that Plato's use of the expression is a quotation from Sophocles]; the use of *erōs* language in this context is clearly influenced by the close link in Greek culture between hunting and *erōs*: see Barringer 2001: ch. 2, esp. 85–9); *erōs* together with pleasure and ἐπιθυμία (general) appears at 1.632a1, 1.645d7, 1.649d5 and 5.734a2, a4; *erōs* of wealth and acquisition: 8.831c4, 870a4–5 (cf. also the use of ἐράω at 5.727e3); *erōs* and theft at 12.941c6 (for *erōs* of acquisition, with implicit reference to violations of temples, see also Aesch. *Ag.* 341–2). The cases of 1.643d2, 643e5, 3.688b3–4 and 4.711d6 (*erōs* of statesmanship) are analysed later. At 7.792a3 (ἐρᾶ), the verb ἐράω is predicated of children in their infancy (τοῖς παιδίοις), about their instinctive predilections and aversions.

the programmatic praise of the ‘perfect citizen’ examined in §2.2. Both are elements of Plato’s broader agenda to tackle the ‘incentive problem’ (proper to any given community, independently from its constitutional and institutional make-up) within a political framework that requires voluntary submission to the law and hence a compromise between freedom of the individual and ‘enlightened’ compulsion.⁵⁶

A semantic survey will show that in the *Laws* this downgrading of the language and rhetoric of *erōs* from a purely philosophical and dialectical level to a more ‘ordinary’ level is consistent to such a degree as to be hardly coincidental. This does *not* mean, however, that in the *Laws* Plato came to reconceptualize his understanding of *erōs* to any substantial extent.⁵⁷ *Erōs* is and remains reason’s desire for what is good. In its highest form it is still a form of (quasi-)philosophical *erōs*: the only occurrence in the *Laws* of this higher *erōs* is ‘the god-inspired passion for wise and just practices’ of 4.711d6–7 (ἔρως θεῖος τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ δικαίων ἐπιτηδεύματων) that we find at the end of the Athenian Stranger’s excursus on the ‘moderate’ tyrant as ally of the enlightened lawgiver. Scholars are divided on the real aim and purport of what at first sight looks like a recantation of Plato’s own previous view on tyranny.⁵⁸ A detailed treatment of this passage is not within the aim of this chapter. For present purposes it will suffice to notice that: (1) the focus here is on the ‘erotics of statesmanship’, not of citizenship – that is, the passionate, divine desire for ‘wise and just practices’ is purposely represented by the Athenian Stranger as something *outside* the experience of the ordinary citizen and to which only the wisest and most just among the virtuous can aspire; and

⁵⁶ What I have called here the ‘incentive problem’ is framed by Schofield 2010b as the integration of the *Laws*’ ‘two projects’, the idealising project and the more practice-oriented project.

⁵⁷ For the deep continuity in Plato’s treatment of *erōs* across the *Republic*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*, see Moore 2007.

⁵⁸ For a sceptical reading of the tyrant excursus in the *Laws*, see Schofield 1999a. For a more positive evaluation of the specific context, with which I incline to agree, see Rowe 2010: 37–9. A partially positive reading of the figure of the young tyrant in Book 4 is offered also by Brisson 2009 and Laks 2005: 93–110 and 2012: 33–6 (in both contributions Laks puts particular emphasis on the conditions allowing for such a partial rehabilitation of the tyrant: the foundation *ab initio* of a new colony).

(2) the erotics of statesmanship outlined at 4.711d6–712a7 introduces a significant shift of focus from the ‘co-operative’ leadership of tyrant *and* lawgiver envisaged at 4.709d1–711d1: what is wished for at 4.711d6–712a7 is not a dual leadership but the *coincidence* of political power and quasi-philosophical insight in the one and same person.⁵⁹ Although framed at a more ‘demotic’ level, and within the power of understanding of the likes of Cleinias and Megillos (cf. at 4.711d1ff. the paradigm of Nestor as model of power, moderation [σωφρονεῖν] and prudence [φρονεῖν]), the individual animated by a divine passion for politics at 4.711d represents in the *Laws* the best approximation to the figure of the philosopher-king of the *Republic*.⁶⁰

With this sole exception, in all the other passages we examine, *erōs* for civic virtue is explicitly represented in Magnesia as a motivational resource not only achievable by the ‘ordinary’ citizen but by default inbuilt in Magnesia’s educational system. This extension of the language of *erōs* to designate an emotional and cognitive state of mind that can be predicated of and attained by the ordinary citizen is one of the ways in which

⁵⁹ I follow here Schöpsdau 1996: 140–2. For the link between *erōs* and lawgivers in Plato cf. esp. *Symp.* 209a–d, where lawgivers, together with poets and creative craftsmen (at 209d4–e3 the Spartan Lycurgos and Athenian Solon are singled out among the *nomothetai* as those pregnant in soul) are mentioned as an example of the creative psychic pregnancy (mostly motivated by love of honour, which, in its ‘erotic version’, is reinterpreted as love for immortality – that is, love of a *permanent* possession of the good [cf. ἀεὶ at 207a1]). In particular, to set up laws – that is, to arrange in orderly manner the affairs of the cities and households – is conceived, among the possible psychic creations, as ‘the most beautiful and greatest wisdom’, (φρόνησις) which is called ‘moderation’ and ‘justice’ (209a6–8 πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη, ἔφη, καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων τε καὶ οἰκήσεων διακόσμησις, ἥ δὴ ὄνομά ἐστι σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη). At *Symp.* 209b1–d7 the motivation of the legislation is said to be the *erōs* for what is beautiful, in its embodied *human* form (hence the lawgivers have access only to the Lower Mysteries). For a subtle epistemological approach to the different categories of desiring agents implied in this passage of the *Symposium*, and their relationship to the tripartite psychology of the *Republic* (only an imperfect match), see the appendix of Sheffield 2006 (esp. 233–6) and Sheffield 2012: 215–6. Cf. also *Phdr.* 248d2ff.: in the hierarchy of lives, that of the lawful kings and military leaders comes second (τὴν δὲ δευτέραν εἰς βασιλείῳ ἐννόμου ἢ πολεμικοῦ καὶ ἀρχικοῦ), that of political man, estate holder and businessman (τρίτην εἰς πολιτικοῦ ἢ τινος οἰκονομικοῦ ἢ χρηματιστικοῦ) third. In the enlightened lawgiver of the *Laws* the second and third lives seem mostly to converge.

⁶⁰ See Schöpsdau 1996: 142–8 for an extended treatment of this point.

Plato flags up in the *Laws* his paramount concern with *persuasive* forms of civic discourse. We shall see that an additional corollary of this deployment of erotic language in the *Laws* is also a significant reduction, if not straightforward effacement, in Plato's last work of the connection between *erōs* and tyranny (the only passage that hints in this direction, but with a very different twist, is, as we have seen, 4.711d6–7).

Let us start with 3.688b1–4. We are within the historical excursus of Book 3, and more precisely at the point when the Athenian Stranger gives his explanation of why the Doric states of Argos and Messene collapsed into ruin. The whole of Book 3 is meant to reveal the main principles for building up a well-balanced constitution in which friendship and regulated freedom reign among its citizens.⁶¹ The cause of the ruin of Argos and Messene, according to the Athenian Stranger, must be identified in the greatest form of ignorance (3.689a1 ἡ μέγιστη . . . ἀμαθία) that can ever befall a state or a single individual (3.689b4–5 πόλεως τε . . . καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός): the disharmony (διαφωνία) between the perception of pain and pleasure and the opinion following reason (3.689a7–8 πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν) – that is, the lack of unison by which one does not love what he/she believes to be good but hates it and vice versa (3.689a5–8). This is why we should not wish for everything to follow one's desires (3.687e6–7 ἐπεσθαι πάντα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ βουλήσει) unless at the same time one prays that 'his desires should be in accordance with his own wisdom' (τὴν βούλησιν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φρονήσει).⁶² It is at this stage that the Athenian Stranger states that not only intelligence and opinion but also *desire* and *erōs* will all be enrolled into the service of civic virtue by the true legislator in his role of statesman (πολιτικός ἀνὴρ: 3.688a1).⁶³ The 'good lawgiver' (3.688a5 τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην), we are told,

⁶¹ See Schofield 2010b: 18–20.

⁶² For a defence of the reading μηδὲν μᾶλλον at 3.687e7 and the translation here adopted, see England 1921, I: 373 ad loc.

⁶³ On the opposition between the 'true' legislator who is such because of his τέχνη πολιτική and τοῖς τε πάλαι πολιτικοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ νομοθέταις καὶ τοῖς νῦν, see Schöpsdau 1994: 409 ad loc.

δέοι δὲ δὴ πρὸς πᾶσαν (sc. ἀρετήν) μὲν βλέπειν, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πρὸς πρώτην τὴν τῆς συμπάσης ἡγεμόνα ἀρετῆς, φρόνησις δ' εἴη τοῦτο καὶ νοῦς καὶ δόξα μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἐπομένης. (3.688b1–4)

must legislate with a view to virtue as a whole, but especially and in the first place to what constitutes the guide to virtue in its entirety, that is, wisdom,⁶⁴ intelligence and opinion together with *erōs* and desire that accompany them.⁶⁵

There are two main interpretative problems with this passage. First, the referent of the expression μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας (3.688b3): what kind of *erōs* and what kind of *desire*? Is it just a periphrasis for appetitive desires *tout court* (sex included) or can the range of passionate desires here implied be understood more broadly? Second, the meaning of the participle ἐπομένης: does ἔπομαι here have the 'weaker' sense of 'following', in the sense of Latin *consequor* or the 'stronger' sense of 'obeying' (Lat. *pareo*), or something in between?⁶⁶ Both points are of course strictly related to each other and, not surprisingly, the interpretation one adopts raises the whole issue of a possible tripartition of the soul in the *Laws* (cf. §P.1). Brisson, for instance, who is generally keen on seeing operative in the *Laws* a tripartition of the soul analogous to that of the *Republic*, translates the passage as follows: the lawgiver must bear in mind 'especially and pre-eminently the virtue that heads the list – judgment (*doxa*), and intelligence (*nous*) and wisdom (*phronēsis*), such that sexual passion (*erōs*) and appetite (*epithymia*) are kept under control'.⁶⁷ The underlying inference

⁶⁴ For 'wisdom' (φρόνησις) as 'nous' cf. 3.687e5–9. See Bobonich 2002: 197–201 and esp. 520–1 n. 124 for the interchangeable use of φρόνησις and σοφία in this passage and in the Platonic corpus at large. Cf. also Schöpsdau 1994: 416–17 (following Görgemanns 1960: 164) on the oscillation of φρόνησις in the *Laws* between 'keine theoretische, sondern die "praktisch-sittliche Einsicht"' and its near identity with συμφωνία of pleasure and pain with the correct *logos* (= σοφία).

⁶⁵ I understand τούτοις of 3.688b4 as referring back not only to δόξα but retrospectively also to φρόνησις and νοῦς: see Schöpsdau 1994: 410 ad loc. (cf. esp. 3.689b2–3 ὅταν οὖν ἐπιστήμῃς ἢ δόξαις ἢ λόγῳ ἐναντιῶται).

⁶⁶ Both usages are well attested in Plato: see Ast s.v. ἔπομαι.

⁶⁷ Brisson's translation inverts the word order (*phronēsis* is left last) of the Greek text but apart from this his translation follows closely enough that of Saunders 1970: 135 (who however translates μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας as 'desires and appetites'). Differently from Brisson, however, Saunders 1962a (otherwise a strong believer in the tripartite structure of soul in Plato's last dialogue) does not quote this passage

(not spelled out by Brisson) seems to be that νοῦς would refer to the rational part of the soul, δόξα to the spirited part and μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας to the appetitive part, with ἔρωσ referring specifically to sexual passion. Consequently, ἐπομένης must refer to the subordinate role of appetite to reason. Is this the only possible interpretation, or the more correct one in this context?

Let us begin with the second point. That ἐπομένης must refer to the guiding role of the rational part of the soul seems to me countenanced by the fact that the whole section, as we have seen, can be summed up under the rubric 'desires must follow the lead of reason' (see previous discussion on 3.687e6–7). Yet this does *not* exclude *a priori* the 'weaker' nuance of ἔπομαι: ἐπομένης also suggests the idea that passion (*erōs*) and desire (*epithymia*) must first be roused and summoned in order to be the 'servants' (ὑπηρεταί) of the 'golden string'. That is, in order to follow suit, *erōs* and *epithymia* must first be brought about, or *activated* in one's soul. In this sense I do not see any stark contrast or irreconcilability between the 'weaker' and 'stronger' sense of ἔπομαι at 3.688b4.⁶⁸ This brings us back to the main question: what do *erōs* and *epithymia* stand here for? Should we restrict, as Brisson does, the sense of *erōs* and *epithymia* to appetitive desires only? The broader context seems to point in another direction, suggesting that a wider underlying logic is at work in this passage. As we have seen, both at 3.687e5–7⁶⁹ and 3.688b4–c1 (presented as a formal 'capping' of the argument pursued so far: cf. ἥκει δὴ πάλιν ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν),⁷⁰ we are told

among those that support a tripartition of the soul in the *Laws*. The joint translation of Brisson-Pradeau (2006: 188) is more neutral ('il fallait avoir en vue la totalité qu'elles forment, et tout particulièrement la première, celle qui commande à la vertu dans son ensemble, à savoir, la réflexion, l'intellect et l'opinion qu'accompagnent la passion et le désir qui leur obéit').

⁶⁸ In this sense Des Places' translation of μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας as 'avec leur escorte de passion et de désir' (1951: 27) seems best. Cf. also Apelt's rendition (1916: 92) 'im Bunde mit denjenigen Herzensneigungen und Trieben, die sich ihnen willig unterordneten'.

⁶⁹ λέγειν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς ὡς οὐ τοῦτο εὐκτέον οὐδὲ ἐπεικτέον, ἔπεσθαι πάντα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ βουλήσει, τὴν βούλησιν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φρονήσει.

⁷⁰ ἥκει δὴ πάλιν ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν, καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω πάλιν ἅπερ τότε, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε, ὡς παίζων, εἰ δ', ὡς σπουδάζων, ὅτι δὴ φημι εὐχῇ χρῆσθαι σφαλερόν εἶναι νοῦν μὴ κεκτμένον, ἀλλὰ τάναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσιν οἱ γίγνεσθαι.

that one's desires should harmonize with one's rational faculty (φρόνησις), and this is what should be hoped/prayed for both individually and at a communal level. In both passages, what I have translated as 'desires' is expressed by the Greek term βούλησις.⁷¹ Among the 'desires' cited as examples by the Athenian Stranger at 687d, there are also those that a father may wish for his son: it seems clear that the overall range of the type of *boulēsis* referred to in this section is wider and less specific than appetitive desires only. The same can be said for the way in which the topic under discussion is introduced at 3.687c1–7. There the argument is presented as the 'one desire commonly shared by all human beings' (πάντων ἀνθρώπων . . . κοινὸν ἐπιθύμημα ἔν τι): that human events may happen according to the dictates of one's soul (κατὰ τὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς ἐπίταξιν). The use of both the generic *boulēsis* and *epithymēma* in the passages quoted previously suggests therefore a non-exclusively appetitive interpretation of the syntagm μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας at 3.688b3. Instead, *erōs* and *epithymia* at 3.688b3 are better understood as *motivational states* that can be predicated of *any* desire (not only appetitive).⁷²

This interpretation seems further confirmed by the conclusive remarks of the Athenian Stranger at 3.689b2–c1, where we are reminded once more of the nature of the greatest 'ignorance':

ὅταν οὖν ἐπιστήμῃς ἢ δόξαις ἢ λόγῳ ἐναντιῶται, τοῖς φύσει ἀρχικοῖς, ἡ ψυχῇ, τοῦτο ἄνοιαν προσαγορεύω, πόλεώς τε, ὅταν ἄρχουσιν καὶ νόμοις μὴ πείθεται τὸ πλῆθος, ταῦτόν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, ὁπόταν καλοὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λόγοι ἐνόντες μὴδὲν ποιῶσιν πλέον ἄλλὰ δὴ τούτοις πᾶν τούναντιον ταύτας πάσας ἀμαθίας τὰς πλημμελεστάτας ἔγωγ' ἂν θείην πόλεώς τε καὶ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν.

Whenever [that in the soul which feels pleasure and pain] opposes kinds of knowledge, or opinions or reason, that is, what by nature are the ruling elements, this I call folly either of the city, whenever the mass does not obey the rulers and the laws, or of a single individual, whenever the fine elements of reason present in the soul achieve nothing but all the opposite to these

⁷¹ For Plato's use of *boulēsis* and its fluid relationship with *epithymia*, see §P.1 n. 30.

⁷² Cf. Stallbaum 1859, I: 300 who translates μετ' ἔρωτος with the generic 'animi impetus' without restricting it to sexual or appetitive desires.

things, these all I call the most discordant forms of ignorance of both a state and each single individual.

This entire passage indeed may be read as a commentary on 3.688b1–4: ἐπιστήμαις ἢ δόξαις of 3.689b2 brings us back to νοῦς καὶ δόξα of 3.688b3,⁷³ and likewise 3.689b5–6 ὁπόταν καλοὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λόγοι ἐνόντες μηδὲν ποιῶσιν πλεον seems like an extended gloss on δόξα μετ’ ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἐπομένης of 3.688b3–4. As observed by England (1921, I: 374), the parallel of 3.689b5–6 suggests that what we must understand μετ’ ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἐπομένης to mean is that ‘the right view must be accompanied by a passionate desire to see it acted on and enforced’.⁷⁴ That is, passion and desire as motivational states must be co-opted as allies of reason: the beauty of reason present in our soul (καλοὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λόγοι ἐνόντες) produces no effect (μηδὲν ποιῶσιν πλεον) if passion and desire cannot be simultaneously stirred to follow its lead. To instill intelligence and correct opinion is not enough if unaccompanied by a (correctly informed: cf. τούτοις ἐπομένης) desiring state of mind. No distinction is drawn here between the common citizen and the higher echelons of Magnesia’s polity. To trigger this desiring disposition of mind in every citizen is what a good lawgiver should aim at: the *civic* frame of this endeavour is conveniently signposted at the very beginning of the passage with which we are concerned (3.688c1 πολιτικόν γε ἄνδρα). It may also be worth noticing that this reflection on the part of Athenian Stranger is prompted not by abstract observations in general (or not only) but primarily by history’s lessons: Argos and Messene – that is, *not* an imagined political community – are introduced as concrete historical examples of the process he wants to explain. Human nature, manifesting itself through history, is the kernel of the Athenian Stranger’s argumentation.⁷⁵

A second passage that equally promotes, as far as the ‘common’ citizen is concerned, not only knowledge or (correct)

⁷³ See Schöpsdau 1994: 417 ad loc. In both passages, δόξα means, of course, ὀρθὴ δόξα and λόγος refers to ὀρθὸς λόγος; cf. 6.696c9–10 τοῖς ὀρθοῖς λόγοις.

⁷⁴ Cf. Taylor’s translation ‘judgment, intelligence and right conviction attended by appropriate passionate desire’ (1934: 69).

⁷⁵ This aspect is best emphasized by Schofield 2010b: 18–21.

opinion but also *desire* (in this case the generic *epithymia*) as a pathway to civic virtue is 6.770c7–d6. The specific context is interesting: it considers the possibilities of future *improvements*, by way of correction (ἐπανορθοῦν) or refinement (συμπληροῦν), of the legislation of Magnesia (6.669c–d). The necessity of contemplating in advance the prospective need of resorting to *all* the available means to foster communal virtue and prevent the decay of the laws brings the Athenian Stranger to deliver an impassionate address to the imagined lawgivers and law-wardens to be of the second-best city. They should aim at those objectives on which the Athenian Stranger, Megillos and Cleinias have agreed (6.770c5–6 ξυνεχωρήσαμεν). The one core (ἐν . . . κεφάλαιον) of this agreement (συγχώρησις) is that

ὅπως ποτὲ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνοιτ' ἂν, τὴν ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχων ἐκ τίνος ἐπιτηδεύματος ἢ τίνος ἥθους ἢ ποτ' ἀσκήσεως⁷⁶ ἢ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ δόξης ἢ μαθημάτων ποτὲ τινων, εἴτε ἄρρην τις τῶν συνοικούντων οὔσα ἢ φύσις εἴτε θήλεια, νέων ἢ γερόντων, ὅπως εἰς ταῦτόν τοῦτο ὁ λέγομεν τεταμένη⁷⁷ σπουδὴ πᾶσα ἔσται διὰ παντός τοῦ βίου κτλ. (6.770c7–d6)

In whatever way a member of the community, be his nature male or female, young or old, may become a good person possessing the virtue of the soul becoming a human being, whether derived from some practice, or disposition of character or some kind of exercise, or *desire* or opinion or some learning,⁷⁸ towards this same end which we are speaking of every effort shall be directed throughout the whole of life etc.

⁷⁶ I follow here, with some hesitation, Apelt's emendation of the transmitted ποιῆς κτήσεως into ποτ' ἀσκήσεως (Apelt 1916: 258 n. 45). Apelt's emendation has been rejected as tautologic after the previous ἐπιτηδεύματος by England 1921, I: 601 ad loc. (apparently followed by Schöpsdau 2003: 445 who translates ποιῆς κτήσεως as 'infolge einer bestimmten Erwerbsart'). Yet one could compare *Resp.* 7.518e2 ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσειν and above all *Laws* 7.791b4–c2 where *askēsis* and *epitedeuma* seems to be used as perfectly interchangeable. Bury 1926, I: 454 ad loc. prints σιτήσεως instead of κτήσεως translating 'from some form of diet', but the notion of dietary regime seems extraneous to the context. Brisson-Pradeau 2006, I: 311 (claiming to follow the text of *Des Places*: cf. I, 59) translate 'à la possession de quelque désir' which seems to imply athetesis of the disjunctive ἢ before ἐπιθυμίας, yet *Des Places* has the same text as England and translates (p. 134) as 'par . . . une possession quelconque'. The expression, admittedly, remains obscure.

⁷⁷ I accept Stephanus' emendation τεταμένη (d6) of the mss reading τεταμένη.

⁷⁸ England 1921, I: 601 sees in this expression 'a foreshadowing of the ἀκριβεστέρᾳ παιδείᾳ of 965b1'. In this direction, see also Saunders 1962a: 41. Differently, see Tarrant 2004: 154, according to whom the μαθήματα here mention do not have part in the true ἐπιστήμη.

‘In whatever way’ (ὅπως): to ‘save’ the spirit of the laws (cf. 6.770b4 ὧ φίλοι σωτῆρες νόμων), the lawgivers and law-wardens must be ready to exploit the citizens’ disposition to virtue whatever its source may be. In a list that has been thought of by some as reminiscent of the tripartition of the soul of the *Republic*,⁷⁹ among the possible spring-boards of *civic* virtue (6.770d4 τῖς τῶν συνοικούντων), together with accustomed practice (ἐκ τίνος ἐπιτηδεύματος), habituated disposition of character (ἢ τίνος ἥθους), some sort of exercise (ποτ’ ἀσκήσεως), (correct) opinion (ἢ δόξης) and some forms of knowledge (ἢ μαθημάτων ποτέ τινων), also *desire* (ἢ ἐπιθυμίας) is recognized as a potentially positive source if rightly channelled. But what is the meaning of *epithymia* in this passage? The last three items of the list, taken together, may seem to suggest the equivalence *epithymia*-appetitive desire. Yet the first part of the same list (ἐπιτήδευμα, ἥθος, ἀσκησις) makes the invoked tripartition more blurred and fuzzy and less easily mapped onto. Certainty is difficult to achieve, and perhaps unachievable in this particular case. However, it seems likelier to me that in a context in which the whole spectrum of human motivations is harnessed to foster the civic virtue of the ‘common’ citizen (τῖς τῶν συνοικούντων), *epithymia* must refer to an *inborn, unhabituated longing* as opposed to the ‘habituated’ disposition of character (through education) conveyed by the term ἥθος. Again, as in the passage of Book 3, *epithymia* seems to be a by-word here for ‘any desire’ that may be conceived of as a ‘primitive urge’ – that is, every desire that is not the result of a deliberation. A natural, uncultivated inclination: and we know from the *Republic* that each part of the soul feels desire in such a way (the rational part included), even if their object of desire is different.

The most significant re-deployment of the language of erotic desire as a motivational source made normatively available to

⁷⁹ See e.g. Saunders 1962a: 40–I: ‘ἐπιθυμία is associated with the lowest part of the soul; δόξα, as distinct from knowledge, with the middle part (see *Republic*: οἱ ἐπικουροὶ have ἀνδρεία= δόξα περὶ τῶν δεινῶν); as to μαθημάτων τινῶν, studies... can only be carried on properly by the λογιστικόν part of the soul. Thus Plato may be referring to three sorts of men in the state, in whom one of the three parts of the soul must predominate’. Brisson 2012 does not mention this passage.

the ordinary citizen of Magnesia in order to become a ‘perfect’ member (τέλειος) of the community occurs in two programmatic passages of Book I (I.643c8–d3 and I.643e4–6). There the Athenian Stranger imparts to Cleinias and Megillos the first working definition of the ‘core meaning’ of the ‘correct’ education (I.643c8 κεφάλαιον δὴ παιδείας) devised for the children of ‘law-abiding’ Magnesians.⁸⁰ In the first passage, we are told that it is

τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφὴν, ἣ τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου ὃ δεήσει γενόμενον ἄνδρ’ αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς. (I.643d1–3)

the correct form of nurture that, more than anything else, will draw the soul of the child⁸¹ at play to desire passionately that in which when he becomes a man, he will have to gain as great perfection as the subject admits of.⁸²

In the latter passage, the ‘correct education’ must not be conceived as the conventional education of a so-called well-educated man (ὁ πεπαιδευμένος) but as

τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλειον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. (I.643e4–6)

the education that aims at virtue since infancy, making the person involved long and passionately desire to become a perfect citizen, that is, to be able to govern and be governed with justice.

It is notable that in both passages the compulsive drive of *erōs* in achieving civic virtue is predicated as available since early childhood.⁸³ In the first quote, it is the soul of the *child* that will be led, while engaged in play, to desire passionately (εἰς ἔρωτα)

⁸⁰ Cf. also 7.815b6 and 11.934e1. ⁸¹ Cf. I.643c8 τῶν παίδων.

⁸² I take τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς as ‘genitive defining the scope of τέλειον’: see England 1921, I: 251 followed also by Schöpsdau 1994: 225. The translation of this passage follows England’s.

⁸³ Cf. I.643c6–8 (καὶ πειρᾶσθαι διὰ τῶν παίδων ἐκέισε τρέπειν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τῶν παίδων, οἳ ἀφικομένους αὐτοὺς δεῖ τέλος ἔχειν): the specific reference is to the training of pleasures and desires of *children* – that is, the training of the pre-rational urges and impulses towards pleasures. Education at a pre-natal-stage is developed later at 7.790e8–791b1: cf. in particular 7.790c1–2 τὰ περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πάντων νέων παίδων ἐπιτηδεύματα; cf. also 7.790c8–9 τοῖς ὅτι νεωτάτοις, 7.790d1–2 περὶ τὰ νεογενῆ παίδων θρέμματα, 7.791e2–3 τὰ μήπω φωνῆς συνιέντα.

the perfection in virtue (τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς) that he/she will have to achieve when grown up;⁸⁴ likewise in the second quote, the emotional training imparted by the correct education, though envisaged as a lifelong process, finds already fertile soil in childhood (I.643e4 ἐκ παίδων). The ‘passionate desire’ (*erōs*) stirred up by the correct education aims at shaping and moulding the pre-rational part of the soul first. This is made clear at 2.653b2–6:

ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὁρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὁρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἔθῶν, αὕτη ‘σθ’ ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετὴ κτλ.

Whenever pleasure and liking, pain and disliking are instilled correctly in the souls of those who are not yet able to grasp it rationally and, once that they have acquired reason, these sensations concur with it in affirming that they have been correctly habituated thanks to appropriate habits, this concordance represents the whole of virtue etc.

The habituation of emotions in general is described here as a process that is distinct from rational training and prior to it (cf. μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν), but its pre-rational level of apprehension does *not* imply an anti-rational attitude. The training of emotions is clearly meant to be propaedeutic to and compatible with rational understanding (cf. λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὁρθῶς εἰθίσθαι). The *erōs* aroused in both quotes seems thus to refer to the *erōs* of which pre-rational beings are capable in directing away psychic energy from elementary pleasures towards higher aims. To which part of the soul then does the *erōs* triggered by the ‘correct’ education refer? Passage 3.400c12–403c6 of the *Republic* has already given us the answer, I believe: it is through perceptive stimuli that the rational part of the soul will come to recognize what is akin to itself. As phrased by Wilberding, ‘it is best to understand the rational part of the soul as the philosophical part of soul in adults who have become rational...’, whereas the philosophical part of the soul of the children (and some

⁸⁴ On the interconnected nature of desire and play, see Frede 2010: 115.

adults) is pre-rational'.⁸⁵ What is instead significantly different from the *Republic*, in terms at least of rhetorical strategy, is Plato's willingness to deploy without restrictions the unadulterated language of erotic desire for such a pre-rational longing. We have in fact seen that in the section of the *Republic* devoted to the education of the young guardians (3.400c12–403c6) the love for the beautiful is carefully and consistently couched into the language of *philia*. It is only when applied to the sphere of interpersonal relationships – that is, to embodied human beauty – that this *philia* is promoted to the level of passionate desire (*erōs*) among the fledgling guardians (cf. §1.4). In the *Laws*, this reluctance seems to yield to the ideological imperative of persuading the entire population en masse. This downgrading of the language of *erōs* from a purely philosophical level to a more 'ordinary' one does not imply, as we have already observed, any substantial reconceptualization of *erōs* on Plato's part. The addressee of such an *erōs* is still the rational part of the soul, even if literally still in its 'infancy', so to speak. What, in a sense, facilitates this slippage in the use of the language of *erōs* (from philosophical *erōs* to 'ordinary' virtue) is Plato's interest, in the *Laws*, to distinguish mainly between a rational part of the soul and the rest of the soul taken as a whole.

If there is no substantial *doctrinaire* difference, is it then only a matter of rhetoric, one could ask? The answer very much depends on what we mean by rhetoric. The degree of sophistication and sustained attention paid by Plato to the web of persuasive strategies (rational and non-rational) to be enacted by the god-inspired lawgiver justifies the assumption, I believe, that in the *Laws* the *form* of social and political discourse is something to be taken very seriously. The lawgiver of Magnesia needs to be a practitioner of the 'true' psychagogic rhetoric, as defined in *Phaedrus* 277b5–c6. Psychic complexity requires multiple forms of discourse: in the *Laws* the 'political' *technē* is identified from the very beginning with the skill of recognizing the different natures and dispositions of the souls

⁸⁵ Wilberding 2012: 142. Cf. also Kamtekar 2008b: 357.

and taking care of them (1.650b6–9).⁸⁶ Plato's statecraft, as is often observed, coincides, quite literally, with soulcraft.⁸⁷ But when it comes to an exercise in mass persuasion it is vital to identify also the common denominator of human nature. To mobilize *erōs* and desire as the main springboard to civic excellence available to the 'common citizen' of Magnesia allows Plato to impose uniformity and identity on human desires by labelling them as *one* phenomenon. Within the boundaries imposed by a 'citizenship of virtue' it is the rhetoric of inclusiveness (and not of exclusion) that can bring the point home. Plato himself is deeply aware in the *Laws* of the 'limited' effect of exhortation (cf. 4.718d5–e1):⁸⁸ the lawgiver's persuasive words do not bring about *per se* a change of deep seated beliefs but must be considered successful when they drive home something less effective than this – that is, make people more pliable, more amenable to entertain the right belief. In this sense persuasion is only a *preparatory* stage to believing. And in order to believe, you must first *feel*. The reason of the limited effect of persuasion is human nature: very few are *willing* to become as virtuous as possible in the quickest way (4.718d8–e1 οὐ γὰρ πολλή τις εὐπέτεια οὐδὲ ἀφθονία τῶν προθυμουμένων ὡς ἀρίστων ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ὡς τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι).⁸⁹ It is upon human nature in its fundamental elements that the lawgiver must first act: this is why the correct kind of *erōs* must be aroused. Passionate desire must be enrolled into the landscape of Magnesia's civic virtues. In this sense, then, to speak simply of rhetoric when outlining Plato's strategy in the deployment of *erōs*-related words in

⁸⁶ 1.650b6–9 τοῦτο μὲν ἄρ' ἂν τῶν χρησιμωτάτων ἐν εἴῃ, τὸ γινῶναι τὰς φύσεις τε καὶ ἔξεις τῶν ψυχῶν, τῇ τέχνῃ ἐκείνῃ ἥς ἐστὶν ταῦτα θεραπεύειν· ἔστιν δέ που, φαμέν, ὡς οἶμαι, πολιτικῆς ('this, that is, to know the natures and dispositions of the souls, would rank as one of the most useful aids for that art which is concerned to foster these: and we say, I take it, that this is the art of statesmanship').

⁸⁷ For an updated survey, see Balot 2007.

⁸⁸ See esp. 4.718d5–8 ὥστε εἰ καὶ μὴ μέγα τι, σμικρὸν δέ, τὸν ἀκούοντα ὅπερ φησὶν εὐμένεστερον γιγνόμενον εὐμαθέστερον ἀπεργάζεται, πᾶν ἀγαπητόν. On this passage see Schofield 2010b: 23.

⁸⁹ Cf. also 9.875a1–4 ἡ δὲ αἰτία τούτων ἦδε, ὅτι φύσις ἀνθρώπων οὐδενὸς ἱκανὴ φύεται ὥστε γινῶναι τε τὰ συμφέροντα ἀνθρώποις εἰς πολιτείαν καὶ γνοῦσα, τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ δύνασθαι τε καὶ ἐθέλειν πράττειν (the necessity of law is due to a defective human nature: even if you know what is the common good, it is difficult always to arouse your will to act accordingly).

the *Laws* seems to me reductive. If anything, Plato's extension of the language of erotic desire in his last dialogue shows that the rhetoric of ideology can create channels of communications along which 'real' feelings can flow: in this case, a passionate love with the *idea* of becoming a *perfect* citizen (1.643e5–6 ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἔραστην τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον). In the *Laws*, the inborn human responsiveness to the transformative power of what is beautiful and orderly, a fundamental *a priori* assumption of Plato's argument about musical education, is promoted, from its earliest manifestations, to the level of *erōs*.

A corollary of this particular deployment of the erotic language in Plato's last dialogue is also a notable reduction, if not erasure, of the connection between *erōs* and tyranny: a link that Plato, drawing on a perception deeply rooted in Greek culture,⁹⁰ extensively developed in the *Republic*. The only passage in the *Laws* that may seem to hint in that direction, yet with an entirely different agenda, is the capping of the tyrant excursus at 4.711d6ff., where, as previously observed, we find the mention of the ἔρως θεῖος τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ δικαίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. Yet we have already seen that this god-inspired passion for wise and just practices, together with the attribute of *phronēsis* (and not only instinctual *sōphrosynē*), suggests that at 4.711d6–712a7 the focus of attention has switched from the joint collaboration between tyrant and lawgiver to the leadership of the 'enlightened' lawgiver only.⁹¹ This does not mean to deny that at the same time Plato is willingly provoking the reader of the *Laws* to think of the tyrant of the *Republic*:⁹² but to think of it *contrastively*, rather than in parallel.⁹³ Tyranny in

⁹⁰ Ancient Greeks perceived a very close relationship between *erōs* and tyranny: cf. Ludwig 2002: 141–2. For the tyrants and the promotion of the cult of *erōs* at Athens, see Shapiro 1989: 119–20 and 124; Kovaleva 2005 seems to me over-optimistic.

⁹¹ See Schöpsdau 1996: 138–40 for a detailed analysis of this switch of focus. Cf. also Rowe 2010: 38–40 with nn. 35–6.

⁹² For Plato's technique, in the *Laws*, of hinting (with varying degrees of explicitness) at his own's treatment of the subject in dialogues other than the *Laws* themselves, see Schöpsdau 2003: 167–8 ad 4.711a5–6.

⁹³ I am close here to Rowe's interpretation of the passage (Rowe 2010: 39 with n. 36): 'Their "passion" – contrasting with the master "passion" (*eros* that destroys the tyrant of *Republic* Book 9... – is what counts'.

the *Laws* is of course still the recipient of unchecked desires,⁹⁴ but the language of *erōs* is here purposely absent. Instead, in terms of insatiability of desires, tyranny in Plato's *Laws* does not distinguish itself from any other *human* form of political power (that is, independently from its constitutional set-up). This is made clear at 4.714a1–8:

εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἢ ὀλιγαρχία τις, ἢ καὶ δημοκρατία ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι τούτων δεομένην, στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἀννηνύτω καὶ ἀπλήστῳ κακῷ [νοσήματι]⁹⁵ συνεχομένην, ὅρξει δὴ πόλεως ἢ τινος ἰδιώτου καταπατήσας ὁ τοιοῦτος τοὺς νόμους, ὃ νυνδὲ ἐλέγομεν, οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανή.

But if a single person, or an oligarchy, or a democracy with a soul longing for pleasures and desires and seeking to be replenished with these, yet unable to retain anything and possessed by an endless and insatiable evil, if then such a one will ever rule over a city or some individual by trampling on the laws, then, which we said just now, there is no way to save us.

The referent of ἄνθρωπος εἷς at 4.714a1 equally could be the leadership of either a king or a tyrant or indeed both: as England has pointed out, the emphasis is more on the term ἄνθρωπος (*human* leadership as opposed to *divine* leadership) rather than on the numeral εἷς.⁹⁶ However, what is more significant here is that the state of the soul that otherwise one

⁹⁴ Cf. 2.661b2 τὸ ποιεῖν τυραννοῦντα ὅτι ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ where tyranny is listed among the 'so-called goods' (2.661a3–4 τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν; for the link between these 'so-called goods' and the 'human goods' [τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα] of 1.631c, see Schöpsdau 1994: 295–6); 3.695a–b and 3.696a1 (the education of the children of tyrants is no education at all: it is only indulgence to luxuries and lack of discipline); 8.832a1 (acquisitiveness stirs up wars and tyrants); 9.863e8 (metaphorically said of the tyranny exercised in the soul by anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy and desires: τὴν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ φόβου καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης καὶ φθόνων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τυραννίδα). For 4.714a1–8, see following discussion.

⁹⁵ For the athetesis of νοσήματι as an intruded gloss, see England 1921, I: 442–3.

⁹⁶ England 1921, I: 442. Schöpsdau 2003: 193 takes ἄνθρωπος εἷς as referring to monarchy, yet the parallel adduced – that is, 'the man of power' described by Callicles in the *Gorgias* – is just another travesty for the *tyrant* type: for the verbal similarities in the portrait of the *Übermensch* of *Gorgias* and the description of the successful tyrant by Polus in the *Republic* 5.473c, see Dodds 1959: 269. In this sense the similarity between *Laws* 4.714a5 ψυχὴν ἔχουσα . . . στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἀννηνύτω καὶ ἀπλήστῳ κακῷ συνεχομένην and *Gorgias* 493b2 τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὥς τετρημένος εἴη πῖθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας (cf. also c2–3 τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν . . . τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὥς τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐδυναμένην στέγειν) favours, if anything, a reference to tyranny rather than monarchy.

would *especially* associate with the ‘democratic man’ of the *Republic*⁹⁷ – that is, a soul longing for insatiable pleasures and desires – is extended in the *Laws* to the inner state of mind underlying each possible form of *human* power when not divinely guided. In the *Laws* tyranny is instead consistently realigned to the dominant paradigm of violence/compulsion as a (mostly negative) foil for the true lawgiver.⁹⁸

Particularly pointed, when understood against the broader late-fifth/middle-fourth-century BC Athenian reflection on issues of citizenship, desire and intention, is the use of erotic language at *Laws* 1.643e4–6 (τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἔραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης⁹⁹). Given the close verbal similarity of expression, it is difficult not to see in this passage Plato’s last reply, on his own terms, to the Periclean demagogic rhetoric of the exemplary citizen as *erastēs* of the city (cf. Thuc. 2.43.1 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἔραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς (see §1.5). A related question is whether in this passage we should see Plato as replying to what his reader would have recognized, at a more general level, as a distinctly Periclean rhetoric (be it in its Thucydidean ‘clothes’ or not), or as alluding specifically to Pericles’ *Funeral Oration* as reported by Thucydides. Plato’s engagement with Thucydides is a thorny issue and one that

⁹⁷ Cf. *Laws* 4.714a7 καταπατήσας...τοὺς νόμους ~ *Resp.* 8.558b5 καταπατήσασα πάντα ταῦτα; *Laws* 4.714a3–4 ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι τούτων δεομένην ~ *Resp.* 8.559c9–10 τὸν τῶν τοιοῦτων ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων.

⁹⁸ Cf. *Laws* 4.720c5–7, and 4.722e8–723a4; 6.777e1–4; 9.859a1–6. For the lawgiver being *also* a tyrant as far as the power of *enacting* his orders is concerned, cf. 5.735d and 739a. On the inherently coercive aspect of the law and its (unresolved) criticism in the *Laws*, see Laks 1990: 222–3, esp. on 10.890b3–d8: a lawgiver worth his name will not *only* threatens (10.890b5 μόνον ἀπειλεῖν), but *also* exercise gentle persuasion in his speeches (10.890c5–8 πειθῶ δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα πιθὲντα αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους, μηδεμίαν ἔχειν τοῖς λόγοις προσάπτοντα εἰς δύναμιν ἡμεροῦν). As observed by Mayhew 2008a: 95 ‘it is crucially important to keep in mind that this [i.e. persuasion] does not replace force’.

⁹⁹ For sharing in ruling and being ruled as a requisite of *virtuous* citizenship, cf. also Arist. *Pol.* 1283b42–1284a3. For Aristotle, as for Plato, ‘sharing according to justice’ in the constitution does not mean by default an equal share in political rule but only a ‘proportional equality’: not all citizens qua citizens are entitled to an equal share in ruling; see Bobonich 2002: 436–50.

cannot be reassessed here in any detail.¹⁰⁰ Although my argument does not need to rely on the ‘stronger’ claim (Plato’s intertextual allusion to Thucydides’ *Funeral Oration*, rather than a more ‘open’ reference to Pericles’ rhetoric in general),¹⁰¹ the close verbal echo and its contextual affinity (the *paideia* of the exemplar citizen) seem to me to suggest that Plato *is* here consciously referring to the Periclean *Funeral Oration* as transmitted by Thucydides.¹⁰² What is the broader meaning of this rhetorical move by Plato?

We have already seen Plato’s reservations (§1.5), in the *Republic*, on the *erastēs* metaphor as a successful medium to promote civic-minded spiritedness. At *Resp.* 7.521b4–5 Socrates states that only those who are *not* subject to an erotic passion for power must have access to it (ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε μὴ ἐραστὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν ἶέναι ἐπ’ αὐτό), otherwise *stasis*, in the form of ‘rivalry in desire’, will inevitably follow (εἰ δὲ μὴ, οἳ γε ἀντερασταὶ μαχοῦνται). In the *Republic*, the Periclean erotic model of citizenship is straightforwardly rejected as morally inadequate: instead, the paradigm of familial affection (*philia*) and care (*kēdesthai*, *epimelesthai*) is put forward as the correct

¹⁰⁰ The question whether Plato knew Thucydides’ work (at least the first books) is a long-standing and controversial one: for a concise summary of the problems of Thucydides’ way of composition and early transmission of his *Historiae*, see Canfora 2006 (esp. 11–26). Personally, I side with the increasing (though by no means universal) scholarly consensus that Plato read Thucydides and actively engaged with his text: see, among others, Nicolai 2005: 246–7 with nn. 26–7, Giordano 2000: 55–7, Yunis 1996: 137–8 with n. 4, Kahn 1963: 220–4. This, in a sense, was already the ancients’ opinion, cf. e.g. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 23.10 on the *Menexenus* (...ὁ Μενέξενος, ἐν ᾧ τὸν ἐπιτάφιον διεξέρχεται λόγον, ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, Θουκυδίδην παραμιμούμενος, ὥς δὲ αὐτὸς φησιν, Ἀρχίνῳ καὶ Δίῳνι).

¹⁰¹ For the ‘lover of people’ motif in Aristophanes, see Yates 2005 and Scholtz 2004.

¹⁰² Another pointed allusion to Pericles’ *Funeral Oration* as transmitted by Thucydides (and in an equally programmatic context) is 2.653d2–3 ἀναπαύλας τε αὐτοῖς τῶν πόνων ἐτάξαντο τὰς τῶν ἐορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς (≈ Thuc. 2.38.1 καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν πόνων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορίσάμεθα, ἀγῶσι μὲν γε καὶ θυσίαις διετησίαις νομίζοντες; on this possibility, see Rusten 1989: 148). *Laws* 12.949e7–950d4 seems also to me a probable rejoinder to Thuc. 2.39 (τὴν τε γὰρ πόλιν κοινὴν παρέχομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε ξενηλασίαις ἀπείργομέν τινα ἢ μαθήματος ἢ θεάματος, ὁ μὴ κρυφθὲν ἂν τις τῶν πολέμιων ἰδῶν ὠφελῇθῃ, πιστεύοντες οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς τὸ πλεον καὶ ἀπάταις ἢ τῷ ἄφ’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ ἔργα εὐψύχῳ), cf. Gomme 1959: 117 ad loc. For the presence of sustained parallels between Book 3 of the *Laws* and Thucydides’ work, see Weil 1959: 63–73.

alternative. Callipolis' citizens must not only take care of each other but also be care-takers of the *polis* as a whole. A similar, if less refined, view is expressed also in the *Gorgias*, a dialogue that stages a direct confrontation between Pericles and Socrates for the qualification of 'true politician' (πολιτικός ἀνὴρ) in contemporary Athens. The criterion for winning such a title is the 'correct' function of true rhetoric (517a5 ἀληθινὴ ῥητορική): to improve the souls of the fellow citizens by *taking care* (*epimelesthai*, *therapeuein*) of their moral progression.¹⁰³ In the *Gorgias* 515e–19b Plato resists Thucydides' portrayal of Pericles as a democratic leader sincerely interested in the well-being of the *demos* and refusing flattery as a political tool (Thuc. 2.65.8 διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν τι λέγειν). Plato's Pericles in the *Gorgias* caters instead to the pleasures and desires of the mob (518e2–3) without genuine consideration (*epimeleia*) for the inner well-being of the citizens.¹⁰⁴ In the *Gorgias*, as in the *Republic*, it is the language of care that is deployed by Plato to distance himself from Pericles' rhetoric of the duties and rights of citizenship.

We also know of course of another, extended reply, on Plato's part, to Pericles' *Funeral Oration*: the *Menexenus*.¹⁰⁵ The 'genre' and purpose of this dialogue are debated.¹⁰⁶ Although I share the view that the literary form of *pastiche* comes closest to defining the particular mixture of overt irony, more

¹⁰³ For the language of 'civic-minded' care in the *Gorgias*, see 515b8–c1 ἡ ἄλλου τοῦ ἄρα ἐπιμελήσῃ ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν; 516a5 and b1 ἐπιμελητής, 516b8 ἐπεμέλετο, 516c1 ἐπεμελείτο; the language of *θεραπεύω/θεράπεια* also abounds in this section.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Yunis 1996: 136 on how certain elements of Plato's attack on Pericles' rhetorical skill in the *Gorgias* make better sense if understood against Thucydides' account of Periclean rhetoric.

¹⁰⁵ See Schofield 2006: 70–74 and 211–12. For the strong similarities of the arguments deployed against rhetoric in both the *Gorgias* and *Menexenus*, see already Kahn 1963 (esp. 223–6).

¹⁰⁶ 'Pastiche' (not parody) of a funeral oration: Schofield 2006: 72–4 and esp. 94 n. 64, Tsitsiridis 1998: 82–9, Loraux 1986: 311–27. For a more nuanced approach to the *Menexenus*, beyond the limits imposed by the mostly 'negative' concepts of 'satire' and 'parody', see Salkever 1993, Monoson 2000: ch. 7 (with some excess towards the 'seriousness' of the dialogue), Long 2003, Haskins 2005 and Trivigno 2009 (the latter proposes a fruitful 'integrated' reading of 'the serious points' underlying the parodic stance).

subtle allusion and sprinkling of *prima facie* ‘serious’ elements in the dialogue, my reading of the *Menexenus* follows some recent attempts at unraveling *also* the constructive, though often ironical, hints scattered in the text as to the possibility of providing an *alternative* vision of Athenian citizenship centred on virtue.¹⁰⁷ In this sense, it is remarkable that the language of care (*epimelesthai/therapeuein*) and familial attachment (*philia*) is once more deployed to outsource the *erastēs* model of citizenship promoted by Thucydides’ Pericles in the *Funeral Oration*. The very opening frame of the dialogue (*Menex.* 234a–b) introduces us half-ironically to the ‘care’ motif, with Socrates asking Menexenus whether he wants to have a go at ruling (234a7) so that his family may never fail to provide the Athenians with a ‘care-taker’ (234b1–2 *τινα ἡμῶν ἐπιμελητὴν παρεχομένη*).¹⁰⁸ Both within and outside the reported speech of the war dead, the language of care frames the relationship of both the citizens among themselves and with the *polis*.¹⁰⁹ And although the language of care is ambiguously embedded in a mystifying military frame,¹¹⁰ it is nevertheless still significant that in the *Menexenus* Plato’s Aspasia, teacher not only of rhetoric but also of erotics, never endorses Pericles’ *erotic* paradigm of citizenship even though we are expressly told that she herself inspired the content of Pericles’ speech and for the new occasion she has made a ‘collage’ from the left-overs of Pericles’ funeral oration (236b6 *περιλείμματ’ ἄττα ἐξ ἐκείνου συγκολλῶσα*) and some new

¹⁰⁷ In this respect I side with Salkever 1993 and, up to a point, with Trivigno 2009.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Salkever 1993: 136 ‘Socrates ... tries to redescribe the political life from its ordinary Athenian designation (*archein* and ruling) to Socrates’ characteristic and different way of speaking about political leadership (*epimeleia*, the art of care-taking)’. In the same direction, see also Long 2003: 52.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. (within the reported speech of the war dead): 248c5–6 *γυναικῶν δὲ τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ παίδων ἐπιμελούμενοι καὶ τρέφοντες*, 248d4–5 *ἐπιμελήσονται τοὺς μὲν παιδεύοντες κοσμίως, τοὺς δὲ γηροτροφοῦντες ἀξίως*, 248d6 *ἐπιμελήσεται*; outside the speech of the war dead: 248e4–5 *ἡμῶν ... γηροτροφησόντων ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐπιμελησόντων*, 248e6 *τῆς δὲ πόλεως ... ἐπιμέλειαν*, 248e8 *ἐπιμελεῖται*, 249a3 *συνεκτρέφει*, 249a4–5 *ἐν πατρὸς σχήματι καταστᾶσα*, 249c3 *ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενη*, 249c4–5 each Athenian citizen must tend and be tended to in turn (*ῥᾶστοι θεραπεύειν τε καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι*). For the autochthony motif of the Athenian soil as mother of all the citizens, cf. 239a1–3.

¹¹⁰ In this sense Trivigno 2009: 44–5 is right in criticizing the too narrow approach of Monoson 2000 to 248d–249c.

ex tempore material.¹¹¹ If there is some badinage, it is badinage with a critical purpose.¹¹²

How do we explain then Plato's use at 1.643e4–6 of an undiluted erotic terminology when it comes to define the aspiration of the Magnesian citizen to become a perfect (τέλειον) paradigm of civic virtue? Has the Plato of the *Laws* changed his mind since the *Republic*, *Gorgias* and *Menexenus*? Certainly not as far as the substance goes: mutual *philia* and care are also at the basis of Magnesia's (and Magnesians') happiness.¹¹³ The city, or better its laws, will still be like a parent to its citizens (cf. 9.859a1–4 ἐν πατρός τε καὶ μητρός σχήμασι φιλοῦντων τε καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντων).¹¹⁴ The difference between the *Republic* and the *Laws* is that in the latter Plato is engaging head-on with its arch-enemy (Athenian democratic oratory) by appropriating, and thus pre-empting, its distinctive rhetorical strategy. If the metaphor of the *erastēs* is retained and appropriated by Plato, the object of this passionate desire in the *Laws* is fully re-configured: the Magnesian citizen is not asked to be an *erastēs* of the *polis*, an image, as we have seen, ripe with potential for civic strife, but instead to passionately desire the *idea* of becoming a perfect citizen (τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλειον). By substituting Pericles' object of desire (the city) with the abstract quality of becoming a perfect member of a community, and by totally rewriting, if compared with Pericles' oration, the underlying moral psychology of the exemplary citizen, Plato has at the same time appropriated and neutralized his enemy's weapons

¹¹¹ 236b2–6. For the *Menexenus*' engagement with Pericles' *Funeral Oration* as reported by Thucydides, see already Kahn 1963: 222–4.

¹¹² From this point of view it is also notable that while the rhetoric of exhorting the living to equal the achievements of the dead is a standard feature of the *epitaphios logos* tradition, this is not the case for the repeated appeal, in the *Menexenus*, to compete and *surpass* in virtue the ancestors. Cf. 246b6–c2 and 247a2–6 ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστατον καὶ διὰ παντός πᾶσαν πάντως προθυμίαν πειρᾶσθε ἔχειν ὅπως μάλιστα μὲν ὑπερβαλεῖσθε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς πρόσθεν εὐκλεία· εἰ δὲ μή, ἴστε ὡς ἡμῖν, ἂν μὲν νικῶμεν ὑμᾶς ἀρετῇ, ἡ νίκη αἰσχύνην φέρει, ἡ δὲ ἥττα, ἐὰν ἡττώμεθα, εὐδαιμονίαν. This agonistics of virtue (to surpass each other in *aretē*) and its future-oriented (rather than past-oriented) approach is a utopian feature that is detectable also in the *Laws*, cf. esp. 5.731a2–3 φιλονικεῖτω δὲ ἡμῖν πᾶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀφθόνως.

¹¹³ See Chapter 1, nn. 9–10. The art of statesmanship has as a goal that of 'taking care' (θεραπεύειν) of the souls of the citizens: cf. *Laws* 1.650b6–9.

¹¹⁴ For the personifications of the (written) laws in this passage, see England 1921, II: 390–1.

and retained their hold on human emotion – *erōs* as the supreme form of free will (inasmuch as disinterested) and at the same time commitment (its compulsive nature). And he has done it in a way that is both specific (what I believe to be the intertextual reference to Thuc. 2.43.1) and more general – that is, he has done it by consistently embedding, in the *Laws*, the language of desire and *erōs* into the fabric of his own moral psychology of the ‘common’ citizen of Magnesia.

The ‘release’ of *erōs* from its exclusively philosophical dimension allows Plato also to emphasize the notion (and feeling) of citizenship as ‘a mode of belonging by choice’¹¹⁵: ‘volitional belonging’ and its self-propelling motivational drive form an important complement to the rhetoric of persuasion enacted in the *Laws*.¹¹⁶ By underlining the volitional aspect of citizenship Plato is again exploiting, very much on his own terms, what in the Athenian political thought of the first half of the fourth century BC had become one of the most pressing questions of the time: what does it take to be a truly good citizen in historically unstable circumstances? Are formal criteria (birth, for example) enough to qualify as a ‘sharer’ in the constitution? How does one distinguish between a good and a bad citizen? What kind of commitment is required to ground safely citizens’ mutual goodwill? Epigraphic and literary (mainly from oratory) evidence tells us clearly that after the restoration of democracy in 403/2 BC the Periclean law on citizenship (both parents had to be Athenian citizens) was reintroduced and remained basically unchanged throughout the entire fourth century BC.¹¹⁷ Yet, although the formal criteria to draw the boundary of citizenship remained unchanged, the first half of the century saw in Athens, mainly but not only within oligarchic circles, an intense political reflection on the original nature and scope of the ancestral *patrios politeia* (no doubt as a reaction to the oligarchic *coups* of the 411/10 and 404/3 BC).¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ I am borrowing here Ciprut’s expression (Ciprut 2008: 23–4).

¹¹⁶ See Urban 2008 on the role played by ‘volitional belonging’ in defining culturally the concept of citizenship.

¹¹⁷ Cf. e.g. Hansen 1991: 54 and 1982: 178–9; Ostwald 1986: 506–9.

¹¹⁸ For a survey, see the still useful essay ‘The ancestral constitution’ by Finley (Finley 1975: ch. 2). For the constitutional debate after the oligarchic experiments of the

Likewise, in forensic and public oratory of the fourth century BC, one of the uppermost concerns is how to define and hence recognize ‘good’ citizenship.¹¹⁹ While formal criteria (first of all, being an Athenian by birth) still holds central stage,¹²⁰ there is also some neglected but clear evidence testifying to the increasing importance attributed, at least in some quarters, to the inner, ‘invisible’ prerequisites that truly qualify one as Athenian citizen: his/her desire (*epithymia*), eagerness to be such.¹²¹ With the restoration of the democracy after the Thirty a public rediscussion of the principle and defining features of citizenship is carried forth. The two core formal ‘legal’ obligations of Athenian citizenship require the citizen to serve the *polis* with his ‘person’ (that is, as hoplite) and ‘property’ (that is, performing his share in the liturgic system).¹²² In terms of ideology, the normatively ‘decent’ democratic Athenian citizen (μέτριος, κόσμιος)¹²³ is he who does so *willingly*,¹²⁴ the implied assumption being that Athenians alone consider ‘useless’ those who do not take part in the public life (Thuc. 2.40.2 μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ’ ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν). In practice, the expectation from an ordinary Athenian citizen was that of ‘passive’ participation as a shareholder of the constitution, active participation being left to ‘he who wishes it’

Four Hundred and the Thirty and the different strategies enacted by the Athenians to reappropriate the democratic nature of the *patrios politeia*, see more recently Shear 2011: ch. 2 (the aftermath of the Four Hundred) and 167–75 (the aftermath of the Thirty). More generally, on the fourth century BC ‘revisions’ of the ‘ancestral constitution’, see Balot 2006: ch. 6.

¹¹⁹ See Gastaldi 1987 for a survey of the ideologically different embodiments of the σπουδαῖος πολίτης in fourth century Athenian prose.

¹²⁰ On Pericles’ law of citizenship in the fifth and fourth centuries BC as a ‘political matter’ (that is, not only a legal one), see Connor 1994 and De Ste Croix 2004: 233–53.

¹²¹ For the distinctively fourth-century BC declination of the discursive paradigm of civic desire, see Allen 2006: 204–10 (on *proairhēsis* and citizenship) and, with specific relation to Lysias and Demosthenes cf. Bakewell 1999 and Liddel 2007: 142–3. For the language of ‘zealousness’ (προθυμία) and its cognates in fourth-century BC Athenian honorary decrees, see Whitehead 1993: 48–51, Veligianni-Terzi 1997: 195–8, 297; on its manipulation by orators, see Cook 2009: 43–6 and Balot 2009: 284–5.

¹²² Cf. [Arist.] *Athen. Pol.* 29.5. See also Hansen 1991: 97–101.

¹²³ For a semantic analysis of these terms, see Balot 2009: 289–91.

¹²⁴ For the paradigm of the σπουδαῖος πολίτης, see e.g. Lysias 20.23, Isaeus 4.27, 7.40–41.

(ὁ βουλόμενος).¹²⁵ Ideological pressure increased in the fourth century: the ‘normal’ performance of one’s social and political duties required by Athenian citizenship is not enough under the newly restored democratic regime. To enroll fully as a citizen one must be motivated by an inner *desire* to be so: it is the extent of public-minded spiritedness – that is, the degree of civic *epithymia* – that is often presented in front of the community as the only adequate criterion to award or withdraw citizenship.¹²⁶ A good example is Lysias 31 *Against Philon* (ca. 403–1 BC). The speaker is challenging Philon’s legitimacy to aspire to become a member of the Council. Philon, although legally an Athenian citizen, did not behave as such during the time of the Thirty, forsaking his fatherland when *even* metics (τοὺς μετοίκους μὲν) helped the Athenian people beyond their duty (31.29 οὐ κατὰ τὸ προσήκον ἐβοήθησαν τῷ δήμῳ).¹²⁷ Philon is cast by the speaking ‘I’ as the anti-citizen prototype: in those troubled times each helped the city to the best of his/her abilities (31.8 ἐπειδὴ... καθ’ ἑκάστον οἷός τ’ ἦν, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἐβοήθει τῇ πατρίδι), but Philon alone did the opposite (τὰ ἐναντία ἅπανσι τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ἐποίησεν). From the beginning, the speaker thematizes the *desire* to be a citizen as one of the necessary qualities of true citizenship: to be born a citizen (31.6 οἱ δὲ φύσει μὲν πολῖται εἰσι) is not enough, one should also *desire* to be one such (31.5 τοὺς πρὸς τῷ εἶναι πολίτας καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντας τούτου). The target of this rhetoric of civic desire is the citizen who is such ‘by birth’ (31.6 φύσει), but ‘by choice’ and conduct (γνώμη δέ) considers any place in which he owns some property as his fatherland. Persons like these do not deserve

¹²⁵ See Hansen 1991: 306 and 309–10 and Liddel 2007: 28. For the ongoing negotiation of the concept of democratic voluntarism and freedom (ὁ βουλόμενος) in fifth-century and fourth-century BC Attic oratory cf. e.g. Aeschines *Against Ctesiphon* 3.218 and 20, where Aeschines defends his ‘quietism’ (ἡσυχία) as a more effective way to participating in the public life of the *polis* if compared with Demosthenes’ civic activism (πολυπραμοσύνη). On the ‘incentive problems’ faced by a democracy – that is, how to institutionalize rewards and punishments so as to prompt individuals to co-operative behaviour – see Ober 2009.

¹²⁶ For a survey of the sources, see Liddel 2007: 142–3. For citizenship disputes in the fourth century BC, see the evidence discussed by Connor 1994: 36 with n. 6, 40–41.

¹²⁷ On the rhetoric of the comparison metics/citizens in this speech and in Lysias 12, see Bakewell 1999: 8–17.

to be citizens: they ‘forsake the common good for personal profit’ (31.6 παρέντες τὸ τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἴδιον κέρδος). It is the intangible, inner longing to be a citizen that is promoted as the real criterion by which to discriminate between good and undeserving citizens. And to desire to be a citizen of a *polis* means to feel desire for its laws. This is clearly spelled out by Demosthenes in his speech *Against Aristocrates* (ca. 352/1 BC)¹²⁸ in which issues of citizenship, desire and intention are further elaborated but this time in relation to those who were not born Athenian citizens. *Against Aristocrates* is a speech for prosecution in a *graphē paranomōn*: it was written to be delivered by a certain Euthycles against Aristocrates who had brought a proposal for a decree granting Charidemus, a general of the Thracian king Cersobleptes, the right of bodily protection. Epigraphic evidence tells us that Charidemus, originally a foreigner from the state of Oreos (Euboia), had been granted Athenian citizenship probably in 357 BC.¹²⁹ Demosthenes makes Euthycles give vent to a strong criticism of Athenians’ misleading policy of granting honours (citizenship included) to Thracian kings and their satellites. The real criterion by which to award citizenship should instead be the desire one feels for the laws and customs of the city to which he wants to belong (Dem. 23.126.1–4):

ἐγὼ νομίζω, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἔθων καὶ νόμων ἐπιθυμηταὶ γενόμενοι πολῖται γενέσθαι ἐσπούδασαν, ἅμα τ’ αὐτοὺς ἂν τυγχάνειν τούτων καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν οἰκεῖν καὶ μετέχειν ὧν ἐπεθύμησαν.

I believe, men of Athens, that all who were eager to become citizens because they desired our ways and customs would at the same time obtain these things, live among us and have a share in that which they desired.

A reliable citizen is someone who feels desires for its city’s laws (ἐπιθυμητῆς νόμων), the exact opposite of ‘those for whom neither desire nor zeal for any of these things have any effect’ (126.5 ὅσους δὲ τούτων μὲν μηδενὸς μήτ’ ἐπιθυμία μήτε ζήλος εἰσέρχεται). This same language of ‘nomic desire’ is present in

¹²⁸ On the date, see MacDowell 2009: 196 n. 113.

¹²⁹ See Kelly 1990 on *IG* ii² 207. For the Athenian law and practice of naturalization in Athens, with particular emphasis on the fourth BC, see Osborne 1983: 142–54.

Plato's *Laws* too. The Athenian Stranger is keen to present himself, Cleinias and Megillos as νόμων ἐπιθυμηταί at 3.697a7 (ἐπειδὴ νόμων ἔσμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πῶς ἐπιθυμηταί), in a context in some respects strikingly similar to the Demosthenic passage just quoted: the necessity, on the part of the lawgiver, of correctly granting (or withholding) honours to Magnesia's citizens.¹³⁰ ἐπιθυμητῆς νόμων is not at all a frequent syntagm: up to the second century AD its only other occurrence is in Joseph. *Contra Apionem* 2.151 (οἱ τάξεως καὶ νόμου κοινωνίας ἐπιθυμηταὶ γενόμενοι).¹³¹ Is Demosthenes alluding to Plato's *Laws*?¹³² Intriguing as this possibility of a privileged intertextual dialogue between Plato and Demosthenes may be, it is far more likely that both writers are dipping into a rhetoric that was no idiolect but common currency in the political debate of the time. Once again, we can see how Plato's exploitation of the language of desire and *erōs* in the *Laws*, while representing a coherent extension of his own thought on the moral psychology of the individual, at the same reaches out to widespread concerns of the Athenian political life of the time: civic passion and how to motivate it.

In the following chapters I analyse more in detail the ways in which this rhetoric of 'civic desire', which, as we have seen, finds powerful emotional resonances in the political debate of

¹³⁰ Cf. also 7.798c6: the Athenian Stranger advises against changing the plays of children: these children, once grown up into adulthood, will then desire new practices and laws (ἐτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ νόμων ἐπιθυμῆσαι).

¹³¹ ἐπιθυμεῖν νόμων is not much more common either: apart from *Laws* 7.798c6 (see the previous footnote; for the syntagm ἐπιθυμία νόμων, cf. also *Crito* 52b8–9 οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι), it occurs only in Ar. *Birds* 1345 καπιθυμῶ τῶν νόμων (the youngster who wants to beat his father says to be infatuated with *nomoi*, with a the pun on *nomos* referring both to song (in this case birds' songs) and laws; the civic *erōs* motif is strongly prominent in the *Birds* (414 BC): cf. 1279 ἔραστὰς τῇσδε τῆς χώρας, 1316 ἔρωτες ἑμᾶς πόλεως, 1320 Πόθος, together with Charites and Hesychia, is invoked in occasion of the foundation of Nephelokokygia) and Lys. *In Ergoclem* 28.5 τῶν ἀρχαίων νόμων ἐπιθυμεῖτε (here the twist is different: the desire for old laws is negatively represented together with a reference to sycophancy).

¹³² Ancient doxographic tradition has Demosthenes as pupil, among others, of Plato: for an overview of the ancient evidence, see Allen 2010: 93 and 192–3 n. 14 (somehow over-sceptic, mostly following Cooper 2000); for a more balanced approach (with an in-depth discussion of the ancient sources), see Pernot 2006; cf. also MacDowell 2009: 21–2.

the time, is implemented in the second-best city both at the level of the moral psychology of the embodied person (the physiology of pain and pleasure; the human inborn responsiveness to orderly movements and sounds) and of communal social practices (choral performances as ritualized forms of public discourse re-enforcing the cohesion of the social body of Magnesia).

PART II

CITIZENSHIP AND PERFORMANCE
IN THE *LAWS*

βίος ἀνεόρταστος μακρὴ ὁδὸς ἀπανδόκευτος

Democritus fr. 230 D-K

A life without festivals is a long journey without inns

ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ

Democritus fr. 33 D-K

Nature and education are similar. For education transforms the man and in transforming him creates his nature

CHORAL PERFORMANCES, PERSUASION AND PLEASURE

In the previous chapters we have seen that a fundamental condition for the success of Plato's second-best city is the unity and self-likeness of its social body.¹ The very possibility of a well-ordered, functional *polis* is predicated on a mutual relationship of care (*philia*) and communality (*koinōnia*) among its members (*Laws* 5.739c2–5): its citizens must willingly embrace not only shared thoughts and feelings but even shared perceptions (5.739c7–d1).² The ideal city on which Magnesia will be modelled is, quite literally, a living organism in which those elements that are 'by nature proper of the individual' (τὰ φύσει ἰδία) like eyes, ears and hands, will become 'common to all' (κοινά): its citizens will 'seem then to see, hear and act collectively', approving and disapproving 'unanimously' on the basis of their capacity of 'rejoicing and feeling pain at the same things'.³ The main aim of the law is thus to create a community that may be as much as possible 'one *polis*' (μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα πόλιν 5.739d3–4), reflecting in its oneness the unity of the divine intelligence (*nous*).⁴ To provide Magnesia with a communal ideology based on the willingness, on the part of its citizens, to live out this

¹ Cf. §1.1.

² On the 'homogenization of citizenship' envisaged by Plato in the *Laws*, see Sassi 2008: 141–3.

³ *Laws* 5.739c8–d3 οἷον ὁμματα καὶ ὠτα καὶ χεῖρας κοινὰ μὲν ὁρᾶν δοκεῖν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ πράττειν, ἐπαινεῖν τ' αὐτὸ καὶ ψέγειν καθ' ἓν ὅτι μάλιστα σύμπαντας ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίροντας καὶ λυπομένους. Cf. also 2.664a5–6, 8.829a1 (καθάπερ ἕνα ἀνθρώπων), 9.942c1–4.

⁴ On the importance of the 'assimilation to god' in the *Laws*, see Armstrong 2004 and Lavecchia 2006: 160–6. The theological underpinning of this virtuous co-operation among citizens is laid bare at 10.903b4–d3: to foster virtue in its every form is 'sharing in god's plan for the universe as a whole' (Bobonich 2002: 433). Each component of a whole strives for what is best in common, because what is best for each part is also best for the whole (10.903c6–d1 πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συντεῖνον βέλτιστον μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται).

belief,⁵ the divinely inspired lawgiver must be able to display a whole set of communicative strategies that are deeply indebted to the social and religious fabric of the Greek *polis*.⁶ It has often been observed that to bring this experiment in ‘mass persuasion’ to a successful conclusion, Plato is ready to appropriate the entire spectrum of discursive strategies offered by the ritual frame of the *polis* system, from legislative speech and contemporary rhetorical theory to the language of public choral performances, poetry, and above all religion.⁷

This chapter focuses on one particular form of ritualized public discourse: Magnesia’s choral performances and their power to instill in the citizens of the new Cretan colony a self-reinforcing and virtually endless network of persuasion that the ‘best’ (ἄριστος), most virtuous life is also the ‘most pleasant’ (ἡδιστος) (2.664b7–8). The second-best city’s collective songs and dances represent, in fact, one of the most remarkable ways in which the passionate desire (*erōs*) to become a ‘perfect citizen’, the building block of Magnesia’s civic ethos (1.643d1–3), is activated, nurtured and sustained throughout the entire life-span of individual citizens. A closer look at the context of the ‘erotics of citizenship’, discussed in the previous chapter, shows how Plato, by connecting choral performances with pleasure and desire (and especially erotically charged desire: *erōs*), is appropriating a quintessentially ‘lyric’ mode of experiencing desire that is frequently thematised in both monodic and choral poetry.⁸ As always with Plato,

⁵ On the free submission of the citizens of Magnesia to the city’s rules, see Schofield 2006: 77–88 and 2010b: 25–6. Cf. also Yunis 1996: 215–18.

⁶ Divine inspiration of the laws: see above all Mayhew 2011, Welton 1995 and Nightingale 1993 (esp. 298–9).

⁷ Rhetoric and law: Laks 2000 (esp. 260–7, 285–90), Bertrand 1998, Yunis 1990 and 1996; poetry and music: D’Alessio (forthcoming), Panno 2007 (ch. 3 and 4), Mouze 2005 (esp. 273–354 on the lawgiver as poet), Kowalzig 2004 and 2013 (on the politics of chorality as a tool for social cohesion), Morgan 2013 (on epinician poetry), P. Murray 2002 (esp. 43–4) and 2013 (on tragedy), Peponi 2013 (on the aesthetics of chorality), Halliwell 2002: 65–71, Bertrand 1999: 400–405, Lonsdale 1993: 21–43; religion: Mayhew 2008b and 2011, Schofield 2003 and 2006: 282–331, Welton 1995.

⁸ This aspect has been highlighted by Kurke 2013 as far as choral poetry is concerned. For the semantic overlap between the field of music and erotic desire in Greek culture, see Calame 1990: 37–8 and ch. 3 passim, Peponi 2012: 102–8. For Plato’s erotic conceptualisation of *mousikē* in the *Republic*, see Peponi 2012: ch. 6.

this reappropriation of a lyric modality of desiring in a specific civic context is not only a rhetorical gesture to a well-established cultural practice familiar to his readers (the link between *paideia*, choral singing/dancing and the channelling of emotions).⁹ More importantly, the disciplining of emotions brought about by the collective singing and dancing is significantly re-configured by Plato on a new ethical and cognitive basis as an integral part of his 'correct' physiology of pleasure and pain to be implanted in the citizens-to-be of the new Cretan colony (§3.1).

In the following sections, I try to show how Magnesia's choral performances, and the pleasure they generate, become an essential tool for *constructing*, *experiencing* and *projecting* a strong sense of civic identity and unity.¹⁰ My main claim will be that Magnesia's choruses contribute to the second-best city's behavioural policy and its vision of 'perfect citizenship' by means of their own *performativity* – that is, in the second-best city, 'ordinary' citizenship at its most effective is distinctly and repeatedly troped as a performative action. It is within this framework that I believe one must read the controversial claim of the Athenian Stranger that the whole *politeia* of Magnesia enacts 'the best', 'most beautiful' and 'truest tragedy' because it 'reproduces the most beautiful and virtuous life' (7.817b2–3). This claim is made possible only by Plato's careful negotiation of the mimetic status of Magnesia's choruses. We shall see that this negotiation implies a constant process of mediation between a strictly dramatic (tragic mimesis) and a non-dramatic (lyric mimesis) mode of performance (§3.2). In Magnesia, the choreut-citizens will be both speakers and addressees of the views that they advocate, and it is because of this identity between performer and audience that their songs are able

⁹ Cf. Peponi 2007 (esp. 351 and 360).

¹⁰ For how to interpret 'choral diversity' within Plato's second-best city against the background of Greek polytheism and *polis* religion, see Kowalzig 2004 (esp. 48–9, 60–1). Cf. however D'Alessio's qualifications to Kowalzig's claim that 'the Athenians danced few *choroi* other than those for Dionysos' (2004: 60): in Plato's time, 'real life' Athenian choruses were not the exclusive monopoly of Dionysos; for non Dionysiac 'circular choruses' (κύκλιοι χοροί) at the Panathenaia, Thargelia, Prometheia and Hephaesteia, see D'Alessio 2013: 116.

to reach the entire city.¹¹ In their choral performances, they can just be ‘themselves’: a group of citizens performing how to be a group of citizens (§3.3). The underlying premise that allows for the transformative power of choral performances over humans’ perception of the world they live in, especially when they are experienced directly by its actors but also when vicariously relived by the spectators, is their spontaneous hold on human nature at its most basic, and hence universally shared, level: humankind’s inborn, god-given perception of rhythm as *pleasurable* order (τάξις). In this sense, orderly vocal activity and dance movement help humans to connect the rational and

¹¹ Peponi 2013 has recently emphasized, and correctly so, the preeminent emphasis on performance rather than spectatorship within the choral aesthetics of the *Laws*. Although this is certainly right, I feel less comfortable with her further step, that of equating the identity of performers and spectators in the *Laws* to a total erasure of any positive role of active spectatorship within the communicational utopia of Magnesia (see esp. 219–20 and 223–6). A radical separation, in the *Laws*, of these two moments of aesthetic ‘fusion’ – that is, performance and active spectatorship as its vicarious counterpart – seems to me problematic for the following reasons. First, the examples of ‘negative’ pleasure of (mostly theatrical) spectatorship present in the *Laws* refer *not* to Magnesia but to the deplorable status quo of contemporary corrupted societies (and hence its model has *not* to be replicated in the second-best city). Second, at 2.664b3–5, a passage whose importance can scarcely be over-emphasized, we are explicitly told by the Athenian Stranger that *all* three choruses of Magnesia (young, adult and old) must enchant the souls of the young (φημί γάρ ἅπαντας δεῖν ἐπαδεῖν τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χοροὺς ἕτι νέαις οὐσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἀπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων; cf. also 2.664c7–d1). That is, whereas we are explicitly told that the first chorus (i.e. of παῖδες) will have as spectator *the whole city* (2.664c4–6 εἰς τὸ μέσον ἁσόμενος ἀπάσῃ σπουδῇ καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει), we must infer that the young will also be, in some form and to some extent at least, the recipients/spectators of the songs/speech-acts of the second and third chorus. Third, the quasi-sympotic performances of the elders, too, to reach their scope (i.e. the education and persuasion of the young), presuppose not only an active enjoyment, on the part of the elders themselves, of their songs (i.e. in order to make others rejoice in their singing they too must experience innocent pleasures/joy: cf. 2.666a–c in general and more specifically 2.670d6) but also the presence of a specific addressee/recipient: the souls of the young (2.670d7–e2 καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἡγεμόνες ἡβῶν χρηστῶν ἀσπασμοῦ προσήκοντος γίγνωνται; cf. also 2.659e). On this function of the Chorus of Dionysos, see Schöpsdau 1994: 311 who plausibly maintains that because the singing of the elders must have an effect on the young, young male adults younger than thirty will be physically present at these quasi-sympotic performances (‘anwesend zu denken sind’). This neatly dovetails with the participation of the ‘chosen’ young to the Nocturnal Council’s meetings: cf. 12.951e–952a (the elder members of the Nocturnal Council shall each of them bring a young man *who may please him* – the didactic aim is made clear at 12.952a6–7 (ἃ δ’ ἂν τούτων ἐγκρίνωσιν οἱ γεραιότεροι, τοὺς νεωτέρους πάσῃ σπουδῇ μανθάνειν). For the close parallelism and, up to a point, overlap of functions between the Chorus of Dionysos and the Nocturnal Council: see Panno 2007: 150–4 (esp. 150 n. 40 on age class), Larivée 2003a, Brisson 2001.

irrational parts of the soul, thus helping them to experience the divine harmony between perceptions, emotions and reason. Persuasion, and especially choral persuasion, in the *Laws*, fully exploits sense perception (αἴσθησις) and its cognitive package as the *medium* that more than others is able to take into account the most defining feature of human nature: its inborn tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain (5.732e4–733d6).¹² In this sense a correctly informed perception-based cognition represents the overall important first step to mobilize the psychagogic force released by Magnesia's erotics of citizenship (§3.4–5).

3.1 The erotics of citizenship and its context: between symposium and chorus

In §2.4 we have seen that the communal ideology promoted in the second-best city predicates the enrollment of *erōs* into Magnesia's landscape of civic virtues. The structure of Magnesia's society will be such as to enable its ordinary citizens to cultivate from early childhood a passionate desire (1.643d2 εἰς ἔρωτα) to develop perfection in virtue (1.643d3 τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς), the true corner-stone of a 'correct' education (1.643c8 κεφάλαιον δὴ παιδείας). The educational process of the new colony will put into being 'the correct form of nurture' (τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφήν) whose chief aim is to develop virtue since infancy by making the person involved long passionately to become a perfect member of the community (1.643e4–5 τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδεῖαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἔραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλειον). We have also seen that the way in which this ambitious programme of moulding human nature

¹² Cf. also 2.636d7–e3. For these passages see above all Laks 2005: 45–6 and Woerther 2008: 95–7; cf. also White 2001: 469–76 and Carone 2003: 287–8. Whether god, too, experiences pleasure or not is a highly controversial issue (for the *Philebus*' take on it, see Carone 2000, esp. 262–4 on 32d–33c and Lavecchia 2006: 148). I tend to agree with Carone's interpretation of 7.792c–d (*ibid.* 286–91): the equation of 'the middle state' (τὸ μέσον) in relation to pleasure and pain, which must be pursued by whoever wants to become like god (7.792d5 τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσσεσθαι θεόν), to the very 'condition of god' (διάθεσιν . . . θεοῦ) (i.e. a state of 'grace' [ἰλως]), does not suggest that god's life is entirely deprived of pleasure but only that god naturally experiences only harmonious, pure pleasures, without the indiscriminate attitude of humans.

will be implemented is the training of our most instinctual, perception-based feelings of ‘like’ and ‘dislike’ (ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος), an exercise that, to be effective, must start when adult rationality is not yet fully developed (2.653b2–6). Before analysing in more detail the ways in which choral performances, as envisaged in Magnesia, fulfil this important role of mediation between pre-rational impulses and reason and are hence a necessary component in the formation of the ‘perfect citizen’ by arousing in him/her the passionate desire (*erōs*) to be such, it is necessary first to look at both the broader and narrower context which frames the Athenian Stranger’s statements about the erotics of citizenship.

In general terms, a substantial part of Book 1 serves to establish a fundamental tenet of the whole legislative programme of the *Laws*: the distinction between ‘divine’ goods (wisdom, moderation, justice and courage) and ‘human’ goods (health, beauty, strength and wealth) and the undiscussed superiority of the former over the latter (1.631b–632c).¹³ Individual and collective happiness can be achieved only if both the individual person and society at large respect the ‘right’ priority of the divine goods over the human ones. This is the broader frame (guarantee of the provision of divine goods to the polity) in which the ‘correct’ training of emotions is first introduced in the discussion between the Athenian Stranger and his interlocutors.¹⁴ What about the more specific context of the erotics of citizenship (1.643c8–e6) as *part* and at the same time *result* of this training? After an initial start (1.632c–633d) on ‘courage’ only (ἀνδρεία), clearly motivated by the pre-eminence of this virtue in the Doric education of his interlocutors, the Athenian Stranger shifts the focus of the discussion from the endurance of pain to ‘resistance to pleasure’s allurements’

¹³ Cf. Frede 2010: 113–16. It is noteworthy that this hierarchy between goods (that is, the superiority of τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ above physical and material goods) is represented by the Athenian Stranger not as a simple moral exhortation but as the first ‘political principle of legislation’ (cf. Larivée 2003b: 99).

¹⁴ See esp. 1.636d4–7 where we are told that humans’ inquiry into laws (νόμων δὲ περὶ διασκοποῦμένων ἀνθρώπων) is by definition almost like an inquiry into the pleasures and pains of cities and individuals (ὀλίγου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις περὶ τε τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας ἐν τε πόλεσιν καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις ἕθεσιν).

(καρτερεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς) (I.635a–d). It is at this stage that wine-drinking or, rather, drunkenness (I.637d5–6 λέγω δ' οὐκ οἴνου περὶ πόσεως τὸ παράπαν ἢ μή, μέθης δὲ αὐτῆς πέρι) within the institutionalised frame of the symposium is introduced as *the* test of character in controlling pleasure (I.648b1–2 βάσανον... ἀνδρείας τε πέρι καὶ δειλίας; cf. also 2.652a2–3 τὸ κατιδεῖν πῶς ἔχομεν τὰς φύσεις). From this point on, the rest of Book I (I.638a–650c) morphs into a discussion of the educative function of moderate sympotic practices, under the guide of a wise symposiarch, in controlling pleasure's hold on human nature. Drawing on a well-established poetic tradition (above all elegiac),¹⁵ the Athenian Stranger goes on at length to describe the 'correct' symposium as a peaceful community (I.639c1 κοινωνία, I.639d3 συνουσία) of friends sharing goodwill (I.640b7–8 φίλων δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ πρὸς φίλους κοινωνησόντων φιλοφροσύνης) and hence the privileged locus of education, mainly conceived as the training of our emotional responses.¹⁶ The precise nature of the emotional states that will be 'disciplined' by a correct sympotic practice is left quite vague by the Athenian Stranger at this point (do they concern our response to the divine goods or to the human goods or to both?).¹⁷ Nevertheless, their range (pleasure, pain, wrath, *erōs*: cf. I.645d6–7 ἄρα σφοδρότερας τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ θυμούς καὶ ἔρωτας ἢ τῶν οἴνων πόσις ἐπιτείνει)¹⁸ is easily mapped onto the spectrum of emotions dealt with in sympotic elegy (with the notable exception of paederastic love).¹⁹

¹⁵ For the symposium as microcosm of the 'human condition', see Griffith 2009: 88–90; on the symbiotic relationship between symposium and *polis* in archaic elegy, esp. Theognis (quoted by the Athenian Stranger at I.630a5–6: Thgn. 77–8 West), see Levine 1985. For the image of the *polis* as a mixing-bowl at 6.773c8–d4, cf. Belfiore 1986: 430–1.

¹⁶ On Magnesia's symposia and their relationship to the Spartan *syssitia* and the Athenian (public and private) symposia, see Schmitt Pantel 1992: 234–7, Fisher 1989: 28–30, 36–8 and 41, David 1978. On Plato's attitude towards wine and symposium in the *Laws*, see also Tecuşan 1990: 244–57 and O. Murray 2013.

¹⁷ See Frede 2010: 113–14.

¹⁸ Cf. the longer (but not necessarily more comprehensive) list at 649e5–7 θυμός, ἔρως, ὕβρις, ἀμαθία, φιλοκέρδεια, δειλία, καὶ ἔτι τοιάδε, πλοῦτος, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα δι' ἡδονῆς αὐτὸς μεθύσκοντα παράφρονος ποιεῖ.

¹⁹ Cf. Levine 1985 and Lewis 1985. For the close link, in Greek culture, between symposium and *erōs*, see Calame 1990: 94–8, Stehle 1997: 211–28 and Carey 2009: 35–8.

At 1.641b1–c2 the first direct link is established between a properly ‘educated’ symposium (συμποσίου δὲ ὀρθῶς παιδαγωγηθέντος 641b1) and the ‘correct’ education of youths (1.641b3–4).²⁰ In terms of expression and imagery, what is remarkable about this passage is that the Athenian Stranger replies to Cleinias’ question (‘what would be the benefit of a correct sympotic practice for the *polis* and the individual?’) by explicitly *assimilating* the educative process of the symposium to that of the training of a *chorus* of youths (χοροῦ παιδαγωγηθέντος),²¹ a rhetorical move whose importance has so far escaped the attention of commentators. The image of choral training is introduced by the Athenian Stranger only as a second alternative (cf. 1.641b3 παιδὸς ἑνὸς ἢ καὶ χοροῦ παιδαγωγηθέντος κτλ.) yet this slippage, as if *en passant*, from sympotic practices to choral performances seems to me hardly coincidental given the specific context. This apparently casual and seamless extension of the field of inquiry from sympotic practices (drinking and revelling²²) to choral songs and dances ‘proper’ allows the Athenian Stranger to foreground what is going to be the main theme of Book 2 – that is, choral education as the quintessentially civic medium to impart a ‘correct’ physiology of pleasure and pain (for example, virtue) into the ‘children of law-abiding citizens and the young’ (2.656c5–6 καὶ τοὺς τῶν εὐνόμων παῖδας καὶ νέους ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς).

At the same time, this extension also prepares the audience (internal as much as external) for the ‘novelty’ of a *chorus* of Dionysos in a quasi-sympotic setting (2.666a–c)²³

²⁰ Cf. also 1.641c8–d2 τὴν ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις κοινὴν διατριβὴν ὡς εἰς παιδείας μεγάλην μοῖραν τείνουσαν.

²¹ On the meaning of παιδαγωγέω in this context, cf. Schöpsdau 1994: 216. That the chorus is a chorus of boys (παῖδες) seems implied by the use of the disjunctive ἢ at 1.641b3 (παιδὸς ἑνὸς ἢ καὶ χοροῦ παιδαγωγηθέντος κατὰ τρόπον ἑνός). The assimilation of a correct sympotic education to a correct choral training is not undermined as such by the Athenian Stranger’s subsequent admission that the education of a single boy or chorus of boy would benefit only marginally the *polis*, whereas the education of *all* the youths would obviously constitute a great benefit for the polity as a whole (1.641b3–7).

²² For the latter, see 1.637a5–b1 (esp. κομάζοντί τι).

²³ For the relationship between the Chorus of Dionysos, symposium and *syssitia* in the second-best city, see Panno 2007: 156–9, Larivée 2003a, Belfiore 1986 (esp. 434).

and, more importantly, firmly establishes an indissoluble link between civic education and musical education in its wider sense (μουσική). In fact, at 1.642a3–6 (that is, in a section that immediately precedes the erotics of citizenship as both a necessary component and at the same time aim of Magnesian education) the Athenian Stranger states that a ‘correct’ treatment of sympotic practice (ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ²⁴ διόρθωσις) necessarily presupposes the preliminary definition of the ‘correctness of music’ (μουσικῆς ὀρθότης), and this in turn involves a discussion of the ‘correct’ form of the ‘whole education’ (παιδεία ἡ πᾶσα). It is in this specific context, the definition of *paideia* as first and foremost *musical* education, that the erotics of citizenship must be situated. It is also important to emphasize that the mention of choral training at 1.641b3 is not meant to be read as antagonistic to, or a substitute for, sympotic practices but rather to *complement* them by enlarging the scope of inquiry. At 2.652a–653a the Athenian Stranger will reaffirm that great benefits accrue to a city from ‘the correct use of drinking-parties’ (2.652a3–5 καὶ τι μέγεθος ὠφελίας ἄξιον πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἔνεστ’ ἐν τῇ κατ’ ὀρθὸν χρεῖα τῆς ἐν οἴῳ συνουσίας): in fact the very ‘safe-guard’ of education is predicated on the correct management of this same institution (2.653a1–3 τούτου²⁵ γάρ, ὥς γε ἐγὼ τοπάζω τὰ νῦν, ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι τούτῳ καλῶς κατορθουμένῳ σωτηρία). Dionysos’ gift will have a fundamental role in the re-education of the ‘best part of the city’ (2.665d1 τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως), the chorus of the elders, that just because of its re-education will then be able, in its turn, to educate the young. At 2.664d8–9 the Athenian Stranger’s answer to a perplexed Cleinias leaves us in no doubt that what has been said so far has been said mostly for the sake of the Chorus of Dionysos

Cf. also Morrow 1960: 316–7 and 395. For the debated meaning of 2.666b2 ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις εὐωχηθέντα, cf. Tecuşan 1990: 245–6 n. 17 and 247 n. 22. Tecuşan 1990: 248 rightly observes that ‘the Athenian insists on describing the group of *sympotai* in terms of a chorus of Dionysos’; yet whereas Tecuşan emphasizes the strangeness of *older* people worshipping Dionysos, I am more interested in the combination of apparently different modalities of performance (*choreutai* and *sympotai*).

²⁴ αὐτοῦ refers back to 1.642a2 μέθης πέρι.

²⁵ τούτου refers back to the content of the ‘correct education’ of 2.652b3–653a1 (ἀναμνησθῆναι τοίνυν ἔγωγε πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ τί ποτε λέγομεν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ὀρθὴν παιδείαν).

(καὶ μὴν εἰσὶν γε οὗτοι σχεδὸν ὧν χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθησαν λόγων). Nor is this surprising as it is the Chorus of Dionysos who will decide what songs and dances are to be performed in Magnesia because of their more accurate education and their more advanced understanding of the ‘correctness of songs’ (τὴν ὀρθότατα... τῶν μελῶν) (2.670a6–b7).²⁶ Yet the introduction, at 1.641b3–4, of choral training (χοροῦ παιδαγωγηθέντος) alongside sympotic education is nevertheless essential to the Athenian Stranger’s overarching legislative project. Because the consumption of wine will be strictly regulated according to age-classes (2.666a8–c6: those under eighteen must abstain; those up to thirty will taste it in moderation; drunkenness is reserved for those entering the fourth decade of life), the ‘first education’ (παιδείαν εἶναι πρώτην) will fall under the provinces of the Muses and Apollo (διὰ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος) (2.654a6–7).²⁷ Furthermore, with regard to the modality of *experiencing* the event as such (from the point of view of both the performer and spectator), choral performances naturally converge into the erotics of Magnesian citizenship: in archaic and classical Greek poetry, feeling and arousing erotic desire is repeatedly thematized as the natural (inasmuch as instinctively rooted in human nature) and socially ‘proper’ response to the power of collective song and dance.²⁸ As observed by Kurke, for ancient Greeks ‘[c]horeia is a machine for the production of pure presence, which, through mimesis links together and merges the gods, the dancers, and

²⁶ On the role of the elders in dictating an ‘objective aesthetics’ of songs in Magnesia, see Bartels 2012. However, I cannot agree with the complete exclusion of the chorus of elders from any kind of active singing performance (Bartels at 146 n. 36: ‘[t]he Athenian presents the exclusion of the elderly as necessitated by their age – entirely in line with the fact that old people are virtuous and do not need to be trained in virtue anymore’): choral *paideia*, in its various forms and vicarious substitutes, is envisaged by the Athenian Stranger as a lifelong process: also the elders must be re-educated via Dionysos’ gifts: cf. §4.2.

²⁷ The omission of Dionysos, especially in such a close proximity to 2.653d3–4 (the choruses of the Muses, Apollo and Dionysos), has been seen as puzzling by some, yet cf. also 7.796e4–5 περὶ τὰ τῶν Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος δῶρα. Schöpsdau 1994, I: 264 is probably right in saying that in our passage the omission is owed to the fact that the Athenian Stranger is here focusing on the ‘first stages’ of education (Dionysos coming into the picture only for those over eighteen).

²⁸ See Kurke 2013 for the ancient evidence on the erotic effects of choral performances.

the human spectators. This is what makes it a *thauma*. The engine or motor of this mimetic chain is *erōs*' (2013: 147).²⁹ If it is thus correct to say, strictly speaking, that in the choral landscape of Magnesia 'erotic melic poetry, with its function of initiatory education, no longer has any place' (Calame 2013: 106), nevertheless the erotic response triggered in human nature by the performing event is retained within the social cosmos of the second-best city. Collective singing and dancing will still exert, as performative acts, their ability to arouse erotic desire in both performers and beholders, even if the ethical and aesthetical basis of this *erōs* will be re-configured to serve the vision of Magnesia's 'perfect citizenship'.

From this point of view, the co-opting, in the *Laws*, of erotic desire through choral performances can be read as a further extension and elaboration of Socrates' reluctant acknowledgment, in his 'greatest charge against poetry', that poetry as poetry³⁰ elicits from its audience (including 'the best of us' (*Resp.* 10.605c9) a mode of response similar to erotic desire (10.607e4–608a5).³¹ This *erōs*, 'a corporeal mode of responding to poetry' (Peponi 2012: 136), is represented by Socrates as a 'childish passion shared by the many' that ought to be avoided (*Resp.* 10.608a4–5 εὐλαβούμενοι πάλιν ἐμπεισεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικόν³² τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα), yet Socrates is at the same time ready to recognize in it a 'heightened state of

²⁹ Cf. also Kurke 2013: 150 'I have also said that the motor of this mimetic chain is *erōs*. By that I mean that the expanding circles of pleasure and the perfect intersubjective identification provoked by choral activity are fuelled by erotic desire, awakened by the uncanny, heightened beauty and grace of the dancers in motion'. Kurke also suggests reading the narrative of the divine puppet at 1.644d6–645d6 as conjuring up the image of choral dancers assimilated to divine, self-moving artefacts eliciting *erōs* and wonder. Kurke sees this as a further elaboration of the language of *erōs* at 1.643b–d.

³⁰ The ἡδυσμένη Μοῦσα discussed in Book 10 encompasses both sung and recitative poetry (10.607a5–6 ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεισιν), that is, both lyric (dramatic or non-dramatic) and epos.

³¹ For a detailed analysis of this passage see Halliwell 2011a and 2011b: 180–207.

³² I follow Halliwell 1988: 157 ad loc. in interpreting the adj. παιδικόν as 'subjective' ('the love felt by boys ... there is no reference to homosexuality, which would clash with the feminine personification of poetry'). See also Peponi 2012: 134 and 136, according to whom the assimilation of the passion for poetry to an *erōs* 'childish and common' highlights the priority of an erotic interest in the body more than the soul.

consciousness' which brings with it some kind of deeply 'transformative power' over human nature.³³ It has rightly been observed that Socrates' acknowledgment takes place within 'a moment of explicit self-consciousness embracing not only Socrates and Glaukon but also Plato as a writer of a lingering, insuppressible attraction towards poetry' (Halliwell 2011b: 193), and that this second critique of poetry is therefore 'independent of any particular political or social framework, let alone the peculiar class-structure of Callipolis, and is correspondingly focused on the impact of poetry on the individual soul' (Halliwell 2011a: 250). However, it is equally important to add that 'independent of any particular political or social framework' does not mean 'unrelated to' a more generic, even underdetermined, if you like, civic context.³⁴ Even if in Book 10 of the *Republic* there is no sustained explicit reference to the educational system or the socio-political structure of Callipolis, Socrates' attention to the effects of the emotional power of poetry over the individual soul³⁵ goes hand in hand with its repercussion over the broader community.³⁶ What is different in Book 10 of the *Republic* (but not for this reason incompatible with the *Laws*) is the pronounced, if not exclusive, emphasis, in the 'greatest charge' passage, on the audience reception rather than on the act of performing itself.³⁷ The *Laws* supplements and extends the *Republic* passage: the *erotic* attachment instilled by poetry in human nature, at least in those of us who are 'lovers of poets' (*Resp.* 10.607d8 φιλοποιηταί), is

³³ See esp. Halliwell 2011b.

³⁴ In this sense, I think that Levin 2001: 162 is right in saying that 'Plato's focus in Book 10 is on adults and on poetry's potential role, not in pedagogy – as it was in his reflections on children in Books 2–3 – but instead in the fostering of civic unity'.

³⁵ Both the appetitive and spirited part: see Moss 2008: 41–6.

³⁶ Cf. *Resp.* 10.607a4–5 παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν, α6 ἐν τῇ πόλει, 10.607c6 ἐν πόλει εὐνομούμενη, 10.607d9–10 ὡς οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐστίν and especially 10.607e6–608a1 διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τοιαύτης ποιήσεως ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν τροφῆς, where the desires for poetry is said to 'have been bred in us by being brought up in the so-called fine cities'.

³⁷ I side with those who emphasize the continuity in Plato's conceptualization of mimesis between Books 2–3 and 10 of the *Republic*: see e.g. Levin 2001: 157–8, Ferrari 1989: 125. Cf. now also Heath 2013: 32–40, 43–5. For the 'active' and 'co-operative' role of the audience in Book 10, see Harte 2010.

rescued by being re-configured into a new ‘grammar of perceiving’ implanted in the souls of Magnesia’s citizens by the correct form of education.

This is by no means the only instance in which the *Laws* picks up, expands, qualifies and hence re-configures a line of thought already present in the *Republic*. In Magnesia the whole citizen body will quite literally be what Glaukon, in a well-known passage of Book 5 of the *Republic*, dismissively calls ‘lovers of sound and sight’ (φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες).³⁸ To Socrates’ first, all too-capacious definition of the philosopher as the ‘lover of learning’ (5.475c6–8), Glaukon objects that, on the basis of this criterion, then also ordinary ‘lovers of sight’ (5.475d2 φιλοθεάμονες) and ‘sound’ (5.475d3 φιλήκοοι), with specific reference to those attending dramatic choral performances (5.475d6–7 ὥσπερ δὲ ἀπομεμισθωκότες τὰ ὦτα ἐπακοῦσαι πάντων χορῶν περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις),³⁹ would qualify as such. Socrates’ reply, although firmly denying such an identity between true philosophers and common sightseers (true philosophers nurture a love of sight for the truth: 5.475e4 τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμονας), still allows for some *similarity* between philosophers and those who are ‘lovers of sight and sound’ (5.475e2 οὐδαμῶς, ... ἀλλ’ ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις). The best explanation for this concession must be that also the ordinary ‘lovers of sound and sight’ share with the philosophers some desire (though in a somewhat diminished form) for learning and knowledge,⁴⁰ which manifests itself primarily through an encounter with what is beautiful (5.476b4–d6), paradigmatically exemplified by music among others (5.476b4–6). These lovers of sight and sound differ substantially from the philosophers inasmuch as they are limited by their sensory perception: even though they ‘appreciate beautiful voices, colours and shapes’ through their senses (5.476b5 τὰς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χροῖας καὶ σχήματα κτλ.), their rational faculty is not able to grasp the nature of beauty itself (5.476b6–7 αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ

³⁸ Both adjectives are likely to be Platonic neologisms: see Halliwell 1993: 206 ad loc.

³⁹ For *mousikē* as the primary realm of reference of φιλοθεάμονες and φιλήκοοι, see Halliwell 1993: 206 ad loc.

⁴⁰ See Halliwell 1993: 207 on 5.475e2.

καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἢ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι). Do things change, in this respect, in the *Laws*? From an epistemological perspective, the answer is a resounding negative because only the ‘happy few’ will be able to give a rational account of the ‘truth’,⁴¹ and the content and forms of the choral performances to be enacted in Magnesia will be those determined by the chorus of the elders. Yet the collective ideology of citizenship fostered in Magnesia is such as to rhetorically by-pass Glaukon’s ironic observation and positively to promote the image of a polity in which the ‘correct’ form of education will make all its citizens become, literally, ‘lovers of sight and sound’, either in their capacity as performers or members of the audience, or, even better, as both simultaneously. Being φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες of the *correct* form of singing and dancing is an essential requisite for becoming a ‘perfect citizen’: perception (to hear, see and feel), when correctly guided and informed, is the stepping stone for activating humans’ inborn responsiveness to beauty.

3.2 Dramatic and non-dramatic mimesis in Magnesia

The vehicle through which a ‘whole community’ (συνοικία) can be brought about to express its shared identity in ‘songs, myths and discourses’ (2.664a5–6 ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν ὅτι μάλιστα φθέγγοιτ’ αἰεὶ διὰ βίου παντὸς ἐν τε ᾧδαῖς καὶ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις) is the persuasion enacted by continuous choral performances (2.663e–664d). In this sense, the self-presentation of the new colony through the choral voice of its citizens is envisaged by the Athenian Stranger as one of the most effective means of communicating, and at the same time enacting, ‘the best life’. This is clearly made explicit at 2.664c1–2, where the persuasive power of choral songs (a power grounded not only in the belief content of the songs but also in the very same act of performing them) is represented as the medium holding the strongest grip on human nature. It is via the uninterrupted chain of choral

⁴¹ See §2.3 nn. 36 and 40.

singing and dancing performed in Magnesia that ‘we shall be saying what is most true and we shall persuade those who must be persuaded better than if by any other assertion’ (2.664c1–2 ἀληθέστατα ἐροῦμεν ἅμα, καὶ μᾶλλον πείσομεν οὓς δεῖ πείθειν ἢ ἐὰν ἄλλως πως φθεγγώμεθα λέγοντες).⁴²

Before showing in detail how the human choruses of Plato’s second-best city play an essential role in constructing the moral and social fabric of the new colony by activating in its performers and observers the desire of being a perfect citizen, some preliminary questions must be addressed here if only to be sketched in its outline: what is the *modality* of performance envisaged by the Athenian Stranger for Magnesia’s choruses? What kind of mimesis will they involve? What is the underlying psychology of performance in the second-best city? These questions are particularly urged upon the reader when confronted with what I call the ‘tragedy claim’ of Book 7, where the Athenian Stranger, while discussing the musical education of Magnesian citizens, states that the whole *politeia* of Magnesia will be configured as a mimesis of ‘the best’, ‘most beautiful’ and ‘truest tragedy’ (7.817b2–6).⁴³ What does this mean? What bearing, if any, has this claim on the choral performances to be enacted in Magnesia? In which sense will they be ‘tragic’? Or are the two issues unrelated? The whole passage is interesting for various reasons, and worth quoting in full (7.817a2–d8):

τῶν δὲ σπουδαίων, ὡς φασι, τῶν περὶ τραγωδίαν ἡμῖν ποιητῶν, ἐὰν ποτὲ τινες αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ἐλθόντες ἐπανερωτήσωσιν οὕτωςί πως· “ὦ ξένοι, πότερον φοιτῶμεν ὑμῖν εἰς τὴν πόλιν τε καὶ χώραν ἢ μή, καὶ τὴν ποίησιν φέρωμέν τε καὶ ἄγωμεν, ἢ πῶς ὑμῖν δέδοκται περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα δρᾶν;” τί οὖν ἂν πρὸς ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἀποκριναίμεθα τοῖς θείοις ἀνδράσιν; ἔμοι μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τάδε· “ὦ ἄριστοι,” φάναι, “τῶν ξένων, ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν τραγωδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ

⁴² At 2.664b3–5 we have just been told by the Athenian Stranger that all the three choruses of Magnesia must enchant (ἐπάρειν) with their singing and dancing the souls of the young.

⁴³ On the self-referential character of 7.817b1–6 as ‘text’, see Adoménas 2001: 55 (I disagree however with Adoménas’ exclusive emphasis on the ‘written’ nature of Magnesia’s ‘best tragedy’ [the parallel with the *Phaedrus* passage on the critique of writing is misleading in this respect]). What is at issue here is not only the vehicle of diffusion of the ‘script’ but its representational dimension as enacted by multiple, overlapping ways of performing the script itself.

ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν⁴⁴ ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκε⁴⁵ μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δὴ φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγωδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην. ποιηταὶ μὲν οὖν ὑμεῖς, ποιηταὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὑμῖν ἀντίτεχνοί τε καὶ ἀνταγωνισταὶ τοῦ καλλίστου δράματος, ὃ δὴ νόμος ἀληθὴς μόνος ἀποτελεῖν πέφυκεν, ὡς ἡ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐλπίς· μὴ δὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς ῥαδίως γε οὕτως ὑμᾶς ποτε παρ' ἡμῖν ἐάσειν σκηνάς τε πῆξαντας κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ καλλιφώνους ὑποκριτὰς εἰσαγαγομένους, μείζον φθεγγομένους ἡμῶν, ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναικας καὶ τὸν πάντα ὄχλον, τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντας ἐπιτηδευμάτων περὶ μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖστα. σχεδὸν γάρ τοι κἂν μαινοίμεθα τελέως ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἅπανα ἡ πόλις, ἥτισον ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέποι δρᾶν τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, πρὶν κρίναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ ἐπιτήδεια πεποιήκατε λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον εἴτε μὴ. νῦν οὖν, ὦ παῖδες μαλακῶν Μουσῶν ἔκγονοι, ἐπιδείξαντες τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρῶτον τὰς ὑμετέρας παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ᾠδὰς, ἂν μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ γε ἡ καὶ βελτίω τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν φαίνηται λεγόμενα, δώσωμεν ὑμῖν χορόν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὦ φίλοι, οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυναίμεθα.”

Now as for the so-called serious poets, the tragedians, if some of them came to us and asked us the following kind of question: ‘O strangers, shall we, or shall we not, come to your city and country and bring with us our poetry, or what have you decided to do about such things?’ What would be then the correct response to give to these divinely inspired men’s questions?⁴⁶ For I think we should reply thus: ‘Most excellent of strangers, we ourselves are composers of tragedy, of the most beautiful and best we can; our polity has thus been composed as a mimesis of the most beautiful and best life, which in our view at least is the truest tragedy. So you are poets, but we are poets too, composing in the same genre as yourself, your rival composers and performers of the finest play, which, as our hope is, only true law is by nature able to bring to its completion.’⁴⁷ Do not imagine that we will ever thus allow you easily to set

⁴⁴ For a defence at 7.817b3 of the mss οὖν against Bywater’s emendation γοῦν (accepted by England 1921, II: 307 ad loc. and Schöpsdau 2003: 598), see already Des Places 1929: 35 with n. 1. Differently from Schöpsdau, I do not find the sequence affirmative οὖν + perfect tense (συνέστηκε) problematic: I take the perfect as resultative. Furthermore, at b5 γε already specifies that this is ‘their’ view. The sequence γοῦν + γε is not unparalleled (cf. e.g. Eur. Med. 123–4 with Mastronarde 2002: 127 ad loc.) but it is mostly poetic.

⁴⁵ Given the context, it is difficult not to see in συνέστηκε at 7.817b4 a specifically dramatic connotation (unnoticed by England and Schöpsdau). For the dramaturgical meaning of σύστασις and συνίστημι as ‘technical terms for literary composition’, see Craig 1970, esp. p. 97. Cf. already Ar. Nub. 1369 ἀξύστατος (of Aeschylus) and for Plato cf. e.g. Phdr. 268d4–5 τραγωδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοισι τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην.

⁴⁶ For the ironic sense of τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνδράσιν at 7.817a7–8, playing on the pretended divine inspirations of poets, see Van Camp and Canart 1956: 367–70.

⁴⁷ The exact sense of ἀποτελεῖν at 7.817b8 has been variously interpreted. England 1921, II: 307 ad loc. comments that ἀποτελεῖν is used here ‘like our “render”, of performances, and so appropriately used of a δράμα; ... Here, therefore, it is more than

up your stage in the marketplace and introduce actors whose fine voices are louder than ours, and to harangue children, women and the whole populace, saying about the same practices we talk about things not only different from ours but for the most part just the exact opposite. For we would really be totally mad, and so every city that allows you to do what I have just said, before the magistrates had judged whether what you have composed can be said and is appropriate to be made public or not. So now, you children born of the soft Muses, do you first display to the rulers your songs for comparison with ours, and if it is evident that what you say is the same as we say, or even better, we shall grant you a chorus; but if not, my friends, we could never do so’.

This apparently eccentric claim has long since attracted scholarly attention, first of all as piece of evidence, twisted and partisan as it may be, for the broader institutional context of dramatic performances in the fourth century BC. Historians

“bring about”, “compose”; it is “give a representation of”, “produce” (author’s italics). England quotes à propos 2.668b6–7 μίμησιν γὰρ ἦν, ὥς φαμεν, ὀρθότης, εἰ τὸ μίμηθῆν ὅσον τε καὶ οἷον ἦν ἀποτελοῖτο (‘for the correctness of imitation, was, according to us, in representing the original in its quantity and quality’), yet in this passage any ‘performative’ aspect is absent (and England himself translates ἀποτελοῖτο at 668 as ‘representing/reproducing’). In Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* 748b ἐν ἔργον ἀμφοτέραι τὴν διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων μίμησιν ἀποτελοῦσι (on the *hyporchēma*: poetry and dance ‘effect’, ‘produce’ a single work, that is a representation through postures and words) μίμησιν is not direct object of ἀποτελοῦσι but apposition of ἐν ἔργον (Bergk’s correction for the transmitted ἐνεργόν: probably right, cf. the opposition ἀμφοτέραι/ἐν). In our passage a performative dimension may be as well implied since the reference is to a form of δρᾶμα, yet the sense of ‘bringing to completion’ seems the more apt, cf. also to this effect Mouze 1998: 87–88 (who observes that ἀποτελεῖν in the dramatic sense of ‘to produce’ is not attested). The best internal parallel for ἀποτελεῖν, said of the *law* (νόμος ἀληθὴς μόνος), in the sense of ‘bringing to completion’, seems to me 4.718a6–b5 (the law helping the citizens to ‘bring to completion and fulfillment’ their duties) δὲ πρὸς ἐγγόνους καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ φίλους καὶ πολίτας, ὅσα τε ξενικὰ πρὸς θεῶν θεραπεύματα καὶ ὁμιλίας συμπάντων τούτων ἀποτελοῦντα τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον φαιδρυνάμενον κατὰ νόμον κοσμεῖν δεῖ, τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν ἡ διέξοδος, τὰ μὲν πείθουσα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπέικοντα πειθοῖ τῶν ἡθῶν βίᾳ καὶ δίκη κολάζουσα, τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν συμβουληθέντων θεῶν μακαρίαν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἀποτελεῖ (‘as regards the obligations towards children, relatives, friends, citizens and whatever duties are required by the gods towards strangers, and how to relate to all these, by fulfilling which [a man] ought to brighten up and confer order to his own life as the law requires, the detailed exposition contained in the laws themselves, partly by persuasion and partly by punishing with violence and justice when men’s habit do not yield to persuasion, will make our city, if the gods are willing, blessed and happy’). At 4.718b2 I take ἡ διέξοδος as referring primarily to the expository and explanatory character embedded in the Magnesian law code, that is, esp. the preludes to the laws (718a6–c7 deals with the issue of what *form* of the law is more effective), cf. Schöpsdau 2003: 25; Bury’s and Pangle’s rendering of διέξοδος as ‘sequel’ misses the point: what matters is not the *ensuing* character of the discourse but its detailed explanatory nature.

have thus debated its import, if any, for the (still mostly obscure to us) procedure by which the Athenian archons must have selected among the aspirant competing tragedians,⁴⁸ and also the extent to which the formal address to tragedians as *xenoi* (817b2) might reflect the possibility that in the late fourth century BC ‘foreign’ wandering dramatic players may have co-opted local choruses in the places they visited (Wilson 2000: 289).⁴⁹ The framing of the Athenian Stranger’s ‘tragedy claim’ as a dialogue between *xenoi* is in itself interesting, especially in a work so obsessively concerned with civic identity and sense of communal belonging. Although part of the reason for this set-up (tragedians arriving as ‘outsiders’ in Magnesia) may be motivated by the narrative frame so far developed (the dramatic setting of the dialogue is Crete, Magnesia is a *new* Cretan colony, the Athenian Stranger is obviously not Cretan and so forth), the whole dynamics of strangers/in-dwellers dramatized in the ‘tragedy claim’ passage seems to me to give a better pay-off if contextualised not only within the historical context of the *Laws* and contemporary fourth-century BC dramatic practices, but also within the rhetoric of citizenship promoted in Magnesia. It is significant that in the second-best city, where the *technē* of virtue coincides with the art of citizenship (cf. §1.1), tragedians are troped by default as ‘strangers’ – that is, literally, as ‘non-citizens’, a group external to the civic body.⁵⁰ And yet the Athenian Stranger, while rejecting the tragedians as *xenoi*, is ready to appropriate, or better reclaim, tragedy as the monopoly of the new polity: ‘the whole polity’ of Magnesia (πᾶσα... ἡ πολιτεία)⁵¹ is a mimesis of ‘the best’, ‘most

⁴⁸ Cf. e.g. Morrow 1960: 375–6 and Wilson 2000: 63 on technicisms as ἐπιδείξαντες (7.817d4) and δώσομεν... χορόν (7.817d7).

⁴⁹ For the *xenoi* motif Morrow 1960: 375–6 n. 272 speaks of a ‘dramatic touch’ analogous to *Resp.* 3.398a1–b4; see now the rejoinder by P. Murray 2013: 300–01.

⁵⁰ For the external audience, there is certainly also an ironic element in this ‘distancing’ device: tragedians at the Great Dionysia in the fifth century BC were overwhelmingly Athenian citizens. Even if in the fourth century BC the number of non-Athenian tragedians increased, tragedy very much remained an Athenian cultural product (for tragedians and tragedy actors of non-Athenian origin at the end of the fifth/beginning of the fourth century BC, see Csapo 2010: 85–6).

⁵¹ I am reluctant to share Sauvé Meyer’s interpretation of *politeia* as limited here to the mere ‘body of legislation’ in its strict sense. The context seems to me to suggest a more capacious definition of *politeia* as the whole sets of activity presiding

beautiful’ and ‘truest tragedy’ (7.817b2–5). Magnesia’s divinely inspired lawgivers are ‘tragedians’ themselves (7.817b2 ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν τραγωδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταί, 7.817b6–7 ποιηταὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν τῶν αὐτῶν), ‘rival composers and performers⁵² of the finest play’ (7.817b7–8 ὑμῖν ἀντίτεχνοί τε καὶ ἀνταγωνισταὶ τοῦ καλλίστου δράματος). What does this claim amount to? Interpretations of its significance have widely varied, from the ironic and/or metaphorical to the over-literal.⁵³ Whereas some scholars have more generally seen it as a formulation of Plato’s willingness to rival and appropriate the psychagogic power of tragic mimesis *qua* psychological and behavioural assimilation through performance,⁵⁴ others have emphasized its representational content: tragedy as a form of discourse on ‘the best life’.⁵⁵

In the following, I argue that Plato’s appropriation of tragic mimesis involves a concept of mimesis that is active at *both* a representational level (mimesis *qua* representation) and

the organization of the public life: cf. also Laks 2010: 218 with n. 3 (‘*politeia* ... can also carry a wider sense that includes the way in which the citizens of a city conduct their lives’). It is this wider sense, which includes also the ‘legislation’ proper but goes beyond it, that I think is activated here, hence my translation of πολιτεία as ‘polity’. Likewise, I take the νόμος ἀληθής of 7.817b8 in its broader sense spelled out at 4.714a1–2: ‘true law’ is the expression of the intellect’s ordinances (τὴν τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ἐπινόμαζοντες νόμον; for τοῦ νοῦ as subjective genitive of διανομήν, see England 1921, I: 442 ad loc.).

⁵² For this rendering of ἀνταγωνισταὶ as ‘rival performers’, see already England 1921, II: 307. Commentators do not elaborate on it, but it is tempting to see in Plato’s choice of this word (not commonly used in theatrical contexts as is instead the case of the simple ἀγωνιστής, ἀγωνίζομαι, etc.) a pointed reference to Ar. *Vesp.* 1497 φέρε νυν, ἀνείπω κἀνταγωνιστὰς καλῶ./ εἴ τις τραγῳδὸς φησιν ὀρχεῖσθαι καλῶς,/ ἐμοὶ διορχησόμενος ἐνθάδ’ εἰσὶτω (Philocleon’s call for a dancing contest with the sons of the *tragedian* Carcinus; for the technical meaning of this term in Aristophanes, see Campagner 2001: 80). The fact that the first attested occurrence of ἀντίτεχνος is Ar. *Ran.* 816 (again, said of a tragedian) reinforces this suspicion (ἀντίτεχνος is a relatively infrequent word: up to the first century BC there are only 11 occurrences, of which 3x in Plato and 2x in [Plato]). [Longinus] 13.3–4 calls Plato Ὀμηρικώτατος and ἀνταγωνιστὴς νέος of Homer).

⁵³ For an updated survey of some scholarly interpretations of the claim by the Athenian Stranger, see e.g. Sauvé Meyer 2011: 388 with n. 2 and also P. Murray 2013.

⁵⁴ See e.g. Murray 2002: 44 and 2013. In the same direction, cf. Halliwell 1996: 335–7 (336 on the passage of the *Laws*) and 2002: 99–108.

⁵⁵ On the political and ideological import of this claim, see Laks 2010 and Sauvé Meyer 2011 (both highlighting the importance of contextualizing historically the notion of ‘tragedy’ as a form of discourse on the ‘best life’, although from different perspectives). Cf. also Mouze 2005: 332–54 and Jouët-Pastré 2006: 139–51.

performative level (*mimesis qua enactment*).⁵⁶ In fact, although it is right to emphasize that, strictly speaking, it is the lawgivers who present themselves as ‘rival composers and performers’ of the tragedians (Sauvé Meyer 2011: 388), there are indeed good reasons for extending this performative analogy also to the civic body *via* its choral performances. In this sense, with regard to the meaning of *μίμησις* in the ‘tragedy claim’ passage, it has correctly been observed that ‘the importance of the role accorded in the constitution of the *Laws* to choral performance does incontrovertibly serve to reduce the distance between *representation* and *performance*’ (Laks 2010: 222; my emphasis). This interpretation of *mimesis* as both enactment and representation in the ‘tragedy claim’ passage is supported, I believe, at a double level: at the macroscopic level by the content of the *Laws* as a whole; at a microscopic level by the fact (rarely remarked on) that in the ensuing explanation of *why* the tragic poets will not be allowed in Magnesia (or only if...) the Athenian Stranger puts emphasis on *both* the belief content of their poetry (7.817c5–7 τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντας ἐπιτηδευμάτων περί μη τὰ αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖστα) and the modality of performance of his rivals (7.817c3–4 καλλιφώνους ὑποκριτὰς εἰσαγομένους, μεῖζον φθεγγομένους ἡμῶν, 7.817c4–5 δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδας τε καὶ γυναικας καὶ τὸν πάντα ὄχλον).⁵⁷ Furthermore, one aspect often

⁵⁶ This possibility is tentatively considered by Laks 2010: 222 (‘one might go so far as to say that the constitution of the *Laws* is in part a representation of performance’; author’s italics). P. Murray 2013: 310 seems to hint in this direction only to dismiss it on the basis that (1) ‘[t]heatre and *choreia* obviously merge if theatrical performance is envisaged as choral, but Plato seems not to represent tragedy in this way’; and (2) ‘tragedy is treated predominantly from the point of view of the spectator rather than from the point of view of the performer’. Yet both claims seem to me unwarranted. As to the first point, that Plato, as any contemporary Athenian theatre-goer, perceived tragedy not only as actor-based but also, if not predominantly, as a choral performance, is clearly testified, within the passage of the *Laws* in question, by 7.817d6 ἐπιδείξαντες... τὰς ὑμετέρας... ᾠδὰς (cf. the observation of Sauvé Meyer 2011: 390 on the use of ᾠδὰς in this context) and 7.817d7 δῶσομεν ὑμῖν χορόν; cf. also 7.800c7–d5 where the πλῆθος of *choruses* assembling about the altar and competing for victory are easily mapped into tragic and dithyrambic choruses (on this passage see §4.4). As for the second point, see §3 n. 11.

⁵⁷ This is also why I find Sauvé Meyer’s claim that in 7.817b3–5 Plato ‘deliberately strips away the ‘aesthetic’ elements of tragic composition’ misleading (Sauvé Meyer 2011: 399). The comparison with *Gorgias* 502b1–c8 (tragedy reduced to a form of

glossed over is the specific context in which the ‘tragedy claim’ by the Athenian Stranger takes place. It is worth noticing that the claim that the political and social organization of the civic body of Magnesia represents ‘the best’, ‘most beautiful’ and ‘truest tragedy’ because it ‘reproduces the most beautiful and virtuous life’ occurs within a broader section (7.814d8–817e4) specifically devoted to those bodily movements that can be ‘correctly’ (ὀρθῶς) categorized as *dance* (7.814d8e2 ὀρχησις). The initial part of this subsection on the education of the young introduces, in fact, a shift of focus from gymnastics to dance (7.814d8–e9):

περὶ δὲ τῆς ἄλλης κινήσεως παντὸς τοῦ σώματος, ἧς τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος ὀρχησίν τινά τις προσαγορεύων ὀρθῶς ἂν φθέγγοιτο, δύο μὲν αὐτῆς εἶδη χρή νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχρόνων ἐπὶ τὸ φαῦλον, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαύλου τε δύο καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου δύο ἕτερα. τοῦ δὴ σπουδαίου τὴν μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ ἐν βίαισις ἐμπλακέντων πόνοις σωμάτων μὲν καλῶν, ψυχῆς δ’ ἀνδρικῆς, τὴν δ’ ἐν εὐπραγίαις τε οὐσης ψυχῆς σώφρονος ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε ἐμμέτροις· εἰρηνικὴν ἂν τις λέγων κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ὀρχησίν λέγοι.

As to the rest of the motion of the body as a whole, of which one would be speaking correctly calling the greatest part of it some sort of dance, we ought to consider that there are two kinds: one imitating the movement of finer bodies engaged in solemn behaviour, the other imitating those of uglier bodies in low behaviour. Then in turn there are two kinds of low and serious types. Of the serious kind there is, on the one hand, that of bodies entangled in war and in violent exertions, proper of a brave soul; and, on the other hand, the motion of a moderate soul experiencing a state of well-being and enjoying moderate pleasures. If someone called such a dance ‘eirenic’, he would speak according to nature.

The Athenian Stranger is acknowledging here the existence of two ‘types’ of dance: one consisting in the imitation of superior beautiful bodies moving in a solemn way, the other in the imitation of uglier bodies behaving improperly. We have then a further subdivision: there are two kinds of ‘low’ dances, and two kinds of the ‘serious’ dances, namely the war-like dance

public oratory) is only partial: in the ‘tragedy claim passage’ the author does not take into sufficient account the powerfully persuasive role of the *vehicle* (performance) through which the content is conveyed.

and the eirenic dance that is proper of a person ‘feeling a sense of general well-being while enjoying moderate pleasures’.⁵⁸ The context could not be more specific: orchestric performance and its relation to ethical character-types.

It is also useful to remember that at 7.816a3–6 we have just been given what amounts to an anthropological aetiology of human dance: ὅλως δὲ φθεγγόμενος, εἴτ’ ἐν ᾧδαῖς εἴτ’ ἐν λόγοις, ἡσυχίαν οὐ πᾶνυ δυνατός τῳ σώματι παρέχεσθαι πᾶς. διὸ μίμησις τῶν λεγομένων σχήμασι γενομένη τὴν ὀρχηστικὴν ἐξηργάσατο τέχνην σύμπασαν (‘in general, anyone is using his voice, be it in songs or speeches, is utterly incapable of keeping his body still. Thus the imitation through gestures of what has been articulated by the voice gave rise to the art of dancing as a whole’). What is significant for our purpose is that at 7.816a3–6 the Athenian Stranger represents the movements of the body as a *natural* extension of the voice. One immediate consequence is that the bodily *schēmata*, of which dance is composed, are never ‘autonomous with reference to the content of the song’ (Peponi 2009: 59). The interconnectedness of dancing and singing, with the first deriving from the second, is an *a priori* assumption for Plato.⁵⁹

Second, just as comedy (together with other kinds of comic representations) is introduced at 7.816d3ff. as representative of the degenerate (*phaulos*) type of dance (in diction, song and bodily movements), so at 7.817a2ff. the treatment of tragedy is introduced as part of the discourse on the ‘serious’ (*spoudaion*) type of *choreia* (cf. εἰς τὰς χορείας at 7.816d2). Types of performance and their moral effects on individuals provide the broader frame within this the ‘tragedy claim’ occurs. From this perspective, the main question is why at this specific juncture the Athenian Stranger has felt the need to appeal to tragedy,

⁵⁸ For a fuller treatment of the eirenic dance, see §4.3.

⁵⁹ This may seem at odds with the birth of the *choreia* in Book 2, where the pleasure of rhythmic kinetic and vocal activity is represented as independent from and almost prior to the cognitive content of songs. This difference is not, I believe, a contradiction if we take into account the specific contexts: in Book 2 we have an exposition of the physiology of an exclusively human kind of pleasure, the perception of order in movement; in Book 7 the Athenian Stranger is not talking about the dance as a way of perceiving but as an organized *technē* (cf. 7.802c4–6).

whereas so far in constructing the voice of Magnesia's ideal choruses he has drawn profusely, though in a highly selective way,⁶⁰ on the representations of the communal voice as exemplified in the pan-Hellenic lyric tradition. My contention is that the 'truest tragedy' claim instantiated by the *politeia* of the new Cretan colony is made possible, at a performative level, only by a careful negotiation of the mimetic status of Magnesia's choruses, its civic bodies. This negotiation entails a constant process of mediation between what I shall call, for convenience's sake, strictly dramatic (tragic mimesis) and non-dramatic (lyric mimesis) modes of performance.⁶¹ In the *Laws*, the way to save the psychagogic force of dramatic mimesis – that is, its profound hold on human nature – and at the same time avoid 'being necessarily in contradiction with oneself' (4.719c6–7 ἀναγκάζεται... ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτῷ), is to equate mimesis to an absolute identity between performer and performed, actor and audience: it is here that the model of 'lyric' mimesis represented by choral cultic poetry offers obvious advantages over the 'tragic' form. Tragic choruses may, of course, embody on stage what we can call a communal, civic voice and identity (for example, the chorus of the Elders in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*). Yet most of the time they represent socially marginal groups (women, old men, captives and foreigners) and the authority of the tragic choral voice, even when representative of a civic community, is always limited and unstable: as observed by scholars, '[it] both allows a wider picture of the action to develop and also remains one of the many views expressed'

⁶⁰ One notable absence in Magnesia's festive calendar is epinician *choreia*. I cannot treat this issue here but certainly the notorious dearth of epinician performances in historical fourth-century BC Athens, together with Plato's anxiety about the containing of social envy (φθόνος), is part of the reason. For the lawgiver as the true 'epinician poet' apportioning praise and blame, see Morgan 2013.

⁶¹ I use here the term 'lyric mimesis' as a somehow inadequate but recognizable term to designate the kind of ritualized performances in which the members of the chorus perform a song for the community to which they belong as a body representative of that very community – that is, the performers are citizens who perform *in propria persona*. On the huge question of the relationship between dramatic and lyric chorus, see esp. Kowalzig 2004: 41–2 (from a political and social perspective), Calame 1994/1995, 1999a and 2007 (on the 'hermeneutical', 'explanatory' and 'self-reflexive' function of the tragic chorus that compensates for the loss of the lyric chorus' cultic voice), Nagy 1994/1995 and more recently Swift 2010.

(Goldhill 1996: 255).⁶² The tragic chorus can never reach the all-encompassing inclusiveness and authority of the choral lyric voice.⁶³ But in Magnesia the choreut-citizens are both speakers and addressees of the views that they promote, and it is because of this identity between performer and audience that the Magnesians, in their choral performances, can just be ‘themselves’ – members of a collectivity expressing a communal civic identity. From this perspective, the adoption of a lyric modality of experiential mimesis allows them to re-enact endlessly their own self-likeness, by-passing the psychological dangers of an alienating tragic mimesis. As we see in the next sections, the model of chorality supported in the *Laws* as the building block of the social fabric of the second-best city is consistently mapped onto the image of the non-dramatic, civic choruses of the classical *polis*, while at the same time retaining the psychagogic driving force of its dramatic rival (the tragic chorus).⁶⁴

3.3 The origin of *choreia*: *charā*, *charis* and *peithō*

It has often been remarked that the festival calendar of Magnesia is saturated with choral performances.⁶⁵ Plato’s second-best city is a community perpetually re-enacting through dance and song what we might legitimately call one of the colony’s ‘foundational myths’ (2.653c7–654a7), the divine origin of *choreia*, or, better, the bestowal of song and dance by the gods as a celebration for the whole community (2.653d2–3

⁶² On the limits of identification, authority and knowledge of the choral voice in drama, cf. Battezzato 2005: 154–6; Foley 2003; Mastronarde 1998 and 2010: 89–106; Gould 1996 and Bacon 1994/1995. Cf. also Lada-Richards 2002: 78–9 on how only inasmuch as the members of a tragic chorus can be perceived themselves as ‘the human equivalent’ of the Muses in moments of choral projection, the chorus of tragedy may be seen as the ‘paradigm image for performance in the Greek *polis*’.

⁶³ This, of course, does not mean to undermine the well-known fact that tragedy from the very beginning incorporated and appropriated non-dramatic choral voices (see Swift 2010); what is at stake here is the modality and context of the mimetic performance per se.

⁶⁴ For 7.800c7–e3, see §4.4.

⁶⁵ See Morrow 1960: 352–5. A discussion of the educative role of *heortai* in the *Laws* can be found also in Panno 2007: 135–78.

τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβάς)⁶⁶ in which mortals find ‘respite from labours’ (2.653d2 ἀναπαύλας τε αὐτοῖς τῶν πόνων ἐτάξαντο).⁶⁷ Significantly, this ‘quasi-mythical account’⁶⁸ of the birth of song as a powerful tool of socialization coincides with the origin of the ‘correct education’ (ὀρθὴ παιδεία),⁶⁹ which is represented as a process of ‘re-education’ made necessary by the unavoidable ‘slackening’ and ‘corruption’ that intervene in the course of human life (2.653c8–9 χαλᾶται...καὶ διαφθείρεται κατὰ πολλὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ).⁷⁰ The ‘correct education’ consists first of all in infusing into individuals the experience of a ‘correct’ physiology of pleasure and pain in order to trigger the ‘correct’ form of desire (2.653c7–8). A ‘correct’ way of perceiving pleasure and pain must be already activated before the full development of rational faculties (2.653c3–6) and the resulting ‘agreement’ (συμφωνία) between emotions and reason requires a form of control that must be situated beyond the strictly subjective sphere. It can be accomplished only within a ‘network of inter-subjective relationships’,⁷¹ and it is here that the socializing and educative role of choral performances, a divine gift, becomes an essential tool. A key passage is 2.653c9–d5:

...θεοὶ δὲ οἰκτίραντες τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπίπονον πεφυκὸς γένος, ἀναπαύλας τε αὐτοῖς τῶν πόνων ἐτάξαντο τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβάς [τοῖς θεοῖς], καὶ Μούσας Ἀπόλλωνά τε μουσηγέτην καὶ Διόνυσον συνεορταστὰς ἔδωσαν, ἵν’ ἐπανορθῶνται, τὰς τε τροφὰς γενομένας ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς μετὰ θεῶν.

...the gods, taking pity on the suffering which is the natural lot of human race, assigned to the mortals the recompense of *heortai*⁷² as relief from their

⁶⁶ For the social dimension implied by the term ἑορτή, see Mikalson 1982 and now also Burkert 2012: 45–6.

⁶⁷ As observed by Rusten 1989: 148 Plato’s text at 653d is reminiscent of Thuc. 2.38: see §3.2 n. 101. Significantly, however, the emphasis in Thucydides is almost entirely on the social rather than the religious value of the *heortai*.

⁶⁸ The expression is in P. Murray 2002: 47.

⁶⁹ Cf. 2.653a1 τὴν ὀρθὴν παιδείαν, 2.653b7 τεθραμμένον...ὀρθῶς, 2.653c3 παιδείαν...ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύεις, 2.653c5–6 ὀρθῶς...παιδείας περὶ, 2.653c7–8 τῶν ὀρθῶς τεθραμμένων ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν. The relationship between the definition of the *heortē* and that of *paideia* is analysed by Mouze 2005: 212–20.

⁷⁰ On the non-contradictory roles of the *heortai* as a means to found and at the same time re-establish the *paideia*, see Mouze 2005: 216–18.

⁷¹ I owe the expression to Sassi 2008: 129.

⁷² The exact meaning of the expression τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβάς is debated: England 1921, I: 275 ad loc. takes τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβάς to mean ‘changes consisting of

toils. And they gave to men the Muses, Apollo Musagetes and Dionysos as fellow-participants in the *heortai* so that humankind may be set right.⁷³ They also gave mortals the nourishments that *heortai* afford with the helping presence of the gods.

Communal choral songs and dances (ἐορταί) are the medium through which the gap between the divine and human worlds can be reduced. The gods ‘ordained’ (2.653d2 ἐτάξαντο)⁷⁴ the mortals to celebrate the *heortai* so that human suffering may be assuaged. It is within the ritual space and time of the festive performance that gods offer themselves as exemplary fellow-celebrants in dance and song (2.653d4 συνεορταστάς; cf. 2.654a1 and 2.665a4 συγχορευτάς), guiding the mortals in their singing and dancing (2.654a3 χορηγεῖν; cf. 2.665a4 χορηγούς) while enforcing community bonds and bringing joy (χαρά) through choral performance (2.654a4–5 χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα, ‘[and the gods] called these activities ‘choruses’ from the noun “joy” that is inborn to it’). The ensuing sense of human solidarity and communal belonging brought about by collective dancing and singing makes the

festivals’. Yet the use of ἀμοιβή (‘benefit in return’) to denote the reciprocity of the χάρις relationship between gods and humans since Homer (cf. Parker 1998: 107–9) seems to me to favour strongly Schöpsdau’s interpretation (id. 1994: 259) in understanding ἀμοιβάς to mean ‘recompenses’, τῶν ἐορτῶν being the defining genitive attached to it: the context of Plato’s passage clearly suggests a mutual relationship of care between gods and men. For the athetesis of the transmitted τοῖς θεοῖς and its possible genesis, see England 1921, I: 275 ad loc.

⁷³ This passage is textually very tormented. I follow Kannicht (1996: 91 n. 58) in taking the men as subject of the passive ἐπανορθῶνται (I consider now the syntactical interpretation offered in Prauscello 2011: 138 n. 22 as mistaken). Strongly in support of this reading is the parallel from *Plt.* 273d4–e4 (god ordering the universe) pointed out to me by Giovan Battista D’Alessio *per litteras*: διὸ δὴ καὶ τότε ἤδη θεὸς ὁ κοσμήσας αὐτόν, καθορῶν ἐν ἀπορίαις ὄντα, κηδόμενος (cf. *Laws* 2.653c9 θεοὶ δὲ οἰκτίραντες... ἐπίπνον) ... τὰ νοσήσαντα καὶ λυθέντα (cf. *Laws* 2.653c8–9 χαλᾶται καὶ διαφθείρεται) ἐν τῇ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ στρέψας, κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν (cf. *Laws* 2.653d4 ἵν’ ἐπανορθῶνται) ἀθάνατον αὐτόν καὶ ἀγήρων ἀπεργάζεται. On the close affinity between *Statesman* and *Laws* with regard to cosmology, see the overview by Carone 2005: 145–61. For other possible interpretations of the syntax of this vexed passage, see England 1921, I: 275 (the gods as subject, ἐπανορθῶνται as middle with τὰς ἐορτάς as implied object), Morrow 1960: 353 n. 193 (τὰς τε τροφάς as object of the middle ἐπανορθῶνται; for a similar solution cf. also Schöpsdau 1994: 260).

⁷⁴ The use of the verb τάσσω in this context is quite remarkable: the comfort and relaxation of the *choreia* is defined as a sort of τάξις – that is, an orderly regulated activity.

citizens of Magnesia quite literally ‘string themselves together’ with songs and dances in an uninterrupted physical chain of joy (2.654a4 ὥδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσῃσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας).⁷⁵ The importance of *heortai* as an opportunity for socialization and reciprocal acquaintance among citizens, leading to reciprocal familiarity and goodwill towards each other, is further emphasized at 5.738d6–e1 (ὅπως... φιλοφρονῶνται τε ἀλλήλους μετὰ θυσιῶν καὶ οἰκειῶνται καὶ γνωρίζωσιν, οὗ μείζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι). Likewise, at 6.771d5–e1 we are explicitly reminded that the *heortai* are the ritual space *par excellence* which showcases the interconnected nature of ‘pleasing the gods’ (θεῶν μὲν δὴ πρῶτον χάριτος ἔνεκα καὶ τῶν περὶ θεοῦς) and fostering familiarity, reciprocal intimacy and every kind of interpersonal relationship (δεύτερον δὲ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἰκειότητός τε πέρι καὶ γνωρίσεως ἀλλήλων, ὡς φαίμεν ἂν, καὶ ὁμιλίας ἔνεκα πάσης).⁷⁶

The *heortai* establish a reciprocal network of *charis*, articulated through persuasive songs, with the gods: singing and dancing are presented by the Athenian Stranger as a *response* to divine authority, but at the same time they also enact a *call* for a divine response. The gods have given to men ‘the pleasant perception of rhythm and harmony’ (2.654a2–3 τὴν ἔνρυσμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς) so that they may find pleasure and order in the *heortai*, but at the same time the *heortai* are also pleasing to the gods inasmuch as they celebrate their honour (7.809d2–7).⁷⁷ Magnesia’s choruses must ‘enchant with songs’ (ἐπᾶδεῖν) the souls of the children to persuade them that the most virtuous

⁷⁵ For the ‘joy’ conjured up by the *heortai* through song and dance, and the resulting consciousness of ‘well-being’, see also Strabo 10.3.9 and Burkert 2012: 45 on it. On συνείροντας at 654a4 conjuring up the ‘image of divine puppets, all the citizens together, responding in unison in dance to the golden cord of *logismos*’, see Kurke 2013: 131–2 and 138.

⁷⁶ For *heortai* as a primary tool of socialization between sexes, cf. also 8.835d3–e5 where the link between festivals, sacrifices, choruses and sexual behaviour is made explicit (cf. also 6.771e5–772a3: young of both sexes will dance together naked, within the boundary of propriety, so that they may look at one another and familiarize with each other as much as possible).

⁷⁷ For a detailed analysis of the reciprocity of *charis* through song between men and gods, see Lonsdale 1994/1995 on the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*.

life is the most pleasurable (2.663b3–5). The ‘whole city’ (2.665c3–4 ὅλην τὴν πόλιν αὐτήν) must never cease to enchant itself (2.665c3–5 ὅλη τῇ πόλει... αὐτῇ ἐπαύδουσαν μὴ παύεσθαι ποτε) with an incessant variety of songs (2.665c5–6 ἀεὶ μεταβαλλόμενα καὶ πάντως παρεχόμενα ποικιλίαν), so that they can infuse in the singers (τοῖς ᾄδουσιν) an ‘insatiable eagerness and pleasure for singing’ (2.665c6–7 ὥστε ἀπληστίαν εἶναι τινὰ τῶν ὕμνων... καὶ ἡδονήν).⁷⁸ The vehicle of persuasion of both mortals and gods is the pleasure generated by song and the ensuing desire to replicate this pleasure.⁷⁹

As formulated by Bertrand, Magnesia’s choruses contribute to Plato’s ‘behavioural policy’ by means of their own performativity: the performers and recipients of songs are the same.⁸⁰ This link – established by Plato – between choral performance and its behavioural meaning exploits a fundamental experience frequently thematized in Greek cult poetry: the ‘joy’ that the choral performance causes in both gods and mortals (cf. the para-etymology χορός/χαρά at 2.654c4–5).⁸¹ A

⁷⁸ Variation and diversity (ποικιλία) in songs have been explained by Kowalzig 2004: 47 as mainly referring to the necessity of distinguishing different types of worship within a polytheistic society, and this may well be part of what is going on. Yet the necessity to generate an ‘inexhaustible eagerness and pleasure for songs’ in the performers (who are also the recipients of the songs themselves) seems more directly linked to the ‘correct’ physiology of pleasure and pain exposed at 2.653a5–c4. Cf. also Peponi 2013: 232–3 emphasizing the link between *choreia* and ‘physical gratification’. Bartels’ clear-cut distinction between χάρις (‘limited’ pleasure) and ἡδονή (unlimited pleasure) in the *Laws* is unwarranted (Bartels 2012: 154–6): if it is generally true that χάρις is often (but not only) associated to moderate behaviour in Greek literature (cf. MacLachlan 1993: 77–8, 81–3), yet in the realm of musical aesthetics of the *Laws* reciprocity too can be unlimited, as the use of ἀπληστία at 2.665c6–7 clearly suggests.

⁷⁹ D’Alessio (forthcoming) is a fundamental contribution to the issue. The copious debate on the nature of persuasion (rational versus irrational) in the *Laws* has only just started to take into account the extent to which Plato’s persuasive strategy of communication is indebted to choral lyric. For the state of the art, cf. Buccioni 2007 with previous literature. I personally agree, among others, with Welton 1995 that Plato’s language of divine inspiration and poetry integrates both irrational and rational components.

⁸⁰ Bertrand 2005: 158.

⁸¹ An insightful treatment of the *charis/charā* and chorus motif in the *Laws* and its relationship with the world of choral lyric can be found in Kurke 2013: 144 and 166 n. 41; see also Peponi 2013: 217 and Prauscello 2011: 139–40. In general, on Plato’s engagement with literary sources in his discussion of etymology and onymy, see Levin 1997 (Tarrant 1946 is silent on this specific passage of the *Laws*). On *charis/charā* in general, see MacLachlan 1993: 3–6.

constant tension regarding the exact nature of the relationship between gods and men is a distinctive feature of the *Laws*: yet, as pointed out by Laks, ‘the gulf between the two orders is not insuperable after all, under certain exceptional circumstances, or perhaps better in another period of what could still be described as *human history*’.⁸² I would add that it is by reliving and re-enacting the myth of *choreia* that Magnesia’s choral performances manage, at least in part, to bridge this gap: myth is reworked into human history on condition that the *polis* becomes the living myth itself, constantly retelling its own story.

That Plato’s account of the divine origin of *choreia* in the *Laws* shares thus in a larger pattern of Greek thought is certainly part of the reason why his myth of the birth of collective singing and dancing becomes at least partly political theology. Affinities with the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, the ‘prototype of all choral performances’, have often been noticed.⁸³ There the gathering of gods on Olympus (187 μεθ’ ὁμήγουριν) rejoices at the songs of the Muses led by Apollo playing the kithara (κιθαριστής): the Muses sing of ‘the gods’ immortal privileges’ (190 θεῶν δῶρ’ ἄμβροτα) and of ‘the sufferings of men’ (190–1 ἀνθρώπων/ τλημοσύνας) under the gods (191 ὑπ’ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι), powerfully symbolized by death and old age (191–2).⁸⁴ Men, in the *Hymn to Apollo*, are apparently excluded from direct contact with gods, and it is only in the temporary space of the feast, through their choral performances imitating those of the gods, that they become for the time being ‘immortals and ageless’ (151 ἀθανάτους καὶ ἀγήρω) to the eye of the spectator. According to Lonsdale, ‘this pathetic state of things... is taken up and transformed by Plato in the origins of *paideia* in the *Laws*. The gods, in pity for the human race born to misery, ordained feasts as a respite from toil and suffering etc.’⁸⁵

⁸² Laks 2001: 108 (author’s emphasis).

⁸³ See in particular Lonsdale 1994/1995: 33–5 and 1993: 71–3; Bacon 1994/1995: 14–6 (with a good discussion also of the affinities of our passage with Pindar’s *Pythian* 1). Cf. also Kurke 2013: 147–9.

⁸⁴ For the contextual meaning of θεῶν δῶρα and ἀνθρώπων τλημοσύνας, see Cassola 1975: 498–9 ad loc.

⁸⁵ Lonsdale 1994/1995: 33.

Elsewhere I have tried to show in some detail that the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* is only one possible intertext for what Lonsdale calls Plato's 'transformation' of *choreia* in *Laws* 2.653c9–d5 and that it is instead Pindar's *First hymn* (fr. 29–35c M: the wedding of Cadmus and Harmonia), with its overall cosmic frame, the close proximity of gods and men through song, the music bestowed by Zeus on both gods and men as the proper completion of the cosmos, and the emphasis on the 'correctness' of music (Pind. fr. 32 M (with reference to Apollo) μουσικὰν ὀρθὰν ἐπιδεικνυμένου), that resonates most in the *Laws'* mythical account of the origin of *choreia*.⁸⁶ Here, I limit myself to stressing what is more relevant to present purposes – that is, that both in Pindar's *First hymn* and in the *Laws* the ordering power of music is something which the gods themselves feel to be necessary for the proper completion of the cosmos. Aelius Aristides (= Pind. fr. 31 M) informs us that in the section of the hymn relating to Zeus' wedding (to Themis: fr. 30 M) and sung by the Muses themselves 'when Zeus [after the creation of the cosmos] asked the gods if anything was lacking, they asked him to create for himself some divinities [that is, the Muses] who would adorn and order with words and music this great work of his and the whole of his arrangement'.⁸⁷ The version of Pindar's hymn offered by Choricus of Gaza (13.1) tells us a somewhat similar tale, with the interesting further detail that Zeus' creation was 'an act of benevolence towards humankind' (τὰς τοῦ Διὸς ἐς ἀνθρώπους φιλοτιμίας: cf. θεοὶ...οἰκτίραντες at 2.653d1 and θεοὺς...ἐλεοῦντας at 2.665a4).⁸⁸ In Pindar's *First Hymn*, then, the origin of music coincides with the completion of the *cosmos*, and this act of completion – that is, the Muses' song (at the wedding of Cadmus and Harmonia) – is

⁸⁶ Prauscello 2011: 140–3. My argument heavily relies on the new reconstruction of Pindar's *First Hymn* (most probably a hymn to Apollo and not Zeus) by D'Alessio 2005 and 2007.

⁸⁷ Aelius Aristides *To Plato in defense of oratory* 2.420 (= I. 277 Behr-Lenz) ... καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτοὺς φησιν ἐρομένου τοῦ Διὸς εἰ τοῦ δέοιντο αἰτῆσαι ποιήσασθαι τινὰς αὐτῶν θεοὺς, οἵτινες τὰ μεγάλα ταῦτ' ἔργα καὶ πᾶσαν γε δὴ τὴν ἐκείνου κατασκευὴν κατακοσμήσουσι (codd.: κοσμήσουσι Wilamowitz) λόγοις καὶ μουσικῇ.

⁸⁸ A further version is in Philo *De Plant. Noe* 127–9, introducing Mnēmosynē as the mother of the Muses: see Hardie 2000: 33 and D'Alessio 2005: 120–1.

described as ‘the god-built sound of *nomoi*’ (Pindar fr. 35c M νόμων ἀκούοντες θεόδματον κέλαδον) and it is at the same time an act of pity of gods towards mortals but also something bringing perfection to the divine sphere by pleasing the gods *first*.⁸⁹

Likewise, in Plato’s Magnesia choral performances are the ritual space where mortals learn how to be ‘divine’ by sharing with the gods the joy of *choreia*, because, as we have seen, ‘it is necessary that one who takes delight (τὸν χαίροντα) in things *become similar* (ὁμοιοῦσθαι) to the things he rejoices in’ (2.656b4–5). As D’Alessio observes, ‘Plato really does see choral performance as a crossroads of persuasion: the choruses have to persuade the community, and are, in their turn, to be persuaded by the gods’.⁹⁰ The ‘correct’ use of the playful dimension related to song and dance (2.657c3–4 τὴν τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τῇ παιδιᾷ μετὰ χορείας χρεῖαν ὀρθήν) brings about an identity between experiencing delight (χαίρειν) and the self-consciousness of ‘doing well’ (οἶεσθαι εὖ πράττειν).⁹¹ The vehicle through which a whole community can realize this identity is the persuasion enacted by continuous choral performances (2.663e–664d): the *insatiable desire* for songs (ἀπληστία ὕμνων) and the pleasure (ἡδονή) they generate represents, within the social utopia of Magnesia, the real springboard for accessing the erotics of citizenship.

3.4 Divine and human *choreia*

Before turning to the forms of expression of the persuasion voiced by Magnesia’s choruses, let us first have a closer look

⁸⁹ On fr. 35c M as preceding fr. 30 and probably signaling the introduction of the song by the Muses, see D’Alessio 2005: 126–7. For the source of *charis* conveyed through song as lying outside human society, that is a divine gift, cf. also Pindar fr. 141 M (= Didym. Caec. *De trin.* 3.1 p. 320 Bon.) θεὸς ὃ πάντα τεύχων βροτοῖς/ καὶ χάριν ἀοιδᾷ φυτεύει (‘the god who creates everything for the mortals also implants *charis* in song’).

⁹⁰ D’Alessio (forthcoming).

⁹¹ 2.657c5–6 χαίρομεν ὅταν οἰώμεθα εὖ πράττειν, καὶ ὅπότεν χαίρωμεν, οἰόμεθα εὖ πράττειν αὖ; ‘do we feel delight when we think that we are well and we think that we are well when we feel delight?’

at the ways in which Magnesia's choral performances embody an important channel through which divine and human dimensions are brought into contact via infusing into individuals the experience of a 'correct' physiology of pleasure and pain – that is, a correct form of *desire* (2.653c7–654a5, 2.664e2–665a6). In the second-best city, anthropology virtually becomes a sub-discipline of 'speaking about the gods' (θεολογία): god, the divine *nous*, is 'the measure of all things' (4.716c4–6) and humans, because of their original kinship with the divine (10.899d7–8 συγγενεία τις θεία),⁹² should aim, throughout their lives, to assimilate themselves to it (ὁμοιοῦσθαι), doing what is 'dear and conforming' to god (πρᾶξις φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ: 4.716c1–4).⁹³ In Magnesia, individual psychology (5.731d6–732e2) and collective behavioural policy (5.739b8–e7) must be both equally modelled on their divine paradigm (1.645b4–8): the citizens of the new colony must try to replicate, on a social level, the orderly unity of the divine cosmos. The 'dual nature' of man in the *Laws*, more than merely human but not yet fully divine, generates a constant tension regarding the exact modality of the relationship between humankind and divinity.⁹⁴ The lawgiver must address men, not gods (5.732e3 ἀνθρώποις γὰρ διαλεγόμεθα ἄλλ' οὐ θεοῖς). The process of self-likening to the divine must thus be enacted through a *medium* able to take into account what is the most defining and individualizing aspect of human nature (φύσει ἀνθρώπειον μάλιστα): its innate disposition to seek pleasures and avoid pain (5.732e4–733d6).⁹⁵ At the same time the assimilation to god of the civic body requires that the new *politeia* be modelled on the unity, self-likeness and oneness of the divine *nous*. In this section, I

⁹² Cf. 5.726a1–3, 10.900a7; see also above all 1.644c1–645c8 (the 'human puppet') and 7.803c4–8: the best element (βέλτιστον) to be found in humanity is that man is a plaything of god (θεοῦ τι παίγνιον... μεμηχανημένον). On these passages cf. Laks 2000: 276–7; Jouët-Pastré 2006: 15–24, 40–5. For a perceptive analysis of the literary and cultural background of the 'puppet' imagery, see now Kurke 2013.

⁹³ On the 'assimilation to god' motif in the *Laws*, see Lavecchia 2006: 160–6 and Armstrong 2004: 177–82. More generally, for the idea of 'god-likeness' in Plato's works, see Sedley 2000 and Annas 1999: 52–71.

⁹⁴ 'Dual nature': Laks 2000: 276. On the unresolved tension between men and gods in the *Laws*, see Laks 2001: 107–9, 2005: 36–7.

⁹⁵ Cf. also 2.636d7–e3. On these passages, see also §3.1 n. 12.

explore in more detail how orderly vocal and kinetic activity is represented and offered to the Magnesian citizens as the most powerful means to connect the rational and irrational parts of the soul. Rhythm (ῥυθμός) and order (τάξις) in song and dance embody the quintessentially ‘human’ link between the perception of pleasure and the belief generated by that perception: the capacity of rhythm to train and condition our future emotional responses to a given set of activities mediates between the physical perception and the belief (δόξα) it engenders. By deriving pleasure in order, humans become divine. This uniquely human capacity of perceiving pleasure in τάξις represents an innate shortcut to the divine latent in us: it allows mankind to impose order in a world of change. Above all, rhythmic bodily agreement creates affective bonds, and hence a *shared* perception of life and its ‘social time’: choral performances thus represent, via the collective, social nature of rhythm, the most genuine form of ‘embodied morality’.⁹⁶

3.5 Rhythm, order, pleasure and belief

In §3.3 we saw that the vehicle of persuasion of both mortals and gods is, literally, not only the content promulgated by the activity of singing and dancing but also (and even prior to it) the very *pleasure* generated by these activities per se, that is, by the simple act of performing them.⁹⁷ How does *choreia* in its performative components manage to mediate between perceptions, emotions and belief?

We have already seen that at 2.653b2–6 (§2.4) the habituation of emotions in general (that is, not via a particular *medium*) is described as a process that is indeed distinct from rational

⁹⁶ For the ‘moral’ dimension of rhythm as a social phenomenon and its ‘synchronized temporality’ proper of rite, see Bourdieu 1977: 162–3. For Plato’s own exploitation of this phenomenon in the *Laws*, see now also Kowalzig 2013 (esp. 190–4), emphasizing Plato’s use of corporeal rhythm as a way of exercising social control.

⁹⁷ For Plato’s conception of pleasure as a kind of ‘emotional engagement’ inasmuch as it is activity-oriented (that is, pleasure/enjoyment can be seen as a function/measure of the value that one places on the object of enjoyment), see Russell 2005: 124–5.

training and prior to it, but its pre-rational level of apprehension does not necessarily mean an anti-rational attitude. The training of emotions is clearly meant to be propaedeutic to and compatible with rational understanding. At the same time, education is envisaged as a lifelong process where emotional training does not become superfluous when reason supervenes: on the contrary, emotional habituation continues to work as a necessary auxiliary of reason, because it already involves, though passively, some kind of reasoning.⁹⁸ As formulated by Russell (2005: 222), '[r]eason is introduced not as bringing moral insight anew, but rather as confirming and explaining the insight already present within the emotions': emotional habituation is *per se* already 'a kind of *learning*' (author's emphasis), even if at the inferior level of *doxa*.⁹⁹ This neatly dovetails with the fact that to implement his exercise in mass-persuasion in the *Laws* Plato is ready to exploit the whole cognitive spectrum, from *doxa* to *epistēmē*: the divine lawgiver of Magnesia 'is interested in the feelings that promote and are promoted by each ... cognitive state' (Welton 1996: 219).¹⁰⁰ With this in mind, let us now go back to the specific example of the habituation principle as instantiated by choral training in Magnesia.

Choral performances, we are told, are 'representations of character' (2.655d5 μιμήματα τρόπων ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς χορείας): behavioural types are reproduced and relived by the performers thanks to both their natural disposition and imitative capacity (2.655d6–7 ἥθεσι καὶ μιμήσεσι).¹⁰¹ In Magnesia 'self-likening'

⁹⁸ See Hobbs 2000: 63–4 on how role models continue to be active in training emotions throughout one's life. For the analogy of this passage with *Resp.* 3.401d4–402a4, see Belfiore 1980: 135.

⁹⁹ On the role of *doxa* in the perception of pleasures in the *Philebus*, see Delcomminette 2006: 362–83.

¹⁰⁰ That is, opinion in general, true opinion, educated true opinion and knowledge: cf. esp. 3.688b2–4 (on which see §2.3). Similarly, at 1.644e4–645b1 the golden-puppet string of reason needs 'helpers' (*hypēretai*) at a *pre-rational* level: see now Sauvé Meyer 2012. For a more pessimistic assessment of the role of 'right *doxa*' in Plato's *Laws*, see Scolnicov 2003: 124–5.

¹⁰¹ For ἥθεσι καὶ μιμήσεσι as dative instrumental governed by the ensuing διεξιόντων, (and not as coordinated with the preceding πράξεσι and τύχαις) see England 1921, I: 283 and Schöpsdau 1994: 274 ad loc.

(ὁμοιοῦσθαι) through mimesis must be limited to ‘the artistic performance that possesses a resemblance to the imitation of the beautiful’ (2.668b1–2 μουσικὴν... ἐκείνην τὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμήματι).¹⁰² The ideal *choreia* of the second-best city will then involve only the imitation of states of character and actions that are proper of the good citizen: its aim is to educate to virtue (πρὸς ἀρετὴν) the ‘children of law-abiding citizens and the young’ (2.656c5–6 τοὺς τῶν εὐνόμων παῖδας καὶ νέους).

We have seen that *mousikē* and ‘emotional’ *paideia* coexist side by side already in the multiform choral practices of the archaic *polis*¹⁰³ and that Plato is exploiting an experience deeply rooted in the social fabric of the archaic and classical *polis*: the collective disciplining of instinctive drives and emotions through choral performances as thematized by archaic lyric (§3.2). Yet the way in which this interconnectedness between singing/dancing and emotional education is conceptualized in the *Laws* has also deep connections with Plato’s own physiology of ‘human’ pleasure.¹⁰⁴ Magnesia’s choruses will have as their primary function that of ‘enchaining with song the souls of the children, still young and tender’ (2.664b2–3 ἐπάδειν... ἔτι νέαις οὔσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἀπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων). The content of this collective ‘enchantment’ will be ‘the divine truth’ (ὑπὸ θεῶν... λέγεσθαι) that the ‘best’ life is also the ‘most pleasant’ (2.664b7–8). And the ‘best life’ is not only superior with respect to good reputation (5.733a1 κρατεῖ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν), thanks to its inborn ‘comeliness’ (σχήματι), but also superior with respect to what we all seek – a majority of pleasure and a minority of pain throughout the whole of life (5.733a3–5 κρατεῖ καὶ τούτῳ ὃ πάντες ζητοῦμεν, τῷ χαίρειν πλείω, ἑλάττω δὲ λυπεῖσθαι παρὰ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα).

¹⁰² On the ‘correct’ nature of mimesis *qua* species of representational mimesis if and only if it successfully represents a *beautiful* original, see Hatzistavrou 2011.

¹⁰³ See in particular Peponi 2007; for the privileged link between erotic desire and choral performances as experienced by performers and audience and its idiosyncratic adaptation by Plato in the *Laws*, see Kurke 2013.

¹⁰⁴ On pleasure and education in the *Laws*, see Frede 2010, Jouët-Pastré 2006: 55–74, Russell 2005: 219–29, Stalley 1983: 59–67.

Dancing and singing, a divine gift bestowed out of pity to the toil-worn humankind (cf. θεοὶ...οἰκτίραντες at 2.653d1 and θεοὺς...ἐλεοῦντας at 2.665a4),¹⁰⁵ are grounded in humans' inborn desire for pleasure. *Choreia* triggers and brings to full development a distinctively 'human' form of pleasure, latent in our nature – that is, the ability to perceive and, while perceiving, to rejoice at the orderliness of sound and motion – as claimed by the account (λόγος)¹⁰⁶ just given on the birth of *chor-eia* (2.653d7–654a5):

φησὶν δὲ τὸ νέον ἅπαν ὡς ἔπος εἶπεῖν τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐ δύνασθαι, κινεῖσθαι δὲ αἰεὶ ζητεῖν καὶ φθέγγεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἀλλόμενα καὶ σκιρτῶντα, οἷον ὀρχούμενα μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ προσπαίζοντα, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα πάσας φωνάς. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ζῶα οὐκ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀταξιῶν, οἷς¹⁰⁷ δὴ ῥυθμός ὄνομα καὶ ἁρμονία· ἡμῖν δὲ οὓς εἴπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτάς δεδῶσθαι, τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἔνρυθμόν¹⁰⁸ τε καὶ ἑναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ἣ δὴ κινεῖν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους, ὧδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας, χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ¹⁰⁹ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα.

[the account] says that every young being, so to speak, cannot be quiet in either body or voice but it is always seeking to move and emit sounds, now leaping and jumping as if it were dancing with pleasure and playing cheerfully together, now emitting all sorts of voices. The other living beings, then, lack the perception of order and disorder in movement, whose names are 'rhythm' and 'harmony'. But to us men the gods, whom we said were given as our fellow celebrants, are also those who have bestowed the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, by means of which they set us in motion and lead us in the choruses, joining us with each other with songs and dances and they named the choruses so because of the name of joy which is inborn in them.

¹⁰⁵ For the caring attitude of gods towards men, cf. e.g. 10.902b, 902e, 903a, 905d, 906a–c.

¹⁰⁶ On the nature of this *logos*, whether a truly Platonic invention or not, cf. Schöpsdau 1994: 261–2.

¹⁰⁷ For the syntax see England 1921, I: 276 *ad* 2.653e4: 'it is only the τάξεις, not the ἀταξίαις to which οἷς refers: the *perception* of τάξεις involves the perception of their opposites, and Plato will not omit this fact; at the same time he finds the illogical relative οἷς a convenient sentence-link'.

¹⁰⁸ At 654a2 the marginal variant εὐρυθμόν in L is clearly wrong inasmuch as introduces 'the further notion of the adaptability or the careful preservation of ῥυθμός' (England 1921, I: 277 *ad loc.*).

¹⁰⁹ I follow England 1921, I: 276–7 in taking παρὰ τὸ ὄνομα as an instance of causal παρὰ + acc.

A similar phenomenology for humans' unique ability to perceive (αἴσθησις)¹¹⁰ order (τάξις) in movement and sound is repeated, with small variation (the link with pleasure is not explicitly stated but is easily inferred from the relative contexts), in three other passages. The first of these is 2.664e3–665a2:

εἵπομεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὥς ἡ φύσις ἀπάντων τῶν νέων διάπυρος οὕσα ἡσυχίαν οὐχ οἶα τε ἄγειν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ σῶμα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν εἶη, φθέγγοιτο δ' αἰεὶ ἀτάκτως καὶ πηδῶ, τάξεως δ' αἴσθησιν¹¹¹ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ζῶων οὐδὲν ἐφάρπτοιτο, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρώπου φύσις ἔχει μόνη τοῦτο· τῇ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἶη, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραυνυμένων, ἀρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, χορεία δὲ τὸ συναμφοτέρον κληθεῖη.

If we recollect, at the beginning of our discourse we said that the nature of every young being is fiery and that it is incapable of keeping still either in body or in voice but always cries and leaps in a disorderly manner; whereas the perception of order in both bodily motion and sound we said that this human nature alone possesses and that none of the other living beings has it. And we said that order in motion is called 'rhythm' and order in voice, when acute and grave are mixed together, is called 'harmony' and that the combination of the two things is called *choreia*.¹¹²

The second is 2.672b8–d3, where the emphasis is on the perception of rhythm and harmony as precursor to and at the same time conducive to the fuller development of reason:

ΑΘ. τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε οἶδα, ὅτι πᾶν ζῶον, ὅσον αὐτῷ προσήκει νοῦν ἔχειν τελεωθέντι, τοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὐδὲν ἔχον ποτὲ φύεται· ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐν ᾧ μήπω κέκτηται τὴν οἰκείαν φρόνησιν, πᾶν μαινεται τε καὶ βοᾷ ἀτάκτως, καὶ ὅταν ἀκταινώσῃ ἑαυτὸ τάχιστα, ἀτάκτως αὖ πηδᾷ. ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὲ ὅτι μουσικῆς τε καὶ γυμναστικῆς ἔφαμεν ἀρχὰς ταύτας εἶναι.

ΚΛ. μεμνήμεθα· τί δ' οὐ;

¹¹⁰ On the meaning of αἴσθησις in this passage ('elementary sensation' that though 'largely connected to a physical dimension, nonetheless... concerns the soul'), see the analysis by Pelosi 2010: 50.

¹¹¹ τάξεως... αἴσθησιν (2.664e6): in favour of the transmitted accusative, see England 1921, I: 310 ad loc. and Schöpsdau 1993: 310 ('freischwebende[r] Akkusativ'). τούτων ἀμφοτέρων: England 1921, I: 310 'i.e. of bodily movement, and voice; this genitive depends on τάξεως, and that on αἴσθησιν'.

¹¹² For the importance of this passage in creating the 'modern' perception and categorization of 'rhythm', see Kowalzig 2013: 184–5. Cf. also 2.672e8–673a1.

ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τὴν ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας αἴσθησιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡμῖν ἐνδεδωκέναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ἔφαμεν, Ἀπόλλωνα δὲ καὶ Μούσας καὶ Διόνυσον θεῶν αἰτίους γεγόνέναι;

(Athenian Stranger): ... but this much I know, that no living being is ever born having that extent of reason which is proper to it to have when fully developed. During this time in which it has not yet acquired the intelligence proper to it, every living being is entirely mad and shouts in a disorderly fashion, and as soon as it can stand erect by itself it leaps in a disorderly way. Let us remember that we said that these are the beginnings of music and gymnastics.

(Cleinius): We remember it; how could we not?

(Athenian Stranger): Do we not also remember that we said that it was this origin which has given to us the perception of rhythm and harmony and that the responsible among the gods are Apollo, the Muses and Dionysos?

The third passage is 2.673c9–d5:

οὐκοῦν αὖ ταύτης ἀρχῇ μὲν τῆς παιδιᾶς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν πηδᾶν εἰθίσθαι πᾶν ζῶον, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπινον, ὥς ἔφαμεν, αἴσθησιν λαβὼν τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ ἐγέννησέν τε ὄρχησιν καὶ ἔτεκεν, τοῦ δὲ μέλους ὑπομιμνήσκοντος καὶ ἐγείροντος τὸν ῥυθμόν, κοινωθέντ' ἄλληλοις χορείαν καὶ παιδιὰν ἐτεκέτην.

Well, also the origin of this play (i.e. gymnastics) lies in the fact that every living being is accustomed by nature to leaping, whereas humankind, as we said, having obtained the perception of rhythm, generated and gave birth to dance; and since the song recalled and awakened rhythm, the union of these two gave birth to *choreia* and play.

Disorderly movements of the body and unarticulated cries are the visible manifestation of a psychic disorder that every young living being, human and not human, (τὸ νέον ἄπαν) shares (for human infants, see also 7.790e8–791b1, which is discussed later in this chapter).¹¹³ Yet human nature, and human nature alone, has already in itself, by divine dispensation, the capacity

¹¹³ A subtle analysis of this passage in relation to *Phaedrus* 254d (the movements of the black horse) is provided by Belfiore 2006: 209–10. As observed by Pelosi 2004: 407 in *Tim.* 42e–44d the restlessness of the soul at the moment in which it enters into a body is described in terms analogous to the restlessness of the children of *Laws* 7.790d–791b: its movements are equally ἀτάκτως and ἀλόγως. On the ‘physics of infant psychology’ as described by the motions of the soul in children at *Tim.* 43a ff. cf. also Sedley 2000: 798–9. See also Kamtekar 2008b: 356–7 and 2010 on the disciplining of children psychology through an aesthetics of kinetics.

of overcoming this inner disorder: the ability to perceive an orderly pattern in movements (ῥυθμός) and to rejoice at it (at 10.898a we are told that also the movement of the mind [κίνησις νοῦ] is endowed with its own τάξις).¹¹⁴

Similarly, at 7.790e8–791b1, speaking about the education of the soul of the youngest (infants included: 7.790c1–2 τὰ περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πάνυ νέων παιδίων ἐπιτηδεύματα; see also 7.790c8–9 τοῖς ὅτι νεωτάτοισι, 7.790d1–2 περὶ τὰ νεογενῆ παιδίων θρέμματα, 7.791e1–2 τὰ μήπω φωνῆς συνιέντα μηδὲ παιδείας τῆς ἄλλης δυνατὰ γεύεσθαι πω),¹¹⁵ the Athenian Stranger clearly equates the care of nursing ‘correctly’ their soul and body with movement (7.790c6–7 σώματός τε καὶ ψυχῆς τῶν πάνυ νέων τὴν τιθήνησιν καὶ κίνησιν), and movement accompanied by some form of music (7.790e4). Continuous and regulated motion and music heal the disordered internal movement of both infants and those affected by bacchic *mania* (7.790d5–e4):¹¹⁶

ἡνίκα γὰρ ἂν που βουλῇθῶσιν κατακοιμίζειν τὰ δυσυπνοῦντα τῶν παιδίων αἱ μητέρες, οὐχ ἥσυχίαν αὐτοῖς προσφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ τούναντίον κίνησιν, ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις αἰεὶ σείουσai, καὶ οὐ σιγὴν ἀλλὰ τινα μελωδίαν, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς οἷον καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθάπερ εἰ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βακχειῶν ἰάσει ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅμα χορεῖα καὶ μούση χρώμεναι.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ For the evolution of the semantics of ῥυθμός from ‘changeable, fluid form in the instant that is assumed by what is moving’ to ‘perception of a regular, fixed order in movement’ (mostly a Pythagorean and Platonic development), see Benveniste 1951 updated and qualified by Sandoz 1971: 58–77; cf. also Calame 2008: 208–10 (esp. n. 14) and Kowalzig 2013: 181–5 for a critical survey of the linguistic evidence. Plato’s definition of rhythm can still be considered as the minimal working definition that meets contemporary scholarly consensus: cf. Fraisse 1982: 150 and 1987: 8; on Fraisse’s impact on studies of perception of time, cf. Clarke 1999: 473–5. On the ‘bodily nature of rhythm’ in the *Laws* as a link between the individual and social spheres and also between ‘social rhythm’ and social change, see Kowalzig 2013: 184–5.

¹¹⁵ This passage is particularly interesting: τὰ μήπω φωνῆς συνιέντα must refer to the fact that babies cannot understand language as vehicle of contents to be transmitted – that is, they are sensible not to the content-belief communicated by human voice but *only* to the acoustic structure of the sound itself.

¹¹⁶ For the importance in this passage of the notion of ‘movement’ as the vehicle channelling the interaction between music and soul, see Pelosi 2010: 17–18.

¹¹⁷ I follow here Bury’s text and punctuation but retain the transmitted βακχειῶν (on βακχειῶν see Linforth 1946: 132–3); for this solution cf. also Panno 2007: 112–13 n. 84. For alternative textual arrangements, see England 1921, II: 240–1 and Schöpsdau 2003: 511–12. I take τῆς κινήσεως at 7.790e2 as the defining genitive of χορεῖα καὶ μούση.

For when mothers want to lull to sleep children suffering from sleeplessness, they do not apply to them quiet but on the contrary motion, keeping rocking them continuously in their arms, and instead of silence they offer them a kind of melody. It is as if they were casting charms on their children (as it is done upon those who are mentally disturbed) by using as a remedy the combined movements of dance and song.

The psychic disorder of infants and ‘possessed’ adults that manifests itself in unruly motion of the body and cries is attributed to a faulty disposition of the soul – that is, ‘fear’ (7.790e8–9 *ἔστι δαίματα δι’ ἔξιν φάυλην τῆς ψυχῆς τινα*). An external motion (7.791a1 *ἔξωθεν ... σεισμόν* and *ἡ τῶν ἔξωθεν ... κίνησις*), combined with music, overpowers the ‘inner mad-dened movement’ of the soul (7.791a1–3: *τὴν ἐντὸς φοβεράν οὔσαν καὶ μανικὴν κίνησιν*) producing a ‘tranquil calmness’ (7.791a3 *γαλήνην ἡσυχίαν*) over the ‘leaping’, palpitating heart (*τῆς περὶ τὰ τῆς καρδίας χαλεπῆς γενομένης ... πηδῆσεως*).¹¹⁸ We are not told here explicitly that the counteracting movement must be orderly, yet the lulling movement of the nurses, the analogy with the rhythmic movement of sea-voyage (7.790c9 *καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν ᾗν, οἷον ἀεὶ πλέοντας*) and the close similarity, both in terms of expressions and content, between this passage and the effects of regular movements on the body in *Tim.* 88d–e speak strongly in favour of a rhythmic bodily motion.¹¹⁹ This orderly motion is first imposed on them by external forces but is immediately fully internalised, inasmuch as it produces a thoroughly desirable and pleasurable outcome (7.791a5–6 *παντάπασιν ἀγαπητόν τι*). Bodily therapy through motion and sound becomes a therapy of the soul: the infants find relief in sleep and the manic bacchantes are awakened to a new state of consciousness by dancing and playing music with the presence and help of

¹¹⁸ On this passage, see Pelosi 2004: 406–7 and Belfiore 2006: 207–9.

¹¹⁹ Cf. esp. *Tim.* 88e2 *μετρίως σείων* and *εἰς εἰς τάξιν κατακοσμή*. For the regular motion of the rocking movement imposed by sea on the sea-voyager, cf. *Tim.* 89a7 *ἡ (sc. κάθαρσις) διὰ τῶν αἰωρήσεων κατὰ τε πλοῦς* (on the meaning of *αἰώρησις* ‘oscillatory motion’, see Taylor 1928: 626 ad loc.). The relevance of this *Timaeus* passage for the *Laws* is now highlighted also by Pelosi 2010: 18. For the orderly nature of the motion imposed on children and ‘divinely possessed’ adults at 7.790e8–791b1, cf. Linforth 1946: 133, Belfiore 2006: 208 and Schöpsdau 2003: 510–11.

the gods (7.791a6–7 τοὺς δ' ἐγρηγορότας ὀρχουμένους τε καὶ αὐλουμένους μετὰ θεῶν¹²⁰) and are thus brought from their 'manic' condition (7.791a8–b1 ἀντὶ μανικῶν... διαθέσεων) to a rational state of mind (7.791b1 ἔξεις ἔμφρονας ἔχειν).

In the passages quoted earlier (2.653d7–654a5, 2.664e3–665a2 and 2.673c9–d5), τάξις is represented by the Athenian Stranger not only as the *result* of the act of exercising/imposing order in a world of disorder and change but also as its *premise* – a premise already dormant in human nature (cf. esp. 2.673d5 ὑπομιμνήσκοντος καὶ ἐγείροντος τὸν ῥυθμόν).¹²¹ The gods themselves, we are told at *Phaedrus* 247a3–4, move through heaven in an *orderly* choral arrangement (θεοὶ ἄρχοντες ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τάξιν ἣν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη).¹²² By a divine gift, prompted by compassion for man's suffering, humankind (and humankind alone) can thus not only perceive order in movements (be it vocal or bodily), but also rejoice by nature at this very perception.¹²³ The pleasure generated by *choreia*, inasmuch as it involves the perception and recognition of order, not only appeals to the irrational part of human nature but represents the closest humankind can ever get to a 'spontaneous' convergence between rational and irrational.¹²⁴ If there is a *human* form of expression of what could be called 'spontaneous' rationality (spontaneous inasmuch as it is triggered by our own

¹²⁰ For Plato's use of μετὰ θεῶν to indicate both the actual presence and help of the gods, see England 1921, II: 242 ad loc.

¹²¹ On τάξις and φύσις in Plato, see Mannsperger 1969: 196–205 (esp. 197 on 2.664e3ff.).

¹²² For the image of the cosmic dance (gods ~ stars) in Plato's *Timaeus* (esp. *Tim.* 40c–d, 44b–c and 47c–e), now see Kurke 2013: 140–6. Cf. also [*Epin.*] 982e3–6.

¹²³ For the close link between τάξις, human φύσις and ἡδονή, with special reference to child psychology, cf. also [*Arist.*] *Probl.* 38.920b29–36. This of course does not rule out the possibility that non-human beings may experience pleasure in movement *qua* movement, even if the movement is unruly: cf., in fact, the expression οἷον ὀρχούμενα μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ προσπαίζοντα at 2.653e1–2 (see earlier discussion). Such a comparison, even allowing for the indirect way in which it is introduced (cf. οἷον), does indeed suggest that in all young beings *already* unruly, disordered movements of the body engender, or at least can engender, pleasure. This pleasure probably consists in some kind of consciousness, even if only sensorial, of being in motion. What the gods give us is not just the capacity of perceiving pleasure as such in movement but that of perceiving pleasure in *orderly* motion.

¹²⁴ Cf. Laks 2000: 277 (= id. 2005: 48); see also Jouët-Pastré 2006: 69–71, Castel-Bouchouchi 2003: 197, Welton 1996: 218–19.

nature), this is to be found in the phenomenology of *choreia* and its implications in terms of the physiology of pleasure. Very similarly, in *Tim.* 47c–d, harmony, a divine gift whose movements are akin to the regular movements of the soul (47d2–3), has been bestowed by the Muses on those who use them ‘with reason’ (47d3 τῷ μετὰ νοῦ προσχωμένῳ Μούσαις). And this gift has been given not with the view to a merely *irrational* pleasure (47d3–4 οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡδονὴν ἄλογον) but as an ally (47d6 σύμμαχος) of the soul to restore its order and concord with itself once it has lost it (47d5–6 ἐπὶ τὴν γεγονυῖαν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνάρμοστον ψυχῆς περίοδον εἰς κατακόσμησιν καὶ συμφωνίαν ἑαυτῇ). In the same way, rhythm (47d7 ῥυθμός) has been given to us as a ‘helper’ (47e1 ἐπίκουρος) because of our natural disposition, which is deficient in measure and grace (47d7–e2 διὰ τὴν ἄμετρον ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ χαρίτων ἐπιδεᾶ γιγνομένην ... ἔξιν).¹²⁵

In Magnesia humans start learning to be divine by means of a ‘kinetics of virtue’¹²⁶ that strives to equate, as closely as possible, nature and pleasure (ἡδονή), nature and order (τάξις), nature and education (παιδεία).¹²⁷ Order in movement, whether perceived or imagined, is then literally in the second-best city a defining category of human experience in as much it brings humankind closer to its inborn divine element.¹²⁸

This mode of being ‘distinctly human’ is also a *social* way of being: it integrates individuals into the community and gives them a shared perception of life and its ‘social time’.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ The similarity between this passage of the *Timaeus* and *Laws* 2.653d7f had already been noted by Taylor 1928: 297 ad loc. For a nuanced reading of *Tim.* 47d2–7, see now Pelosi 2010: 68–9 and Kurke 2013: 144–5. χαρίτων ἐπιδεᾶ ... ἔξιν: at *Laws* 2.667b5–8 *charis* is defined as the *pleasure* produced by one’s activity (cf. esp. 2.667b9 παρέπεσθαι τὴν χάριν ἣν ἡδονὴν ἂν προσεῖποιμεν).

¹²⁶ For the term cf. Laks 1987: 220.

¹²⁷ Cases of a nature (φύσις) recalcitrant to the ‘correct’ education are nevertheless contemplated if only to be discarded on the grounds of ‘ignorance’ (ἄγνοια) and ‘inexperience’ (ἀπειρία) of what we really desire by nature: cf. 2.655e5–656a5, 6.765e3–766a4. On the former passage, see Russell 2005: 224–5.

¹²⁸ At 4.716b1–2 a human life deprived of the divine is troped as the disorderly movements of an unruly dance: whoever does not act in a way that is dear and conforming to god καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ, καταλείφθεις δὲ ... σκιρτᾷ ταραττων πάντα ἄμα.

¹²⁹ Cf. Mauss 1969: 252–3 ‘le rythme, faculté d’ensemble, vient directement d’une action fait d’ensemble’. For the ‘choral body’ as ‘a means of materialising *collective*

Social solidarity and cohesion are grounded in the collective experience of dancing and singing together: rhythmic bodily agreement generates bonds, which project *beyond* the immediate present of the performance. To be able to perceive rhythm in movements not only implies a capacity to recognize a pattern of repetition but the perception of early events in a sequence also creates expectations about later events: in this sense the defining feature of rhythm as order is ‘the demand, preparation and anticipation for something to come’ (You 1994: 363). The ‘moral’ dimension of rhythm is oriented towards the future (You 1994: 364): rhythm is an intentional state and has a perspective. It is this ability of rhythm to prepare, train and condition our *future* emotional responses that provides the important link between the (human) sensorial perception of pleasure in order and the emotional belief (*doxa*) it generates.¹³⁰ At 1.644c–d the Athenian Stranger tells Cleinias that our soul has two opposite, non-intelligent ‘counsellors’ (συμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε 1.644c6–7): pain (λύπη) and pleasure (ἡδονή). In addition to these advisers, the soul also has ‘opinions’ regarding the future (1.644c9 δόξας μελλόντων): expectations of pleasure (‘hope’) and pain (‘fear’).¹³¹ This seems to suggest that pleasure deriving from anticipation involves a propositional attitude – that is, alongside the instinctual perception, anticipation of pleasure requires also what we can call an evaluative *belief*.¹³² Memory plays an important

rhythmicity and of embodying social time’, see Kowalzig 2013: 180–1 (emphasis mine).

¹³⁰ For *doxa* as an essential constitutive element of pleasure, which cannot be reduced to mere perception, see Delcomminette 2003 (esp. 219–22 and 226–7 n. 27). Similarly, at *Phlb.* 39d1–5 Socrates introduces the pleasure of anticipation or ‘hope’ as an instance of a *doxa* concerning what is about to happen.

¹³¹ Cf. *Resp.* 9.584c7–9 on the pleasures called προησθήσεις τε καὶ προλυπτήσεις that derive from expectation (ἐκ προσδοκίας): see Russell 2005: 129 on the passage.

¹³² Cf. Russell 2005: 129 n. 47 ‘Plato ... focuses on anticipation in order to isolate the crucial element of intentionality in certain kinds of pleasure’. On the *Laws* passage, see also Sassi 2008: 131 ‘such opinions are obviously “instinctive” in a certain sense, since they can lead to action immediately, without being filtered by rational evaluation. Yet in this passage the term *doxa* none the less also refers to a basic level of interior representation of sensible reality’. On the pleasure of expectation as a ‘pleasure of the soul’ in *Phlb.* 32c–d and on the role of ‘recollection’ (μνήμη) and ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμία) in the soul determining what a pleasure is about, see Frede 1993: xliiv–v.

role in this: because we remember the rhythmic progress so far, we are inclined to form the expectation that it will continue in an orderly fashion and take pleasure in the fulfilment of that expectation.¹³³ In fact at 2.656b4–5 the Athenian Stranger, speaking of the psychological effects of pleasure, states that ‘it is necessary that one who takes delight (τὸν χαίροντα) in things *becomes similar* (ὁμοιοῦσθαι) to the things he rejoices in’. Furthermore, we have seen that the ‘correct’ use of the playful experience of song and dance (2.657c3–4 τὴν τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τῇ παιδιᾷ μετὰ χορείας χρεῖαν ὀρθήν) generates an identity between experiencing well-being (χαίρειν) and the self-awareness of ‘doing well’ (οἶεσθαι εὖ πράττειν) (2.657c5–6).¹³⁴ That is, as observed by Welton (1996: 216) ‘pleasure is both the cause and the effect of a certain kind of belief’.

In the case of *choreia*, because rhythm by its constitution is a future-oriented activity, to perceive the pleasure of order in motion means at the same time also to discipline your future expectation of pleasure – that is, to exploit ‘by nature’ the intentional state present in pleasure in a ‘correct’ way. The mental representation of an anticipated pleasure generates pleasure itself, apart from the actual bodily perception.¹³⁵ With regard to dance and song, exclusively human activities, the pleasure in orderly motion is a divine gift, meant to reconnect humankind to its divine origin: it is then a ‘true’ pleasure of the soul and body jointly combined, inasmuch as ‘the condition of the truth of any pleasure is the truth of the concept of pleasure we have at our disposal’ (Delcomminette 2003: 235). In this sense, the anticipatory value of rhythm contributes to create a ‘moral’ narrative by shaping movements over longer stretches of time and giving them groundings and coherence. Order in bodily and vocal motion brings the invisible sacred into visible corporeal reality: rhythm thus links even more closely feelings and belief as a form of ‘spontaneous’ human rationality

¹³³ For the important role played by memory in the perception of pleasure, see Warren 2010.

¹³⁴ On this passage, see Welton 1996: 216–7 and Carone 2003: 292–3.

¹³⁵ For the importance of λογισμός in humans’ prospective faculties and ‘future-directed attitudes’, see Warren 2010 (esp. 6–7).

that finds its truest social dimension in collective dancing and singing.

Before moving to the next chapter and analysing the various patterns of chorality mobilized by the three choruses of the second-best city, I would like to conclude this section by making a last point, mainly a negative one, on what to be ‘truly educated’ in *choreia*, and hence a potential pretender to the title of ‘perfect citizen’, is *not*, or at least not according to Magnesia’s civic ethos so far reconstructed. Immediately after the section on the ‘foundational myth’ of *choreia*, the Athenian Stranger states again that the true and correct education owes ‘its origin’ (2.654a6 εἶναι πρῶτην) to the Muses and Apollo (διδά Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπολλωνος).¹³⁶ What follows (2.654a9–b1) is then the equivalence of ‘lack of education’ (ἀπαιδευτος) with lack of choral training (ἀχόρευτος), and the identity of ‘a good education’ with being ‘properly trained in choral dances and singing’ (πεπαιδευμένον ἱκανῶς κεχορευκότα).¹³⁷ The ‘educated’ person will then be able to both dance and sing ‘well’ (2.654b6–7 ὁ καλῶς ἄρα πεπαιδευμένος ἄδειν τε καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι δυνατός ἂν εἴη καλῶς). This passage of the *Laws* is often quoted by modern literature to exemplify the (historically correct) assumption that an Athenian citizen of the classical period would inevitably have been exposed to some form of training in dance and music in a civic context. Yet closer attention to the surroundings of our passage (both the preceding section on the inborn human responsiveness to orderly movements and sounds – that is, 2.653d7–654a5 and the ensuing passage [2.654b9–e1] on the importance of a correct agreement between reasons and feelings), makes clear that the Athenian Stranger is making a much more fundamental claim about human nature and its way of experiencing like and dislike. The text of 2.654b11–d4 is the following:

ΑΘ. ‘καλῶς ἄδει,’ φαμέν, ‘καὶ καλῶς ὀρχεῖται’· πότερον ‘εἰ καὶ καλὰ ἄδει καὶ καλὰ ὀρχεῖται’ προσθῶμεν ἢ μή;

¹³⁶ For the omission of Dionysos, see n. 28 in this chapter.

¹³⁷ I follow Des Places 1962: 10 in taking ἱκανῶς as qualifying both πεπαιδευμένον and κεχορευκότα.

ΚΛ. προσθῶμεν.

ΑΘ. τί δ' ἂν τὰ καλὰ τε ἡγούμενος εἶναι καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχροῦ αἰσχροῦ οὕτως αὐτοῖς χρῆται; βέλτιον ὁ τοιοῦτος πεπαιδευμένος ἡμῖν ἔσται τὴν χορείαν τε καὶ μουσικὴν ἢ ὅς ἂν τῷ μὲν σώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ τὸ διανοηθὲν εἶναι καλὸν ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετεῖν δυνήθῃ ἐκάστοτε, χαίρῃ δὲ μὴ τοῖς καλοῖς μηδὲ μισῇ τὰ μὴ καλὰ; ἢ 'κεῖνος ὅς ἂν τῇ μὲν φωνῇ καὶ τῷ σώματι μὴ πάνυ δυνατὸς ᾖ κατορθοῦν, ἢ διανοεῖται,¹³⁸ τῇ δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ κατορθοῖ, τὰ μὲν ἀσπαζόμενος, ὅσα καλὰ, τὰ δὲ δυσχεραίνων, ὅποσα μὴ καλὰ;

ΚΛ. πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον, ὧ ξένη, λέγεις τῆς παιδείας.

(Athenian Stranger) We say 'he sings and dances well'. Should we add or not 'provided that the songs he sings and the dances he dances are beautiful'?

(Cleinius) We should add this proviso.

(Athenian Stranger) What about someone who considers as beautiful what is beautiful and ugly what is ugly and makes use of them accordingly? Shall we consider as better educated in dance and music a man of such a type who is able to do an adequate service with his body and voice to what has been judged to be beautiful but he does not rejoice in what is beautiful nor does he hate what is not fine? Or the one who is not entirely able to give a successful expression with his voice and body to what he thinks, yet he feels right with regards to pleasure and pain, since he welcomes what is beautiful and feels dislike for what is not beautiful?

(Cleinius) You are saying what is by far the most relevant point of education.

What is at stake in this passage is not simply proficiency (not at least as commonly conceived) in dancing and singing: to be able to express adequately – that is, successfully (ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετεῖν) – through bodily and vocal activity (τῷ μὲν σώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ) what is thought to be fine not only is not a sufficient condition for the title of πεπαιδευμένος in the second-best city but is not even a necessary one. To take pleasure in the 'correct' forms

¹³⁸ The passage is fraught with textual difficulties; I follow here England 1921, I: 278–9 in accepting Badham's emendation of the transmitted ἢ διανοεῖσθαι into ἢ διανοεῖται at 654d1. Schöpsdau 1994, I: 265–6 retains the transmitted text and suggests that we should interpret διανοεῖσθαι as 'ein bloss verstandesmäßiges Erfassen und Vorstellen des Schönen... und nähert sich dem χαίρειν bzw. ἀσπάζεσθαι des folgenden Satzes'. Yet England's objections to such a solution seem to me to be still outstanding.

of dancing and singing (2.654d1–2 τῇ δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ κατορθοῖ) is something *prior* to and more important than outward correctness in performing dance movements or in singing.¹³⁹ In Magnesia, then, to be truly ‘educated’ means to experience a perfect harmony between one’s rational content-beliefs (a ‘correct’ apprehension of what is fine and what is not) and the emotional responses to them (the feelings of liking and disliking). What counts most is not simply a specific skill in a *technē* but a ‘correctly’ trained emotional response to what we should desire, a response which finds its advocate in the pleasure that humans take in orderly dance and song, be it by performing them personally or vicariously (or watching/listening to them in the prenatal stage). More than anything else, the Magnesian education in *choreia* is an education of perceptions. The choral education of the children of well-governed citizens will first of all be a training of emotions conducive to virtue: choral singing and dancing is quite literally the process of ‘drawing and pulling’ (2.659d2 ἡ παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγή) the souls of the children ‘towards the argument that is said by the law to be correct’ (2.659e2–3 πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον).

In the next chapter, we see in more detail what forms of expression are promoted by Magnesia’s civic choruses in order to implement the ‘common law’ (κοινὸν νόμον) of the second-best city: to follow the guidance of the ‘finest pull’ of the law, that is reason (1.645a4–5 δεῖν δὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωγῇ τῇ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ συλλαμβάνειν), while co-opting as ‘servants’ (1.645a6–7 δεῖσθαι ὑπηρετῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀγωγήν) the irrational parts of the soul.

¹³⁹ On this passage, see Kamtekar 2008b: 356–7.

PATTERNS OF CHORALITY IN MAGNESIA

In [Chapter 3](#), we saw how choral performances in Magnesia work as an uninterrupted and virtually endless chain of persuasion (self-persuasion included): the choruses of the new Cretan colony must first persuade ‘themselves’ so that they are able to persuade the whole community, but at the same time they are also to be persuaded by the gods. The process of persuasion is not unidirectional: both gods and men benefit from this web of incantations (ἐπιφδοσί). It is on the *forms* of expression of such a persuasion as voiced by Magnesia’s choruses that I focus in this chapter. To unravel some of the ways in which the civic choral voice of Magnesia is configured will help to clarify the complex process of mimetic mediation that Plato has to negotiate to foreground the authority and modality of performance of the new colony’s choruses (§4.1). Magnesia will be and enact the ‘truest tragedy’, yet it is a choral dimension more genuinely cognate to the tradition of choral lyric in its civic and cultic context that illuminates the integration of Dionysos and its chorus of elders into the social and musical world of the *Laws* (§4.2). In the second part of the chapter, I focus more narrowly on Plato’s revision of *tragic* choruses by developing some reflections (1) on Plato’s reappropriation of the *emmeleia* in the second-best city (§4.3) and (2) on how the Athenian Stranger’s plea for a ‘euphemic’ chorus at 7.800c7–e3 works within the network of Magnesia’s performances and how it bears on choral practices (especially dramatic) in contemporary Athens (Plato’s attack on the ‘politics of dirge’ promoted by contemporary dramatic choruses; §4.5).

4.1 The three choruses of Magnesia

In the foundational myth of the new Cretan colony, the birth of *choreia*, it is the gods who assigned to mortals the Muses,

Apollo and Dionysos as both ‘fellow-celebrants’ (συνεορταστάς 2.653d4; συγχορευτάς 2.654a1, 2.665a4) and at the same time ‘leaders of choral performances’ (χορηγεῖν 2.654a3; χορηγούς 2.665a4). Later on, when it comes down to the actual organisation and integration of these performances into Magnesia’s civic life, the Athenian Stranger tells his interlocutors that the citizens of the second-best city will be split into three choruses, *all* of them having as their primary function ‘enchanting with song the souls of the children, still young and tender’ (2.664b3–5 φημί γὰρ ἅπαντας δεῖν ἐπάδειν τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χοροὺς ἔτι νέαις οὖσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἀπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων).¹ The content of this choral enchantment (2.664b7–8) will be the ‘divine truth’ (ὑπὸ θεῶν . . . λέγεσθαι) that the ‘best’ life is also the ‘most pleasant’. This form of persuasion through choral songs is also deemed the most effective by the Athenian Stranger (2.664c1–2). Who are these three choruses? In what sense may they be seen as true representatives of Magnesia’s civic ethos?² On what is the authority of their choral voice based? The Athenian Stranger introduces them at 2.664c4–d4 in the following way:

πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ὁ Μουσῶν χορὸς ὁ παιδικὸς ὀρθότατ’ ἂν εἰσίοι πρῶτος τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄσόμενος ἀπάσῃ σπουδῇ καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει, δεύτερος δὲ ὁ μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, τὸν τε Παιῖνα ἐπικαλούμενος μάρτυρα τῶν λεγομένων ἀληθείας περὶ καὶ τοῖς νέοις ἴλεων μετὰ πειθοῦς γίγνεσθαι ἐπευχόμενος. δεῖ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἔτι τρίτους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἔτη μέχρι τῶν ἐξήκοντα γεγονότας ἄδειν· τοὺς δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα – οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δυνατοὶ φέρειν ὥδᾶς – μυθολόγους περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἠθῶν διὰ θείας φήμης καταλελειφθαι.

First then it would be most right for the children’s chorus dedicated to the Muses to come forward first, to sing such songs publicly with the utmost eagerness and in front of the whole city. Second will come the chorus of those under thirty, invoking Paeon [that is, Apollo] as witness of the truth of what

¹ For the necessity of different kinds of songs for different sexes from a certain age on, cf. 7.802d8–e3 ἔτι δὲ θηλείαις τε πρεπούσας ὥδᾶς ἄρρεσι τε χωρίσαι που δέον ἂν εἶη τύπον τινὶ διορισάμενον, καὶ ἀρμονίαισιν δὴ καὶ ῥυθμοῖς προσαρμόττειν ἀναγκαῖον (for ὥδᾶς at 802d8 referring primarily to ‘subject matter and language’, see England 1921, II: 268 ad loc.). On the education of the female sex in Magnesia, see Bruit Zaidman 2009.

² On Plato’s tripartite choral world and its possible relationship to the Spartan *trichoria*, see the concise survey by Schöpsdau 1994: 305–6 with previous literature. A useful assessment of the ancient sources about the Spartan *trichoria* and its alleged link to the *Gymnopaideiai* can be found in Ducat 2006: 268–73.

has been said and praying that he may be propitious towards the young³ and persuade them. Then a third group of men must sing, those who are over thirty and up to sixty. Those who come after these⁴ – for they are not able to endure the songs any longer – are left to tell stories about the same kinds of moral characters out of their divine inspiration.

A first matter-of-fact observation is that the three choruses are organized on the basis of age-classes.⁵ If we make exception for the chorus of the elders (see discussion later in this chapter), this way of conceptualising civic choral performances by age-class is entirely traditional and in keeping with what we know about Athenian contemporary practices. The most immediate term of comparison for fourth-century BC Athens is the dithyramb.⁶ The dithyrambic choruses performing at the Great Dionysia were recruited on both geopolitical (*phylai*) and age-class criteria: each *phylē* had to provide two choruses of fifty members, one of ‘children’ (παῖδες) and one of ‘adult men’ (ἄνδρες).⁷ Plato does not make mention here of the geographical criterion. Magnesia is of course no historical city and it would be wrong to transpose on it ‘real’ societal standards, yet some observations may all the same be made. Later on we learn that Magnesia’s citizens will be divided in twelve *phylai* consecrated to the twelve gods (5.745d–e) and there are some passages that may lend themselves to the suggestion of choral

³ The text as it is does not make clear whether τοῖς νέοις at 2.664c8 includes those under thirty or refers only to the παῖδες. England 1921, I: 309 favours the latter hypothesis (‘the words *ἄγων μετὰ πειθοῦς* . . . look more like a prayer for others than for the suppliants themselves’) but later on at 12.951e3–4 νέοι are those aged between thirty and forty, and at 12.961b1 the νέοι who have to join in the Nocturnal Council must be no less than thirty years old: see Larivée 2003a: 50 n. 83 and also Brisson 2001: 165. For νέοι in Athenian inscriptions from the late fourth century BC referring to ‘those under thirty’, see Davidson 2006: 48. It seems to me more probable that τοῖς νέοις of 2.664c8 comprises both παῖδες and young ἄνδρες: persuading others and persuading oneself are very often inseparable processes in Magnesia’s network of communication.

⁴ Cf. England 1921, I: 309 ‘this can mean nothing but those who are beyond that age’.

⁵ On the possibility of a likely subdivision of the third chorus in two sub-choruses, see Schöpsdau 1994: 308–9, Larivée 2003a: 49–50, Mouze 2005: 212, n. 2.

⁶ On the growing popularity of dithyrambic performances in the fourth century BC, see Wilson 2003: 164–7 (Athens: 165–6).

⁷ See Wilson 2000: 75–6. According to Wilson 2000: 75 the category of παῖδες ‘presumably represented a band of about five to seven years of age (c. 11–17)’, whereas ‘the men’s category will have been some four times as broad (c. 18/20–45+?)’.

performances organized on a phyletic basis, even if admittedly there is no explicit textual clue in this direction.⁸ At 8.828c2–3 we are told that every year there must be twelve *heortai* (one each month) to the twelve eponymous gods of the twelve *phylai*, and that these festivities will entail ‘choruses and musical contests and also gymnastic ones’ (χορούς τε καὶ ἀγῶνας μουσικούς, τοὺς δὲ γυμνικούς). Nothing more precise is said about the organization of these choruses and musical/sporting contests: what is clear is that the whole civic body is meant to take part in them. In a society so obsessed with hierarchy based on biological seniority,⁹ it seems likely that at these *heortai* the age-class criterion would certainly have been respected. As to the possibility of intra-phyletic competition, it cannot be proved but it cannot be ruled out either. It is true that Magnesia’s city must be as much as possible ‘one *polis*’. Occasions that foster inner divisions are *a priori* unwelcome, and competition between *phylai* could be seen in this respect as a disturbing factor. Yet Magnesia’s society is anyway highly agonistic: public praise and blame (also for, among other activities, choral and athletic performances) are positively encouraged within certain limits by the law.¹⁰ Collective performances may be competitive without utterly undermining the sense of social solidarity:¹¹ if the prize to be won is a prize in civic excellence and communal ideals, the overall unity of a community may after all be reinforced.¹²

Be this as it may, what is interesting to point out is that the recruitment of Magnesia’s choruses does *not* follow Athens’

⁸ At 6.771d the law establishes that each citizen will take part in two *heortai* every month, one in honour of the eponym of his/her tribe and one celebrating the eponym of his/her *deme* (I follow here Saunders’ interpretation of this much discussed passage: see Saunders 1976: 25 and Schöpsdau 1994: 447).

⁹ See Schofield 2003: 4–6.

¹⁰ Cf. e.g. 7.801d–802d, 7.822e–23a, 8.829c–e, 8.835a (ἄμιλλαν χορῶν: a Dionysiac expression? Cf. Soph. *Tr.* 219–20 βακχίαν... ἄμιλλαν, Philod. *Paean to Dionysus CA* p. 169 ll. 133–4 χορῶν τε... κυκλίαν ἄμιλλαν). For both musical and agonistic competitions cf. also 6.764dff. On the rhetoric of praise and blame in the *Laws*, see Morgan 2013. For the agonistics of virtue in Magnesia, see §5.1.

¹¹ Cf. Wilson 2007a: 175 n. 96 on ‘theoric’ and ‘competitive’ choruses.

¹² Cf. Wilson’s comments on how ‘a vision of a unified city – over and above its individual tribes – may have been promulgated in Athenian dithyrambs’ (Wilson 2003: 169).

procedure for selecting the choreuts of either tragic or comic choruses, where the age-class distinction ‘was less of a defining criterion in the general perception of the genre’.¹³ Their social composition is much more strictly related to what we know about choral lyric performances: as Nagy puts it, ‘the ritual essence of the choral lyric performance is that it is *constitutive* of a society in the very process of dividing it’.¹⁴

Of particular interest are the second and third choruses, those of Apollo and Dionysos. The second chorus, of men up to age thirty, will invoke (ἐπικαλούμενος) Apollo as ‘Paean’ (‘Healer’) and will pray (ἐπευχόμενος) the god to be gracious (ἡλεως) to the young and to show his benevolence through persuasion (μετὰ πειθοῦς). The celebratory song to Apollo is presented at the same time as a *request* for divine persuasion and as an *act* of persuasion towards the same god whose persuasion is requested in turn (the invocation of Paean as witness of the truth of what is being sung: μάρτυρα τῶν λεγομένων ἀληθείας πέρι). This network of reciprocal *peithō* is a typical feature of choral lyric and has its roots in the specificity of its cultic context.¹⁵ It seems to me that this pattern of reciprocity may help us to understand also the repeated insistence with which Plato *wants* Magnesia’s choral songs to be prayers as well (3.700b1–2; 7.801e1–2).¹⁶ These two passages have often been interpreted as reliable evidence for an early generic categorization within lyric poetry,¹⁷ yet *hymnos*-related words in both Pindar and Bacchylides refer without distinction to men and gods alike,¹⁸ and if a hymn may be a prayer, a prayer need not necessarily be a hymn.¹⁹ If Plato *wanted* a hymn to be, at least at

¹³ Wilson 2000: 76–80 (the quotation is from 77).

¹⁴ Nagy 1990: 367. ¹⁵ See, above all, D’Alessio (forthcoming).

¹⁶ 3.700b1–2 καὶ τι ἦν εἶδος ᾧδεῖς εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεοῦς, ὄνομα δὲ ὕμνοι ἐπεκαλοῦντο; 7.801e1–2 μετὰ γε μὴν ταῦτα ὕμνοι θεῶν καὶ ἐγκώμια κεκοινωνημένα εὐχαῖς ᾄδοιτ’ ἂν ὀρθότατα.

¹⁷ Bibliography would be endless here: cf. e.g. Furley-Bremer 2001, I: 11–2. For a different approach, see Fearn 2007: 186–8.

¹⁸ For *hymnos* referring to men cf. e.g. Pind. *Isthm.* 2. 3, Bacch. 6. 11.

¹⁹ See Pulleyn 1997: 43–50 (esp. 44–5 with n. 18 on 801e1–2), Willi 2003: 13–5. However, I do not agree with Pulleyn when he claims that hymn is ‘a kind of negotiable commodity’ that generates *charis*, whereas the prayer does not (55). The difference between prayer and hymn is in the context and modality of utterance. Prayer is a speech-act, hymn is a *mode* of performing a speech-act.

Magnesia, a ‘sung prayer to the gods’, this has more to do with his particular agenda than with literary classification: the citizens of the second-best city must spend their lives ‘in a dialogue with the gods by means of prayers and supplications’ (10.887e1–2 ὥς ὅτι μάλιστα οὓσιν θεοῖς εὐχαῖς προσδιαλεγομένους καὶ ἱκεταῖαις). This is also why song and dance can be seen as virtual sacrifices to the gods: the ‘correct way’ of living is to go through life ‘playing some plays, sacrificing, singing and dancing, so as to propitiate the gods towards one self’ (7.803e1–3 παίζοντά ἐστιν διαβιωτέον τινὰς δὴ παιδιάς, θύοντα καὶ ἔδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἴλεως αὐτῷ παρασκευάζειν δυνατόν εἶναι). This equivalence between choral performance and sacrifice is already there in the language of choral lyric where hymns are presented as offerings to the gods.²⁰

With the first and second chorus of Magnesia’s citizens we thus are within a mode of experiencing the dimension of song and dance that we have called, for brevity’s sake, ‘lyric’ mimesis (§3.2): the members of the chorus of the Muses and Apollo are characterized as being ‘themselves’, a group representative of the *polis* performing how to be proper citizens. Psychological and behavioural assimilation through mimesis are for the person experiencing them a state of being as ‘true’ as that of empirical reality: ‘Plato’s approach to the psychology of mimesis is grounded on the assumption that there is continuity, even equivalence, between our relations to people and things in the real word and to people and things presented in mimetic art’ (Halliwell 2002: 76).²¹ This is why the process

²⁰ Cf. e.g. Philodemus *De Mus.* 4 col. 135. ll. 10–13 Delattre (= Pindar fr. *86a M) on Pindar offering a dithyramb as sacrifice (θύσων ποιῆσθαι διθύραμβον).

²¹ Halliwell 2002: 72–85 provides an excellent exploration of Plato’s psychology of mimesis in both *Republic* and *Laws*. Although I agree with his demonstration that Plato’s view of mimesis, already in the *Republic*, allows for ‘a series of grades of imaginative absorption in the mimetic world that extends from the adoption of a quasi-participant point of view to the holding of an attitude of critical detachment’ (Halliwell 2002: 80), the ‘lyric’ way of experiencing mimesis that constantly emerges in Magnesia’s choruses seems to me to level the distinction between performers and audiences in the *Laws* more than Halliwell is disposed to admit (cf. Halliwell 2002: 78 on 2.655b–656b). This is particularly the case for 2.657d1–6, where ‘watching the *heortē*’ (θεωροῦντες) means taking part in it; see discussion later in this chapter.

of ‘self-likening’ (ὁμοιοῦσθαι) through mimesis must be limited, in Magnesia, to ‘the artistic performance that possesses a resemblance to the imitation of the beautiful’ (2.668b1–2 μουσικὴν ... ἐκείνην τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμήματι). The guardians of Callipolis are not allowed to be *mimētikoi* (*Resp.* 3.394e) because mimesis (and in the *Republic* the main concern is with ‘tragic’ or ‘dramatic’ forms of mimesis: that is, with imitating ‘otherness’) ‘leads us to discover other lives, and, in the process, to make them psychologically our own’ (Halliwell 1992: 68).²² In the *Laws*, the way to preserve the psychological force of artistic mimesis, but avoid ‘being by necessity in contradiction with oneself’ (4.719c6–7), is, as we have seen, to equate mimesis to an absolute identity between performer and performed, actor and audience,²³ and it is in this respect that the model of ‘lyric’ mimesis enacted by choral cultic poetry presents clear advantages over the ‘tragic’ form.²⁴ The official language of the *polis* tells us that in fifth- and fourth-century BC Athens dramatic performances, both tragic and comic, were regarded fundamentally as *choral* performances.²⁵ In this broader sense we have already observed that tragic choruses may certainly be said to reflect a collective, communal voice. Yet the authority of the tragic choral voice, even when representative of a civic community, is always limited (§3.2). This limited authority of the tragic chorus is a key element of tragic representation: the tragic chorus can never aspire to the all-embracing inclusiveness and authority of the choral lyric voice.

It is interesting to note that in a section on the architecture and building regulations of the new Cretan colony (6.778bff.), the Athenian Stranger refers, *en passant*, to the presence of theatres among the civic buildings of Magnesia (6.779d2–6):

²² On the ‘negative’ forms of mimesis prohibited in the *Republic*, see Moss 2007.

²³ The exception is comedy: comic performances are allowed in Magnesia only inasmuch as they are performed by hired foreigners and slaves (7.816d–e): civic purity is preserved by distancing performers from their audience. On mimesis, strangers and comedy in the *Laws*, see Chapter 5.

²⁴ On tragic and lyric mimesis, see Mullen 1982: 52–5.

²⁵ Cf. Foley 2003: 3 with n. 9, Wilson 1999/2000: 429.

ὅτε δὲ ταῦτα τε καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀγορὰν οἰκοδομήματα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ πάντα ὅσα διδασκαλεῖα κατεσκευασμένα περιμένει τοὺς φοιτητὰς καὶ θεατὰς θέατρα, πορευώμεθα ἐπὶ τὰ μετὰ τοὺς γάμους, τῆς νομοθεσίας ἐξῆς ἐχόμενοι κτλ.

And when these buildings and those of the agora and the gymnasia and all the schools have been prepared and await those who will frequent them and the theatres the spectators, let us move to the subject which follows the marriages, sticking to the order of our legislation etc.

In this passage theatres are mentioned along with all the other essential buildings of a Greek *polis* (market buildings, schools, gymnasia). Theatres are clearly meant to play a significant role in the civic life of the second-best city: but what is going to be their function?²⁶ Will tragedies be performed in them?²⁷ Or only comedies? Or what other kind of events will Magnesia's theatres host? If we keep in mind the ethnic identity of internal 'audience' of the *Laws* – that is, the Spartan Megillos and the Cretan Cleinias – the mention of theatres *not* hosting dramatic performances (namely, tragedy and comedy) is less puzzling than it may first seem to modern commentators. Earlier on, at 1.637a1–b6 Megillos said that the Spartan law has banned drunken Dionysiac festivals from the whole of Lacedaemonia (1.637a4 ἐκ τῆς χώρας συμπάσης: that is, both countryside and towns). We also know from [Plut.] *Mor.* 239b (= *Apophth. Lac.* 33) that the Spartans 'used not to attend either comedy or tragedy so that they might not hear anyone speaking against the laws either in earnest or in jest' (κωμωδίας καὶ τραγωδίας οὐκ ἠκροῶντο, ὅπως μήτ' ἐν σπουδῇ μήτ' ἐν παιδιᾷ ἀκούωσι τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων τοῖς νόμοις). In Sparta, as a civic community, dramatic festivals were 'replaced' by other forms of choral performance (dancing choruses) and Sparta's theatre, at least as far as our evidence goes for the classical and Hellenistic period, seems not to have been intended for the performance of 'Athenian drama': it was instead mainly a communal space where civic and religious festivals took place.²⁸ With the exception of comedy, the

²⁶ Morrow 1960: 182 and 193 mentions theatres as part of the buildings of the city but does not speculate on their function; cf. instead P. Murray 2013: 296–7.

²⁷ This possibility is raised, to be ultimately dismissed, by P. Murray 2013: 296–7.

²⁸ Constantinidou 1998: 25; David 1989, 8–9; Parker 1989: 151; Loucas 1984: 152–3. For Sparta's theatre as venue of public non-dramatic *heortai*: Hdt. 6.67

communal space of Magnesia's theatres (7.779d5) will literally become a second version of Sparta's theatre:²⁹ the recipient of non-dramatic forms of choral performance of the first and second chorus, thus enhancing social cohesion and stability.³⁰

4.2 Dionysiac music: the third chorus

But what about Magnesia's third chorus? How does the chorus of those over thirty, with its special link with Dionysos, the Athenian god of the theatre *par excellence*, fit into this rescue of an educational, non-dramatic mimesis where 'correctness' (ὀρθότης), 'benefit' (ὠφελία), 'pleasure' (ἡδονή) and 'truth' (ἀλήθεια) are intimately interwoven with each other (2.667c5–7)? How should we read the repeated claim by the Athenian Stranger that the music performed by the third chorus will be the 'most beautiful song' (ἡ καλλίστη ᾠδή)?³¹ And how is it that Dionysos, a god eternally young and new, finds in Magnesia his truest representatives in the elders? At §3.1 we have seen that the ritual space for the performances of the chorus of elders will not be the public open spaces *en masse* (theatres) but the more intimate and restricted setting of the symposium: the devotees of Dionysos will enact their performances at quasi-private symposia (2.666c4–5 οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς ἀλλὰ ἐν μετρίοις, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοτρίοις ἀλλ' ἐν οἰκείοις; cf. also 2.667b1). They will be first and most of all *sympotai*, but they will nevertheless retain their status of 'members of a chorus' (χορευταί).

The strict link between the Chorus of Dionysos, intoxication and the symposium, as formulated in *Laws* 2.665b–671b,

(Gymnopaideiai); Athen. 14.631c (Gymnopaideiai); Polycr. *FGrH* 588 F1 (Hyacinthia; on the precise nature of the *theatron* referred to as venue for the Hyacinthia, cf. Moreno Conde 2008: 46 with n. 174); Plut. *Ages.* 29.3 (Gymnopaideiai), Paus. 3.14.1 (the later marble theatre was erected in Hellenistic time 30–2 BC: see Waywell et al. 1998).

²⁹ For the theatres as the likely venue for the performances of the chorus of the Muses and Apollo, cf. Larivée 2003a: 49.

³⁰ On the absence of canonical theatrical plays (tragedies and comedies) in Sparta's theatre up to the late Hellenistic/early Roman period (tragedies were first introduced under the Roman domination), see Loucas 1984.

³¹ 2.665d3 ἄδον τὰ κάλλιστα; d4–5 κυριώτατον... τῶν καλλίστων τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτων ᾠδῶν; cf. also 2.666d10–e1 οὐκ... ἐπήβολοι γεγονάτε τῆς καλλίστης ᾠδῆς.

has received copious attention in recent scholarship. The focus has usually been either on the ‘allopathic catharsis of emotions’ caused by wine, Dionysiac inspiration and its role in Plato’s physiology of pleasure (a way of educating the young through a re-education of the elders)³² or on the institutional affinities between the Chorus of Dionysos, ‘the best part of the city’ (2.665d1 τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως) and the Nocturnal Council.³³ More generally, the reintegration of Dionysos and the Dionysiac in the Apollinean cosmos of Magnesia, in terms of both social and cultic practices, has also received close attention.³⁴ In this section I shift the focus of critical discussion to a still underexplored dimension of the Chorus of Dionysos: its modality of performance. I shall pay specific attention to the *forms* of expression and patterns of performance staged (or imagined to be staged) by the chorus of the elders and show how the discursive rhetoric enacted by the chorus of Dionysos is one of the most fascinating ways in which Plato manages to reinscribe the collective ‘I’ of choral lyric into Magnesia’s tragic discourse.³⁵ Through an intertextual dialogue with opportunely selected voices of tragic ‘civic’ choruses, the Chorus of Dionysos of the new Cretan colony is competing with tragedy’s own appropriation of the lyric discourse of civic identity. This negotiation will reveal once again how Plato’s vision of chorality is deeply indebted to the religious, cultic frame of the *polis* in general and Athens in particular.

Let us then go back to Plato’s first introduction of the Chorus of Dionysos (2.664d1–4). Dionysos will be the patron of the chorus of ‘old’ men (2.665b4 Διονύσου πρεσβυτῶν χορός). The age requirement (especially the lower limit) for belonging to the third chorus oscillates throughout the

³² ‘Allopathic catharsis of emotions’: Belfiore 1986: 432. Cf. also, among others, O. Murray 2013, Mouze 2005: 168–73 and 247–71.

³³ Cf. e.g. Panno 2007: 150–4, Larivée 2003a, Brisson 2001. Bartels 2012 focuses instead on the third chorus as the vehicle through which Plato legitimates an ‘objective aesthetics’ of old age as criterion of artistic correctness in the *Laws*.

³⁴ Kowalzig 2013: 194–200, Panno 2007 (esp. ch. 3 and 4); Schefer 1996: 226–8; Belfiore 1986.

³⁵ Cf. §3.2.

Laws,³⁶ and it has been rightly explained, I think, with Plato's 'exploratory character of the inquiry'.³⁷ It is also worth noticing that the direction of this seeming inconsistency is in itself coherent:³⁸ through the fictional time of the *Laws* the members of the Chorus of Dionysos grow older and older, and it is not unlikely that this progressive movement may reflect Plato's growing awareness of the necessity of 'containing' as much as possible the Dionysiac component of Magnesia's citizenship. Be this as it may, the age limits identified by the Athenian Stranger for Magnesia's elders are broadly consistent with what we know about age-classes in classical Athens: the dividing line between 'old' (πρεσβυς) and 'young' (νεός) could be as low as thirty.³⁹ Dionysos' Chorus is thus a chorus whose members may legitimately be conceptualized by Plato's readers as 'old'. We are also told that its authority is 'divinely inspired' (διὰ θείας φήμης 2.664d4) and that (with the exception of the over-sixty) it expresses its authority in the persuasion exercised through its songs (2.665d1–4).⁴⁰

Two elements are most interesting here in terms of poetic self-representation. First, as argued by D'Alessio, the form of authority claimed by the Chorus of Dionysos is strongly reminiscent of the parodos of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (104–06), where the problematic status of the choral voice finds its first tragic dramatization.⁴¹ The very moment the chorus of elder Argives switches from anapaests to song proper it also voices this powerful claim of self-assertion:

³⁶ Cf. 2.664d1–4 (30–60; those over 60 will be μυθολόγοι divinely inspired), 2.665b3–6 (30–60: οἱ ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα καὶ πενήτηκοντα δὲ γεγονότες ἔτι μέχρι ἐξήκοντα), 2.666b2 (τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἔτων, i.e. 'when a man is rising forty', that is 'enters the fourth decade': England 1921, I: 313; cf. also Schöpsdau 1994: 312), 2.670a4–b2 (oscillation between 30–50 at 2.670a4–5 and only 50 at b1), 2.671d9–e2 (over 60: τοῖς ἡγημόσιν τοῖς τοῦ Διονύσου, τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἐξήκοντα ἔτι γεγονόσιν), 7.812b9–c1 (60: τοὺς ἐξηκοντούτας ᾧδούς).

³⁷ Morrow 1960: 318. Cf. also Panno 2007: 148 with n. 33. Nails and Thesleff 2003 explain factual inconsistencies in the *Laws* as mainly due to the editorial process by Philip of Opus.

³⁸ Cf. O. Murray 2013: 114. ³⁹ Cf. Davidson 2006: 48, Crowther 1990: 171.

⁴⁰ In particular, at 2.665d2–3 the Chorus of Dionysos is described as the 'part of us that is best at persuading those in the city because of its age and intelligence' (ἡλικίαις τε καὶ ἄμα φρονήσεσιν πιθανώτατον ὃν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει) and as bestowing the greatest benefits on the citizens 'by singing the most beautiful songs' (ᾄδον τὰ κάλλιστα).

⁴¹ D'Alessio (forthcoming).

κύριός εἰμι θροεῖν ὄδιον κράτος αἴσιον ἀνδρῶν
 ἐκτελέων· ἔτι γὰρ θεόθεν καταπνεῖει
 πειθῷ μολπᾶν ὀλκᾶν σύμφυτος αἰών⁴²

I have the authority to utter the auspicious command ruling the expedition, the command of men in their prime. For from the gods the age that has grown with me still breathes down upon me the persuasion of songs so as to be my war-like strength.

There the chorus of the elder citizens of Argos asserts its authoritative voice as a community group on the basis of *both* its old age (106 σύμφυτος αἰών) *and* the divinely inspired persuasion of their songs (105–06 θεόθεν . . . πειθῷ μολπᾶν) voiced through the vicarious ‘strength’ (ὀλκᾶν 106) now represented by their singing. Strictly speaking, this passage differs from the cases of choral self-referentiality identified by Henrichs,⁴³ because at this point of the play the chorus is *not* represented as performing, or imagining performing, a distinct ritual act that involves song and dance. This difference is significant: in the parodos of the *Agamemnon* the chorus of the old Argives defines itself as a group of singers, a definition that is obviously correct when applied to their present role on stage as performing agents (a chorus performing its song and dance) but not so when referred to their ‘dramatic character’ within the play (the Argive elders are *not* imagined as performing a ritual song within the narrative of the *Agamemnon*). That is, the chorus of Argive elders claims its authority ‘not only *qua* elderly citizens, but, more specifically, as performers of lyric poetry’, thus ‘blurring the chorus dramatic role with its function as a poetic chorus using the language of choral lyric’ (D’Alessio, forthcoming). What is most fascinating is that Plato is drawing here on one of the passages in Greek drama where a chorus of elders ‘appropriates’ and ‘inverts’ a fundamental *Leitmotiv* of lyric poetry (choral and monodic): the ‘lyric’ I of the speaking voice describes himself/herself as too old for dancing but not

⁴² I print here the text of Fraenkel 1950, I: 96. For the numerous interpretative problems raised by these lines, see Fraenkel 1950, II: 62–5.

⁴³ Henrichs 1994/1995.

for singing and hence not for directing the song from outside.⁴⁴ D'Alessio has rightly detected in the unusual turn of phrase of 2.664d3 (οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δυνατοὶ φέρειν ᾠδὰς 'for they are not able any longer to sustain songs'⁴⁵) a reference to the 'my-knees-cannot-bear-me' motif, with explicit reference to dance: cf. e.g. Alcman fr. 26 *PMGF* οὐ μ' ἔτι... γυῖα φέρην δύναται and Sappho KölnPap. 429 col. ii l. 1 (= fr. 58. 15 Voigt) γόλνα δ' [ο]ὐ φέροισι. I would like to add to D'Alessio's analysis by observing that this same theme reappears (or better makes its *first* appearance within the compositional time of the *Laws*) with an interesting expansion also at 2.657d1–7:

ΑΘ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡμῶν οἱ μὲν νέοι αὐτοὶ χορεύειν ἔτοιμοι, τὸ δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν ἐκείνους αὖ θεωροῦντες διάγειν ἡγούμεθα πρεπόντως, χαίροντες τῇ ἐκείνων παιδιᾷ τε καὶ ἑορτάσει, ἔπειδὴ τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν ἡμᾶς ἑλαφρόν ἐκλείπει νῦν, ὃ ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι τίθεμεν οὕτως ἀγῶνας τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰς τὴν νεότητα μνήμη ἐπεγείρειν;

ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.

(Athenian Stranger): Is it not the case that our young are ready to sing and dance themselves whereas we elders deem it proper to spend time by watching them and experiencing delight in their play and festivity since the nimbleness we had is now abandoning us? Is it not just because of our longing and affection for that nimbleness that we establish contests for those who can above all wake up us, through memory, to youth?

(Cleinius): Absolutely.

In this last passage, Magnesia's *trichoria* has not yet been mentioned, yet the (elderly) Athenian Stranger is preparing the ground for it. The young, he says, are always more 'disposed to dance' (χορεύειν ἔτοιμοι), whereas the elders believe that it

⁴⁴ For dancing choruses of old men in tragedy and comedy cf. Eur. *Heracles* 673–94 (on which more is discussed later in this chapter), *TrGF* VI.1 fr. 370. 9–10 (*Erechtheus*: for the text see the recent reconstruction by Sonnino 2008), Ar. *Vesp.* 1066–7, *Lys.* 670, *Plut.* 757–61 (an imaginary chorus of elders rejoices with dances at the return of Wealth: ll. 759–60 ἐκτυπεῖτο δέ/ ἐμβὰς γερόντων εὐρύθμοις προβήμασιν [probably a tragic quotation: see Sommerstein 2001: 184] and then at 760–1 the actual chorus of elder on stage is encouraged by Carion to dance [ὀρχεῖσθε]), *Pax* 334.

⁴⁵ On the unidiomatic nature of the collocation φέρειν ᾠδὰς cf. England 1921, I: 309 ad loc. with the qualifications by Bartels 2012: 146 n. 36.

is ‘fitting’ for themselves (πρεπόντως) simply ‘to look on’ the performances of their juniors (ἐκείνους αὖ θεωροῦντες), taking delight (χαίροντες) at their plays and festivals. The explicit reason given for this behaviour is that ‘agility’ (τὸ ... ἐλαφρόν) has now abandoned the old men, yet they still feel an intense nostalgia for it (ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι), and it is for that reason that they establish festivals (τίθεμεν ... ἀγῶνας) for those who are most capable to ‘rejuvenate’ them through memory (τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστ’ εἰς τὴν νεότητα μνήμη ἐπεγείρειν). The ‘agility’ the old men long for is clearly the nimbleness of limbs in dancing that the lyric *persona* so often regrets to have lost⁴⁶: one of the most famous examples is, for instance, the ageing Sappho’s self-portrayal in KölnPap. 429 col. ii l. 2 τὰ δὴ ποταλαίψηρ’ ἔον ὄρχησθ’ ἴσα νεβρίοισιν ([my knees] that once a time were nimble for dancing as fawns’). Paradoxically, the eldest citizens of Magnesia decline to dance by rehearsing what is one of the standard motifs of the performing ‘I’ in Greek lyric. But there are further considerations to be made. The elders take part in the performance as ‘observers’ (θεωροῦντες). The importance in Plato’s works of the religious and civic institution of *theōria* as a paradigmatic template on which to construe the idea of philosophic speculation has already been the subject of close scrutiny.⁴⁷ What is interesting in this particular instance is that, while staging a programmatic refusal to join in choral dancing and singing, Plato’s elders are appropriating a *mode* of experiencing the feast that is distinctively proper of the civic institution of the *theōria* itself. As observed by Kavoulaki, ‘the term and practice of *theōria* aligns most closely the aspects of viewing with participation’: to watch the dance and song *is* a way to participate in it.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the way in which this ‘awakening’ to a vicarious form of youth is phrased (2.657d6 εἰς τὴν νεότητα μνήμη

⁴⁶ Cf. the use of ἐλαφρότης in 7.795e3 with reference to the type of dance that is not proper of ‘those who imitate the words of the Muse’ (Μούσης λέξιν μιμουμένων: on the meaning of this expression cf. Schöpsdau 2003: 526) but that is performed ‘for the sake of fitness, agility and beauty’ (εὐεξίας ἐλαφρότητός τε ἔνεκα καὶ κάλλους).

⁴⁷ See Nightingale 2004 and 2005.

⁴⁸ Kavoulaki 1999: 311. For the possible etymology of *theōria* (‘to watch’), see Rutherford 2000: 137 with n. 22.

ἐπεγείρειν) is such as to recall distinctively a Dionysiac experience. Sourvinou-Inwood has shown that Plato's metaphorical use of the term ἐγείρειν (especially but not exclusively in the collocation ἐγείρειν ψυχὴν) bears clear Bacchic resonances,⁴⁹ and rejuvenation through the experience of dance is commonly troped as a typically Dionysiac experience (see, for example, Aristophanes' *Frogs* 345–9 γόνυ πάλλεται γερόντων/ ἀποσεινόνται δὲ λύπας/ χρονίου τ' ἐτῶν παλαιῶν ἐνιαυτοῦς/ ἱεῖρας ὑπὸ τιμῆς, 'the knee of old men leaps in dance; they shake off the long seasons of grief and old age under the holy worship'). Dionysos and his rejuvenating power, although so far both of them unmentioned, are already subtly creeping in. At the same time, the expression φέρειν ᾠδὰς at 2.664d3 ('to endure the songs') also activates the lyric image of 'the labours of the choruses' (πόννοι χορῶν) that literally equates the 'toils' of the young dancing choruses and the joy they bring through the performance to an offering to the god (cf. e.g. Alcman fr. 1 ll. 88–9 *PMGF* πόνων γὰρ/ ἄμιν ἰάτωρ ἔγεντο, Pindar fr. 52h l. 22 M [= paeon C2 Rutherford] ἀθάνατ[ο]ν πόνον, 70c l. 16 M [a dithyramb] πόννοι χορῶν and *TrGF* II F 646a l. 23 τραγικῶν παρῶν πόνος ὕμνων).⁵⁰ Here again, it is interesting to observe that the expression 'the toils of the choruses' is very often associated to a specifically Dionysiac context.⁵¹

The second element of interest in this complex mediation of tragic and lyric voices operated by Plato in his construction of the Chorus of elders is the striking similarity with the self-representation of the chorus of elder Thebans in the second stasimon of Euripides' *Heracles* (ll. 654–94).⁵² At 2.666a–c

⁴⁹ Sourvinou-Inwood 2005: 237–8 (esp. on *Phdr.* 245a ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατὰ τε ᾠδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν).

⁵⁰ On the *ponos* of the songs bringing joy to both the performers and audiences, see the passages quoted by Lavecchia 2000: 226–7. On the close relationship between choruses and sacrifices, see Kowalzig 2005: 48–9.

⁵¹ Cf. Lavecchia 2000: 227 and Battezzato 2006: 55.

⁵² To the best of my knowledge, the affinities of the second ode of Euripides' *Heracles* with Magnesia's third chorus have been mentioned (*en passant*) only by Wilson 1999/2000: 435 n. 29. For the analogy between the Chorus of Dionysos and the second stasimon of Euripides' *Heracles*, D'Alessio and I have come to similar conclusions independently.

the Athenian Stranger praises the positive effect of wine as a ‘healing drug’ (φάρμακον) given by Dionysos to old age so that the elders may become young again and dance and sing in a renewal of the education they enjoyed while young. The text of 2.666a2–c7 is the following:

ΑΘ. πῶς οὖν αὐτοὺς παραμυθησόμεθα προθύμους εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ᾠδὰς; ἃρ’ οὐ νομοθετήσομεν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς παῖδας μέχρι ἐτῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα τὸ παράπαν οἴνου μὴ γεύεσθαι, διδάσκοντες ὥς οὐ χρή πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ ὀχετεύειν εἰς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἐγχειρεῖν πορεύεσθαι, τὴν ἔμμανη εὐλαβουμένους ἕξιν τῶν νέων· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἴνου μὲν δὴ γεύεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, μέθης δὲ καὶ πολυοινίας τὸ παράπαν τὸν νέον ἀπέχεσθαι· τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐτῶν, ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις εὐωχθέντα, καλεῖν τοὺς τε ἄλλους θεοὺς καὶ δὴ καὶ Διόνυσον παρακαλεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τελετὴν ἅμα καὶ παιδιάν, ἣν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρωος αὐστηρότητος ἔδωκ’ ἡσαστο [τὸν οἶνον] φάρμακον, ὥστε ἀνηβᾶν ἡμᾶς, καὶ δυσθυμίας λήθη γίνεσθαι μαλακώτερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος, καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα γιγνώμενον, καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι; πρῶτον μὲν δὴ διατεθεῖς οὕτως ἕκαστος ἄρ’ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι προθυμότερόν γε, ἥττον αἰσχυρόμενος, οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς ἀλλὰ ἐν μετρίοις, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἁλλοτρίοις ἀλλ’ ἐν οἰκείοις, ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὁ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν ἐπαῖδειν;

ΚΛ. καὶ πολὺ γε.

(Athenian Stranger): How shall we then encourage the elders⁵³ to be eager to sing? Shall we not legislate first that children up to the age of eighteen must not taste wine at all, teaching that one must not pour fire upon fire either in body or soul before they undertake to set out upon their toils, and must beware of the raving disposition of youth? And after this shall we not legislate that up to the age of thirty they will taste wine moderately, and that the young⁵⁴ will abstain entirely from drunkenness and heavy drinking? But when someone is entering the fourth decade, enjoying himself in the convivial gatherings⁵⁵ he will invoke the other gods, and above all Dionysos, to join in the initiation rite and play of the old, which he bestowed on men as an ally and medicine [the wine]⁵⁶

⁵³ Differently from England 1921, I: 312 I take αὐτοὺς of 2.666a2 as referring specifically to the elders, not to ‘all the singers’.

⁵⁴ Following England 1921, I: 313 ad loc. I take νέον in its inclusive meaning of ‘the opposite of γέρον’.

⁵⁵ The *syssitia* within the discursive frame of the *Laws*, are, remarkably, presented as part of a festival in honour of Dionysos: cf. Belfiore 1986: 434–6.

⁵⁶ I follow England 1921, I: 314 ad loc. in considering τὸν οἶνον of the manuscript tradition an interpolated gloss of the following φάρμακον.

against the dryness of old age, so that we may become young again and so that by forgetting our despondency the disposition of our soul may become, from harder, more soft and be thus more malleable, like iron when put into fire. If each were so disposed in his soul, will he not be more eager, and less ashamed, to sing songs and incantations, as we often have called them, in the presence not of many strangers but of a limited number of intimate acquaintances?

(Cleinius): Very much so.

At 1.648b1–2 wine – already described by the Athenian Stranger as a remedy against fear (φάρμακον φόβου 1.647e1) – is said to be the real ‘test’ (βάσανον: cf. also 1.649d9) for the true character of a person (cf. 2.6522–3 τὸ κατιδεῖν πῶς ἔχομεν τὰς φύσεις), especially as far ‘courage’ (ἀνδρεία) is concerned. Here rejuvenation through wine (2.666b6 ἀνηβᾶν) is troped as a renewed capacity and eagerness in the elders to sing and enchant (2.666c6 ᾄδειν τε καὶ . . . ἐπᾴδειν), a vicarious way of experiencing delight in a second youth that makes the state of their souls (2.666c1 τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος) become softer (2.666b7 γίγνεσθαι μαλακώτερον) and more pliable (2.666c2 εὐπλαστότερον), and hence susceptible of (re-)education just like the ‘tender souls of the young’ they have to enchant in their turn (2.664b2–3 ἐπᾴδειν . . . ἔτι νέαις οὔσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἀπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων). Although often unnoticed by commentators, it is remarkable that the positive ‘mollifying’ power of wine is here described in such a way as to be strongly reminiscent, in terms of diction and imagery, of the ‘positive’ effects to be gained by moderate use of the aulos, Dionysos’ archetypal musical instrument (ultimately to be banned from Callipolis: cf. *Resp.* 3.399d11–e5), in the *Republic* 3.411a10–b1.⁵⁷ There the first effect exercised by the ‘soft’ music of the aulos (*Resp.* 3.411a7–8 μαλακὰς . . . ἁρμονίας ~ *Laws* 666b7 μαλακώτερον) on a soul that is *thymoeidēs* is to soften it, like (heating) iron (*Resp.* 3.411a10 ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξεν ~ *Laws* 2.666b7–c2 μαλακώτερον . . . καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα

⁵⁷ On the use of the Phrygian harmony in Callipolis and Plato’s homage to some form of Dionysism, see above all Tartaglini 2001.

γιγνόμενον), and to make it malleable and useful instead of use-
less and rigid (*Resp.* 3.411a10–b1 καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξ ἀχρήστου καὶ
σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν ~ *Laws* 2.666b7–c1 γίγνεσθαι μαλακώτερον
ἐκ σκληροτέρου). In this sense Plato's revaluation of Dionysiac
chorality in the *Laws* finds already its first seeds in the
Republic.

But what is more interesting is the way in which at *Laws*
2.666a2–c7 Plato appropriates and reshapes the self-reflective
claim of the chorus (the Theban elders) in the second stasimon
of Euripides' *Heracles*: it is through the power of songs that a
renewed youth born out of excellence (ἀρετή) manifests itself
in old age. Notwithstanding their length, it is worth quoting
the two strophic pairs in full (ll. 637–700), especially because
of the compressed nature of the logical transition between the
first antistrophe and the second strophe.⁵⁸

ἀ νεότας μοι φίλον· ἄ- χθος δὲ τὸ γήρας αἰεὶ βαρύτερον Αἴτνας σκοπέλων ἐπὶ κρατὶ κεῖται, βλεφάρῳ σκοτεινὸν φᾶος ἐπικαλύψαν. μὴ μοι μήτ' Ἀσιήτιδος τυραννίδος ὄλβος εἶη, μὴ χρυσοῦ δώματα πλήρη τᾶς ἥβας ἀντιλαβεῖν, ἃ καλλίστα μὲν ἐν ὄλβῳ, καλλίστα δ' ἐν πενίᾳ. τὸ δὲ λυγρὸν φόνιόν τε γή- ρας μισῶ· κατὰ κυμάτων δ' ἔρροι μηδέποτ' ὥφελεν θνατῶν δώματα καὶ πόλεις ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰθέρ' αἰ- εὶ πτεροῖσι φορεῖσθαι.	[str. α	Youth is the thing I love. But age is a burden that always lies heavier than the crags of Aetna upon the head, and over my eye it casts a veil of darkness. May I not have the wealth of Asian potentates, nor houses filled with gold to take in the place of youth! Youth is the fairest thing in the midst of riches, fairest too in poverty. But grim and deadly old age I hate. Beneath the waves may it vanish! Would that it had never come to visit the house and cities of mortal men but were always being whirled along on the upper air!
εἰ δὲ θεοῖς ἦν ξύνεσις καὶ σοφία κατ' ἄνδρας, δίδυμον ἂν ἦβαν ἔφερον, φανερὸν χαρακτῆρ' ἀρετᾶς	[ant. α 655	If the gods had understanding and wisdom where men are concerned, a double youth would they win as a clear mark of goodness,

⁵⁸ Text and translation are after Kovacs 1998.

ὁσοῖσιν μέτα, καὶ θανόντες
εἰς αὐγὰς πάλιν ἀλίου
δισσοῦς ἂν ἔβαν διαύλους
ἅ δυσγένεια δ' ἀπλοῦν ἂν
εἶχε ζῶας βίοντον,
καὶ τῷ δ' ἂν τοὺς τε κακοὺς ἦν
γνώναι καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς,
ἴσον ἅτ' ἐν νεφέλαισιν ἅ-
στρων ναύταις ἀριθμὸς πέλει.
νῦν δ' οὐδεὶς ὅρος ἐκ θεῶν
χρηστοῖς οὐδὲ κακοῖς σαφής,
ἀλλ' εἰλισσόμενός τις αἰ-
ὼν πλοῦτον μόνον αὔξει.

660 they who were good, and when they died,
they would run back to the light of the sun
on the return leg of the course.
But the ignoble would have
but a single life's course to run,
and by this means one could tell
the bad from the good,
just as through the clouds
the sailor sees the throng of stars.
But as things stand, there is no reliable fixed mark
670 from the gods to judge the good and the bad,
but the course of a man's life as it whirls along
serves only to glorify his wealth.

οὐ παύσομαι τὰς Χάριτας
ταῖς Μούσαισιν συγκαταμει-
γνύς, ἡδίσταν συζυγίαν.
μὴ ζῶην μετ' ἄμουσίας,
αἰεὶ δ' ἐν στεφάνοισιν εἶην·
ἔτι τοι γέρων ἄοιδός
κελαδῶ Μναμοσύναν,
ἔτι τὰν Ἡρακλέους
καλλίνικον ἀεῖδω
παρά τε Βρόμιον οἰνοδόταν
παρά τε χέλυσ ἐπτατόνου
μολπᾶν καὶ Λίβυν αὐλόν.
οὐπῶ καταπαύσομεν
Μούσας, αἶ μ' ἐχόρευσαν.

[str.β I shall not cease mingling
the Graces and the Muses,
675 a union most sweet.
May I never live a Muse-less life!
Ever may I go garlanded!
Old singer that I am I still
sing the praise of Mnemosyne,
680 still hymn Heracles'
glorious victory
in company with Bacchus giver of wine,
in company with the song
of the seven-stringed tortoise shell and the Libyan pipe.
685 Never shall I check
the Muses who have made me dance!

παιᾶνα μὲν Δηλιάδες
<ναῶν> ὕμνοῦσ' ἀμφὶ πύλας
τὸν Λατοῦς εὐπαιδα γόνον,
εἰλίσσουσαι καλλίχοροι·
690 παιᾶνας δ' ἐπὶ σοῖς μελάθροισιν
κύκνος ὥς γέρων ἄοιδός
πολιᾶν ἐκ γενύων
κελαδήσω· τὸ γὰρ εὔ
τοῖς ὕμνοισιν ὑπάρχει·
695 Διὸς ὁ παῖς· τὰς δ' εὐγενίας
πλέον ὑπερβάλλων <ἀρετᾶ>
μοχθήσας τὸν ἄκμουν
θῆκεν βίοντον βροτοῖς
πέρσας δείματα θηρῶν.

[ant.β A paean about their temple gates
the maidens of Delos sing
to the fair son of Leto,
weaving their lovely dance steps.
And paeans about your house
I, an aged singer, swan-like
from my hoary throat
shall pour forth. For the power of right
is in my hymns.
He is the son of Zeus. But surpassing even this high birth
with his deeds of valor,
he has made peaceful by his struggles
the life of mortals
and overcome dread monsters.

Notwithstanding its seemingly meandering train of thought, the second stasimon of the *Heracles* exhibits a coherent thematic unity:⁵⁹ the opposition ‘praise of youth’/ ‘deprecation of old age’ takes in the first strophe the form of a priamel where youth is said to be the highest form of mortal good, even above material wealth (ll. 637–54). In the first antistrophe, the chorus fantasises that gods should bestow a second youth (l. 657 διδύμον... ἥβαν) on those who are good: this ‘renewed’ youth would be a visible mark of excellence (l. 659 φανερόν χαρακτηρ’ ἀρετᾶς) that would enable mortals to distinguish between good and bad men (ll. 655–72). The transition between the first antistrophe and the second strophe is fundamental to our understanding the structural and thematic unity of the stasimon: the chorus, while pragmatically recognizing the impossibility of a second youth (l. 669), grounds the possibility of distinguishing good men (their ἀρετή) from bad in its lifelong dedication, *through song*, to the Charites and the Muses (ll. 673–6).⁶⁰ They will be vicariously rejuvenated via their song: although ‘old singers’ (l. 678 γέρων ἀοιδός; cf. also l. 109),⁶¹ they will never cease to sing and dance (ll. 685–6 οὐπὼ καταπαύσομεν/ Μούσας αἶ μ’ ἐχόρευσαν) in the presence of Dionysos ‘giver of wine’ (l. 682 παρά τε Βρόμιον οἰνοδόταν), and to the accompaniment of both the lyre and the aulos (ll. 684–5 παρά τε χέλυσος ἐπτατόνου/ μολπὰν καὶ Λίβυν αὐλόν). In the immediately following lines (ll. 687–94), the chorus’ self-referentiality takes the form of choral projection: the Theban elders explicitly compare their present ‘epinician’ performance for Heracles to the paean of the Delian Maidens in honour of Apollo.⁶² The Dionysiac

⁵⁹ My reading of the ode is dependent on Parry 1965; cf. also Swift 2010: 129–31 for the epinician features disseminated in the second stasimon.

⁶⁰ Cf. Parry 1965: 371: ‘through the power of song, then, personified in the Muses and the Graces, the chorus of the *Heracles* resolves the problem posed in the second stanza of their ode, as to *how* the *arete* of good men may be manifested’ (authors’ emphasis).

⁶¹ The affinities between the chorus of elder Thebans in *Heracles* and the old Argives in the *Agamemnon* have long been noticed: see Wilamowitz 1909: 357–8 and Fraenkel 1950, II: 63–4.

⁶² Fundamental on the whole passage is Henrichs 1996.

music of the previous stanza finds its ideal mirror and counterpart in paeans in honour of Apollo at Delos. This projection should certainly have reminded the Athenian audience of the civic *theōria* with a chorus of male dancers regularly sent to Delos by Athens. Furthermore, Theophrastus' *On Drunkenness* (fr. 576 Fortenbaugh = fr. 119 Wimmer) attests to the fact that in Athens Apollo Delios was identified with the Apollo Pythios of the Thargelia,⁶³ and this joint worship well reflects the Thargelian influence on the choral contest held at the *Delia* under Athenian control.⁶⁴ Apollo Delios, in Athens, was thus strictly linked to the Delphic Apollo, the brother of Dionysos.

The thematic and verbal affinities of *Laws* 2.666a–c with the second stasimon of *Heracles* are startling.⁶⁵ In his attempt at integrating Dionysos' songs into Magnesia's social and religious organization, Plato has significantly echoed one of the few tragic passages in which Dionysos and Apollo, the aulos and the lyre (cf. *Resp.* 3.399d11–e5), are seen not as mutually exclusive but as harmoniously complementary and almost equivalent to each other.⁶⁶ That is to say, Dionysos and Apollo Delios/Pythios of the second stasimon of Euripides' *Heracles* are *already* 'fellow choreuts' (συγχορευταί), and this within the cultic landscape of the Athenian *polis*.⁶⁷ Plato's decision to echo this passage is all the more telling if we think that Euripides' *Heracles* as a whole is a play pervasively permeated by images of destructive Dionysian music, a tendency that has been related 'to a broader religious anxiety concerning a

⁶³ On the Athenian Thargelia in honour of Apollo Pythios and their conciliation of Dionysiac and Apollinean elements, see on Wilson 2007a. Matthaïou has made a strong case for identifying the Athenian Pythion with the temple of Apollo Delios: see Matthaïou 2003. For the close link between Apollo Pythios, Delios and Patroos at Athens see also Karila Cohen 2005: 224–35.

⁶⁴ See Wilson 2007a: 175–8.

⁶⁵ Cf. especially *Heracles* 646 τὰς ἡβας ἀντιλαβεῖν and 663 διδυμον ἄν ἡβαν ἔφερον ~ *Laws* 666b7 ὥστε ἀνηβᾶν ἡμᾶς; *Heracles* 682 παρὰ τε Βρόμιον οἶνοδόταν ~ *Laws* 666b4–6.

⁶⁶ See Wilson 1999/2000: 435.

⁶⁷ At 8.828a–835a the Athenian Stranger says that the Delphic Apollo must be considered the 'lawgiver' (νομοθέτης) of every kind of 'festivals' (ἐορταί), which include athletic and poetic/musical contests.

perceived inefficacy or irrelevance of traditional ritual forms – including most importantly musical forms’ (Wilson 1999/2000: 439). Within the plot of *Heracles* the second stasimon is but an ‘ode of premature rejoicing’, and as such only an illusory moment of peace before the ultimate disaster. By deliberately selecting this very passage in which Dionysos and Apollo are ‘fellow-celebrants’ (συγχορευταί just as in the foundational myth of the ‘birth of *choreia*’ in Magnesia), Plato is implicitly by-passing the musical heritage left by the New Dithyramb and its descendants. Magnesia’s third chorus of elders will ‘rescue’ Dionysos and his music (2.671a2–3 τὴν τῷ τοῦ Διονύσου χορῷ βοήθειαν) from both dramatic mimesis and New Musical intoxication by exploiting the cultic practices of contemporary Athens to bridge the gap between Dionysos and Apollo, tragic and lyric mimesis.⁶⁸

4.3 Magnesia’s *emmeleia(i)*

In §3.2 we have seen that the specific context in which the ‘tragedy claim’ by the Athenian Stranger takes place is a larger section (7.814d8–817e4) dedicated to those bodily movements that can be ‘correctly’ labelled as dance. At 7.814d8–e9 the Athenian Stranger distinguishes two forms of dance: one that imitates superior beautiful bodies moving in a solemn way (7.814e3–4 ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην) and a second that imitates uglier bodies behaving disgracefully (7.814e4 ἐπὶ τὸ φαῦλον). A further subdivision is then introduced: there are two kinds of ‘low’ dances,⁶⁹ and two kinds of ‘serious’ dances (7.814e5 τοῦ σπουδαίου δύο ἔτερα), the latter being namely the war-like dance – that is, the *pyrrhichē*⁷⁰ – and the eirenic dance

⁶⁸ On the ‘Apollinean’ Dionysos of the *Laws* cf. also Schefer 1996: 225–9, although I do not agree with her purely metaphorical interpretation of the *choreia* of the third chorus.

⁶⁹ For the *phaulon* types of dance, see §5.3.

⁷⁰ For a discussion of the role of the pyrrhic dance in the *Laws*, see Morrow 1960: 359–62. For the various functions of the pyrrhic dance in antiquity, see Ceccarelli 1998. Possible Athenian and more broadly Attic contexts for the *pyrrhichē* are examined by Ceccarelli 2004.

that consists in the motion of ‘a moderate soul experiencing a state of well-being and enjoying moderate pleasures’ (7.814e8–9 τὴν δ’ ἐν εὐπραγίαις τε οὔσης ψυχῆς σώφρονος ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε ἐμμέτροις). Within the category of the ‘eirenic’ dance the Athenian Stranger then goes on explaining that one should always consider whether or not the performer, in his dancing movements, keeps correctly to the beautiful dance ‘in a manner fitting well-governed citizens’ (7.815b4–6 θεωρητέον . . . εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ κατὰ φύσιν τις τῆς καλῆς ὀρχήσεως ἀντιλαμβάνόμενος ἐν χορείαις πρεπόντως εὐνόμων ἀνδρῶν διατελεῖ).⁷¹ This (the propriety of such movements for citizens living under good laws) is why a line should be drawn between ‘controversial’ (mainly Bacchic in character) and ‘uncontroversial’ dancing (7.815b7–c1 τὴν τοίνυν ἀμφισβητουμένην ὀρχησιν δεῖ πρῶτον χωρὶς τῆς ἀναμφισβητήτου διατεμεῖν).⁷² The object of the discussion by the Athenian stranger will then be only the ‘non disputed type’ of eirenic dance (7.815d3–4 νῦν ἐπὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν ἅμα καὶ εἰρηνικὸν (sc. γένος) ὡς ἀναμφισβητήτως ἡμέτερον ὄν ἐπανέναι).

In this section, I focus on the ways in which Plato’s careful handling of the generic status of the *emmeleia* as belonging to the ‘undisputed’ type of the eirenic dance may help us to understand his idiosyncratic revision of *tragic* dance (let us in fact here remind ourselves that at 7.817a2 the treatment of tragedy is introduced as part of the discourse on the *spoudaion* type of *choreia*). The passage about the ‘undisputed’ eirenic dance that interests us is 7.815d4–816c1:

τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπολέμου μουσῆς, ἐν ὀρχήσεσιν δὲ τοὺς τε θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν παῖδας τιμώντων, ἐν μὲν σύμπαν γίγνοιτ’ ἂν γένος ἐν δόξῃ τοῦ πράττειν εὖ γιγνόμενον. τοῦτο δὲ διχῇ διαίρομεν ἄν, τὸ μὲν ἐκ πόνων τινῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κινδύνων διαπεφευγόντων εἰς ἀγαθὰ, μείζους ἡδονὰς ἔχον, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀγαθῶν σωτηρίας οὔσης καὶ ἐπαύσης, πρᾶτορας τὰς ἡδονὰς κεκτημένον ἐκείνων.⁷³ ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις που πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τὰς κινήσεις τοῦ σώματος μειζόνων μὲν τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐσῶν μείζους, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἐλάττους κινεῖται,

⁷¹ For the complex syntax of this period, see England 1921, II: 302 ad loc.

⁷² For the various possible nuances of the expression οὐ πολιτικόν at 7.815d2 (said of various forms of Bacchic dances: either ‘not fitting to citizens’ or ‘outside the scope of legislation’), see Morrow 1960: 364–5.

⁷³ For the syntactical articulation of 7.815e1–4, see England 1921, II: 303–4 ad loc.

καὶ κοσμιώτερος μὲν ὢν πρὸς τε ἀνδρείαν μᾶλλον γεγυμνασμένος ἐλάττους αὖ, δειλὸς δὲ καὶ ἀγύμναστος γεγονῶς πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν μείζους καὶ σφοδροτέρας παρέχεται μεταβολὰς τῆς κινήσεως· ὅλως δὲ φθεγγόμενος, εἴτ' ἐν ᾧδαῖς εἴτ' ἐν λόγοις, ἡσυχίαν οὐ πάνυ δυνατὸς τῷ σώματι παρέχεσθαι πᾶς, διὸ μίμησις τῶν λεγομένων σχήμασι γενομένη τὴν ὀρχηστικὴν ἐξηργάσατο τέχνην σύμπασαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐμμελῶς ἡμῶν, ὁ δὲ πλημμελῶς ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι κινεῖται. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τοῖνυν ἄλλα ἡμῖν τῶν παλαιῶν ὀνομάτων ὥς εὖ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν κείμενα δεῖ διανοοῦμενον ἐπαινεῖν, τούτων δὲ ἐν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ὀρχήσεις τὰς τῶν εὖ πραττόντων, ὄντων τε⁷⁴ μετρίων αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, ὡς ὀρθῶς ἅμα καὶ μουσικῶς ὠνόμασεν ὅστις ποτ' ἦν, καὶ κατὰ λόγον αὐταῖς θέμενος ὄνομα συμπάσαις ἐμμελείας ἐπωνόμασε, καὶ δύο δὴ τῶν ὀρχήσεων τῶν καλῶν εἶδη κατεστήσατο, τὸ μὲν πολεμικὸν πυρρίχην, τὸ δὲ εἰρηνικὸν ἐμμελείαν, ἐκάτέρῳ τὸ πρέπον τε καὶ ἀρμόττον ἐπιθείς ὄνομα.

As for the non-warlike muse, in the case of men honouring the gods and the children of gods in their dances, it will form a single class of dancing characterized by a consciousness of well-being. This we should divide in two: one kind, which involves greater pleasures, proper to those who have escaped from certain toils and dangers towards good things; and a second kind, which involves milder pleasures than those, consisting in the preservation and augmentation of previous blessings. Under such circumstances every one moves his body more when his pleasures are greater, less when his pleasures are smaller; and he moves it less who is more orderly and better trained in courage, whereas he who is a coward and untrained in moderation, presents greater and more violent changes in his movements. Generally, no one who uses his voice in either songs or speeches can keep his body at all still. This imitation through gestures of what has been articulated by the voice gave rise to the art of dancing as a whole. In all these instances some of us move harmoniously whereas others in a non-harmonious way. As to many of the other ancient names we must consider that they are well assigned and according to nature and we must praise them; and one of these names, namely that concerning the dances of those who are doing well and are themselves moderate towards pleasures, how correctly and musically named them whoever he was who did it, and how rationally he called them all *emmeleiai* and established two types of beautiful dances, the war-like, called *pyrrhichē*, and the eirenic one called *emmeleia*, ascribing to each its appropriate and fitting name!

In this long digression, there are at least two features of the eirenic type of dance that are worth discussing. First, the

⁷⁴ With England 1921, II: 304 I accept the reading τε (LO and codex Voss.) rather than δέ (A).

unifying feature (7.815d6–7 ἐν μὲν σύμπαν γίγνοιτ' ἂν γένος) of the eirenic dance in its multiple forms is identified by the Athenian Stranger in the 'self-consciousness of doing well' (7.815d7 ἐν δόξῃ τοῦ πράττειν εὖ). This very closely recalls two important passages of Book 2 (2.656b4–5 and 2.657c3–7) in which the self-awareness of 'doing well' is said to stem precisely from the *pleasure* experienced while performing 'correctly'.⁷⁵ In particular in the latter passage, the 'correct' use of the playful dimension related to song and dance is said to bring about an identity between 'experiencing delight' (χαίρειν) and the self-consciousness of 'doing well' (οἶεσθαι εὖ πράττειν). This perception of 'well-being' while dancing and singing 'correctly' is both the cause and the effect of a certain kind of belief. This, as we know, is made possible only because in Magnesia choral performances are 'representations of character' (2.655d5 μιμήματα τρόπων ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς χορείας) and 'self-likening' (ὁμοιοῦσθαι) through mimesis must thus be limited to the artistic performance that possesses a 'resemblance to the imitation of the beautiful' (2.668b1–2 ἐκείνην τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμήματι).

A second remarkable aspect is what I shall call the 'restrictive' meaning that the Athenian Stranger seems to be willing to accept for *emmeleia* in the second part of our passage. At 7.816b4–6 we are just been told that the name of *emmeleia* has been bestowed rationally (κατὰ λόγον) to *all* the kinds of the aforementioned dances entailing moderate pleasures (ὡς ὀρθῶς ἅμα καὶ μουσικῶς . . . καὶ κατὰ λόγον αὐταῖς θέμενος ὄνομα συμπάσαις ἐμμελείας⁷⁶ ἐπωνόμασε). Yet, immediately after this wider

⁷⁵ 2.656b4–5 τότε ὁμοιοῦσθαι δέηπου ἀνάγκη τὸν χαίροντα ὁποτέρους ἂν χαίρῃ and 2.657c3–7 ἄρ οὖν θαρροῦντες λέγομεν τὴν τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τῇ παιδιᾷ μετὰ χορείας χρεῖαν ὀρθὴν εἶναι τοιῶδέ τινι τρόπῳ; χαίρομεν ὅταν οἴώμεθα εὖ πράττειν, καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρωμεν, οἴώμεθα εὖ πράττειν αὐτῶς; μὴ οὐχ οὕτως; On these passages, see above §3.3 with n. 91.

⁷⁶ At 7.816b6 I take ἐμμελείας as accusative *plural* after ἐπωνόμασε. The syntax of these lines is problematic, see England 1921, II: 304–5 ad loc. Either one takes ἐμμελείας as genitive qualifying ὄνομα, but (1) κατὰ λόγον and the previous ὠνόμασε seem to refer primarily to the act of naming as such, not of naming something 'x', and (2) the resulting word-order would be awkward; or, better, one must interpret ἐμμελείας as accusative plural after ἐπωνόμασε, as is the regular construction after

acknowledgment, the Athenian Stranger significantly restricts the application of the term *emmeleia* proper (in the singular, this time) only to the eirenic dance, inasmuch as this name is ‘proper and befitting’ (τὸ πρέπον τε καὶ ἄρμόττον ἐπιθεῖς ὄνομα). It seems thus likely that in the first half of the passage the Athenian Stranger is using *emmeleiai* (plural) in the broader sense of ‘harmonious/tuneful dancing’ as the etymology of the noun makes it obvious,⁷⁷ whereas the second time (7.816b6 *emmeleia* in the singular) he has in mind, or wants us to have in mind, something more narrow: *one* particular type of dance so-called. Given this rhetorical counter-manoeuvre, the main question seems then to be: how typical is this Platonic restriction of the meaning of *emmeleia*, and what resonances might this term have evoked for a contemporary fourth-century BC audience? Standard treatments of the term tell us that the equation of *emmeleia* with ‘tragic dance’ goes back to Aristoxenus of Tarentum (third century BC) and not before.⁷⁸ Yet, although it is certainly safe to assume that by Aristoxenus’ time the term *emmeleia*, in an orchestric context, meant primarily, if not uniquely, *the* ‘tragic way’ of dancing,⁷⁹ the earlier occurrences of the term are more interesting than Pickard-Cambridge, for instance, would allow.

Our earliest extant occurrence of the term is apparently in Aeschylus, as recorded in the entry of Hesychius ε 2367 Latte (= Aesch. *TrGF* 424a):

ἐμμέλεια· εἶδος ὀρχήσεως. καὶ Πλάτων (*Legg.* 7,816b) ἐπαινεῖ τὴν ὀρχήσιν, καὶ φησιν ἣ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέλους ὠνομάσθαι, ἣ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὰ μέλη γίνεσθαι. τραγικὴ δὲ

ἐπνομαζῶ, cf. *LSJ*⁹ s.v. ‘apply a word (accus.) as a name to a thing (dat.)’, cf. e.g. *Tim.* 60d, *Th.* 185c, *Pl.* 263c. It is also worth observing that the plural of ἐμμέλεια is quite rare: after Plato its first occurrence is in Dion. Hal. (1 BC) *Dem.* 48.54, 51.8 (said of the melodic contour of Demosthenes’ *lexis*).

⁷⁷ Cf. Koller 1965: 29–31 and Poltera 1997: 329 on the semantic development of the adjective ἐμμελής.

⁷⁸ See e.g. Pickard-Cambridge 1968: 253–4 and J. Jüthner, *RE* (1905) vol. 2, col. 2498 s.v. ἐμμέλεια.

⁷⁹ Cf. Aristox. fr. 103.7–8 (= Athen. 14.630c), 104.1–3 (= *Anecd. Gr.* ed. Bekker I 101, 17) and 106 Wehrli (= *Etymologicum Magnum* s.v. σίκιννις); cf. also fr. 109.3 Wehrli where *emmeleia* is defined as σπουδαία.

ἡ ὄρχησις. ἀκύρως (Bothe: †ἀργυρίοις† cod.) δὲ Αἰσχύλος ἀντὶ τοῦ σατυρική, ἣ ἔστι σίκιννις.

ἀκύρως Bothe: †ἀργυρίοις† cod.; Ἀργείοις Meursius, Hermann τοῦ σατυρική Musurus: τοῦ σατοιρική cod.: τῆς σατυρικής Bothe lacunam post ἀντὶ τοῦ multi suspicati: e.g. ἀντὶ τοῦ < > σατυρική δὲ ἔστι σίκιννις. Schoell

emmeleia: a type of dance. Also Plato approves of it and says that it is named either from the *melos* or from the fact that it is in tune. The dance is a tragic one. Aeschylus uses it improperly instead of the satiric dance, which is the *sikinnis*.

Unfortunately, the text of Hesychius' entry is heavily corrupt. If we accept Latte's text, we get a version according to which Aeschylus somewhere used 'improperly' (Bothe's ἀκύρως) the term *emmeleia* with reference to the satyr dance.⁸⁰ In this case the qualifier ἀκύρως, if Bothe's conjecture is right, might simply reflect a later exegetical stage of the tradition in which *emmeleia* had already been crystallized as the technical term for the tragic dance.⁸¹ On the other hand, if under the corrupted †ἀργυρίοις† of the manuscript tradition we try to recover the title of a play (e.g. Ἀργείοις) and posit a lacuna after ἀντὶ τοῦ, what we get is that Aeschylus did use the term *emmeleia* in either a satyr play or a tragedy (and then the exegesis goes on explaining that *sikinnis* is proper of the satyr play).⁸² Hesychius' entry might seem to suggest obliquely that Plato refers to *emmeleia* as a tragic dance, but this may just be the wishful thinking of Hesychius or his sources and it is equally possible to read Hesychius sentences as an agglomerate of different material. Ultimately Hesychius' entry remains problematic, and the exact nature of the use of the term *emmeleia* in Aeschylus is

⁸⁰ Sic for instance also Radt, who interprets *emmeleia* of fr. 424a as 'de saltatione satyrica dictum'.

⁸¹ Or, similarly, one might surmise that Aeschylus had his chorus use language that refers to a tragic kind of dance because the meaning really involved reference to tragedy (satyr plays are often interested in cross-generic references), but some dim-witted commentator is thinking as if a satyric chorus ought only to refer to that which is satyric, and therefore argues that Aeschylus has made a mistake.

⁸² Boeckh considered Aeschylus' *Argives* a satyr drama, Hermann inclined towards tragedy: cf. Hermann 1839: 207–8. Matthiessen 1966: 131 also favours a satyr play and conjectures Ἀργ<οἱ σατ>ύροις for the transmitted ἀργυρίοις.

subject of speculation. What can perhaps be said is that the entry gives the impression (but perhaps it is a false impression) that Aeschylus used *emmeleia* in already a ‘specialized’ way (be it satyr or tragic dancing).⁸³

The next occurrence of the term *emmeleia*, Hdt. 6.129 (the Athenian Hippocleides famously dances away his wedding, performing a sequence of more and more disgraceful dances in front of a disapproving Clisthenes of Sicyon) is, unfortunately, equally inconclusive.⁸⁴ More interesting are instead the Aristophanic occurrences of the word. The first passage is from the end of the *Wasps* (422 BC) when Philocleon, in his dancing frenzy, challenges Carcinus’ sons, themselves tragedians, ‘to dance well’ (1497–1504):

Φι. φέρε νυν, ἀνείπω κἀνταγωνιστὰς καλῶ.

εἴ τις τραγωδὸς φησιν ὀρχεῖσθαι καλῶς, 1498

ἐμοὶ διορχησόμενος ἐνθάδ’ εἰσίτω.

φησὶν τις, ἢ οὐδείς;

Ξα. εἴς γ’ ἐκείνοσ’ ἴσιν. 1500

Φι. τίς ὁ κακοδαίμων ἔστιν;

Ξα. υἱὸς Καρκίνου

ὁ μέστος.

⁸³ The suspicion unfortunately becomes deeper when we compare Aesch. *TrGF* 424a with Aesch. *TrGF* 78c**, col.2 l. 58 (= fr. 78c l. 94 Sommerstein) ξυνισθιμάζειν... ἐμμελέστατον (‘to join in the Isthmian games [it’s] most fitting’) of Aeschylus’ satyr drama *Theōroi* (to the best of my knowledge this connection has passed unnoticed). Dionysos is addressing the satyrs he was training for a dancing performance: they have betrayed him and want now to become athletes (ισθιμάζειν). It is difficult not to see some irony here: the satyrs have just treacherously left their ‘proper’ activity (dionysiac dancing as an act of worshipping) in the quest of self-betterment and declared their desire to become athletes (ισθιμάζειν), and Dionysos is mocking them, using for ‘most fitting’ a term heavily loaded musically, with reference to the ‘greater’ genre of tragedy (ἐμμελέστατον). Another technical term referring to dancing postures (σχήματα ὀρχήσεως) in the *Theōroi* is in *TrGF* 79 (σκώπευμα).

⁸⁴ Opinions widely differ as to the nature of the *emmeleia* danced to the aulos by Hippocleides: in favour of a proto-tragic dance, see e.g. Ceccarelli 1998: 15 n. 26; differently, How and Wells (1912) ad loc. take it to mean more generally ‘tuneful dance’.

ΦΙ. ἄλλ' οὗτός γε καταποθήσεται·

1502

ἄπολῳ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐμμελεία κονδύλου.

ἐν τῷ ῥυθμῷ γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστ'.

(Philocleon): Come now, let me make an announcement: I challenge all comers! Any tragic performer who claims to be a good dancer, come right up here and dance against me! Any one out there care to try? No one?

(Xanthias:) Only that one over there.

(Philocleon): Who is the unfortunate person?

(Xanthias): A son of Carcinus, the middle one.

(Philocleon): Him? He'll be beaten alive! I'll demolish him with a *pas de fist*! Rhythmically, he is nothing at all. (text and translation from Henderson 1998a: 411)

Pickard-Cambridge (1968: 253 n. 5) considers the term *emmeleia* at *Wasps* 1503 as a 'neutral' occurrence, yet the highly agonistic context and the overtly meta-theatrical implications of the final scene of *Wasps* (a 'dance-off' of comedy *versus* tragedy) are difficult to dismiss.⁸⁵ Whatever the exact dance figures performed by Philocleon in these lines,⁸⁶ the overall context strongly invites the spectator/reader to see in the metaphoric '*emmeleia* of fists' (ἐμμελεία κονδύλου) a specific reference to the 'tragic' way of dancing.⁸⁷

The second Aristophanic passage in question is *Frogs* 895–6 (405/4 BC). The chorus is exhorting Aeschylus and Euripides to do their best just before the actual agon:

καὶ μὴν ἡμεῖς ἐπιθυμοῦμεν

παρὰ σοφοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἀκοῦσαί

τινα λόγων ἐμμέλειαν.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ On the meta-literary character of the closing scene of *Wasps*, see Wright 2013: 223–5 and Biles 2011: 165–6.

⁸⁶ On the possible dancing movements performed by Philocleon in the orchestric agon, see Borthwick 1967 and MacCary 1979: 142–7.

⁸⁷ See in this direction, among others, Roos 1951: 141–3 and MacDowell 1971 ad loc.

⁸⁸ I adopt here the text of the mss tradition as printed by Dover 1992: for a defense of this textual arrangement see id. 1992: 305. Koch's emendation has been accepted by Wilson's *OCT* (cf. also Parker 1997: 492–3).

ἔπιτε δαΐαν ὁδόν.

896 ἐμμέλειαν mss: secl. Dindorf: τίνα λόγων, τίν' ἐμμελείας/ ἔπιτε κτλ. Koch

and now we are eager

to hear from two smart men

a real ballet of words.

Embark on the war-path!

(translation after Henderson 2002: 147)

Denniston, followed by Pickard-Cambridge, claimed that ‘a metaphor from the tragic dance certainly seems pointless. . . I believe that ἐμμέλειαν in the *Frogs* means either euphony in the literary sense or the melodious recitation of lines’, adducing as parallels the use of ἐμμέλεια by Dionysios of Halicarnassus with reference to the euphonic element of Demosthenes’ *lexis*.⁸⁹ Yet in more recent times, both Dover and Willi have persuasively defended the propriety of such a metaphor.⁹⁰ In these two last comic passages, given their specific para-tragic contexts (Philocleon’s tragic dance in the *Wasps* and the tragic *agōn* in the *Frogs*), Aristophanes is clearly playing with the *generic* expectation of the audience: this seems to suggest that already in the second half of the fifth century BC the term *emmeleia*, in a given context, could have had a specifically tragic reference.

With this in mind let us now turn back to Plato’s use of *emmeleia* in *Laws* 7.815d4–816c1. Immediately after this section, the Athenian Stranger moves on to treat *comedy* as representative of the φαῦλον γένος of dance (7.816d), after which we have the famous ‘tragedy-claim’. Given the surrounding context, it is difficult not to see in this section Plato’s attempt at

⁸⁹ Denniston 1927: 115–16 and Pickard-Cambridge 1968: 253.

⁹⁰ Dover 1992: 305 ‘λόγων ἐμμέλεια, “argument-dance”, is not inappropriate to a dispute between tragic poets etc.’; Willi 2003: 89–90 ‘a metaphor from the lively tragic dance *emmeleia* . . . is not “pointless” enough before the duel of the two tragic poets to override the principle that a technical meaning may be assumed only if a non-technical meaning is excluded’. Aristophanes uses the adjective ἐμμελέστερον in *Ecl.* 807, pointedly said of Antisthenes, most probably a well-known *chorēgos* of tragedy (Xen. *Mem.* 3.4.1–4): see Sommerstein 1998: 173 ad loc. (at *Ecl.* 808 Callimachus ὁ χοροδιδάσκαλος is mentioned).

reappropriating the ‘tragic’ *emmeleia* on his own, very different, terms. The ‘tragic’ or ‘supra-tragic’ *emmeleia* allowed in Magnesia will promote a sense of well-being and moderation: it will have its origin in the self-consciousness of doing well – that is, in an ethos opposed to the ‘ethos of lament’, the *thrēnōdes*, which feeds on the irrational part of the soul, and which Plato has repeatedly singled out in the *Republic* (and elsewhere) as the distinctive feature of *tragic mimesis*.⁹¹

4.4 *Euphēmia* versus *thrēnos*

Finally, I would like to turn to one more passage of the *Laws*, where reading Magnesia’s *choreia* against the background of Athenian contemporary dramatic practices may further our understanding of the ways in which the choral performances of the second-best city contribute to projecting a strong sense of civic purity and cohesion towards both the performers/spectators and the outside world. My test-case shall be the Athenian Stranger’s plea for a ‘euphemic’ chorus at 7.800c7–e3: how does this ‘ideal’ of a euphemic chorus bear upon choral practices (especially dramatic) of contemporary Athens?

After having praised the Egyptians for consecrating (7.799a4 καθιερωσαι) every form of dance and song and avoiding any novelty,⁹² the Athenian Stranger urges the Magnesians to do the same: ‘let no one voice (μηδεὶς . . . φθεγγέσθω) anything or make any dance movement (μηδ’ ἐν ὀρχήσει κινείσθω) that is

⁹¹ For τὸ θρηνώδες (‘the mournful mood’): (1) in relation to poetic mimesis (Homer and drama), see *Resp.* 3.387d1–10, 387e10–388b4 (no θρήνους τῶν ὀνομαστών ἀνδρῶν for the guardians: b4 κλαίοντά τε καὶ ὀδυρόμενον, b9 ὀδυρομένους), 388d7 (θρήνους ἂν ἔδοι καὶ ὀδυρούς); 3.395e1–2 (tragic mimesis: guardians should not imitate a woman when θρήνοις ἐχομένην); 10.606a3–b8 (dramatic mimesis release our watch over the mournful nature which is in us [ἀνίησιν τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνώδους]); (2) as the analogue to the public profile of the tyrant at *Resp.* 9.578a1–b2; and (3) as musical ethos at 3.398e1–2 and 3.411a8. For Plato’s critique of the *thrēnōdes* as an ‘emotional attitude . . . to a major and explicitly named performance genre, tragedy’, see Peponi 2012: 53–6; cf. also Swift 2010: 320–2.

⁹² On the ideological premises underlying Plato’s portrayal of Egyptian *mousikē* in the *Laws*, see Rutherford 2013 (esp. 77–83).

contrary to the public and sacred songs and the whole *chor-eia* of the young (παρὰ τὰ δημόσια μέλη τε καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν νέων σύμπασαν χορείαν) any more than against any other law' (7.800a4–7). To implement successfully this decree (7.800a3 δόγμα), the divine legislator must first 'shape with his speech' (7.800b7 πλάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ) some kind of 'moulds' (7.800b6 καθάπερ ἔκμαγεῖ ἄττα) that will set out the most important criteria.⁹³ The first requirement for the 'holy' songs of Magnesia's choruses is the observance of *euphēmia* (7.800e10–801a4): the 'ritually correct' utterance to propitiate the gods.⁹⁴ It is within this context that the Athenian Stranger voices the following criticism of the perverted sacrificial and choral practices of contemporary Greek cities (Athens in particular) within a broader censure of dirges or funeral lamentations (7.800c7–e9):⁹⁵

δημοσίᾳ γάρ τινα θυσίαν ὅταν ἀρχὴ τις θύσῃ, μετὰ ταῦτα χορὸς οὐχ εἷς ἀλλὰ πλῆθος χορῶν ἦκει, καὶ στάντες οὐ πόρρω τῶν βωμῶν ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτοὺς ἐνίοτε, πᾶσαν βλασφημίαν τῶν ἱερῶν καταχέουσιν, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ῥυθμοὶς καὶ γοωδεστάταις ἁρμονίαις συντείνοντες τὰς τῶν ἀκροωμένων ψυχάς, καὶ ὃς ἂν δακρῦσαι μάλιστα τὴν θύσασαν παραχρῆμα ποιήσῃ πόλιν, οὗτος τὰ νικητήρια φέρει. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν νόμον ἄρ' οὐκ ἀποψηφίζόμεθα; καὶ εἴ ποτ' ἄρα δεῖ τοιούτων οἴκτων γίγνεσθαι τοὺς πολίτας ἐπηκόους, ὅποταν ἡμέραι μὴ καθαραὶ τινες ἀλλὰ ἀποφοράδες ὦσιν, τότε ἦκειν δεόν ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον χοροὺς τινὰς ἔξωθεν μεμισθωμένους ὦδούς, οἷον οἱ περὶ τοὺς τελευτήσαντας μισθοῦμενοι Καρικῇ τινι μούσῃ προπέμπουσι [τοὺς τελευτήσαντας]⁹⁶; τοιοῦτόν που πρέπον ἂν εἴη καὶ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ὦδὰς γιγνώμενον, καὶ δὴ καὶ στολὴ γέ που ταῖς ἐπικηδεῖσις ὦδαῖς οὐ στέφανοι πρέποιεν ἂν οὐδ' ἐπίχρυσοι κόσμοι, πᾶν δὲ τοῦναντίον, ἵν' ὅτι τάχιστα περὶ αὐτῶν λέγων ἀπαλλάττωμαι. τὸ δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπανερωτῶ πάλιν, τῶν ἐκμαγείων ταῖς ὦδαῖς εἰ πρῶτον ἐν τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ἀρέσκον κείσθω.

⁹³ For the exchangeability of *ἐκμαγεῖα/νόμοι/τύποι* in this passage, see Schöpsdau 2003: 537.

⁹⁴ Cf. also 7.821d2–4: the citizens of Magnesia must not 'speak impiously' (βλασφημεῖν) about the gods but εὐφημεῖν δὲ αἰεὶ θύοντάς τε καὶ ἐν εὐχαῖς εὐχομένους εὐσεβῶς (here proficiency in cosmology is linked to *euphēmia* as the 'correct' attitude towards the divine). On *euphēmia* in prayers, see Pulleyn 1997: 184. For *euphēmia* as an ethos opposed to the *threnōdes*, see Tartaglini 2003: 323–4.

⁹⁵ On this latter aspect, see recently Bouvier 2008; for the prohibition of dirges in Callipolis, cf. *Resp.* 3.387d–388e and 10.605c–606e.

⁹⁶ For the athetesis of τοὺς τελευτήσαντας at the end of the sentence at 7.800e3, see England 1921, II: 263–4 ad loc.

Whenever a magistrate carries out some sacrifice in public, afterwards not one single chorus but indeed a crowd of choruses comes along and standing not far from the altars, but at times right beside them, pours every kind of blasphemy on the sacred offerings. They do that by stretching the souls of the listeners with words, rhythms and most mournful *harmoniai*. And whichever chorus makes the sacrificing city weep the most on the spot, this chorus carries off the prize of victory. Are we not going to vote against this custom? And if it is sometimes necessary for the citizens to hear such lamentations, whenever the days are impure and of ill-omen, then would it not be better that some choruses of singers hired from abroad should come instead, as is the case with the hired mourners who escort off the dead with their Carian muse? This kind of thing would presumably be fitting also for songs of such kind. And presumably crowns and golden ornaments would not be the suitable robes for these funeral songs but just the opposite – so that I can get rid of talking about this subject as soon as possible. About such an issue I ask ourselves again: are we pleased to lay this down first as one of our moulds for songs?

What kind of civic event is envisaged by the Athenian Stranger?⁹⁷ We are told that it is a public religious occasion at which multiple choruses stand by the altars and work up the souls of the citizens with the most sorrowful music and rhythms. It is also a *competitive* performance:⁹⁸ whichever chorus is most successful at making the sacrificing city weep will get ‘the prize’ (7.800d5 τὰ νικητήρια). Scholarly opinions have varied, but the insistence on the ‘crowd of choruses’ mentioned by the Athenian Stranger (πλῆθος χορῶν), and the mournful and soul-stirring character of their songs seems indeed to bear a direct reference to the Athenian institution of the dithyrambic and tragic choruses.⁹⁹ The prerequisite of every

⁹⁷ Folch 2013: 346–8 rightly observes that our passage offers a ‘portrayal of *polis* religion’.

⁹⁸ The competitive character of the performance does not seem to be seen as negative per se: Magnesia’s utopianism is highly agonistic and competition in virtue is one of its organizing principles, see §5.1.

⁹⁹ See Tartaglini 2003: 326–9 and Schöpsdau 2003: 538. Cf. already Taylor 1934: 184 n. 1. England 1921, II: 263 refers to *Resp.* 10.605d on the corrupting power of poetic mimesis even on the ‘best’ of us: Homer and tragedy are associated in their common indulgence to grief (πένθος) and lamentations (όδυρμοί). On the ban of the ‘mournful *harmoniai*’ (θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι) from the musical education of Callipolis, see esp. Tartaglini 2003: 326 and 329. On the effect that ‘mournful’ music produces on the soul of the listener, see also Pelosi 2010: 39–40.

song in Magnesia is to be a euphemic act of piety, that is, literally, ‘a prayer to the gods’ (7.801a6 εὐχὰς εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς¹⁰⁰) asking only for what is good (7.801a8–d6);¹⁰¹ these prayers will then be *hymns* to the gods (7.801e1–2 ὕμνοι θεῶν καὶ ἐγκώμια κεκοινωνημένα εὐχᾷς). As observed in §4.1, these passages have often been read as evidence for an early generic classification within lyric poetry, but are better interpreted as part of Plato’s contextual agenda. If Plato *wanted* a hymn to be, at least at Magnesia, a ‘sung prayer to the gods’, this has more to do with his particular project than with literary classification: the citizens of the ‘second-best’ city must spend their lives ‘in a dialogue with the gods by means of prayers and supplications’ (10.887e1–2 ὥς ὅτι μάλιστα οὖσιν θεοῖς εὐχαῖς προσδιαλεγόμενους καὶ ἱκετείαις) to preserve the purity of the civic ritual. Already in Book 2 (2.664c6–d1) in fact we have been told that the euphemic song *par excellence*, the paean,¹⁰² will be sung by the ‘second chorus’ of adult men invoking (ἐπικαλούμενος) Apollo as ‘Paean’ (‘Healer’), and beseeching (ἐπευχόμενος) the god to be gracious (ἱλεως) to the young and to show his benevolence through persuasion. On stage tragic choruses, differently from euphemic choruses, may at times, but not necessarily,¹⁰³ evoke a different set of associations and beliefs about the gods: *thrēnos* and paean (and to a lesser extent dithyramb and paean) are often merged into each other, partially perverting non-dramatic civic rituals.¹⁰⁴

Plato’s attack on the ‘politics of dirge’ enacted by tragedy and dithyramb seems to reflect a specifically fourth-century BC concern: the fact that tragedy was increasingly being perceived,

¹⁰⁰ Cf. also 7.801e1–2 and 3.700b1–2 καὶ τι ἦν εἶδος ὧδεῃς εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεοῦς, ὄνομα δὲ ὕμνοι ἐπικαλοῦντο.

¹⁰¹ This brings us back very closely to the passage on the eirenic dance at 7.815d7–e4 (§4.3).

¹⁰² For the strict link between paean and *euphēmia* in Greek cult and literary imagination, see Rutherford 2001: 53–5 (esp. 54 n. 69) and Stehle 2004: 129.

¹⁰³ Tragedy too can in fact recognize the traditional opposition paean/*thrēnos*, cf. e.g. Aesch. *Cho.* 342–3, Eur. *IT* 181–3.

¹⁰⁴ See Stehle 2004 (esp. 125–6); Rutherford 1995 and 2001: 118–21; for the perverted use of paean in tragedy cf. now also Swift 2010: 70ff. (esp. 102 on civic/tragic religion). For the latent tension between tragic and civic theology, see Parker 1997.

at least from some critical quarters, as less of a ‘civic celebration’ and more of ‘a role-based lamentation’.¹⁰⁵ Euripides’ tragedies were saturated with laments (choral and monodic), and the New Dithyramb contributed substantially to exacerbating the threnodic element of dramatic songs.¹⁰⁶ Later fourth-century BC reflection and theorizing on tragedy as a *genre* seem to emphasize this same aspect, though from a very different point of view and with a different agenda (the rescue of tragedy from Plato’s ‘moral’ criticism as an ‘organic’ literary product, with a neat cause-effect structure). When Aristotle says in his *Poetics* 1453a29–30 that Euripides is ‘the most tragic of the poets’ (τραγικώτατος), inasmuch as his tragedies show an overall preponderance of ‘sad-endings’,¹⁰⁷ he is certainly being prescriptive rather than descriptive, and in so doing he is erasing one of the most fascinating aspects of audience reception of the tragic genre, that is, its ambiguity and open-endedness. Yet Aristotle’s comment, normative as it may be, shows also how it may have been difficult to reconcile Euripides’ ‘poetics of sorrow’ with a more positive civic ethos that Athenian tragedies may after all promote.¹⁰⁸ According to the biographical tradition, the *Women of Aetna* was presented by Aeschylus to the settlers of the new colony as ‘an augury of a happy life’ (*Life of Aeschylus* 10.34 Radt: οἰωνιζόμενος βίον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς συνοικίζουσι τὴν πόλιν).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Wise 2008: 384. On the limits inherent in such an ‘Aristotelian’ view and its prescriptive nature, cf. Mastronarde 2010: 63–4.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Tartaglini 2003: 328 with n. 22. For the New Dithyramb one could compare what we know about Timotheus’ *Scylla* (793 *PMG*): cf. Arist. *Poet.* 1454a28–30 ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα . . . τοῦ δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἀρμόττοντος ὃ τε θρήνος <ὁ τοῦ> Ὀδυσσεύς ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ.

¹⁰⁷ For Aristotle’s use of τραγικώτατος at *Poet.* 1453a29 and the qualifications this term entails, see Halliwell 1996: 333–4 (and n. 4 at 348) and Mastronarde 2010: 58 and 63. For Euripides’ frequent sad-ending tragedies, cf. Arist. *Poet.* 1453a24–6; on which see Janko 1987: 104 ad loc.

¹⁰⁸ Wise 2008 construes a too rigid teleological model of development for the ethos of Greek tragedy and she is positively wrong in the emphases put on the fragmentations of tragic tetralogies in terms of history of transmission (see Hanink 2011): it would be more correct to say that ‘civic celebration’ was simply one of the ‘tragic’ possibilities encoded in the genre from its very beginning. For the ‘tragic muse’ *tout court* as muse of πένθος in its fourth-century BC reception, see Lada-Richards 2002 and Fantuzzi 2007.

Hence what must be avoided, in *Laws* 7.800c7–e9, is above all the psychagogic, persuasive force of the lament, a ‘tragic’ quality that we find very literally exploited in the address to the chorus by Darius’ *eidolon* in Aeschylus’ *Persians* ll. 686–8 ὑμεῖς δὲ θρηνεῖτ’ ἐγγύς ἐστῶτες τάφου, / καὶ ψυχαγωγοῖς ὀρθιάζοντες γόοις/ οἰκτρῶς καλεῖσθέ μ’ (‘and you standing by my tomb sing songs of grief and call on me piteously, shrieking with your laments that win men’s souls’): the laments performed by the chorus of elder Persians have the power to draw Darius’ ghost back from the underworld (ψυχαγωγοὶ γόοι). Some scholarship has read our passage of the *Laws* as evidence of Plato’s condemnation of the tragic muse on the basis of its *representative* content.¹⁰⁹ Yet it is worth pointing out that ‘words’ (7.800d3 ῥήμασι) are only the first element of a tricolon (ῥήμασι τε καὶ ῥυθμοῖς καὶ γωδεστάταις ἀρμονίαις) whose overall diction (the ‘tension’ worked up in the souls, the adjective γωδης) seems to suggest that what the Athenian Stranger has in mind is much more the aural effect produced by music *tout court* on the soul of the listeners (rather than just the notional content of its spoken component). If we read these lines together with what we are told about the Carian muse (7.800e1–7), it is clear that grieving for the dead is not what is forbidden: what must be avoided is not grief in itself but an excessive ‘aural’ expression of grief, and, even more particularly, the musical expression of grief involving citizens *as performers*: hence the relevance of the ‘imported’ Carian singers.¹¹⁰ This is clearly spelled out at 12.959e9–960a5, where we are told that a lawgiver who is also a statesman (τῷ δὲ πολιτικῷ νομοθετοῦντι) should take the following measures:

¹⁰⁹ E.g. Sauvé Meyer 2011: 391–2.

¹¹⁰ Formal *thrēnoi* are forbidden at Magnesia only for a specific class of ‘superior’ citizens, cf. 12.947b3–c1 on the ‘examiners’ (εὐθυνοὶ) – that is, ‘the magistrates of magistrates’ (ἄρχων ἀρχόντων): once they are dead, the exposition of their body, funeral procession and interment must be different from those of other citizens (12.947b4 διαφόρους εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν): a white robe will be worn and there shall be an absence of dirges and lamentations (12.947b5–6 θρήνων δὲ καὶ ὀδυρμῶν χωρὶς γίνεσθαι). Instead a chorus of fifteen girls and another of boys will sing in turn a praise song in form of a hymn (12.947b8–c1 οἶον ὕμνον πεποιημένον ἔπαινον) celebrating their εὐδαιμονία all the day long (εὐδαιμονίζοντας ὥδῃ).

δακρύειν μὲν τὸν τετελευτηκότα ἐπιτάττειν ἢ μὴ ἄμορφον, θρηνεῖν δὲ καὶ ἔξω τῆς οἰκίας φωνὴν ἐξαγγέλλειν ἀπαγορεύειν.

To command that there be tears or not for the deceased is unseemly, but be singing of dirges and the raising of the voice outdoors be forbidden.

This *assimilation* of the vocal manifestation of grief (θρηνωδία) to grief itself is already present in *Resp.* 10.604c5–d1: when facing misfortunes people ought to accept the way things have turned out just as they accept the fall of the dice, and then plan in the way that reason prescribes as best for them (10.604c5–8 περὶ τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ πράγματα, ὅπη ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἀνέχειν). What they should not do is to spend their time howling (10.604c9 ἐν τῷ βοᾷ διατρίβειν), holding to the part that has been hurt like children who have fallen over (10.604c8 καθάπερ παῖδας ἐχομένους τοῦ πληγέντος). On the contrary, they should always accustom their souls (10.604c9 αἰεὶ ἐθίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν) to curing and setting right the damaged and ill part as soon as possible (10.604c9–d1 ὅτι τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἰᾶσθαι τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ νοσήσαν), getting rid of the *thrēnōdia* with healing (10.604d1 ἱατρικῇ θρηνωδίαν ἀφανίζοντα). The vocal embodiment of grief (*thrēnōdia*) is seen here almost as a concomitant *source* of grief itself, rather than simply one of its manifestations. It is also interesting to observe that in this passage of the *Republic* the psychological profile of the ‘mournful mood’ is applied, within a simile, to the image of a *child* (10.604c8 καθάπερ παῖδας). Similarly at *Laws* 7.792a8–b2 the observation on the ‘mournful’ (*thrēnōdes*) nature of humans is prompted by a more general consideration on *infant* psychology and, if you like, physiology.¹¹¹ In fact, at 7.791e the Athenian Stranger has just been considering how to educate infants – that is, human beings who are not yet capable of understanding speech or any other form of education

¹¹¹ 7.792a8–b2 ὁ δὲ δύσκολος οὐδαμῶς τε ἴλεως ἄρ' οὐ δοκεῖ σφῶν θρηνώδης τε εἶναι καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πλήρης μάλλον ἢ χρεῶν ἔστιν τὸν ἀγαθόν; ('does not it seem to you that the person who is ill-humoured and not at all gracious is mournful and for the most part more filled with lamentations than a good man ought to be?').

(7.791e1–2 τὰ μήπω φωνῆς συνιέντα, μηδὲ παιδείας τῆς ἄλλης δυνατὰ γεύεσθαι πω): human newborn babies are given to cry and lament more than other species' offspring (7.791e4–7 φθέγγεσθαι που μετὰ βοῆς εὐθύς πᾶν εἴωθεν τὸ γενόμενον, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος· καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ κλάειν πρὸς τῇ βοῇ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων συνέχεται).¹¹² 'Tears and cry' (κλαυμοναὶ καὶ βοαί) are the natural manifestation of their immediate desires already at their most tender age. Tragic music, because of its overwhelming threnodic quality, for Plato, can be said to appeal to a state of *infancy* of the soul.

At 7.800c7–e9 dramatic choruses (tragic and dithyrambic) of contemporary Athens are thus virtually presented as 'unsuitable dirges' for performers who are first of all *citizens*: a criticism that clearly echoes Aeschylus' charge against Euripides of having indiscriminately drawn for inspiration on 'Karian aulos tunes, dirges and dances' in *Frogs* 1302–3 (Καρικῶν αὐλημάτων,/ θρήνων, χορειῶν).¹¹³ It is also notable that in our passage the Athenian Stranger emphasizes the *immediacy* of the psychological effect produced by dramatic choruses: the city will cry 'on the spot' (7.800d4–5 παραχρῆμα). In drama, song and dance are often envisaged as spontaneous, immediate reactions to events on stage: in particular the dirge is repeatedly presented as a 'self-taught', instinctive response to misfortunes. One of the most famous instances is Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 990–93:

τὸν δ' ἄνευ λύρας ὅμως ὕμνωδεῖ
θρήνον Ἐρινύος αὐτοδίδακτος ἔσωθεν
θυμός κτλ.

yet still within me my soul,
self-taught, sings out the Fury's
lyreless lament etc.

¹¹² '[I]t is usual for every creature which has been born, and especially in the case of the human race, to utter immediately a loud cry and indeed it is more given to weeping and crying than the others'.

¹¹³ See already England 1921, II: 263 ad loc. for the reference to the Aristophanic passage. For the 'politics of lamentation' in fifth-century Attic drama, cf. Swift 2010: 322–66.

The chorus of the Argive elders has just witnessed Agamemnon's homecoming, yet their *thymos* refuses to respond to the king's return with a joyful victory-song: instead their heart is 'self-taught' (αὐτοδίδακτος) in singing the *thrēnos* of the Erinyes. As dramatic, tragic performers, their instinctive nature is to sing a dirge. Likewise at *Sept.* 915–16 (ἄχάεις δόμων μάλ' αὐτούς/ προπέμπει δαικτῆρ/ γόος αὐτόστονος, αὐτοπήμων) the funeral lament (*goos*) is presented by the women of the chorus as 'a self-referential speech act' (αὐτόστονος: 'lamentig for oneself/ coinciding with wailing') and as a spontaneous, uncontrollable reaction to their sorrows (αὐτοπήμων: 'for one's own woes').¹¹⁴ Another famous instance can be found in the pseudo-Euripidean *Rhesus* at ll. 895–6 (ἰαλέμῳ αὐθιγενεῖ,/ τέκνον, σ' ὀλοφύρομαι, ὦ/ μητρός ἄλγος, κτλ.; 'with a spontaneous lament I weep for you, child, object of suffering for your mother'), where it is the (tragic) Muse itself as a character on stage that performs the dirge.¹¹⁵ This *fiction of spontaneity* is common not only to drama but also to choral lyric: one has only to think of the Μοῦσ' αὐθιγενῆς *topos*.¹¹⁶ Dance and song, the very same acts of worship, are often represented as an instantaneous prompting from within in response to the celebration, with the important difference (with respect to tragedy) that in choral lyric this 'spontaneity claim' highlights the joyful stimulus of the festival. In our passage of the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger is exposing this subterfuge/fiction of spontaneity of tragic songs by taking it over-literally and applying it without any intermediary stage to the emotional response of the audience, in a truly tragic fashion.

Most significant is also the equation of mournful songs and hired choruses of foreigners (7.800e1–2 χορούς τινας ἔξωθεν μεμισθωμένους ᾠδοῦς): Magnesia's civic purity must not be

¹¹⁴ Battezzato 2005: 162.

¹¹⁵ On the meta-literary implications of the Muse's dirge in the *Rhesus* as an allusion to tragedy's 'politics of dirge', see Fantuzzi 2007 (esp. 193–5).

¹¹⁶ See Bagordo 1995/1996 and Gelzer 1985.

‘contaminated’.¹¹⁷ The same policy of transferring the dangerous burden of ‘otherness’ to individuals who are outside the civic body of Magnesia will be adopted by the Athenian Stranger also with respect to comic performances allowed in the second-best city, the subject of the next chapter.

¹¹⁷ Interesting here is the parallel with comic performances at Magnesia: cf. 7.816e5–7 (only slaves and ξένοι ἐμμίσθοι will perform comedy); cf. §5.3.

COMEDY AND COMIC DISCOURSE IN MAGNESIA

So far we have examined how choral performances in the second-best city are the primary means to instill and nurture in the citizens' souls the desire to become a virtuous member of the community. This chapter addresses the reverse side of this utopian citizenship: the discursive practices that must *not* be enacted by a 'perfect citizen': comic performances, abusive language and the rhetoric of invective and verbal aggression.¹ We shall see that comedy in particular is presented by the Athenian Stranger as the (controlled) social space in which Magnesia's citizens can and must become vicariously acquainted, although only at a rational level, with a form of 'otherness' with respect to their collective identity. The citizens of the new Cretan colony will attend comic performances in order to acquire a rational apprehension of (aesthetically and morally) negative models of behaviour, avoiding the risk of becoming emotionally implicated in these very same acts (§§5.1, 5.3). This will also unveil another interesting feature of Magnesia's policy of control towards its own citizens: the necessity to supervise and exert control over the citizens' *modes* of speech. Comedy and 'comic' language will represent, within the erotics of citizenship, the negative blueprint of everything that has to be avoided by the new colonists, and this not only in terms of experiential and representational mimesis but also in terms of specific speech-acts of everyday life (§5.4). A detailed analysis of Plato's revisionist account, in the *Laws*, of comedy and its psychology of emotions will show that while this re-configured model of the 'comic' is coherently integrated into Plato's previous reflections on comic laughter

¹ For the civic role of comedy in Magnesia's social cosmos, see recently Folch 2013.

and ridicule,² it also draws extensively on rhetorical strategies of self-representation actively advertised by comedy itself.

5.1 Comedy and the law in Magnesia

Plato's engagement with comedy has a long and interesting history. According to the anonymous *Life of Aristophanes*, when Dionysios the tyrant of Syracuse wanted to learn 'the ways of the Athenians' public life' (τὴν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείαν), Plato answered by sending him Aristophanes' works and advising him to peruse them (τὰ δράματα αὐτοῦ ἀσκηθέντα).³ Anecdotal as this piece of evidence may be,⁴ it reflects Plato's long-standing concerns, in his dialogues, with laughter, and especially comic laughter, as a powerful social and political medium.⁵ In particular, Plato's uneasy relationship with comedy is one of the most intriguing aspects of what Monoson has called his 'democratic entanglements'.⁶ In classical Athens, comedy was a festival sponsored by the state and performed by citizens for the citizens themselves: with all its marked distortion of everyday reality, its appeal to 'free speech' (παρρησία)

² For the (prescriptive) notion of 'comic' as *non* coextensive with 'the laughable', both in Plato and Aristotle, see Held 1984: 163–4 (164 on the semantics of κωμικός and γελοῖος).

³ Ar. T 1 ll. 42–5 K-A (= *Prolegom. de com.* I, Ia, xxviii, ll. 45–9 Koster).

⁴ On its possible pro-Athenian origin, see Riginos 1976: 176. Riginos dates the anecdote as 'no later than the sixth century AD' (1976: 178).

⁵ The bibliography on the subject is endless; I quote here only what I have found most relevant for my argument. Comedy as a form of ritually institutionalised laughter: Halliwell 2008: 206–14, 2004, 1991a: 294–6 and 1991b; Rosen 2007: 27–32. On Plato and laughter: McCabe 2010, Halliwell 2008: 276–302, and 2002: 81–3, Rosen 2007: 255–62, Jouët-Pastré 2005 and 2006: 83–96, Rowe 1997, Steiner 1995, Mader 1977 (esp. 43–58 on comedy). On Plato's engagement with comedy as a competing 'civic' discourse: Nightingale 1995: 60–7, 172–92; on Plato's re-deployment of comic tropes of speech, see Brock 1990. On the alleged fondness of the historical Plato for Aristophanes, Epicharmus and Sophron, see Riginos 1976: 174–8.

⁶ Monoson 2000. Plato's overtly moral interpretation of comedy as a public, if not overtly political, vehicle of communication is, of course, determined by his own philosophical agenda. That is, Plato's response is only one of the possible audience responses to the complexities of Aristophanes' self-presentation as a 'civic voice' (see Silk 2000: 318). I share here the moderate scepticism expressed by Heath 1997 and Olson 2010 (esp. 60–9) on the unambiguous seriousness of comic discourse qua political discourse (versus Henderson 1990 and 1998b).

and ‘equality’ (ισότης) nevertheless contributed to the city’s identity as the archetypal democratic *polis*.⁷ Comedy, especially Aristophanic comedy, tends to present itself as a public ‘dispenser of blame and praise – a social critic that claims to speak the unvarnished truth’ (Nightingale 1995: 174).⁸ Although in a less prominent way, fourth-century BC Athenian comedy still retained a deep interest in contemporary political life and its satire.⁹ This model of self-presentation and advertisement by contemporary comedy poses obvious problems of authority and competition when transplanted into Magnesia’s network of communication. In the second-best city persuasion exercised through public utterances (be they speeches, songs or myths: 2.664a5–6) is indeed the primary form of *political* communication (2.664c1–2): the most powerful educative tool, according to the Athenian Stranger, is to make the very discourse of praise and blame, reward and censure the organizing principle of private and public life.¹⁰ Praise and blame, in the new Cretan colony, are viewed as exerting equal social power on their intended recipients. They must be ‘correctly bestowed through the laws’ (1.632a2 ψέγειν τε ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐπαινεῖν δι’ αὐτῶν τῶν νόμων). The voice of the law in Magnesia is a manifestation of the divine *nous* (12.957c5–6): ‘the writings of the law-giver’ (12.957d5 τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου γράμματα) must be the ‘clear touchstone’ (12.957d4–5 βάσανος... σαφής) of all other ‘public discourses’ (λόγοι) of praise and blame (ἐπαινοὶ καὶ ψόγοι) prompted by ‘emulation’ (φιλονικία), be they in verse or prose, written or oral (12.957d1–3). The discourse of the law will thus be like an ‘antidote to the other speeches’ (12.957d6 καθάπερ

⁷ See Carey 1994: 71; cf. also Goldhill 1991: 164.

⁸ On Plato’s appropriation of the democratic rhetoric of daring, frank-speech beneficial to the whole community, as attested in oratory and comedy, see Monoson 2000: 154–80, and van Raalte 2004: 305–9. On ‘bravery’ (ἀνδρεία) as ‘a metaphor for comic mockery and satire’ in Aristophanes, see Rosen 2007: 268 and Rosen and Sluiter 2004: 13–20.

⁹ I side with Csapo 2000 in emphasizing the continuity between Old and Middle Comedy; cf. also Halliwell 1991b: 64–5. For the caricature of Plato in fourth-century comedy, see Halliwell 2008: 286 n. 49 with bibliography.

¹⁰ Cf. e.g. *Laws* 2.663b–c, 6.773d, 6.784a–e, 7.801d–2d, 8.829c–d, 8.835a; see Morgan 2013 (esp. 272–3), Bertrand 1999: 259–62 and also Laks 2000: 270 and 289–90 (on preambles as ‘speeches of praise and blame’).

ἀλεξιφάρμακα τῶν ἄλλων λόγων), helping to ‘correct’ (ὀρθοῦν) the good judges and the city itself (12.957d 6–7).¹¹

Yet, given the limitedness of human nature and its compromising liaison with pleasure,¹² praise and blame are at times represented in the *Laws* as an educational tool more powerful than the law itself (and somehow *prior* to it as well): ‘... (after that) we must say that what makes each more obedient and well-disposed to the laws that will be laid down is not the law itself but praise and blame in their educative function (ἐπαινοῦς παιδεύων καὶ ψόγος)’ (5.730b5–7). It is the fiction of spontaneity that is such an integral element to the discourse of praise and blame that determines their enhanced educative value within Magnesia’s society.¹³ Magnesia’s utopianism is in fact highly agonistic: public praise and blame (for, among other activities, choral and athletic performances as well) are strongly encouraged within certain limits by the laws.¹⁴ Of course, collective performances may be competitive without fully disrupting social cohesion: if the prize to be won is a prize in civic excellence and communal ideals (5.731a2–3 φιλονικεῖτω δὲ ἡμῖν πᾶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀφθόνως ‘let everyone of us contend in virtue without envy’), the overall unity of a community may be thus reinforced. Yet the balance between ‘correct’ forms of blame, civic unity and the latent danger of individual ‘envy’ (φθόνος) is clearly a sensitive issue in Magnesia.¹⁵

How then do comedy and abusive language fit within Magnesia’s network of collective performances oriented to promote *and* at the same time enact civic virtue? To laugh at someone/something is at the same time an act that is socially inclusive and exclusive, depending on the expected allegiances between the agent/prompter of laughter, its recipient (audience)

¹¹ On this passage, see Nightingale 2013: 255–7, Bertrand 1999: 231–2.

¹² Cf. 5.732e4–33a5. On whether or not this formulation allows for some form of radical psychological hedonism, see Annas 1999: 137–45; for a different view, see Russell 2005: 166–7.

¹³ On 5.730e1–731a1 see Laks 2005: 142–5.

¹⁴ Cf. e.g. 7.801d–802d, 8.822e–823a, 8.829c–e, 8.835a. On public performances of *iambi* at 11.935e, see Rotstein 2010: 259–60.

¹⁵ This tension is analysed in detail by Morgan 2013, with specific attention to the ways in which Plato’s strategies of competitive praise are indebted to the epinician tradition.

and its object (the target of ridicule). In Old Comedy (and especially in Aristophanes), comic ridicule allows for an active form of co-operation and participation, on the part of the audience, in the actual performance.¹⁶ The comic author tends to construct an ‘ideology of exclusiveness’ for his implied audience: ‘[t]he poet addresses the spectators as if they belonged to his friends’ group, he appeals to their complicity’ (Zanetto 2001: 74). Thus, for example, in the *Acharnians* Dicaeopolis, ventriloquizing the poet’s voice, can appeal to ‘the spectators’ (497 ἄνδρες οἱ θεώμενοι) as ‘his own *philoî*’ (513 φίλοι γὰρ οἱ παρόντες ἐν λόγῳ).¹⁷ Like the iambic poet, Aristophanes tends ‘to present the comic performance as if it were addressed to a narrow circle of people’: comedy as public dispenser of blame (and praise) ‘particularly requires that the listeners be mentally close to the poet, that they be his friends’ (Zanetto 2001: 74, 75). This attitude strongly supports the view, advocated by Halliwell, that the comic audience, at least within the ritual frame of the City Dionysia, is ‘an audience psychologically implicated in the shamelessness of the event’.¹⁸ How can a citizen of Magnesia, either in his capacity as viewer or performer, come to terms beneficially with this psychological profile? What about the verbal vilification (κακηγορεῖν), mockery (κωμωδεῖν), foul language (αἰσχρολογεῖν) of comedy, what in sum a fifth-/fourth-century BC theatre-goer may have been expected to perceive as *the* ‘comic experience’?¹⁹

¹⁶ See Halliwell 2004: 137–41, 2008: 254, Slater 1999, Dobrov 1995 (esp. 79). According to Ruffell 2008, the self-reflexive stance of comedy helps to bridge (and not to enlarge) the gap, both emotionally and intellectually, between audience and performers.

¹⁷ On this expression, see Olson 2002: 205 ad loc. The semantic spectrum covered in ancient Greece by the word *philos/philía* is broader than the modern spectrum, applying to a vast range of human attitudes and relationships. For my purpose, let it suffice to point out the well-known fact that *philos* often refers to kith and kin and political allies rather than individual for whom one might feel affection.

¹⁸ Halliwell 2004: 137 (author’s italics); cf. also Halliwell 2008: 254. This of course does not exclude but indeed encourages the ‘comic loop whereby the audience is expected to laugh at a gibe against its own “shamefulness”’ (id. 2004: 138 with reference to *Clouds* 1096–104).

¹⁹ At *Resp.* 3.395e7–396a1 verbal abuse (κακηγορούντας), reciprocal mockery (τε καὶ κωμωδοῦντας ἀλλήλους) and use of obscene/foul language (καὶ αἰσχρολογούντας) ‘stand ... as a kind of synecdoche for comic drama’ (Halliwell 2004: 123 [= 2008:

5.2 The psychology of comic laughter in the *Republic* and the *Philebus*

Before tackling Plato's idiosyncratic response to these questions in the *Laws*, let us briefly survey some passages in which the philosopher has already addressed the moral and cognitive value of laughter, comic laughter included: (1) *Republic* 3.396d3–e1²⁰ and (2) *Philebus* 48a–50b. A unifying feature is that both in the *Republic* and in the *Philebus* the notion of 'comic ridicule' extends far beyond the world of the stage. Com(ed)ic laughter can be (and is) used as an exemplification of the broader psychological process activated by human response towards 'the laughable' (τὸ γελοῖον), but is never limited to it. The 'comic', like the 'tragic', is for Plato a universal concept, a modality of perceiving and being that is not limited to the dramatic world.²¹ Passage (i) (*Resp.* 3.396d3–e1) closely follows Socrates' exposure of the negative models of behaviour offered by comic mimesis at 3.395e5–396a7.²² The text of 3.396d3–e1 is the following:

ὅταν δὲ γίγνηται κατὰ τινα ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον, οὐκ ἐθελήσῃ σπουδῇ ἀπεικάζειν ἑαυτὸν τῷ χείρονι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα κατὰ βραχύ, ὅταν τι χρηστὸν ποιῇ, ἀλλ' αἰσχυνεῖσθαι, ἅμα μὲν ἀγύμναστος ὦν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δυσχεραίνων αὐτὸν ἐκμάττειν τε καὶ ἐνιστάναι εἰς τοὺς τῶν κακιόνων τύπους, ἀτιμάζων τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὅτι μὴ παιδίας χάριν.

When [the decent man] comes [i.e. in the course of his narrative]²³ to someone who is unworthy of him, he will not be willing to liken himself in earnest to that man who is his inferior, unless perhaps briefly when [the inferior character] is doing something good, but he will be ashamed, both because he is untrained in imitating such characters and because he resents shaping and fitting himself to the moulds of inferior people, despising it in his thoughts unless it is for the sake of play.

226]). For the persistence of invective, personal satire and abusive language well into the fourth century BC, see Halliwell 1991b: 64–5.

²⁰ Cf. also 10.606c.

²¹ This is routinely observed for the *Philebus* but, to the best of my knowledge, hardly so for the passages of the *Republic*: most telling is the second alternative at 10.606c8–9 ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμωδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀκούων ('at a comic performance or in private life'): cf. Halliwell 2008: 256 n. 97.

²² Halliwell 2004: 122 rightly qualifies that in 3.395e Plato's argument about mimetic 'imprinting' does not mean a condemnation of comedy per se.

²³ Cf. 3.396c6–7.

The focus of the whole section is mainly oriented to the psychology of the actor/performer, yet the scope of reflection is broader.²⁴ Several commentators have rightly noticed that this passage represents a conditional overture to comedy and have emphasized how the terms of the condition are best summed up in the expression παιδιδᾶς χάριν (that is, a decent man can imitate someone his inferior as long as it is ‘for play’s sake’).²⁵ Comedy’s self-consciousness of its ‘fictional status’ (παιδιδᾶ),²⁶ and the self-contained, ‘inconsequential’ dimension of comic mimesis²⁷ allow for ‘a marginal acknowledgment that role playing can sometimes be separated from psychological internalization’ (Halliwell 2002: 83). This is certainly true, and is surely part of what Plato meant. But there is also another equally important qualification to the (conditional) propriety of *some* forms of comic mimesis that has often passed unnoticed. This qualification is ὅταν τι χρηστὸν ποιῇ (‘when [the inferior character] is doing something good’) at 3.396d5–6. This is as close as Plato ever gets to acknowledging that an inferior/comic character may find itself, after all, doing ‘something good’ (χρηστὸν).²⁸ In Old Comedy the adjective χρηστός is almost a catchword for Aristophanes’ repeated claim, be it serious or not, that comedy is socially useful.²⁹ The ‘comic hero’ defines his identity by aligning himself with the χρηστοί (of which the audience is meant to be part) against the ‘morally bad’ (πονηροί).³⁰ It is thus hard to resist the temptation to see in the Platonic ὅταν τι χρηστὸν ποιῇ an

²⁴ Halliwell 2008: 226 n. 26 observes that παιδιδᾶ at 3.396e1 ‘need not refer exclusively to comedy, ... though comedy seems the most obvious outlet’.

²⁵ Cf. e.g. Heath 2013: 54, Rosen 2007: 258, Murray 1996: 178.

²⁶ For this rendering of παιδιδᾶς χάριν, see Halliwell 2002: 82 with n. 25.

²⁷ The accountability of comic laughter to legal curbs is a highly controversial subject. I side here with Halliwell in believing that Old Comedy enjoyed licensed performance conditions that removed the consequential effect of comic abuse that would have otherwise applied in everyday reality (see Halliwell 2008: 206–14, 243–63, 2004, 1991b). For a very different reading, see Sommerstein 2004 (with previous bibliography).

²⁸ On the value of χρηστὸν, see Giuliano 2005: 53.

²⁹ See e.g. *Ecl.* 583, *Ach.* 656–8, *Eq.* 1274–5 and *Ran.* 685–6 (cf. also 1420–1 and 1056 but with reference to tragedy).

³⁰ For the semantics of χρηστός vs πονηρός in Aristophanes, see Storey 2008: 130–2.

echo of the slogan so obsessively advertised by Aristophanic comedy: namely, that (his) comedy says what is χρηστόν for the citizens and the *polis*. Even in Callipolis then there is some qualified and cautious concession to comedy.

At *Philebus* 48a–50b the psychology of laughter, on and off the stage (50b2–3), is introduced as an instance of the ‘mixed pleasures’ of the soul, that is, pleasures inextricably linked to pain (47d5–9).³¹ The ‘laughable’ (γελοῖον) springs from the sense of ‘childish/playful resentment’ (49a8 παιδικὸς φθόνος) towards our ‘neighbours/friends’ (οἱ πέλας: 48b 11–12; φίλοι: 49d6, 49d11–e4, 50a5–7) who exhibit ‘self-ignorance’ (48c3 ἄγνοια)³² about the true state of affairs of their inner and outer qualities. In so doing they are ‘weak and unable to revenge themselves when laughed at’ (49b6–7 μεθ’ ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελῶμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι). Halliwell has perceptively observed that ‘the notion of comic characters as “friends” in the *Philebus*... points towards a sense... that at some level we are (partly) “on their side”, at least for the duration of the play’ (id. 2008: 301). What has not been observed is that the degree of implicit attraction that the spectator is supposed to feel towards comic characters (inasmuch as they are our *philoî*)³³ finds a fitting *comparandum* in the projected image of the comic audience as ‘friends’ that we have already found, for instance, at *Acharnians* 513.³⁴

The qualification of the ‘envy’ (φθόνος) experienced by the agent and beholder³⁵ of the comic situation as παιδικὸς is also interesting.³⁶ Its primary meaning may well be ‘playful’

³¹ On this most famous passage, see Halliwell 2008: 300–2, Delcomminette 2006: 440–8, Frede 1997: 281–95, Cerasuolo 1996.

³² ἄγνοια is Cornarius’ emendation: the reading of the mss is ἄνοια.

³³ This aspect has often puzzled modern interpreters. In particular the exact sense of *philoî* in the *Philebus* passage has been highly disputed. For a minimalist reading of *philoî* as ‘someone who is harmless with regard to ourselves’, see Delcomminette 2006: 445–6. Cf. also Frede 1997: 288.

³⁴ See §5.1.

³⁵ For an analysis of how the agent/prompter of laughter and the receiver of it (the spectator) tend to collapse into a single psychological profile from 49e9 onwards (esp. 50a5–7), see Cerasuolo 1996: 186.

³⁶ I am deeply grateful to Malcolm Schofield for an illuminating discussion on this issue.

inasmuch as ‘it conveys a form of amusement or pleasure’:³⁷ this is why τὸ γελοῖον is both a pain (λύπη) for the soul (as an expression of envy) but also a pleasure (ἡδονή). Yet παιδικός also conveys the dimension of παιδιά, ‘play’, as the ‘proper’, prescribed sphere of ‘the laughable’.³⁸ Feelings of envy that prompt laughter, although a mild version of *Schadenfreude*, are something ‘not taken in earnest’ not even by their own practitioners, so to speak.³⁹ Once again, in this passage of the *Philebus* there seems to be, on Plato’s part, a marginal acknowledgment of the self-contained, inconsequential nature of laughter directed towards innocuous friends. That Plato in this way erases *a priori* the possibility of thoroughly nasty laughter (comic laughter included) directed against ‘friends’, reveals the extent to which he offers here a prescriptive (and *not* descriptive) notion of ‘the laughable’ (and this even taking into consideration the archaic ethos of ‘helping your friends and harming your enemies’). Comic laughter has often been understood, by ancient and modern interpreters alike, as an outlet for ‘social’ envy (φθόνος).⁴⁰ Plato was doubtless aware of this aspect, but in the *Philebus* he has chosen to ‘introject’ the social dimension of this phenomenon into the individual soul ‘in communion with itself’ (47d8 αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῇ).⁴¹ And yet this critique of our enjoyment of ‘what is laughable’ (τὸ γελοῖον) does not lead to a straightforward condemnation of comedy: as observed by Frede, in the *Philebus* Plato’s ‘diagnosis leaves open the question whether we can do without them [that is, the mixed pleasures activated by tragedy and comedy] or whether the emotions created by the arts might not on occasion be quite therapeutic’ (Frede 1993: liii).⁴²

³⁷ See Delcomminette 2006: 443 n. 23. Frede translates it as ‘comic malice’ (Frede 1993: 57).

³⁸ Cf. before the expression παιδῖς χάριν at 3.396e1.

³⁹ Cf. also Benardete 1993: 205.

⁴⁰ For a survey of this topic, see Carey 1994: 73–4 and 82–3.

⁴¹ On the continuity of Plato’s reflections on laughter between *Philebus* and *Republic*, allowing for the different contexts and perspectives, see Halliwell 2008: 301.

⁴² Cf. also McCabe 2010: 201–3.

5.3 Comedy at Magnesia: the spectacle of otherness

What, then, is the answer of Magnesia's god-inspired lawgiver to the moral-cum-psychological problems raised by comedy? The first passage where the issue is directly tackled by the Athenian Stranger is 7.816d3–817a1:

τὰ δὲ τῶν αἰσχροῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ γέλωτος κωμωδήματα τετραμμένων, κατὰ λέξιν τε καὶ ᾧδην καὶ κατὰ ὄρχησιν καὶ κατὰ τὰ τοῦτων πάντων μιμήματα κεκωμωδημένα, ἀνάγκη μὲν θεάσασθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν· ἄνευ γὰρ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν, εἰ μέλλει τις φρόνιμος ἔσεσθαι, ποιεῖν δὲ οὐκ αὖ δυνατόν ἀμφοτέρα, εἴ τις αὖ μέλλει καὶ σμικρὸν ἀρετῆς μεθέξειν, ἀλλὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τούτων καὶ μαθάνειν αὐτὰ δεῖ, τοῦ μή ποτε δι' ἄγνοιαν δρᾶν ἢ λέγειν ὅσα γελοῖα, μηδὲν δέον, δούλοις δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ξένοις ἐμμίσητοις προστάττειν μιμεῖσθαι, σπουδὴν δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι μηδέποτε μὴδ' ἡντιοῦν, μηδέ τινα μαθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι φανερόν τῶν ἑλευθέρων, μήτε γυναῖκα μήτε ἄνδρα, καινὸν δὲ αἰεὶ τι περὶ αὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι τῶν μιμημάτων. ὅσα μὲν οὖν περὶ γέλωτᾶ ἐστὶν παίγνια, ἃ δὴ κωμωδίαν πάντες λέγομεν, οὕτως τῷ νόμῳ καὶ λόγῳ κείσθω· κτλ.

As to what pertains to the shameful bodies and thoughts and those who turn themselves to laughter-provoking comic performances⁴³ through speech, song, dance and the comic imitations of all these,⁴⁴ it is necessary to observe and get to know them. For, if someone is going to be one who has discernment, it is not possible for him to understand what is serious without what is laughable, nor to get a grasp that way of any of two opposites without the other. But it is not possible for someone to practise both things, if he is going to partake of even a small part of virtue, and indeed it is just for this very reason that he must learn the laughable, so that he may avoid ever doing or saying through ignorance what is laughable, if he does not have to. The imitation of such things must be imposed upon hired strangers and slaves⁴⁵ and there should never be any seriousness whatsoever about these things, nor should any free person, either woman or man, be seen learning [i.e. to practise] these things and something *kainon* must always be manifest in these imitations.⁴⁶ As far as laughter-provoking amusements, which we all call comedy, are concerned, let this be established by law and argument etc.

⁴³ I follow Schöpsdau 2003: 596 (with parallels) in understanding τῶν... τετραμμένων as masculine participle instead of neuter.

⁴⁴ I take τούτων πάντων as objective genitive of μιμήματα: see again Schöpsdau 2003: 596 for the text.

⁴⁵ For this reading of δούλοις... καὶ ξένοις ἐμμίσητοις, see §2.2.

⁴⁶ For περὶ αὐτὰ at 7.816e10 acting as descriptive genitive and closely linked to the ensuing μιμημάτων, see England 1921, II: 306 ad loc.

Before addressing its content in detail, it is worth noting that this discussion of the function of comedy in Magnesia takes place within a broader section (7.814d8–817e4) specifically devoted to dance (7.814d7–e2). The Athenian Stranger has just acknowledged the existence of two ‘forms’ of dance (7.814e2).⁴⁷ The first consists in the imitation of ‘beautiful bodies’ moving ‘in a solemn way’ (7.814e3–4), the other in the imitation of ‘shameful bodies engaged in low behaviour’ (7.814e4 τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχίωνων ἐπὶ τὸ φαῦλον).⁴⁸ It is as representative of this latter type of dance that comedy (together with other kinds of comic representations)⁴⁹ is introduced at 7.816d3ff.⁵⁰ This should not surprise us too much. We have already seen how in Magnesia social solidarity is mainly sought in rhythmic bodily agreement⁵¹ and harmonious, ordered rhythmicity is just what ‘comic’ dance does not seem to be able to offer, at least at face value. On a merely semantic level, if we look through Aristophanes’ language of dance,⁵² with the partial exception of the ‘cultic’ choral songs of *Frogs*, *Thesmophoriazusae* and *Lysistrata*, the vocabulary commonly employed (σκιρτάω, πηδάω, ἄλλομαι)⁵³ refers to spontaneous, uncontrolled movements that are not in keeping with Plato’s notion of well-ordered harmonious dance (τάξις).⁵⁴ In particular, if seen against this background, some passages of the *Laws* (2.653d7–654a3; 2.672c1–6; 2.673c9–d5; 7.790e8–791b1)⁵⁵ seem to re-deploy the ‘comic’

⁴⁷ See §3.1 and 4.3 for a fuller treatment of this section on dance.

⁴⁸ For their further subdivisions, see Schöpsdau 2003: 586–90.

⁴⁹ This inclusive aspect of the phrasing at 7.816d5–8 is clearly emphasized by Morrow 1960: 371–2.

⁵⁰ The ‘moral problem of comic dancing’ is acknowledged *en passant* by Wiles 2008: 386.

⁵¹ See §3.3–4.

⁵² An incomplete but nevertheless useful collection of passages in Aristophanes can be found in Delavaud-Roux 1997.

⁵³ See also Bierl 2001: 102 with n. 214. For σκιρτάω, cf. Ar. *Nub.* 1078, *Vesp.* 1305, *Plut.* 761, *Mnesilochus*, 4. 54–5 K-A; πηδάω: *Pax* 321ff. (esp. 324–5), *Vesp.* 1520, *Ran.* 1213, *Autocrates* 1.3 K-A, *Ophelio* 1 K-A; ἄλλομαι: *Ran.* 244, *Lys.* 82, *Vesp.* 1305. For dance in comedy as vehicle of mockery and abuse, cf. *Eq.* 696–7 (mothón), *Nub.* 1078, *Vesp.* 1305.

⁵⁴ For disorderly dance as manifestation of μανία in comedy: see e.g. Ar. *Vesp.* 1486, 1496, 603.2 K-A. Bierl 2001: 125 n. 37 is misleading on these passages.

⁵⁵ A subtle analysis of these passages in relation to *Phaedrus* 254d (the movements of the black horse) is provided by Belfiore 2006: 209–10.

language of dance to define disorderly body movements as a sign of human infancy.⁵⁶ The excitable, ‘mad’ natural disposition of children (2.672c4 μαίνεται, 2.666a7 ἐμμανῆ... ἔξιν) compels them to make disordered movements, to long to leap about and cry (2.653e1–4 τὰ μὲν ἀλλόμενα καὶ σκιρτῶντα, οἷον ὀρχούμενα μεθ’ ἡδονῆς καὶ προσπαίζοντα, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα πάσας φωνάς; 2.664e6 φθέγγοιτο δ’ αἰεὶ ἀτάκτως καὶ πηδῶ). The spontaneous, unrestrained postures of comic dance are for Plato, quite literally, a form of ‘psychological regression’. Magnesia’s ‘kinetics of virtue’ requires rhythmic order. Yet even so we do not find in the *Laws* a total condemnation of these spontaneous movements. As Belfiore (2006: 209–10) observes, ‘these tendencies of young children to move and cry out are far from being an ineradicable evil. They are a necessary condition for education, for they make it possible for children to learn to use their god-given perception of order and disorder as to move in rhythm and sing in harmony’.⁵⁷ The spontaneous, cheerfully disordered postures of comic dance are something to be tamed and educated rather than totally suppressed: they still express a potential for education.

But let us go back to 7.816d3–817a1. We have seen that Plato’s aetiology of dance at 7.816a3–6 represents the movements of the body as a natural extension of the voice. Its immediate consequence is that ‘bodily figures’ (σχήματα) are never ‘autonomous with reference to the content of the song’ (Peponi 2009: 59). Hence the easy shift of focus the Athenian Stranger can bring in almost immediately in his digression on comedy by extending his argument to *every* kind of comic representations ‘with regard to speech, song, and dance, and the comic imitations they all entail’ (7.816d6–8). What then is the actual content of this digression on laughter-provoking performances? In the reformed world of Magnesia its citizens must

⁵⁶ For comedy as a form of ‘psychological regression’ according to Plato, see *Laws* 2.658c–d (comedy most appeals to the young: for a collection of ancient sources referring to παῖδες as the ‘natural’ audience of comedy, see Halliwell 2008: 24 n. 57). For the link between laughter and youth in Greek culture, see Halliwell 1991a: 284–5 and 2008: 19–25.

⁵⁷ The most explicit passage in this respect is 2.672c5–d4.

observe (816d8 θεάσασθαι)⁵⁸ and get intellectually acquainted (γνωρίζειν) with them,⁵⁹ because the knowledge (816e1 μαθεῖν, 816e4 μανθάνειν) of what is ‘serious’ (σπουδαῖον) necessitates also the knowledge, but *not* the practice (cf. ποιεῖν at 7.816e2), of what is ‘laughable’ (γελοῖον).⁶⁰ Hired slaves (δοῦλοι) and strangers (ξένοι ξμισθοι) must then be ordered (προσάττειν) to be the *performers* of otherness at Magnesia: the integrity of the citizenry must not be polluted.⁶¹ And even in the case of performances enacted by slaves and strangers, any ‘seriousness’ (σπουδή) must be avoided: what we call comedy belongs to the dimension of ‘play’ (7.816e10 παίγνια) and its performances (μιμήματα) must always reveal something that is *καίνον*.

At least three aspects are most interesting here. First, the idea that comedy (and comic performances at large: 7.816e10 ὅσα μὲν οὖν περὶ γέλωτα) is a form of ‘play’ (παίγνια). Once again, as in the *Republic* and *Philebus*, we have a prescriptive notion of what ‘the laughable’ *should* be:⁶² it must be exercised and contained within the realm of what is ‘safely’ playful (and, therefore, not socially divisive) if it has to have any positive social effect on its recipients.⁶³ Old Comedy constantly exploits its dramatic ‘playful’ dimension by paradoxically exposing it, while at the same time claiming (more or less disingenuously) some seriousness of purpose.⁶⁴ Plato, on the other hand, has

⁵⁸ The metaphorical sense of the verb θεάσασθαι for ‘theoretical reflection’ is doubtless meant to evoke also the language of *theōria* as physical spectacle (something we should watch).

⁵⁹ For the citizens and not the lawgiver as the implied subject of θεάσασθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν at 7.816d8–9, see Morrow 1960: 373 n. 262.

⁶⁰ μανθάνοντα at 7.816e7–8 must refer to ‘learning how to enact’ the laughable, not to mere intellectual comprehension. For the contrast ‘intellectual knowledge’ versus ‘practice’ of bad behavioural models, cf. e.g. *Resp.* 3.396a4–6 and 3.408d–409e.

⁶¹ See Folch 2013: 354 on how ‘historical *comparanda* suggest that the Laws refines *extant* conventions of marginalizing noncitizens in performance’.

⁶² That the Athenian Stranger is striving here to give us a ‘persuasive definition’ of comic laughter is confirmed by his attempts to make pass his definition as generally and unproblematically shared: cf. 7.817a1 ἃ δὴ κωμῳδίαν πάντες λέγομεν.

⁶³ On comedy as ‘play’ in the *Laws*, see Jouët-Pastré 2006: 89 and 95, 2005: 48–9, 2000: 305–6. This aspect is explicitly restated at 11.935c7–936a5 (see below).

⁶⁴ Examples could be multiplied: cf. e.g. *Ran.* 389–90, *Plut.* 557, *Ach.* 655. For a survey of Aristophanic passages where the comic poet is presented as striving to speak out ‘what is just’ (τὰ δίκαια) on the behalf of its fellow-citizens, see Bakola 2008: 5 with nn. 18–19. On the purposively elusive and ambiguous nature of Old

no doubt that the only civically ‘useful’ form of comedy for Magnesia is that which abdicates *a priori* all ‘seriousness’, at least on the part of its author(s)/performers. What is more interesting is that this impermeable distinction between serious and playful, repeatedly advocated in Magnesia when it comes to comedy,⁶⁵ is potentially at variance with the otherwise pervasive notion, in the *Laws*, of ‘play’ as the most ‘serious’ and divine mode of existence.⁶⁶ In the *Laws*, ‘play’ is the most serious activity by means of which humans can assimilate themselves to the divine (7.803b3–c8): of ‘true’, ‘blessed seriousness’ only god is worthy (7.803c3–4 φύσει δὲ εἶναι θεὸν μὲν πάσης μακαρίου σπουδῆς ἄξιον). ‘Human’ forms of seriousness must be commensurable (7.803b7 σύμμετρον) to our limited mortal nature: the self-absorbed dimension of play is the ‘fitting medium’ (7.803b6 διὰ προσήκοντός τινος) through which human seriousness can be expressed.⁶⁷ It is by adopting this mode of being (playfulness) that ‘every man and woman must live out his/her life playing the most beautiful plays’ (7.803c6–8).⁶⁸ With the exception of comedy, in the *Laws* ‘play’ (παιδία) and ‘seriousness’ (σπουδή) are constantly presented by the Athenian Stranger as *false* alternatives: they are not only compatible and complementary but actually interchangeable modalities of being.⁶⁹ Comedy, as mirror of the ‘otherness’ with which to confront oneself, finds its place in the ‘second-best city’ at a very heavy cost: that of opening a breach into Magnesia’s theology of play.

A second interesting aspect, strictly linked to the distancing effect (from an audience perspective) implicit in the acknowledgment of ‘playfulness’ as the ‘proper’ sphere of comedy, is the split identity of performers versus spectators. We have already seen how the stability and cohesion of the social body in

Comedy’s advertised ‘seriousness’, see Silk 2000: 301–49 (esp. 311–2), Heath 1997 and Halliwell 2008: 211–4.

⁶⁵ Comedy as something distinct from other ‘serious’ forms of poetry: apart from the already mentioned 11.935c7–36a5, see also 7.819e8–9 and 8.838c3–6.

⁶⁶ Jouët-Pastré 2006: 91 (with n. 233) perceptibly undermines this tension.

⁶⁷ On this passage, see Jouët-Pastré 2006: 15–19. ⁶⁸ See also 7.803e1–2.

⁶⁹ Cf. 1.636c, 2.673a, 3.688b. See Jouët-Pastré 2006: 31 and 83–5; cf. also Ardley 1967. This of course is a contextually motivated idiosyncrasy of the *Laws*.

Magnesia finds its surest foundation in the identity of performers and spectators. The loop whereby citizens performing *qua* citizens are at the same time also the recipients of their own performance is temporarily suspended (only to be ultimately reinforced in its validity) by the introduction of slaves and strangers as actors of an otherness that must be rationally, but not emotionally, processed. This, as we have seen, is perhaps the most marked distortion, in terms of psychology of emotion, of what a comic audience was encouraged and repeatedly invited to experience at the theatre in Plato's time. So what kind of laughter, if any, does Magnesia's comedy envisage for its spectators? In the *Philebus*, where the psychological profile of the promoter (author/actor) of laughter and its recipient (spectator) are brought to overlap sensibly and merge into each other,⁷⁰ the natural result was the mixed pleasure of a laughter prompted by 'childish envy' (παιδικὸς φθόνος). In the *Laws*, by severing the psychology of performers (a body external to the city) and audience, Plato is able to purge comic laughter of the 'playful envy': the disposition of mind of the beholder towards the actor will be such that he/she will not be able to consider the ridiculed as his/her 'neighbour' or 'friend'.

In the *Philebus* (49d3–4), we are told by Socrates that 'to rejoice' (χαίρειν) at one's enemies' misfortunes (if we can call 'enemies' the representatives of bad moral behaviour) with laughter is neither 'unjust' (ἄδικον) nor 'resentful' (φθονερός) conduct, and as such not a pain for the soul of the good citizen. Hired slaves and strangers are physically and metaphorically considered as neutral vehicles of the 'enemy within': a dangerous otherness that can be kept under control only by avoiding contamination.⁷¹ The 'distancing' laughter that the citizens of Magnesia experience watching comic performances will morally absolve them from their potential complicity with the shameful of the event itself. Comedy is the social space

⁷⁰ The same tendency to blur any precise boundary between the psychology of the promoter and enjoyer of laughter can be seen also in *Resp.* 10.606c2ff.: see esp. Halliwell 1988: 149–50.

⁷¹ For the purely 'instrumental' role of the slaves in Magnesia's society, see Panno 2007: 183–6.

in which the citizenship as such can and must become vicariously acquainted with a form of alterity otherwise banned from the civic space. In this sense, the function of comedy in Magnesia is partially similar to that envisaged for the symposium (wine as a vehicle for personally experiencing otherness with respect to oneself), with the fundamental difference that citizens at the symposium are also the performers.⁷² This relationship, in Magnesia, between symposium and comedy as places, respectively, for experiencing otherness with respect to oneself and otherness with respect to a communal sense of shared identity, represents another significant distortion of comic rhetoric, where sympotic and komastic moments, with a varying degree of inclusiveness, tend to be fully integrated into comedy's triumphal narrative pattern.⁷³

Third, at 7.816e9–10 we are told that 'something *kainon* must always be manifest in comic imitations'. The phrasing of this line has often caused troubles to interpreters, and emendations of *καίνόν* have been proposed to save what has sounded like an unexpected and unmotivated afterthought.⁷⁴ Why should comic representations always exhibit something *kainon*? And what is the exact meaning of *καίνόν* δὲ αἰεί τι...φαίνεσθαι? The adjective *καίνόν* has usually been interpreted in two different ways: either in the sense that 'there ought always to be felt to be something unfamiliar and strange' about all comic representations or that such comic representations should be constantly *changed*, for fear that familiarity might give them too strong a hold on the public mind'.⁷⁵ The semantics of *kainos* allows, of course, for either possibilities, and if we look at the spreading of the word in a work so obsessively concerned with stability

⁷² On the relationship between symposium and comedy in Magnesia, see Jouët-Pastré 2005 and Panno 2007: 162–4.

⁷³ Aristophanic comedies often end with some kind of 'komastic' or 'sympotic' triumph (be it either wedding komos or epinician); symposium and komos often appear in a combined form in comedy: see Pütz 2007: 151. For the rhetoric of comic *nikē* in the *exodoi*, see Wilson 2007b.

⁷⁴ See e.g. Post's conjecture *ταπεινόν* 'humiliating' (Post 1939: 97).

⁷⁵ England 1921, II: 306. For the first interpretation, see e.g. Bertrand 1999: 365, Jouët-Pastré 2006: 89; 2005: 47–8, 2003: 305; For the latter, see e.g. Stallbaum 1859, II: 371, Morrow 1960: 373, Schöpsdau 2003: 119, Panno 2007: 49.

and negation of change, *καινο*-related word-formations usually carry a negative moral evaluation.⁷⁶

Yet the two possible interpretations mentioned earlier are not mutually exclusive. Something constantly changing in its nature necessarily becomes ‘unfamiliar’, ‘extraneous’ as a result of its precarious relation with us. In particular, with reference to the dominion of the arts, Egypt is repeatedly praised by the Athenian Stranger for having ‘sacralized’, and thus made unalterable, laws that do not allow for innovation (*καινοτομεῖν*).⁷⁷ Yet change leading to *improvement* is not totally banned in Magnesia (cf. 6.772c7–d4),⁷⁸ and there are occasions, isolated though they are, in which the positive nature of change is advocated. In particular, at 2.665c3–6 we are told that ‘the whole city’ (665c3–4 ὅλην τὴν πόλιν αὐτήν) must never cease to enchant itself with an incessantly changing variety of songs (2.665c5–6 ἀεὶ μεταβαλλόμενα καὶ πάντως παρεχόμενα ποικιλίαν), so that they can infuse in the singers an ‘insatiable eagerness for and pleasure in singing’ (2.665c6–7 ὥστε ἀπληστίαν εἶναι τινα τῶν ὕμνων... καὶ ἡδονήν).⁷⁹ The word *καινός* does not appear in this passage, yet the ‘variety’ and ‘changing nature’ of songs become a positive medium when linked to fostering a correct physiology of pain and pleasure. My contention is that at 7.816e9–10, Plato – by emphasizing that the comic representations must always exhibit some element of ‘novelty’ (*καινότης*) – is at the same time drawing on his own reflections on the physiology of pleasure and thus deliberately exploiting (or better exposing) a recognizably ‘comic’ rhetoric of speech. Various interpretations either as mere rhetorical exercise pointing to the existence of ‘a common pool or repertoire of comic material’ accessible to everyone,⁸⁰ or as vehicle of an ideological

⁷⁶ With the exception of those passages in which *καινο*-words refer to the ‘newly’ founded city of Magnesia (4.704b1, 5.735d6, 5.737b5, 6.754c8, 7.793c6, 7.813d4). A lexical search on the Irvine *TLG E* shows thirty-eight attestations of *καινός* in the *corpus Platonicum* and ten for *καινοτομ*-stem. Nineteen out of these forty-eight joint occurrences are in the *Laws* alone. On the ‘rhetoric’ of novelty with reference to song in ancient Greece, see D’Angour 2011: 184–206.

⁷⁷ 2.656e2, on which see Nightingale 1993. ⁷⁸ See Panno 2007: 276–9.

⁷⁹ Cf. §3.5. ⁸⁰ Heath 1990: 152.

avant-guard,⁸¹ the rhetoric of *kainotēs* and its self-reflexive character are some of the most conspicuous features of Old Comedy.⁸² Aristophanes in particular ‘regularly claims to be a comic innovator and does his best to shape his audience into one prepared to value comic innovation’ (Slater 1999: 359). The comic ‘seriousness’, both literary and ethical, of the poetics of *kainotēs* is indeed at best elusive and ambiguous:⁸³ yet it is a brand to which Aristophanes constantly returns, with more or less pronounced irony. The audience’s taste and propensity for innovative ‘originality’ is what Aristophanes constantly seeks to control in his parabases, where the comic poet presents his own persona as endorsing both ‘old’ traditional values and ‘new’ sophistic *kainotēs*.⁸⁴ There is no doubt that the self-fashioning of the comic persona around key-concepts like *καινότης* is deeply indebted to its obsessive relationship with tragic practice.⁸⁵ In particular, Aristophanes repeatedly tries ‘to negotiate and relate innovation and satire’ (Ruffell 2002: 148), with special emphasis on a satire that purports to be civically beneficial to the community.⁸⁶ Yet the poetics of comic ‘novelty’ has its own anxieties:⁸⁷ it is a double-edged weapon, inasmuch as it might turn out to be a device *distancing* the audience from the comic poet. Aristophanes is perfectly aware of this, but at the same time strives to use the rhetoric of innovation as a further element for drawing the audience to his side.⁸⁸ In the *Laws*, Plato exploits the inner ambiguity of the poetics of comic ‘novelty’ for his own pedagogic goals. The trumpeted ‘comic brand’ of *kainotēs* will be part of Magnesia’s

⁸¹ See e.g. Bakola 2008: 8–10, Ruffell 2002, Slater 1999: 364–5.

⁸² See Silk 2000: 45–54, Slater 1999, Sommerstein 1992, Bremer 1993. Sommerstein 1992 provides a thorough collection of passages from Old and Middle Comedy.

⁸³ Cf. the caveats of Wright 2013: n. 18 and Biles 2011: 162–3, 182–3.

⁸⁴ Bakola 2008: 8–10.

⁸⁵ See esp. *Thesm.* 1130–31, on which cf. Silk 2000: 48–54. For self-conscious *kainotēs* as part of Euripides’ self-definition, see McDermott 1991.

⁸⁶ Cf. *Vesp.* 1043–4 (cf. also 1051–4), *Nub.* 546–8, *Eccl.* 571–87.

⁸⁷ See Bremer 1993: 134–43.

⁸⁸ See *Ach.* 630–2 (the Athenian audience as instable in its tastes and ‘quick to change its mind’), *Eq.* 518 (the audience is prone by nature to change taste every year), *Vesp.* 1044–5 (the audience failed the poet by not being able to understand his ‘brand-new ideas’), *Eccl.* 583–87 (Praxagora worries about the tastes of the spectators: they may look down at novelty and prefer what is stale).

comedy, but at the same time will expose itself for what it is to the eye of the philosopher: the only ‘novelty’ possible will be one denouncing its own incompatibility with a true spirit of shared comradeship.

At Magnesia the reaction of the audience to a comic performance will be similar, if the exact opposite in terms of moral evaluation, to what the ‘motley crowd’ (παντοδαποὶ ἄνθρωποι) of *Resp.* 10.604e1–6 will experience when confronted with the imitation of a ‘prudent and restrained character’ (τὸ δὲ φρόνιμόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος). Such a mimesis will be for them the imitation of an ‘alien experience’ (10.604e5–6 ἀλλοτριῶν γὰρ πού πάθους ἡ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται),⁸⁹ something that is closely comparable to the sense of the *καινόν* conveyed by comic performances to Magnesia’s audience. In this respect, the function of comedy (and comic actors) in the second-best city is interestingly similar to that assigned to the *theōroi*.⁹⁰ Both are vehicles for introducing in Magnesia what is novel and different but this ‘otherness’ is allowed to intrude into Magnesia’s social body only to be ultimately rejected: the supremacy and excellence of Magnesia’s laws must always be reaffirmed.⁹¹ A passage that exhibits interesting affinities with Plato’s attitude towards the function of comedy in Magnesia is 12.951a5–b4:⁹²

ἂν τινες ἐπιθυμῶσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων πράγματα θεωρῆσαι κατὰ τινὰ πλείω σχολήν, ἀπειργέτω μηδεὶς τούτους νόμος. οὐτε γὰρ ἄπειρος οὔσα πόλις ἀνθρώπων κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν δύναται ἂν ποτε, ἀνομιλῆτος οὔσα, ἡμερος

⁸⁹ For ἀλλότριος meaning here ‘alien to themselves’ instead of ‘belonging to others’, see Halliwell 1988: 141.

⁹⁰ For a discussion of the institution of the *theōria* at Magnesia, see Panno 2007: 206–13, Nightingale 2004: 48 and 2005: 158–60. Magnesia will both send some of its own citizens as *theōroi* to other cities and receive *theōroi* from outside. For a brief but illuminating comparison between comedy and *theōria* in Magnesia, see Monoson 2000: 232 on 12.965c.

⁹¹ Cf. esp. 12.951a2–4: the citizens sent outside as *theōroi*, once they have come back (ἐλθόντες δὲ οἴκαδε), will teach the young (διδάξουσι τοὺς νέους) that the political institutions of other cities and countries (τὰ τῶν ἄλλων . . . νόμιμα τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας) are inferior to their own (δεύτερα). On the complex and ultimately unresolved tension between ‘the necessity of a term of comparison external to the *polis* and the will to assert always and anyway, to pre-empt criticism, the excellence of the laws of the fatherland’, see Panno 2007: 213.

⁹² This passage is not discussed by Monoson 2000. Panno 2007: 212 deals with it but not in relation to comedy.

ἰκανῶς εἶναι καὶ τέλος, οὐδ' αὖ τοὺς νόμους διαφυλάττειν ἄνευ τοῦ γνώμη λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον ἔθουσιν.

If some citizens desire to observe the affairs of other men at some greater leisure, let no law prevent them [sc. from doing so]. For a state that is without experience of bad and good men could never be able, isolated as it is, to be sufficiently civilized and perfect. Nor could it safely preserve its own laws without grasping intellectually [the nature of] such men and not only by habit.

The context is partly different, and both bad and good men are considered as worthy object of knowledge. Yet, if we allow for the difference of context, an underlying common line of thought emerges: in both passages it is intellectual, rational acquaintance with (among others) bad models of behaviour which is deemed necessary for the completeness and perfection of the ideal city (τέλεος).

These 'bad' models must be studied and observed (7.816e8 θεάσασθαι ~ 12.951a6 θεωρήσαι) but not emotionally or experientially absorbed.

5.4 Comedy at Magnesia: comic *mania* and bad speech

In Callipolis, the manipulation of language and state-censure extended to *both* the acts of speaking *and* listening: the speaker of false speeches (specifically about the gods) and those who listen are both equally subject to reproach and censure (*Resp.* 3.380b6–7). There is no such collapsing of the distinction between the two poles of the verbal exchange in Magnesia: its citizens not only can but must attend comic spectacles in order to acquire a rational apprehension of morally bad models of behaviour. This brings us close to another interesting feature of Magnesia's policy towards its own citizens: the necessity to exert control, quite literally, over citizens' *modes* of speech. Comedy must provide a negative foil showing what has to be avoided not only in terms of experiential and representational mimesis but also in terms of specific speech-acts. The second passage in the *Laws* in which the Athenian Stranger dwells at some length on comedy (11.935c7–936b2) is in fact framed within a broader reflection on the absolute necessity, in

Magnesia, of avoiding any form of improper, abusive and foul language.⁹³

This second passage is most interesting for various reasons and has already been the object of a thorough analysis with regard to what, for lack of a better word, I call the ‘licensed, fictional’ nature of comedy (that is, its being a form of *παίζειν* ‘without animosity’ [*ἄνευ θυμοῦ*]) and its role within Magnesia’s society.⁹⁴ In Magnesia, even if the status of ‘play’ is fully acknowledged for comedy, no form of ‘playfulness’ (*παίζειν*) – either with or without animosity – will be allowed if addressed against its *citizens* (II.935e5–6).⁹⁵ Those allowed to practise it (that is, the slaves and foreigners of 7.816d)⁹⁶ must do so by limiting the target of ridicule to themselves (II.936a3–4 *ποιεῖν ἐς ἀλλήλους*)⁹⁷ and by adopting a tone of mockery that must be ‘without animosity’ (*ἄνευ θυμοῦ*) and ‘playful’ (*μετὰ παιδιᾶς*) (II.936a4–5).⁹⁸ I would like instead to dwell on a different aspect of our passage: the larger frame informing the ways in which the comic character and poet are represented, with specific reference to their forms of expression.⁹⁹ I would also like to show how the psychological profile of the promoter/agent of comic abuse, as described in II.934c7–935b4, while finding significant resonances in Plato’s physiology of psychic vices, is also exploiting a well-identifiable comic trope, that of the ‘comic’ hero and/or poet as ‘madman’.

We have already observed that this second extended discussion of comedy and comic representations (comedy, iambi

⁹³ On *aischrology* as ‘a special kind of speech-act... not reducible to the status of its subject-matter’, see Halliwell 2004: 121 (= id. 2008: 224).

⁹⁴ For the text and the train of thought of this much discussed passage, see above all Saunders 1972: 116–7. For a historical contextualization of the legal measures proposed here by the Athenian Stranger, see Halliwell 1991b: 67–8 (and id. 2008: 24–5).

⁹⁵ For the exact meaning of *κωμωδεῖν* in this context, see Rotstein 2010: 324.

⁹⁶ For *πρότερον* of II.936a3 referring to 7.816dff. rather than to 8.829c (as, for instance, England does), see the detailed arguments of Saunders 1972: 117.

⁹⁷ For not punctuating with a comma after *ποιεῖν*, see again Saunders 1972: 117 ad loc.

⁹⁸ Cf. also II.936a6. Morgan 2008: 45–6 with n. 39 traces back this attitude to epinician tradition; for a fuller treatment, see now Morgan 2013: 275–7.

⁹⁹ The overlapping between the two roles is most explicit at II.935d3–4.

and lyrics: 11.935e3–4)¹⁰⁰ is part of a broader section on the necessity, at Magnesia, of avoiding any form of improper, abusive and foul language. In the second-best city, there must be only one law about verbal abuse (11.934e2–3 εἷς δὴ περὶ κακηγορίας ἔστω νόμος) and this must apply to everyone (περὶ πάντας): μηδένα κακηγορεῖτω μηδείς (11.934e3–4: ‘let us no one insult anyone’). ‘Irreverent speech’ (βλασφημία), ‘vituperation’ (κακηγορία), ‘abuse’ (λοιδορία) and ‘ridicule’ (κωμωδεῖν)¹⁰¹ are used throughout almost interchangeably to define the most representative speech acts of comic representations (comedy included).¹⁰² If we read this passage bearing in mind 7.816d–e, we are led to conclude that not only the content of comic representations must be, in itself, something inherently extraneous to the civic body of Magnesia (comic imitations must always exhibit something καινόν) but that also the comic language as *language* must be something alien for the citizens of the second-best city.¹⁰³ Here Plato anticipates Aristotle in a very literal way, so to speak:¹⁰⁴ vituperation (κακηγορία) and verbal insults (αἰσχρολογία) are *de facto* reduced to a verbal medium that coincides with a distinct socio-ethical category (slaves and strangers).

Again, this picture is clearly prescriptive and in no way a faithful reflection of what we know of ancient comedy: at

¹⁰⁰ ποιητῇ δὴ κωμωδίας ἢ τίνος ἰάμβων ἢ μουσῶν μελωδίας μὴ ἐξέστω κτλ. (‘a poet of comedy or of some any of the *iamboi* or of the Muses’ song must not be allowed...’). I take the phrase as a disjunction between three different literary genres, that is, comedy, *iambos* and *melos*; cf. Rotstein 2010: 240–7 for a detailed discussion of the passage and its textual difficulties.

¹⁰¹ βλασφημία: 11.934d8–e1; κακηγορία: 11.934e3–4, 11.934e6; λοιδορία: 11.935c3, 11.935c7, 11.935d2; κωμωδεῖν: 11.935d5, 11.935e6. It may be interesting to observe the absence of βωμολοχ- related formations. βωμολοχία with specific reference to the bad moral effects of ‘ridicule’ is mentioned at *Resp.* 10.606c5–7: the *Laws*’ obsession with religious purity (cf. e.g. the criticism against the perverted sacrificial and choral practices of contemporary Greek cities at 7.800c7–e3: a crowd standing not far from the altars, but at times right beside, pours every kind of blasphemy on the sacred offerings [πᾶσαν βλασφημίαν τῶν ἱερῶν καταχέουσιν]) may be part of this linguistic taboo.

¹⁰² For the poetics of ‘bad’ language in Aristophanes, see Storey 2008.

¹⁰³ Cf. Rotstein 2010: 320–5 with a perceptive discussion of the whole passage (esp. 323 [‘Plato’]... is not strictly concerned with false allegations as such, but with the use of abusive language for the sake of humour and derision’).

¹⁰⁴ For αἰσχρολογία as the archetypically servile form of speech, see Arist. *Politics* 1336a39–b12.

least as far as Aristophanes goes, ‘there is no clear evidence that the language of slaves differs in any systematic way from that of free persons of the same gender’ (Sommerstein 2009: 144). What is worthy of further consideration in this systematic alignment of good behaviour/good speech-acts (and, conversely, bad behaviour/bad speech acts) is its visible intersection with the ways in which the Pindaric epinician tradition thematizes the problem of moral badness and blame at the level of *expression*. As Morgan has observed, ‘the struggle between good and evil in Pindar plays out most insistently not in the realm of deeds but in the realm of words. His focus is on speech acts. . . . In the epinician world virtue often tends towards poetic virtue and vice towards poetic vice . . . – all characterize the good citizen as well as the good poet’.¹⁰⁵ In Magnesia’s world, actions count as much as words (and vice versa). Yet, to borrow once again Morgan’s words, we can see reflected in the background the same idea that ‘a continuum stretches between private, public, and poetic speech and these realms enjoy a reciprocal relationship’ (Morgan 2008: 55). Of course, the authorial voice has its own licenses: even if the practice of insulting must be avoided by citizens, at 11.935d2–3 we hear the Athenian Stranger directly engaged in his own *performance* of verbal abuse: ‘this [i.e. form of ridicule] we revile (τοῦτο λοιδοροῦμεν), when it entails animosity’ (ὁπόταν θυμῷ γιγνόμενον ᾖ). This form of performative utterance by the Athenian Stranger is not very different, in terms of rhetorical discourse, from what the chorus, in its authorial mood, states at *Knights* 1274–5 λοιδορῆσαι τοὺς πονηροὺς οὐδέν ἐστ’ ἐπίφθονον, / ἀλλὰ τιμὴ τοῖσι χρηστοῖσι, ὅστις εὖ λογίζεται (‘there is nothing invidious in insulting bad people, but rather is honourable for good people, if you think about it carefully’). This paradoxical rhetorical gesture by the Athenian Stranger nicely dovetails with the comic irony of an Aristophanes, who constantly accuses his rivals of vulgar jokes while doing just the same himself.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Morgan 2008: 55.

¹⁰⁶ For the historical Plato as a ‘iambic’, Archilochean satirist according to his own contemporaries, see the passages quoted by Worman 2008: 161–2. For Plato’s use

But let us go back to my second point and pay attention to the specific context within which the psychological profile of the promoter/agent of comic abuse is introduced at 11.934c7–935b4. This section of Book 11 of the *Laws* comes immediately after the exposition of the legal measures to be taken in the case of theft or violence (κλέπτων ἢ βιάζόμενος at 11.933e6; τῶν κλοπαίων τε καὶ βιαίων πάντων at 11.934c3–4) and before those concerning beggars (11.936b3–c7 πτωχοί). The broader frame is thus strictly legal: Book 11 contains what comes close to what we could call a full exposition of Plato's ideal penal code. Yet in Magnesia punishment, and especially state-sanctioned punishment, aims at reforming the wrongdoer by curing his/her soul's disease (νόσος), when it is curable.¹⁰⁷ The criminal's state of mind – that is, his predisposition to 'injustice' (ἀδικία) – is repeatedly treated as if it were a *disease* of the soul.¹⁰⁸ In Book 10 at 863a3–864a8, the Athenian Stranger identified three main causes leading to forms of 'psychic injustice':¹⁰⁹ 'anger' (θυμός: 10.863b3–4), 'pleasure' (ἡδονή: 10.863b6–9) and 'ignorance' (ἄγνοια: 10.863c).¹¹⁰ What is interesting in this pathography of vice is that crimes are classified according to the psychology of the offender. This is also the case for 11.934c7–935b4. We have already seen that the psychology of the promoter/agent of laughter of 11.935d–936b is subsumed within a broader category: that of a person who verbally abuses others. Yet what has passed unnoticed is that also the portrait of the 'verbal abuser' is only a subset, in its turn, of a larger psychological profile, that of the 'madman' (11.934c7: μαινόμενος).¹¹¹

of figures of speech of the iambic traditions and of the mood associated with the iambos, see Worman 2008: ch. 4.

¹⁰⁷ On Plato's medical penology in the *Laws*, see Saunders 1991 (esp. ch. 5), Lloyd 2003: 146–8 and Mackenzie 1981. Cf. also Stalley 1995 (arguing for a 'communicative theory' of punishment in Plato's *Laws*).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. e.g. 10.862c6–8 (about unjust injuries and gains): the cases that are curable (ἱατρά) we must cure (ἰασθαι) as if they were diseases of the soul (ὡς οὖσων ἐν ψυχῇ νόσων). On the whole passage, see Saunders 1991: 144–5.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Saunders 1991: 187.

¹¹⁰ See Saunders 1991: 145–7. For ἄγνοια denoting moral ignorance and not merely 'non-moral technical' ignorance, cf. Saunders 1991: 147–50 (versus Schöpsdau).

¹¹¹ Saunders 1991 and Mackenzie 1981 both neglect this aspect. Velardi's analysis of the language of μανία in Plato also omits 11.934d (Velardi 1989).

In fact, at 11.934c7 a new kind of psychic offender is introduced: the ‘madman’ (μαινόμενος).¹¹² The ritual purity of Magnesia requires that ‘if someone should be mad, he must not appear openly in the city’ (11.934c7 μαινόμενος δὲ ἂν τις ᾗ, μὴ φανερός ἔστω κατὰ πόλιν).¹¹³ His relatives must guard the person in their homes or, otherwise, pay a penalty proportionate to their census (11.934c8–d5). At this point we are told that there are many forms of madness (11.934d5–e3). The text is worth quoting in full:

μαίνονται μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ πολλοὺς τρόπους· οὓς μὲν νῦν εἴπομεν, ὑπὸ νόσων, εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ διὰ θυμοῦ κακὴν φύσιν ἅμα καὶ τροφὴν γενομένην, οἱ δὲ σμικρὰς ἔχθρας γενομένης, πολλὴν φωνὴν ἰέντες κακῶς ἀλλήλους βλασφημοῦντες λέγουσιν, οὐ πρέπον ἐν εὐνόμων πόλει γίγνεσθαι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς. εἷς δὲ περὶ κακηγορίας ἔστω νόμος περὶ πάντας ὅδε· μηδένα κακηγορεῖτω μηδεὶς.

Now many men are mad in many different ways. Those whom we just mentioned are mad because of diseases, but there are some who are such because of the bad nature of their temper and bad upbringing. When there is a minor quarrel they loudly abuse each other with slander and no such conduct is in any way or on any occasion becoming in a well-governed city. So let there be a single law for all about abusive talk: no one shall abuse anyone.

The connection between verbal abuse and madness is explicit: the person who pours abusive language over others with loud cries (πολλὴν φωνὴν ἰέντες) is nothing but a ‘madman’. His/her madness has a double cause: a bad natural disposition of temper (διὰ θυμοῦ κακὴν φύσιν) and a defective education (ἅμα καὶ τροφὴν γενομένην). Yielding to anger, he/she feeds his/her passion with bad food (11.935a4 ἐμπιμπλὰς ὀργὴν κακῶν ἐστιάματων). By making the part of his/her soul that had been tamed by education (11.935a5 ὑπὸ παιδείας ἡμερώθη) savage again (πάλιν ἐξαγριῶν), he/she becomes a beast living in ill-humour (11.935a6–7 θηριούμενος ἐν δυσκολίᾳ ζῶν γίγνεται). It seems to me hardly coincidental that this portrait of the ‘verbal

¹¹² As is well-known, in Plato’s works the term *μανία* covers a wide range of heterogeneous concepts, from that of vehicle of a higher, god-sent knowledge to that of physical disease: see e.g. Dodds 1968: 64–101, Velardi 1989. In this passage of the *Laws*, *μανία* is more narrowly conceived as a pathological behaviour determined by physiological and ethical-cum-social causes.

¹¹³ On this passage cf. Panno 2007: 95.

abuser' exhibits detailed verbal resonances with the portrait of the democratic populace, 'the Big Beast' (θέμμα μέγα τι καὶ ἰσχυρόν) shouting and indulging its rage at *Republic* 6.493a9–c8.¹¹⁴ The 'verbal abuser', its comic version included, is implicitly cast as the product of democracy: a further consonance with its comic counterpart. This passage of the *Laws* clearly identifies in the indulgence of the *thymos* and *orgē* the primary cause of this form of madness: the comic abuser is an ill-educated, foul-mouthed person who yields to his passions.¹¹⁵

This link between verbal abuse, madness and comedy is not, I believe, a chance element in Plato's thought, nor indeed is Plato's stance a unique one in this respect. In *Republic* 3.395e6–396a6 Socrates, immediately after describing the bad behavioural models proposed by comic mimesis (ἄνδρας κακοὺς . . . κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμωδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας),¹¹⁶ adds that Callipolis' guardians must not assimilate themselves to madmen either (3.396a3 οὐδὲ μαινομένοις ἕξιστέον ἀφομοιοῦν αὐτούς). The behaviour of mad and bad men/women must be rationally known but must not be the object of experiential mimesis (3.396a4–6 γνωστέον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μαινομένους καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας, ποιητέον δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων οὐδὲ μιμητέον). 'Tragic' madness is what commentators have usually thought of in relation to this passage.¹¹⁷ This may well be true, but it is worth noticing that the theme of madness is brought in as an *addendum* (3.396a2 οἶμαι δέ) to Socrates' criticism to comic mimesis specifically. It seems thus reductive to label madness here as only 'tragic' madness: comedy clearly plays an equal role as well.¹¹⁸ The prohibition of 'becoming mad' (μαίνεσθαι) or of 'assimilating themselves to madmen' (μαινομένοις ἀφομοιοῦσθαι) occurs again at 3.396b7–8,

¹¹⁴ On *Resp.* 6.493a9ff., see Rosen-Sluite 2004: 11–12.

¹¹⁵ For the mostly negative role played by the *thymos* within the psychology of the *Laws*, see now Sassi 2008. On the complex dynamics of *thymos*- and *orgē*-related emotions within the reforming punishment system of Plato's ideal city (both Callipolis and Magnesia), see Allen 2000: 251–7 and 277–81.

¹¹⁶ The shift from tragedy to comedy is already perceptible at 3.395e4 where the banned object of mimesis are 'female and male slaves doing what is proper of slaves'.

¹¹⁷ Cf. e.g. Adam 1902, I: 150 ad loc.

¹¹⁸ On 'comic' madness, see following discussion.

with reference to onomatopoeic mimesis and vocal mimicry (3.396b3–5: horses whinnying, bulls bellowing, rivers/sea flowing noisily, thunders thundering and so on). On the basis of a linguistic analysis, this passage (3.396b3–5) has usually been interpreted as referring mainly to tragic and Homeric onomatopoeic diction.¹¹⁹ Yet again this is disputable. In the wake of Stanford, Murray argues that *Il.* 12.51 (μόλα δὲ χρεμέτιζον ‘and [the horses] whinnied loudly’) is ‘the only occurrence of χρεμετίζω in Greek poetry before P[laton]’.¹²⁰ This is only partly correct: between Homer and Plato we find, if not χρεμετίζω, χρεμετισμός in Aristophanes *Knights* 552–3 χαλκοκρότων ἵππων κτύπος/ καὶ χρεμετισμός (‘the din and the whinnying of brazen-hooved horses’: a lyric, sung section – musical mimesis must have played a role here).¹²¹ Imitation of bellowing is found in comedy as well, and, more to the point, is strictly linked to ‘madness’: in *Wasps* 1488 (οἶον μυκτὴρ μυκᾶται ‘how the snout bellows’), Philocleon’s dance – one of the symptoms of his insanity (cf. 1486 μανίας ἀρχήν: ‘the onset of madness’) – is accompanied by snorting and bellowing. In *Frogs* 562 ‘bellowing like a bull’ (κάμυκάτο) is again a manifest sign of madness (564 μαίνεσθαι δοκῶν).¹²² The rushing noise of rivers and sea is evoked, for instance, at *Clouds* 283–4 (another lyric part). Furthermore, at *Knights* 522–3 one of the hallmarks of Magnes’ comic *ars* is that of being able to make his characters ‘vocalize... all kinds of sounds, strumming, flapping, singing Lydian, buzzing, dying himself green as a frog’ (πάσας δ’ ὑμῖν φωνὰς ἰεῖς καὶ ψάλλων καὶ πτερυγίζων/ καὶ λυδίζων καὶ ψηνίζων καὶ βαπτόμενος βατραχείοις).¹²³ Comedy, both in terms of

¹¹⁹ Cf. Stanford 1973 and Murray 1996: 176–8. In addition to the Homeric passages quoted by Stanford, Giuliano 2005: 37–8 interestingly observes that Plutarch in *De audiendis poetis* 17e–18e has in mind as referent not only Homer but also dramatic (tragic and comic) poetry: see the mention of Parmenon, a comic actor, at 18c.

¹²⁰ Murray 1996: 178.

¹²¹ Stanford 1973: 186 n. 6 records the Aristophanic occurrence but does not attribute any significance to it.

¹²² Bellowing like a bull is symptomatic of mental derangement in tragedy too: cf. Lyssa’s description of Heracles as a bull about to charge, bellowing frightfully (δεινὰ μυκᾶται) in Eur. *Heracles* 867–71.

¹²³ Henderson’s translation (1998a). For this reading of the passage, see Sommerstein 2001: 244.

onomatopoeic mimesis and vocal mimicry, is part of what is going on as much as is tragedy and Homer.

A most interesting passage, where the nexus *μανία*/disease/bad speech/bad political institutions resurfaces, is also *Timaeus* 86b–87c.¹²⁴ The context is, of course, markedly different: in the *Laws* the language of medicine and cure is applied to vice only at a figurative level, whereas in the *Timaeus* ‘vice is an effect of physical disorder; thus, “vice is disease” literally’ (Mackenzie 1981: 176).¹²⁵ In the *Timaeus*, all psychic illnesses as such are attributed to the condition of the body (86b1–2 τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν [that is, νοσήματα] διὰ σώματος ἔξιν τῇδε [sc. συμβαίνει]).¹²⁶ Folly (ἄνοια) must be considered a disease of the soul (νόσον μὲν δὴ ψυχῆς συγχωρητέον) and we can distinguish two ‘kinds’ (γένη) of folly: one is madness, the other is ignorance (τὸ μὲν μανίαν, τὸ δὲ ἀμαθίαν: 86b2–4), each deriving from excess of pleasure or pain (86b5–6). By contrast, at *Laws* I I.934d5–7 we have just seen that only *some* forms of madness are due to ‘physical’ illnesses (ὑπὸ νόσων), whereas others (such as verbal abuse) do not have a strictly physiological cause but are ascribable to *both* a bad natural disposition (διὰ θυμοῦ κακὴν φύσιν) and a defective upbringing (ἅμα καὶ τροφὴν γενομένην). Yet the position of the *Timaeus* is not totally incompatible with that of our passage.¹²⁷ At the end of the section concerning the diseases of the soul we find a telling acknowledgment, framed as an afterthought (cf. 87b8–9 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἄλλος λόγων ‘that, however, is another story’), that social and political

¹²⁴ For the legitimacy of studying the treatment of a given theme like psychic illness (*μανία*) across dialogues, see Gill 2000 (with Morgan’s response) and id. 2002: ‘localized’ readings (that is highly contextual-specific interpretations) are not incompatible with but complementary to ‘systematic’ readings as long as differences are not levelled.

¹²⁵ For the pathology of vice offered in the *Timaeus* as not incompatible with certain recurrent lines of Platonic thought, see Gill 2000.

¹²⁶ For this strong reading of the passage (*all* the diseases of the soul arise because of the condition of the body), see Gill 2000: 60 and Mackenzie 1981: 176 n. 54.

¹²⁷ Gill has persuasively demonstrated how the apparently bigger role Plato is willing to concede to the body in the *Timaeus* does not contradict Plato’s account of psychic illnesses in his other dialogues. What emerges from an integrated reading of the *Timaeus* ‘is not so much . . . that psychic illness derives from bodily defects, implying that we are, fundamentally, bodies, but rather that we are integrated combinations of psyche and body, and that sickness and health, body and psyche, depend on maintaining a proportionate relationship between them’ (Gill 2000: 69).

circumstances can contribute as well to madness and ignorance (87a7–b4).¹²⁸

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὅταν οὕτως κακῶς παγέντων πολιτεῖται κακαὶ καὶ λόγοι κατὰ πόλεις ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ λεχθῶσιν, ἔτι δὲ μαθήματα μηδαμῇ τούτων ἱατικά ἐκ νέων μανθάνηται, ταύτῃ κακοὶ πάντες οἱ κακοὶ διὰ δύο ἀκουσιώτατα γιγνόμεθαι αἰτιατέον μὲν τοὺς φυτεύοντας ἀεὶ τῶν φυτευομένων μᾶλλον καὶ τοὺς τρέφοντας τῶν τρεφομένων, προθυμητέον μὲν, ὅπῃ τις δύναται, καὶ διὰ τροφῆς καὶ δι' ἐπιτηδευμάτων μαθημάτων τε φυγεῖν μὲν κακίαν, τοῦναντίον δὲ ἐλεῖν.

Furthermore, when men whose natural constitution is badly fixed in this way have bad forms of government and bad civic speeches are uttered, both in public and in private, and when besides they cannot learn from their youth up any study that could cure this situation, all of us who become bad, become such most of all against our own will because of two reasons. Of this the begetters must always be considered responsible far more than the begotten and the educators far more than those who have been brought up. And one should try as much as he can to avoid badness and pursue the opposite both through upbringing and his pursuits and studies.

Bad political institutions (among which no doubt democracy must be implied) and bad speaking habits, both private and public, if not counterbalanced by a proper upbringing and education, also contribute to causing diseases of the soul. This is very close to what we find at *Tim.* 86e1–2: the ‘mad’ or ‘ignorant’ is such unwillingly, and should not be blamed as responsible for being as he is. He becomes bad (κακός) ‘because of some faulty condition of the body’ (διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἔξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος) and ‘an upbringing that does not educate’ (καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφήν). If we allow for the different notion of ‘health’ in the *Timaeus* (health as proportion between body and soul; illness as the disruption of such structure by the body),¹²⁹ this last passage (86e1–2) is very similar to the aetiology proposed at *Laws* I I.934d6–7 for the ‘verbal offender’: διὰ θυμοῦ κακὴν φύσιν ἅμα καὶ τροφήν γενομένην. Both in the *Laws* and in the *Timaeus* we find a similar aetiology of insanity: it is a form of ‘illness’ (even if not directly a physical one in the *Laws*) attributed to *both*

¹²⁸ On this passage as ‘compound[ing] the effect of ‘bad’ physical constitutions... rather than as being an independent source of psychic disease’, see Gill 2000: 61 with n. 10. Cf. also Lloyd 2003: 156–7.

¹²⁹ On the soul-body interaction in the *Timaeus*, see Johansen 2000 (esp. 107–9).

physiological *and* environmental conditions.¹³⁰ Plato's socio-physiology of the 'verbal offender' as *μαινόμενος* in the *Laws* thus has deep roots in Plato's thought.

But this is only one aspect of the question. If the Athenian Stranger's analysis of comic verbal abuse in the *Laws* is compatible with and fully integrated into Plato's broader psychological reflections, his portrait of the *μαινόμενος* also exhibits a conscious allusion to a clearly identifiable comic trope, that of the 'comic' hero and/or poet as 'madman'.¹³¹ If we limit ourselves to Aristophanes, we can see that the 'comic hero' before, during or after the conception and implementation of the 'Great Idea', is often cast as a madman. In the initial scene of *Peace* one of Trygaeus' slaves explains to the audience that his master 'is mad in a new kind of way' (54 *μαίνεται καινόν τρόπον*): he wants to go up to heaven to persuade Zeus to stop the war.¹³² His madness is of an altogether new type (55 *οὐχ ὄνπερ ὑμεῖς, ἀλλ' ἕτερον καινόν τρόπον*): it manifests itself in his spending the days looking up at the heaven and verbally *reviling* Zeus (56–8 *δι' ἡμέρας γὰρ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν βλέπων / ὥδι κεχηνῶς λοιδορεῖται τῷ Διὶ / καὶ φησιν κτλ.*). Trygaeus' delusion (65 *τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα τῶν μανιῶν*) has been caused by an excess of his *χολή*. Madness, verbal abuse, choleric temper is exactly the nexus of associations we find in our passage of the *Laws*.

Similarly, in the *Wasps* Philocleon too is presented from the prologue onwards as affected by a strange illness (71 *νόσον γὰρ ὁ πατήρ ἀλλόκοτον αὐτοῦ νοσεῖ*)¹³³ that turns out to be a *μανία* (743–4 *οἷς τότε ἐπεμαίνεται*). His 'cure' from his obsession with law courts will be in the end another form of madness as well (cf. 1486 *μανίας ἀρχή*, 1496 *μανικὰ πράγματα*).¹³⁴ In the prologue of *Birds*, Euelpides and Peisetaerus present

¹³⁰ See Casertano 1984: 27–8 (but he omits *θυμοῦ* in quoting 11.934d6–7).

¹³¹ See the seminal article by Harvey 1971. Of course, the 'madness' of the comic hero and/or poet is exploited by Aristophanes for its comic potential of laughter and subversion; Plato's literal re-semanticization of the comic trope is part of his own philosophical agenda.

¹³² Cf. also 90 *ὡς παραπαταῖς* ('how deranged you are') and 95 *τί μάτην οὐχ ὑγιαίνεις*; ('why are you mad ineffectively?').

¹³³ Cf. also ll. 76, 80, 87, 114.

¹³⁴ Cf. recently Ruffell 2002: 162 on Philocleon's madness. See also Sidwell 1990.

themselves to the Athenian audience as ‘ill’ (30–31 ἡμεῖς γὰρ, ὦνδρες οἱ παρόντες ἐν λόγῳ, / νόσον νοσοῦμεν). Their illness is their desire to escape from Athens (32–8). Subsequently, when Peisetaerus comes up with his Great Idea, the coryphaeus refers to his plan of unspeakable prosperity as if it were the plan of a madman (427 πότερα μαινόμενος;). In *Wealth*, Carion complains about the deranged mental state of his master Chremylus (2 παραφρονοῦντος δεσπότης, 12 μελαγχολῶντ’...τὸν δεσπότην), and this already before his master conceives his utopian plot to cure Wealth from blindness.¹³⁵ Doubtless, behind this ‘mania/sickness’ motif there is a blatant, parodic appropriation by Aristophanic comedy of what was perceived as the archetypically ‘tragic’ theme.¹³⁶ Comedy has its madmen too. But there is more than that. In his *Pytine*, Cratinus used his trumpeted intoxicated mania ‘as the vehicle for self-defence as a political comedian’ (Ruffell 2002: 162) according to a well-established iambic cliché of the satirical poet as a madman.¹³⁷ Plato’s psychological assimilation of the comic poet/actor to a ‘madman’ under the broader category of ‘psychic offender’ is another exposure of the inadequate moral basis of abusive comic ridicule: Aristophanes’ Heracleian passion (*Wasps* 1030 Ἡρακλέους ὀργὴν τιν’ ἔχων) has a dark side too¹³⁸ and is taken by Plato for what it really is: the illness of a deranged soul. Comedy, with all its deficiencies in terms of experiential and representational mimesis, will be allowed in Magnesia but only as a ‘negative foil’ illustrating what a ‘perfect citizen’ should *not* do. Plato’s revisionist approach to comedy and its psychology of emotion will transform this dramatic ‘unideal’ genre¹³⁹ into just another medium by which to reinforce the identity of the Magnesian polity by insulating it against any form of civic ‘otherness’.

¹³⁵ On the equivalence μελαγχολᾶν = μαινεσθαι, see Padel 1995: 48.

¹³⁶ See already Harvey 1971; Sidwell 1990; Dobrov 2001: 99. Cf. also Beta 1999.

¹³⁷ On Cratinus’ Dionysiac poetics, see Ruffell 2002: 155–62, Bakola 2008: 11–20. Iambic poet as a madman: see Callim. *Iamb.* 1.78–9 (Hipponax as Alkmeon).

¹³⁸ See Beta 1999 on it.

¹³⁹ See Folch 2013: 351 on comedy as the ‘un-ideal’ genre *par excellence*.

EPILOGUE

On law, agency and motivation

In the previous chapters, I have tried to show how Plato, in the *Laws*, theorizes citizenship as simultaneously a political, ethical and aesthetical practice. His ethical and political reflection on citizenship finds its roots in what might be called a descriptive psychology of human experience, with sentience and, above all, volition seen as the primary targets of a lifelong training in the values of citizenship. In the second-best city, *erōs* for civic virtue is explicitly presented as a motivational resource that is not only within the reach of the ‘ordinary’ citizen, but also factored in by default in Magnesia’s educational system.¹ This is so because to support a vision of ‘perfect citizenship’ based on an internalized obedience to the laws and to persuade the entire polity to consent willingly to it requires an ideology that must be rhetorically all-inclusive. Magnesia’s collective ideology promotes a model of civic excellence grounded in a fundamental aspect of human nature: humans are *desiring* agents.

In this final chapter, I switch the focus for a moment from Plato’s philosophical theorizing to Athenian contemporary discourses and practices of citizenship as recoverable from forensic and public oratory. In the *Laws*, Plato repeatedly engages with the basic question of how to transform individuals, psychologically and morally, into citizens who passionately desire to obey the ‘internal law’ of reason.² In the programmatic passage of Book 1 on the ‘human puppet’, the ruling of the ‘golden cord’, our reasoning faculty (λογισμός), is called by the Athenian Stranger ‘the common law of the city’

¹ See esp. §2.4.

² On Magnesia’s ‘internal law’, see Irwin 2010 (esp. 98–9 and 104–105).

(I.645a1–2 τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν . . . τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην).³ Yet the rational morality of the golden cord, gentle and unaided by violent compulsion (I.645a6 πρᾶξου δὲ καὶ οὐ βιαίου), needs ‘servants’ – or, more literally, ‘helpers’ (I.645a6 δεῖσθαι ὑπηρετῶν):⁴ and it is here that passion and desire can play a positive role if properly channelled.

To read Plato’s major concern – how to co-opt human volition into the service of the ‘internal law’ animating Magnesia’s whole legislative project – against the fourth-century BC discourse on the authority of the law and its relation to human nature can give us a more nuanced insight into Plato’s use of rhetoric as a persuasive form of political action.⁵ In particular, Plato’s re-configuration of citizenship as a mode of ‘feeling’ and ‘belonging by choice’, and his promotion of the inner, intangible quality of civic spiritedness (the compulsive, over-riding desire to be a ‘perfect citizen’) as the most significant criterion to qualify as a citizen, represent a powerful critique (1) of the contemporary democratic rhetoric of civic *erōs*, and (2) of the citizens’ entitlement, ‘if they wished’ (ὁ βουλόμενος), to participate to the public life of the *polis*, the two pillars of Athenian political self-image.⁶ I also argue that Plato’s adoption, in the *Laws*, of a ‘thick’ conception of *citizenship-as-practice* represents an explicit criticism of the ‘thin’ concept of *citizenship-as-status* increasingly advertised, and triumphantly so, at Athens in the mid- to late fourth-century BC.⁷

³ Cf. also I.644d1–3 ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις λογισμός, . . . ὃς γενόμενος δόγμα πόλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται: reason’s faculty once it has become ‘the common decree’ of the *polis*, is named law.

⁴ The language is here clearly reminiscent of the ‘service to the gods’ theme, ever-present in the *Laws*: see the passages gathered by Mikalson 2010: 31–2.

⁵ For the inevitable collapse between the constative (to state what is so) and perlocutionary function (to make it happen) of speech-acts (the former a product of the latter) in politics, see Ober 1994: 161.

⁶ See §2.4. On ὁ βουλόμενος as personification of the law’s will and thus enacting a vision of the law’s agency, see Wohl 2010: 117–18.

⁷ For a critical survey of *citizenship-as-practice* versus *citizenship-as-status* in contemporary western societies and the radically different model of education to citizenship underpinned by the two alternative models, see Lowy-Biesta 2006.

6.1 Law and human nature

From the very beginning, law and morality are, in ancient Greek culture, two strictly interconnected spheres.⁸ Diodorus' words that 'all wise men consider the laws of a city to be its character (τρόποι)' are perhaps the clearest illustration of this widely shared belief (Dem. *Against Timocrates* 24.210).⁹ At any time, within a given society, philosophical reflection and public discourse may, and often do, embody divergent narratives of civic obligations and virtues. This is, of course, also true for Greek political thought in general, yet it has repeatedly been observed that in the fourth century BC, notwithstanding strong ideological differences, there is one element 'on which the philosophers and Athenian public speakers are in complete accord: the central importance of Law or laws' (Brock 2013: 164).¹⁰ The restored Athenian democracy of the fourth century BC saw two narratives of citizenship, the one shaped by philosophical thinking and the other nurtured by everyday engagement with the public dimension of the *polis*, converging in their shared emphasis on the centrality of the rule of law and in their intense scrutiny of the nature of its authority. What justifies law's hold on civil society and human nature at large? What kind of relationship must exist between the rule of law and the sovereignty of the people?

Fourth-century BC Athens offered to its citizens multiple, competing conceptualizations of the rule of law.¹¹ Common to all was the necessity of finding a mutually beneficial convergence between the authority of the law and some deeply felt tenets of human nature (above all, freedom of choice). That the

⁸ See Manville 1994: 24–5.

⁹ τοὺς νόμους ἅπαντες ὑπειλήφασιν, ὅσοι σωφρονοῦσι, τρόπους τῆς πόλεως.

¹⁰ See Brock 2013: 193–4 nn. 176–8 for the ancient evidence.

¹¹ For the rule of law in the fourth century BC as 'a contested ground' fought over by democrats and critics of democracy, see Cohen 1995. On the complementarity of popular sovereignty and rule of the law-argument as foregrounding the authority of judicial discourse, see Wohl 2010: ch. 1. For modern scholarly debate on the 'rule of law' in democratic Athens, see e.g. the more assertive approach by Harris 2006: 3–25 (a nuanced defense of Ostwald's stance) and, from a different perspective, Johnston 1999: 21–45.

Athenians were well aware of an underlying tension between the rule of law and the sovereignty of the people, and also of the necessity of a dialogue, if not mutual interdependence, between the two, is clearly and powerfully voiced by Demosthenes' final peroration in *Against Meidias* 21.224–5:

ἡ δὲ τῶν νόμων ἰσχὺς τίς ἐστιν; ἄρ' ἐάν τις ὑμῶν¹² ἀδικούμενος ἀνακράγῃ, προσδραμοῦνται καὶ παρέσονται βοηθοῦντες; οὐ· γράμματα γὰρ γεγραμμέν' ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχὶ δύναιντ' ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. τίς οὖν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν ἐστιν; ὑμεῖς ἐὰν βεβαιῶτ' αὐτοὺς καὶ παρέχῃτε κυρίους ἀεὶ τῷ δεομένῳ. οὐκοῦν οἱ νόμοι θ' ὑμῖν εἰσιν ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς τοῖς νόμοις.

But what is the force of the laws? Is it perhaps that if any of you is wronged and cries out, they shall come and be there to assist you? No; they are just written letters and could not do that. What is then their power? You, if you guarantee them and make them each single time effective for everyone who is in need. So the laws are powerful through you and you through the laws.

The laws are strong through human agents (in this case, the citizens as judges), and human agents are strong through the laws. The prominence of these two features in Attic forensic oratory is well attested. But what is the relationship between the authority of the law and the 'nature' of the human agents? An interesting dramatization of these principles can be found in the oration transmitted in the Demosthenic corpus as *Oration 25, Against Aristogeiton* (ca. 325/24 BC).¹³ In one of the most abstract and 'philosophical' passages of the oration we are told that

ἅπας ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κἂν μεγάλην πόλιν οἰκῶσι κἂν μικράν, φύσει καὶ νόμοις διοικεῖται. τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν φύσις ἐστὶν ἄτακτον καὶ κατ' ἄνδρ' ἴδιον τοῦ ἔχοντος, οἱ δὲ νόμοι κοινὸν καὶ τεταγμένον καὶ ταῦτο πᾶσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν φύσις, ἂν ᾗ πονηρά, πολλὰκις φαῦλα βούλεται· διόπερ τοὺς τοιούτους ἐξαμαρτάνοντας εὕρησете. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον

¹² For ὑμῶν referring to 'citizens in general, rather than jurors only', see MacDowell 1990: 422 ad loc.

¹³ In favour of the authenticity of [Dem.] 25, suspected as spurious already in antiquity (cf. Libanios, *Hypothesis to Demosthenes* 25 & 26.11–12), see recently MacDowell 2009: 298, 311–13. The issue of authorship is ultimately immaterial to my argument: what matters to my purpose is that its tenets about the juridical order are 'implicit in virtually every forensic speech' of the whole corpus of Attic orators (Wohl 2010: 51). Farenga too describes [Dem.] 25 as 'a potpourri of philosophical, rhetorical, and legal commonplaces about law, community, and individual human psychology' (2006: 542).

βούλονται, καὶ τοῦτο ζητοῦσιν, καὶ ἐπειδὴν εὐρεθῇ, κοινὸν τοῦτο πρόσταγμα ἄπεδείχθη, πᾶσιν ἴσον καὶ ὁμοιον, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι νόμος. ὥ πάντας πείθεσθαι προσήκει διὰ πολλά, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅτι πᾶς ἔστι νόμος εὖρημα μὲν καὶ δῶρον θεῶν, δόγμα δ' ἀνθρώπων φρονίμων, ἐπανόρθωμα δὲ τῶν ἐκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων, πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή, καθ' ἣν πᾶσι προσήκει ζῆν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει. ([Dem.] 25.15–16)

Every human life, Athenians, whether one inhabits a big city or a small one, is governed by nature and by the laws. Of these, nature is disorderly and peculiar to the individual who has it, but the laws are universal and orderly and the same for everyone. Human nature, if wicked, often desires what is base: and this is the reason why you will find such men committing errors. But the laws desire what is just, good and beneficial and they seek this out and when it is found, this is shown to be a common order, equal and the same for everyone, and this is what the law is. And to the law all men ought to obey for many reasons, and above all because each law is an invention and a gift of the gods, the belief of wise men, a correction of voluntary and involuntary errors, the common covenant of the city in accordance with which all men ought to live in that city.

In this snapshot of ‘legal anthropology’, the author of [Dem.] 25 represents the law as an ordering force that imposes order and unity over a too often defective human nature (cf. *Laws* 9.874e7–875d5).¹⁴ What is more, in this passage the law is characterized as a personality¹⁵ and a desiring agent: the laws have their own *desire/will* for what is good (οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον βούλονται, καὶ τοῦτο ζητοῦσιν), and, once found, it is revealed as the ‘common order’ of the city (κοινὸν ... πρόσταγμα: cf. *Laws* I.645a1–2 τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον and 2.644d2–3 λογισμὸς ... ὃς γενόμενος δόγμα πόλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται).¹⁶ As Wohl has observed (2010: 54), ‘in a move with both Platonic and Kantian resonances, law is both the desire for the good and the instantiation of that desire as a categorical imperative’. The law’s command is, quite literally, the embodiment of its own will: in this passage, the orator’s ‘external law’ may seem indeed close to Plato’s ‘internal law’

¹⁴ For the fifth- and fourth-century BC debate *physis/nomos* with relation to law, see Farenga 2006: 439–70.

¹⁵ For the personification of law in the fourth-century BC, see Brock 2013: 165 (ancient evidence at 195 n. 185, where, of course, the pride of place is for Plato’s *Crito*).

¹⁶ Cf. also [Dem.] 25.20.

of the second-best city.¹⁷ Yet, differently from Plato, [Dem.] and forensic oratory in general, do not directly ground the authority of law in human nature *tout court*: what they envisage is rather a co-operation, a partnership of *nomos* and (good) *physis*, as two distinct but correlated entities, brought together in the souls of the righteous citizens. The need for a collaborative, joint interdependence of law and human nature (rather than fusion and identity) clearly emerges at the very beginning of [Dem.] 25, when the orator starts his speech by paradoxically undermining the power of rhetoric to emphasize the *inner* aspect of justice:

καὶ ἔγωγ' ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν μὲν κατηγορίαν καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων πλῆθος ἔθους ἔνεκα καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀκροάσεως δεῖν ποιησασθαι, κεκρίσθαι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα πάλαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκάστου φύσεως οἰκοθεν. ([Dem.] 25.2)

I suppose that I must make the prosecution and produce a mass of words for the sake of habit and informing you, but this case has already been decided long ago by the inner nature of each of you.

Here, the orator is claiming that true justice does not lie in the ‘mass of words’ of the trial, nor in the laws which must be applied,¹⁸ but is grounded in the *inner* nature of each juror (cf. also 25.82 ὑμῶν ἕκαστος ἔχων οἰκοθεν). The expression ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκάστου φύσεως οἰκοθεν seems to emphasize both the ‘private’ dimension of each distinct citizen (οἰκοθεν) but also its ‘natural’ dimension. We are close here to the formulation of a kind of a ‘natural law’ theory. What the orator is saying in this passage, as observed by Farenga (2006: 545), is ‘that, in using their *physis* to perform the law and evaluate Aristogeiton accurately, [the jurors] are simultaneously submitting to a test of their

¹⁷ It is also worth noting that in [Dem.] 25.16 the author presents the laws at the *same* time as (1) a divine gift (εὐρημα μὲν καὶ δῶρον θεῶν), (2) the belief of wise men (δόγμα δ' ἀνθρώπων φρονίμων), and (3) the compact of the citizens (πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή): see MacDowell 2009: 255. This unification and identity of all the possible sources – divine and human alike (both at the individual and collective level) – is equally adopted by Plato in the *Laws*: the inspiration of the law comes from god, wise men implement it, and the citizenry agrees to it.

¹⁸ Aristogeiton, as debtor to the state, was legally disenfranchised and could thus not bring on lawsuits or speak in the *ekklesia*. The orator and his co-counsel Lykourgos claim that Aristogeiton has done all this while *atimos*, thus violating a fundamental law of Athenian society.

citizenship'. Thus, in the end, 'when it comes to performing justice, *physis* and *nomos* appear not to be hostile forces but convergent' (Farenga 2006: 546).

In [Dem.] 25.15–16 the difference between law and human nature is framed as a difference in terms of objects of desire: the laws *want* what is just, good and beneficial (τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον βούλονται), whereas human nature, when wicked,¹⁹ feeds on base desires (πολλάκις φαῦλα βούλεται). Yet in [Dem.] 25.2 and 82 another facet (this time unqualified) of human nature is recognized and validated: the inner, intimate nature of human agents in their role of citizens, their *physis oikothēn*, which, as Wohl has observed, 'seems . . . to contain a *nomos* of its own' (Wohl 2010: 60). Legal desire and human desire are represented in this second passage as potentially coextensive, bridging the gap between citizenship and selfhood.²⁰

What is Plato's contribution, in the *Laws*, to this debate? We have already seen that for Plato 'true' law can be grounded only in the *voluntary* compliance of free human beings to the rational ruling of the golden cord, our best and truest self, that also embodies 'the common law of the city' (1.645a1–2).²¹ Obedience to this 'internal law' must take the form of an only seemingly paradoxical 'self-imposed' choice (5.733d7–e3):

τινες δὴ καὶ πόσοι εἰσὶ βίοι, ὧν περὶ δεῖ προελόμενον τὸ βούλητόν τε καὶ [ἐκούσιον ἀβούλητόν τε καὶ Burnet secl.]²² ἀκούσιον, ἴδιόν τ' αἰεὶ²³ νόμον ἑαυτῷ ταξάμενον, τὸ φίλον ἅμα καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀριστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἐλόμενον, ζῆν ὡς οἶόν τ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων μακαριώτατα;

What kind of lives and how many are there, having chosen between which a person needs to select once he has considered what he would willingly do and what he would do unwilling, and then make a private law for himself based on that classification, choosing what he likes and is pleasant and best and most fine, and live the happiest life he possibly can?

¹⁹ The qualification ἂν ἢ πονηρά is significant: human nature does not desire by default what is vile.

²⁰ See Farenga 2006: 546. ²¹ See Laks 1990: 218–9.

²² For a defense of Burnet's excision, see England 1921, I: 494 ad loc.

²³ ἰδόντα εἰς mss.: I adopt here Bury's improved version of Badham's emendation (ἰδιόν τιν' εἰς) of the transmitted ἰδόντα εἰς; cf. also England 1921, I: 494 ad loc. on the expediency of relieving the text of a further participle between προελόμενον and ταξάμενον.

Individuals are asked to make themselves a law (ἰδίον τ' ἄει νόμον ἑαυτῷ ταξάμενον) out of the preferences that will guide them in the choice of a type of life. The context too of this claim is highly programmatic: we are within the 'general' proem of the laws which forms a preface to the Magnesian law-code proper, where inner persuasion, more than (but not to the exclusion of) external compulsion, is presented as the real foundation of this 'internalized' mode of obedience.²⁴ As Cohen puts it, Plato 'focuses upon the grounding of the rule of law in processes of education and socialization which create the conditions necessary for the maintenance of . . . his fiction' (Cohen 1995: 229). Only a correct education in pleasures and pains makes possible the coexistence of rule of law and voluntary compliance to it on the part of the citizens. The coincidence, in the second best-city, between citizenship and selfhood, law and human nature, is made possible because the law for Plato, as manifestation of our reasoning faculty, in itself a divine gift, is per se the best and truest part of human nature. Surely, it is a part of human nature that needs 'helpers': it is by making it a site of emotional – and not only cognitive – investment (the *erōs* of becoming a perfect citizen) that that aid can be provided. The deeper connection, provided by the 'correct education' of Magnesia, between the physiology of pleasure and pain and moral psychology allows Plato to eradicate the difference between *nomos* and *physis* and recruit as law the best part of human nature.

6.2 Rewriting citizenship in Plato's *Laws*

In Chapters 2 and 3 we have seen that through a correct training of perception and volition *erōs* for civic virtue is promoted, in the second-best city, to a motivational resource within reach of the 'ordinary' citizen. The Magnesian citizen will be led to desire passionately to become a 'perfect citizen' (1.643e5–6

²⁴ See Laks 1990: 222–3; cf. also Mayhew 2008a: 95 on 10.890c5–8 (persuasion and force must coexist in the legislative enterprise: the former does not pre-empt the latter).

ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἔραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλειον): the vision of a ‘perfect citizenship’ becomes, in Magnesia, first and foremost a site for the expression of desire. The erotic, compulsive dimension of this volition emphasizes the emotional and psychic dimension as the motivating, directing force of both cognitive and behavioural acts of the human agent. In §2.4 we have also seen that in reappropriating the language of *erōs* and desire to map out the landscape of civic virtues of the new Cretan colony, Plato is consciously engaging with a pressing question of his own time: what does it take to be good citizen? How does one qualify as such? Plato’s answer is that to enrol fully as a citizen one must be prompted by an inner, passionate *desire* to be so: it is the degree of civic spiritedness, of ‘nomic’ desire that is the most reliable indicator of civic virtue.

The psychic and affective dimension of citizenship is presented by Plato as the real glue that enables and preserves the practice of good normative citizenship within society. There are two important corollaries to this claim that I would like to dwell on briefly in these final considerations. First, modern scholarship on the *Laws* has abundantly emphasized the ‘prescriptive’ nature of Plato’s citizenship. This is certainly correct because the prospective Magnesian citizens are repeatedly and obsessively told in detail what to do and what to avoid doing. It is also undeniable that Athenian citizenship, in the fifth- and fourth-century BC, was mainly a legal status, defined by a specific set of formal criteria, separating Athenians from non-Athenians.²⁵ Yet, equally correctly, in the last two decades it has become increasingly understood that legal requirements and institutional contexts are only part of a more complex set of symbolic references and values which find their expression not only via institutional media but also, and above all, in cultural practices.²⁶ Manville’s ‘pre-modern and organic’ paradigm of Athenian citizenship has shown that ‘intangible values and moral principles offset the lack of sharp legal boundaries while also informing a collective spirit of the society’ (Manville

²⁵ See §2.3.

²⁶ Cf. e.g. Manville 1994: 22–5; Connor 1994.

1994: 25). On such a view, citizenship cannot be considered as ‘value-free’ but fully enters into the social realm.²⁷ Hence, alongside with the two dimensions mentioned previously of Plato’s utopian citizenship – that is, its extent (norms of exclusion and inclusion) and content (obligations) – I would like to bring to the fore what seems to me another equally important aspect of the Magnesian civic ethos: its depth – that is, the thickness of its sense of belonging. In this sense, Plato’s reflection on the *affective* dimension of citizenship fully qualifies him as a precursor of the increasing interest, in contemporary citizenship studies, for what has come to be variously called the social psychology of citizenship or political sociology of emotions.²⁸

Contemporary citizenship studies ground the paradigm of affective citizenship in the emotional dimension of the subject, hence opening up possibilities of subjective ‘dissociation’ and ‘as-if’ enactments of civic practices. Emotional commitment, in other words, can be faked: it can be sincere or not. If the relationship between citizens and the law is like a ‘scripted process’ – that is, if citizenship is a script to be enacted – the performance of that script on the part of the agent does not necessarily entail (or guarantee) his/her *feeling* it.²⁹ Plato’s contemporaries, just like modern readers, were not blind to this possibility. This ‘as-if’ enactment of the affective dimension of citizenship is explicitly ridiculed and exposed by Aristophanes in his debunking parody of the democratic rhetoric of civic *erōs* in both *Acharnians* ll. 142–5 (425 BC) and *Knights* ll. 732–5, 1340–5 (424 BC).³⁰ Vying to be a ‘true lover’ (Ar. *Ach.* 143 ὡμῶν τ’ἔραστῆς ἣν ἀληθῆς) of the Athenian people becomes ‘the essential pre-condition... for a successfully functioning democratic system’ (Connor 1971: 106). Plato’s own response to avoid the possibility of such a fissure within the social fabric

²⁷ Cf. Manville 1990: 5 ‘the status of membership in the Athenian community could not really be separated from the role the citizen played in it’.

²⁸ On the politics of affective citizenship as a resurgent area of contemporary interest, see e.g. Johnson 2010, Neuman et al. 2007, and Redlawsk 2006 and Kymlicka-Norman 1995.

²⁹ On this risk, see Fortier 2013: 5ff.

³⁰ See the extended treatment of these passages in Scholtz 2004.

of the second-best city is, as we have seen, to establish a deeper connection between physiology of perception and moral psychology, taking advantage of what is for Plato humans' *a priori* sensory awareness and responsiveness to the beautiful and orderly as something inherent in human nature.³¹ If psychology has its roots in physiology, that is, if it is through perceptive stimuli that the rational part of the soul, already in its infant stage, will come to recognize and love what is similar to itself, then a 'correct education' of pains and pleasures will enable the Magnesian citizen *both* to feel *and* to perform the 'right' emotions. To found *erōs* for civic virtue in a correct education of perception and thus to make it an emotional reservoir open, potentially, to *all* the citizens of Magnesia is also a powerful, though indirect, rewriting of the concept of voluntarism (ὁ βουλόμενος), the basis of the contemporary Athenian democracy. If the potential is inborn and hence present in everyone, its realization has to be deliberate: to activate and mobilize the unquenchable and overriding force of *erōs* at the service of Magnesia's vision of a 'perfect citizenship' is one way of bridging the gap between potentiality and actuality. Everyone, not only (s)he who wishes, will be led to desire to become a 'perfect citizen' and will thus actively engage in the pursuit of it. The best part of human nature requires that *all* must be recruited as 'passionate lovers' (ἐπιθυμηταί τε καὶ ἔραστοί) of civic virtue.

The second aspect I would like to draw attention to is Plato's repeated emphasis, in the *Laws*, on education in citizenship values as a *lifelong process*. Every stage of life, prenatal gestation and old age included, is seen by Plato as able to bring its own contribution to civic education. The very fact that even the elders, in Magnesia, will take part in quasi-symptotic performances (§3.1) so that through the rejuvenating power of wine they may learn to become pliable again and perform in a renewal of the very same education they enjoyed while young (§4.2), shows how for Plato, education to citizenship is an ongoing process which needs training and supervising 'from

³¹ Examples of human *physis* fractious to the 'correct' education (2.655e5–656a5, 6.765e3–766a4) are considered as instances of 'ignorance' (ἄγνοια) and 'inexperience' (ἀπειρία) of what one truly desires by nature; cf. §3.5 n. 127.

the cradle to the grave'.³² The educational programme of the second-best city remains indeed strictly prescriptive and hierarchical. Yet, the very fact that every age of life is represented as having its own input in learning to become a 'perfect citizen', advertises a more inclusive and relational view of what it means to be a citizen, than that officially promoted by Athenian society. In fourth-century BC Athens, citizenship was restricted to native free-born adult males:³³ a whole set of formal procedures were put in place to mark the advancement and promotion of the single individual to the *status* of full citizen. This is even more true for the second half of the century, with the institutionalization of the *ephēbeia* as an essential part of the developmental and educational trajectory that qualifies one as a 'full' Athenian citizen.³⁴ The *cursus* leading to the acquisition of citizenship entailed precise milestones:³⁵ at their coming of age, those whom the demes presented as eligible to citizenship submitted to a process of scrutiny (δοκιμασία) and registration, before serving two years of training as *ephēboi*. 'Complete' citizen status was then achieved only at the age of 31: it is at this stage that free-born male Athenian citizens were permitted to serve on the Council and hold office (the Aristotelian 'full citizen' (ἀπλῶς πολίτης) as defined in *Politics* 3.1275a22–3).³⁶

If framed against this background, it is difficult not to see in Plato's own narrative of citizenship in the *Laws* the seeds of a powerful counter-hegemonic discourse. The 'thicker' sense of belonging fostered in Magnesia strongly supports and favours a model of *citizenship-as-practice* rather than *citizenship-as-achievement*. In Magnesia, citizenship is not – or at least not only – a status or a possession,³⁷ the once-for-all gained

³² The non-contradictory nature of this re-education of the elders is well highlighted by Mouze 2005: 216–18.

³³ Hansen 1982: 178–9.

³⁴ For a recent reassessment of the institution of the *ephēbeia* in the Lycourgan period, see Liddel 2007: 290–3; cf. also Rhodes 1981: 493–5 on [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.

³⁵ For the 'civic curriculum' to qualify as citizen in fourth-century BC Athens, see Manville 1990: 8–11.

³⁶ See Hedrick 1994: 296 and Frede 2005: 170–2.

³⁷ The founders of Magnesia will test the prospective citizens to decide whom to admit first: 5.736b7–c4 τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων εἰς τὴν νῦν πόλιν ὡς πολιτευσομένων συνιέναι

outcome of a given trajectory: it is instead a lifelong practice embedded in the every-day experience of people's lives, with all its changes and transformations through time. For Plato, in the *Laws*, children and elderly people, rather than being 'imperfect' citizens or citizens 'with qualifications' according to the Aristotelian vision, are seen as embodiments of different stages of the human existence, all of which are able to contribute to a lifelong training in civic excellence. Civic *erōs* is by nature all-inclusive – to foster it is the job of a lifetime.

πειθοῖ πάση καὶ ἱκανῶ χρόνῳ διαβασανίσαντες; cf. also *Plt.* 308d1–5, on which see Bobonich 2002: 413–4. Obviously, this preliminary test restricts the potential range of candidates: Magnesia's volitional citizenship is not opened to cosmopolitanism as in the Stoics (cf. Long 2007).

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INDEX

- Aelius Aristides
To Plato in defense of oratory
 2.420 Behr-Lenz, 134
- Aeschines
 3.218, 98
 3.220, 98
- Aeschylus
Agamemnon
 104–6, 162
 605, 41
 990–3, 189
Libation Bearers
 342–3, 185
Persians
 686–8, 187
Seven against Thebes
 915–16, 190
TrGF
 78c**, 179
 79, 179
 424a. See Hesychius: ε2367 Latte
- Alcman
 fr. 26 *PMGF*, 164
 fr.1 ll. 88–9 *PMGF*, 166
- Anacreon
 375 *PMG*, 41
- Aristophanes
Acharnians
 142–5, 232
 143, 232
 497, 196
 513, 196
 630–2, 209
 655, 204
 656–8, 198
Birds
 30–8, 222
 427, 222
 1279, 100
 1316, 100
 1320, 100
 1345, 100
- Clouds*
 283–4, 218
 546–8, 209
 1078, 202
 1369, 120
- Frogs*
 244, 202
 345–9, 166
 389–90, 204
 562, 218
 564, 218
 685–6, 198
 816, 123
 895–6, 180
 1056, 198
 1213, 202
 1302–03, 189
 1420–1, 198
- Knights*
 518, 209
 522–3, 218
 552–3, 218
 696–7, 202
 732–5, 232
 1274–5, 198, 214
 1340–5, 232
- Lysistrata*
 82, 202
 670, 164
- Peace*
 54, 221
 55–8, 221
 65, 221
 321–5, 202
 334, 164
- Wasps*
 71, 221
 743–4, 221

Aristophanes (*cont.*)

1030, 222
1043–4, 209
1044–5, 209
1051–4, 209
1066–7, 164
1305, 202
1486, 202, 218, 221
1488, 218
1496, 202, 221
1497, 123
1497–1504, 179
1503, 180
1520, 202

Wealth

2, 222
12, 222
557, 204
757–61, 164
761, 202

Women at the assembly

571–87, 209
583, 198
583–7, 209
807, 181

Women at the Thesmophoria

1130–1, 209

test.

1 ll. 42–5 K-A, 193

fr.

603.2 K-A, 202

Aristotle

Poetics

1451a28–30, 186
1453a24–6, 186
1453a29, 186
1453a29–30, 186

Politics

1262b1–2, 15–16,
47
1275a22–3, 234
1276b1–2, 52
1283b42–1284a3, 91
1291b36, 52
1336a39–b12, 213

[Aristotle]

Athēnaion politeia

29.5, 97
42, 234

Problems

38.920b29–36, 145

Aristoxenus

fr. (Wehrli)

103.7–8, 177
104.1–3, 177
106, 177
109.3, 177

Athenaeus

14.631c, 160

Autocrates

fr. 1.3 K-A, 202

Callimachus

Iambi

1.78–9 Pf., 222

Choricius of Gaza

13.1, 134

Demosthenes

21.56, 64
21.224–5, 226
23.126.1–4, 99
23.126.5, 99
24.193, 48
24.210, 225

[Demosthenes]

25.2, 228
25.15–16, 227, 229
25.16, 228
25.20, 227
25.82, 228

Dinarchus

1.31, 48
1.92, 48

Dionysius of Halicarnassus

Demosthenes

23.10, 92
48.54, 177
51.8, 177

Euripides

Heracles

637–700, 169
654–94, 166
673–94, 164
867–71, 218

Iphigenia in Tauris

181–3, 185

INDEX

TrGF
370, 164

[Euripides]
Rhesus
895–6, 190

Herodotus
6.67, 159
6.129, 179

Hesychius
ε 2367 Latte, 177

Homer
Iliad
12.51, 218

Homeric Hymn to Apollo
187, 133

Isaeus
4.27, 97
7.40–41, 97

Isocrates
8.39, 48

Josephus
Against Apion
2.151, 100

Life of Aeschylus
10.34 Radt, 186

[Longinus]
On the Sublime
13.3–4, 123

Lysias
12, 98
20.23, 97
28.5, 100
31.5, 98
31.6, 98
31.8, 98
31.29, 98

Mnesilochus
fr. 4.54–5 K-A, 202

Ophelio
fr. 1 K-A, 202

Pausanias
3.14.1, 160

Pindar
fr.
30 M, 134
31 M, 134
32 M, 134
35c M, 135
52h M, 166
70c M, 166
*86a M, 157
141 M, 135

Plato
Charmides
167e14–5, 16

Crito
50e7–8, 48
51e6, 55
52b8–9, 100
53b6, 47
54b2, 55

Gorgias
493b2, 90
493c2–3, 90
502b1–c8, 124
503a3, 47
515b8–c1, 93
515e–19b, 93
5161–c, 93

Laws
1.627e3–628a3, 23
1.628c10–11, 23
1.630b8–e4, 8
1.632a2, 194
1.632c4–7, 73
1.632c5–6, 69
1.636c, 205
1.636d4–7, 110
1.637d5–6, 111
1.639c–d, 111
1.640b7–8, 111
1.641b3–4, 112
1.641c8–d2, 112
1.642a3–6, 113
1.643c6–8, 85
1.643c8–d3, 12, 75, 85
1.643c8–e6, 110
1.643d1–3, 85, 106
1.643d3, 69
1.643e4–5, 12
1.643e4–5, 109

Plato (*cont.*)

1.643e4–6, 10, 12, 75
 1.643e4–6, 85, 91, 95
 1.643e5–6, 89, 230
 1.643e6, 69
 1.644c1–645c8, 136
 1.644c–d, 147
 1.644d7–645b7, 14
 1.644e4–645b1, 138
 1.645a1–2, 224, 227
 1.645a4–7, 151
 1.645a6, 224
 1.645b4–8, 136
 1.645d6–7, 111
 1.648b1–2, 111, 168
 1.649e5–7, 111
 1.650b6–9, 88, 95
 1.650b6–9, 2
 2. 653a7–8, 73
 2. 654a2, 140
 2.644d2–3, 227
 2.652a–653a, 113
 2.653b2–6, 86, 110, 137
 2.653b3–4, 38
 2.653c3–6, 129
 2.653c7–654a7, 128
 2.653c8–9, 129
 2.653c9–d5, 129
 2.653d2–3, 129
 2.653d2–3, 128
 2.653d4, 130
 2.653d7–654a3, 202
 2.653d7–654a5, 140
 2.653e1–4, 203
 2.654a2–3, 131
 2.654a4, 131
 2.654a4–5, 130
 2.654a9–b1, 149
 2.654b11–d4, 149
 2.654b6–7, 149
 2.654d1–2, 151
 2.655d5, 176
 2.655d5–7, 138
 2.655e5–656a5, 233
 2.656b4–5, 135, 148, 176
 2.656c5–6, 112, 139
 2.657c3–4, 135, 148
 2.657c3–7, 176
 2.657c5–6, 135

2.657d1–7, 164
 2.657d6, 165
 2.658c–d, 203
 2.663e–664d, 135
 2.664a5–6, 118
 2.664b, 60
 2.664b2, 168
 2.664b2–3, 139
 2.664b3–5, 108, 153
 2.664b7–8, 106, 139
 2.664c1–2, 118, 119, 194
 2.664c4–6, 108
 2.664c4–d4, 153
 2.664c6–d1, 185
 2.664c8, 154
 2.664d1–4, 162
 2.664d3, 164, 166
 2.664d8–9, 113
 2.664e3–665a2, 141
 2.664e6, 203
 2.665a, 60
 2.665b3–6, 162
 2.665b4, 161
 2.665c, 60, 63, 132
 2.665c2–4, 61
 2.665c3–6, 208
 2.665d1–4, 162
 2.665d2–3, 162
 2.665d3–5, 160
 2.666a2–c7, 167
 2.666a–c, 108, 172
 2.666b2, 162
 2.666c4–5, 160
 2.666d10–e1, 160
 2.667c5–7, 160
 2.668b1–2, 139, 158, 176
 2.668b6–7, 121
 2.669e1–4, 36
 2.670a4–b2, 162
 2.670a6–b7, 114
 2.670d6–e2, 108
 2.670d7–e2, 108
 2.670e2–3, 68
 2.671a2–3, 173
 2.671d9–e2, 162
 2.672b8–d3, 141
 2.672c1–6, 202
 2.672c5–d4, 203
 2.673a, 205

INDEX

- 2.673c9–d5, 142, 202
- 3.687c1–7, 81
- 3.687d, 81
- 3.687e5–7, 80
- 3.687e6–7, 78
- 3.688a1–b4, 8
- 3.688b, 205
- 3.688b1–4, 73, 75
- 3.688b4–c1, 80
- 3.689a1–8, 78
- 3.689a5–b7, 14
- 3.689a–b, 67
- 3.689b2–c1, 81
- 3.689b5–6, 82
- 3.693b2–5, 23
- 3.693c2–3, 23
- 3.696d4–e6, 57, 66, 67
- 3.697a7, 100
- 3.700b1–2, 156
- 3.701d7–9, 23
- 4.705e1–706a4, 8
- 4.709d1–711d1, 77
- 4.710 a5–b3, 66
- 4.710a5, 57, 67, 72
- 4.711d6, 75
- 4.711d6–7, 76
- 4.711d6–712a7, 89
- 4.711d6–712a7, 77, 89
- 4.714a1–2, 123
- 4.714a1–8, 90
- 4.715b3–4, 8
- 4.716b1–2a, 146
- 4.716c1–4, 136
- 4.718a3–b5, 8
- 4.718a6–b5, 121
- 4.718d5–8, 88
- 4.718d5–e1, 88
- 4.718d8–e1, 88
- 4.719c6–7, 127
- 4.720c5–7, 91
- 4.722e8–723a4, 91
- 5.730b5–7, 195
- 5.730d6–7, 69
- 5.730e1–731a1, 195
- 5.731a2–3, 95, 195
- 5.732e4–733a5., 195
- 5.732e4–733d6, 109, 136
- 5.733a3–5, 139
- 5.733d7–e3, 229
- 5.735a2–4, 68
- 5.736b7–c4, 234
- 5.738d6–e1, 23, 131
- 5.739c2–5, 105
- 5.739c7–d1, 105
- 5.739c8–d3, 105
- 5.739d3–4, 105
- 5.739e1, 17
- 5.743c5–6, 23
- 6.757a1–758a2, 23
- 6.763d–764a, 21
- 6.765e3–766a4, 233
- 6.770b4, 84
- 6.770c7–d6, 75, 83
- 6.770c7–e4, 8
- 6.771d5–e1, 131
- 6.771e5–772a3, 131
- 6.772c7–d4, 208
- 6.776c6–778a11, 60
- 6.776c–d, 63
- 6.777a–b, 22
- 6.777b5, 60
- 6.777d2–e2, 61
- 6.777d–e, 63
- 6.777e1–4, 91
- 6.779d2–6, 158
- 7. 822e4–823a6, 73
- 7.788a–c, 70
- 7.790c9, 144
- 7.790c–d, 143
- 7.790d5–e4, 143
- 7.790d–791b, 142
- 7.790e8–791b1, 85, 143, 202
- 7.790e8–9, 144
- 7.791a, 144
- 7.791a1–3, 144
- 7.791a6–7, 145
- 7.791a8–b1, 145
- 7.791b4–c2, 83
- 7.791e1–2, 143, 189
- 7.791e4–7, 189
- 7.792a8–b2, 188
- 7.792c–d, 109
- 7.793b–d, 70
- 7.794b5–7, 60
- 7.796e 4–5, 115
- 7.798c6, 100
- 7.800a4–7, 183
- 7.800c7–e3, 213

Plato (*cont.*)

7.800c7–e9, 183, 189
 7.800e10–801a4, 183
 7.800e1–2, 190
 7.801a8–d6, 185
 7.801e1–2, 156, 185
 7.801e6–10, 72
 7.802c4–6, 126
 7.802d8–e3, 153
 7.803b3–c8, 205
 7.803c4–8, 136
 7.803e1–3, 157
 7.804c–d, 65
 7.809b1–3, 55
 7.809d2–7, 131
 7.812b9–c1, 162
 7.813e, 65
 7.814d8–817e4, 202
 7.814d8–e9, 125, 173
 7.814e8–9, 174
 7.815b4–6, 174
 7.815b7–c1, 174
 7.815d2, 174
 7.815d3–4, 174
 7.815d4–816c1, 174
 7.816a3–6, 126, 203
 7.816b4–6, 176
 7.816b6, 176
 7.816d3–817a1, 201
 7.816d6–8, 203
 7.816d–e, 204, 213
 7.816e, 62
 7.816e5–6, 64
 7.816e5–7, 191
 7.816e7–8, 204
 7.816e9–10, 207, 208
 7.817a2–d8, 119
 7.817b2–3, 107
 7.817b3, 120
 7.817b4, 120
 7.817b7–8, 123
 7.817b8, 120
 7.817c4–5, 124
 7.817c5–7, 124
 7.817e1–3, 62
 7.817e–818a, 68
 7.819e8–9, 205
 7.821d2–4, 183
 7.822d6–7, 70

7.822e4–823a6, 71
 7.822e4–823a6, 69
 7.823b1–824a22, 75
 8.847a4–6, 21
 8.828a–835a, 172
 8.828c2–3, 155
 8.829a1–3, 8
 8.835d3–e5, 131
 8.836c1–e5, 75
 8.836e5–838e1, 74
 8.837a6–9, 75
 8.837a8–9, 16
 8.837d4–6, 44, 74
 8.838c3–6, 205
 8.838d6–8, 60
 8.846d2–3, 63
 8.846d4–7, 21
 8.847a5–6, 2
 8.850a6–b4, 65
 8.850b2, 66
 8.850b6–c3, 66
 9.853b4–8, 8
 9.859a1–4, 95
 9.859a1–6, 91
 9.863b1–4, 14
 9.864a1–8, 73
 9.866e4, 64
 9.870c3, 14
 9.874e7–875d5, 227
 9.875a1–4, 88
 10.863a3–864a8, 215
 10.862c6–8, 215
 10.887e1–2, 157, 185
 10.890b3–d8, 91
 10.898a, 143
 10.899d7–8, 136
 10.903c6–d1, 105
 11.919c5–6, 63
 11.919d2–6, 21, 59
 11.920d7–921a1, 65
 11.921e2–3, 65
 11.934a, 14
 11.934c7, 216
 11.934c7–35b4, 215
 11.934c7–935b4, 212
 11.934d5–e3, 216
 11.934d6–7, 220
 11.934e2–4, 213
 11.935c, 14

- 11.935c7–936b2, 211
 11.935d2–3, 214
 11.935d3–4, 212
 11.935e3–4, 213
 11.935e5–6, 212
 11.936a3–5, 212
 12.947b3–c1, 187
 12.947b5–6, 187
 12.947b8–c1, 187
 12.951a2–4, 210
 12.951a5–b4, 210
 12.951e–952a, 108
 12.957d, 194, 195
 12.959e9–960a5, 187
 12.963a1–4, 8
 12.965b–968c, 68
 12.965c9–d3, 69
 12.966c4–6, 69, 71
 12.967e4–968a1, 72
 12.968a1–2, 67, 72
 12.968d2–3, 69, 73
 12.968d2–e5, 68
- Lysis*
 221b7–8, 15
- Menexenus*
 234a–b, 94
 234b1–2, 94
 236b6, 94
 246b6–c2, 95
 247a2–6, 95
 248c–249c, 94
- Meno*
 77e–78b, 16
- Phaedo*
 68d–69c, 30
 82a11–b1, 9
 82a11–b3, 30
- Phaedrus*
 245a, 166
 247a3–4, 145
 248d, 77
 250b1–e1, 42
 250c8–d3, 42
 250d7–e1, 42
 250e1, 42
 250e1–252c3, 42
 254d, 142
 268d4–5, 120
 277b5–c6, 87
- Philebus*
 32c–d, 147
 32d–33c, 109
 39d1–5, 147
 47d5–9, 199
 48a–50b, 197, 199
 49a8, 199
 49b6–7, 199
 49d3–4, 206
- Republic*
 1.351d4–5, 23
 2.369b5–c10, 27
 2.371a11–e10, 21
 2.371d9–e4, 34
 3. 387e10–388b4, 182
 3. 388d7, 182
 3.380b6–7, 211
 3.387d1–10, 182
 3.387d–388e, 183
 3.395e1–2, 182
 3.395e6–396a6, 217
 3.395e7–396a1, 196
 3.396a3, 217
 3.396a4–6, 204, 217
 3.396b3–5, 218
 3.396b7–8, 217
 3.396d3–e1, 197
 3.396d5–6, 198
 3.398c1–2, 35
 3.398c–403c, 35
 3.398e1–2, 182
 3.399d11–e5, 168, 172
 3.400c12–400e4, 36
 3.400c12–403c6, 45, 86,
 87
 3.401b1–d3, 30
 3.401b7–8, 31
 3.401c3–5, 31
 3.401c8–d1, 37
 3.401d4–402a6, 37, 39
 3.402a2, 38
 3.402a7–b8, 39
 3.402b8–c9, 39
 3.402c2, 40
 3.402d1–403c3, 42
 3.402d1–9, 40
 3.403a10–c2, 43
 3.403a4–6, 45
 3.403a7–8, 45, 46, 74

Plato (*cont.*)

3.403b1–c6, 43
 3.403c5–6, 35, 44
 3.403c6, 10
 3.408d–409e, 204
 3.411a10–b1, 168
 3.411a8, 182
 3.411e5–6, 35
 3.414b–415d, 46
 3.414b5–6, 55
 3.414e1, 47
 3.414e2, 47
 3.414e4–5, 47
 4.419a10–420a1, 55
 4.420b3–c4, 8
 4.421b5–c5, 8
 4.429c–430c, 30
 4.430e6–431e2, 32
 4.431d9–e2, 32
 4.431e4–432a3, 32
 4.432a2–3, 32
 4.433d1–4, 22
 4.435d9–441a3, 24
 4.441e2–3, 32
 4.443d4–e2, 32
 5.456d8–10, 30
 5.462b–463e, 47
 5.463a10–b8, 53, 54
 5.463b2, 55
 5.463d6–7, 53
 5.464a1, 53
 5.464a4–5, 53
 5.468b3–c8, 44
 5.472c–d, 34
 5.474b3–476d7, 16
 5.474c9–11, 15
 5.475b8, 26
 5.475c–476b, 117
 5.475d2–3, 117
 5.475d6–7, 117
 5.476a5–8, 40
 5.476b4–d6, 117
 6.485a10–b2, 25
 6.485c6–8, 25
 6.490b2, 25
 6.493a9–c8, 217
 6.496a5, 30
 6.500d11, 28
 6.500d5, 29

6.500d5–9, 29
 6.500d9, 24, 57, 67
 6.500e4, 28
 6.501d2, 26
 6.508e–509a, 42
 7.515c4–516a1, 27
 7.518d9, 72
 7.518e2, 83
 7.519e1–520a4, 8
 7.519e1–520a4, 27
 7.521b4–5, 51, 92
 8.547c1–4, 56
 8.563a1–2, 64
 9.572e–575a, 26
 9.578a1–b2, 182
 9.580d6–581b10, 24
 9.580d6–583a11, 26
 9.580d6–7, 15
 9.584c7–9, 147
 9.586d4–e2, 32
 9.590c7–d6, 32, 33
 9.590d3, 33
 10.601a–b, 36
 10.604c5–d1, 188
 10.604e1–6, 210
 10.605c–606e, 183
 10.606a3–b8, 182
 10.606c5–7, 213
 10.606c8–9, 197
 10.607a4–5, 116
 10.607a5–6, 115
 10.607c6, 116
 10.607d9–10, 116
 10.607e4–608a5, 115
 10.607e6–608a1, 116
 10.619c, 30

Statesman

263c, 177
 273d4–e4, 130
 308d1–5, 235
 308e5, 55
 311b9–c1, 23

Symposium

204d–e, 42
 205d2, 16
 209a–d, 77
 210c1, 15

Theaetetus

185c, 177

INDEX

- Timaeus*
 40c–d, 145
 42e–44d, 142
 44b–c, 145
 47c–d, 146
 47d3–4, 146
 47d5–7, 146
 47d7–e2, 146
 60d, 177
 86b–87c, 219
 86e1–2, 220
 87a7–b4, 220
 87d7–8, 42
 88d–e, 144
 88e2–3, 144
 89a7, 144
 [Ep.]
 357c4, 47
 [Epin.]
 982e3–6, 145
- Plutarch
Life of Agesilaus
 29.3, 160
Life of Lysicurgus
 28.9, 63
Life of Phocion
 30.3, 64
Table talks
 748b, 121
- [Plutarch]
Sayings of the Spartans
 33, 159
- Sappho
 fr. 58 V, 164
- Semonides
 fr. 7.52 W², 41
- Sophocles
TrGF 816 Radt², 75
- Strabo
 10.3.9, 131
- Theognis
 fr. 77–8 W, 111
- Theophrastus
On drunkenness
 fr. 576 Fortenbaugh, 172
- Thucydides
 2.36.4, 50
 2.38, 129
 2.38.1, 92
 2.39, 92
 2.40.1–2, 50
 2.40.2, 97
 2.40.2–3, 12
 2.41.1–3, 50
 2.41.2–3, 50
 2.43.1, 12, 49, 50, 51, 91, 96
 2.43.2, 49
 2.46.1, 52
 2.63.1–2, 51
 2.65.8, 93
 6.14, 48
- TrGF*
 adesp. 646a, 166

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- abusive language
 - and madness, 215–17
 - and madness in comedy, 216–19
- akrasia* (weakness of will), 14
- Apollo
 - Delios, 172
 - Pythios, 172
- beauty
 - embodied human beauty, 42
 - erotics of, 35–45
 - transformative power of, 89
- Callipolis
 - model of Magnesia, 17
- choral performances (*choreia*)
 - and assimilation to god, 133, 136
 - and *charis*, 131–2
 - and dance, 125–7
 - and enchantment, 61, 81, 132, 152, 153
 - and *erōs*, 114–17
 - and erotics of citizenship, 106–7
 - and *euphēmia*, 182–5
 - and habituation of emotions, 129, 138–40
 - and *heortai*, 130–1
 - and joy, 130, 132
 - and mimesis, 108, 119, 139, 157–8
 - and order as pleasure, 140–6
 - and persuasion, 106, 118, 135
 - and pleasure, 137
 - and prayers, 156
 - and socialization, 131
 - and spectatorship, 108, 114, 164–5
 - as mediation between pre-rational impulses and reason, 110
 - origin of, 128–35
- Chorus of Apollo, 156
- Chorus of Dionysos, 108, 112, 113, 114, 157, 160–73
 - and re-juvenation through wine and song, 165–9
 - and second stasimon of Euripides' *Heracles*, 169–73
- citizenship
 - 'perfect' citizenship (*teleiōslakros politēs*) and the language of desire in the *Laws*, 73–89
 - 'perfect' citizenship (*teleiōslakros politēs*) in the *Laws*, 12, 69–71, 223, 231
 - affective dimension of, 232–3
 - agrarian citizenship in the *Laws*, 21
 - and political self-determination, 23
 - and volitional belonging, 96–100, 232
 - as *practice* vs citizenship-as-status, 224, 233–5
 - citizen body in the *Republic* and *Laws*, 21–2
 - erotics of, 10–12, 58, 224
 - homogenization of in the *Laws*, 105
 - models of in contemporary Athens, 48–9
 - technē* (craft) of in the *Laws*, 21–2
- comedy
 - and abusive speech-acts, 212–14
 - and dance, 126
 - and democracy, 193
 - and *kainotēs* (novelty), 207–10
 - and madness, 221–2
 - and *paidia* (play), 198, 204–5, 212
 - and slaves & strangers, 62–4, 206
 - in Magnesia, 201–11
- craftsmen
 - in Magnesia, 59, 63, 65

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- dance
 aitiology of, 126
 and comedy, 126
 eirenic, 173–4
emmeleia, 152, 174–82
pyrrhichē, 173
sikinnis, 178
- Demosthenes, 99–100
- desire
 and *boulēsis/boulesthai*, 16, 78, 81
 and civic spiritedness, 64
 insatiable desire for songs, 135
 language of in Plato, 15. *See*
epithymia, *erōs*
- dithyramb, 154, 173, 184, 185
- education
 ‘advanced’ education in Magnesia, 68
 ‘correct’ education in the *Laws*, 85–6,
 109, 129
 and environment, 30–1
 and *erōs* in the *Laws*, 85–7
 and music in the *Republic*, 35–44
 and training of emotions, 149–51
 of the producer class in Callipolis,
 30–2
- epithymia* (desire), 15, 84
 and *boulēsis/boulesthai*, 16
 and *erōs*, 16, 74, 75, 79–81
- erōs*
 and compulsion, 27, 29
 and education in the *Laws*, 85–7
 and embodied human beauty, 40–4
 and *epithymia* in the *Laws*, 78–82
 and homosexuality in the *Laws*, 75
 and homosexuality in the *Republic*,
 42–4
 and language of care (*kēdesthai*), 15
 and lawgivers, 77
 and persuasion, 78
 and *philia*, 15
 and sexual legislation in Magnesia, 74,
 75
 and *stasis*, 51–2, 92
 and tyranny, 26, 51, 89–91
 erotics of beauty, 10
 language of in the *Laws*, 75
 of statemanship in the *Laws*, 76–7
 of virtue in the *Laws*, 74
 philosophical/non-personal in the
Republic, 25–6
- habituation
 of emotions, 86, 87, 109, 110, 137–8
ho boulomenos (he who wishes), 98, 224,
 233
- homonoia* (concord)
 and *philia* in the *Republic*, 23
- kēdesthai* (care)
 and *philia*, 34
 and *philia* in the *Republic*, 47–8
 language of in oratory, 48
 language of in Plato, 47
- law
 ‘internal’ law of reason, 223
 and common good, 8
 and happiness, 23
 and human nature, 225–30
 and obedience, 70, 71
 and persuasion, 73, 87, 88
 and pleasure & pain, 110
 as desiring agent, 226–8
 rule of, 225, 230
- Lysias, 98–9
- metics
 and *sōphrosynē* in Magnesia, 66–7
 in Magnesia, 63
 in the *Republic*, 64
- music. *See also* choral performances
 and education in the *Republic*, 35–45
 and parts of the soul, 35
- Nocturnal Council, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73,
 108, 161
- paean, 153, 156, 172, 185
patrios politeia (ancestral constitution),
 96–8
- Pericles
 and democratic rhetoric, 12, 92–5
 and Funeral Oration in Thucydides,
 49–51
 law on citizenship, 96

- persuasion
 - and praise & blame, 70, 71, 155, 195
- philia* (friendship/love)
 - and care (*kēdesthai*), 34
 - and care in the *Republic*, 46–8
 - and *erōs*, 13, 15
 - civic *philia* in the *Laws*, 23, 59, 95
 - civic *philia* in the *Republic*, 10, 46–52
 - degrees of in the *Republic*, 52–6
- phronēsis* (wisdom), 69, 79, 81
- Pindar, 134, 135
- politeia* (constitution), 122
- poems to the law, 69, 71, 212
- rhythm, 131, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148
 - and pleasure, 137
- sharing
 - and the rise of a political community, 28
 - in the constitution, 98
- slaves
 - and comedy, 62–4
 - in Magnesia, 60–4
 - in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*, 22
- sōphrosynē* (moderation)
 - and instinctive self-moderation in the *Laws*, 57, 59–68
 - and instinctive self-moderation in the *Republic*, 30
 - as agreement among the parts of the soul in the *Republic*, 32
 - as *philia* in the *Republic*, 23, 27–34
 - dēmōdēs sōphrosynē*, 67
- soul
 - partition of in the *Laws*, 13, 14
- symposium
 - and ‘correct music’, 113
 - and chorus, 112
 - and education of the young, 112
 - and sympotic practices in the *Laws*, 111–14
 - and the Chorus of Dionysos, 113–14, 160
- taxis* (order), 108, 130
 - and education of the infants, 143–5
 - and pleasure, 137
 - in music, 137, 140
- thrēnos* (dirge), 183, 185, 187–91
- Thucydides, 12, 49, 50, 51, 91, 96, 129
 - and *erōs*, 49
 - and Pericles, 49
 - Plato reader of, 92
- thymoeides*
 - in the *Laws*, 14
- to geloion* (the laughable)
 - and envy, 199–200
- trade, 64
 - in Magnesia, 63
- tragedy
 - ‘tragedy claim’ by the Athenian stranger, 119–26
 - and mimesis, 119–28
- trichoria*
 - and age classes, 154
 - in Magnesia, 153–8
- tyranny
 - ‘moderate’ tyrant excursus in the *Laws*, 76–7
 - and *erōs*, 27, 89–91
 - and violence in the *Laws*, 91
- utopia
 - possibility of, 9
- virtue
 - ‘ordinary’ virtue and ‘perfect’ citizenship in Magnesia, 68–73
 - ‘ordinary’ virtue in the *Phaedo*, 9
 - ‘ordinary’ virtue in the *Republic*, 9, 24
 - ‘ordinary’ virtue of the producer class in Callipolis, 29–32
 - and *dēmōstai aretai* in Magnesia, 67, 72
 - and happiness, 8
 - degrees of in the *Laws*, 57–8
 - degrees of in the *Republic*, 24–7, 34
- xenos* (stranger/foreigner), 62, 64, 65, 122, 190, 207